
TNI/POLRI IN WEST PAPUA: HOW SECURITY REFORMS WORK IN THE CONFLICT REGION

Antonius Made Tony Supriatma¹

Indonesians often say that although Papua is a seven-hour flight from Jakarta, the province is really 2,000 years away.²

Introduction

Some Indonesian observers express their “reserved optimism” regarding the success of Indonesian military reform. While some maintain that the reform is successful or has achieved the best results under Indonesia’s peculiar social and political circumstances,³ others remain pessimistic. The pessimistic side argues that

¹ I offer my thanks to Douglas Kammen and Octovianus Mote for their critical comments on an earlier version of this paper. Thanks also to Stuart Bishop and the *Indonesia* editors at Cornell for their editorial work. All mistakes and inaccuracies in this paper are, of course, mine.

² “Papua—Continued Problems, and Possible New Hope, for Indonesia’s Troubled East,” cable, US Embassy in Jakarta, September 30, 2009, <http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09JAKARTA1638&q=papua%20west>, accessed November 28, 2012.

³ See Leonard C. Sebastian and Iisgindarsah, “Assessing 12-year Military Reform in Indonesia: Major Strategic Gaps for the Next Stage of Reform,” *RSIS Working Paper* No. 227, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 2011; Marcus Meitzner, *The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism, and Institutional Resistance* (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2006); Rizal Sukma, “Civil-Military Relations in Post-authoritarian Indonesia,” in *Democracy under Stress: Civil-Military Relations in South and Southeast Asia*, ed. Paul Chambers and Aurel Croissant (Bangkok: ISIS Thailand, 2010), pp. 149–69.

reform has stalled, especially in abolishing the military's territorial structure and dismantling its business interests.⁴

After the demise of the New Order regime in 1998, the military was forced to reform. The most important aspects of these reforms include separating the police and the military, abolishing *dwi fungsi* (dual function) and *kekaryaan* (placement of military officers in civilian posts) doctrines, liquidating institutions such as *Bakorstanas* and *Litsus*,⁵ severing formal ties with Golkar, restricting involvement by active duty officers in civilian bureaucracy, and maintaining neutrality toward political parties. For example, formally, the Indonesian military is no longer involved in politics. In 2004, the military gave up its seats in the Indonesian parliament, where some active military personnel used to be appointed to serve alongside elected politicians. All these reforms, however, did not discourage officers from plunging into politics as individuals. Many officers are keen to occupy political positions. Because of limitations imposed by the new laws, many military officers are preparing to run for office while still in service.

Military reform was also supported by the issuance of two laws, namely, Law No. 3/2002 on State Defense and Law No. 34/2004 on the Indonesian Armed Forces. Although these laws often draw criticism from activists because of their insufficiencies and deficiencies,⁶ aspects of the laws affect the military as an institution. There are no doubts that these laws redefine the military's place and role in Indonesian politics and society.

Formal and legal foundations of military reform, however, have never erased expectations that the military will surely be engaged in politics if the situation permits it to do so.⁷ Skepticism about the military arises because it has been able to keep its territorial structure intact, and civilian politicians have failed to impose control over military policy and strategies. TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian armed forces) is able to maintain its institutional autonomy and in some cases is also capable of influencing politics from behind the scenes. The military, as one scholar aptly put it, can be a "spoiler" of Indonesian democracy.⁸

Questions and doubts over Indonesian military reforms are especially important if we look at how the military uses "legal loopholes" in laws that are aimed at limiting its involvement outside state defense. By using Law No. 34/2004, for example, the military was able to secure a position in internal security. The law stipulates that TNI

⁴ See, for example, Human Rights Watch, *Unkept Promise: Failure to End Military Business Activity in Indonesia* (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 2010).

⁵ *Bakorstanas* is the New Order's agency to coordinate security and intelligence offices in order to maintain "national stability." This agency, among other things, has the authority to conduct special investigations (*penelitian khusus*, also famously known as *Litsus*) of people who are considered a threat to national security, especially the former Communist Party members and their relatives.

⁶ See, for example, *Satu Dekade: Keberhasilan Reformasi TNI Terbebani Paradigma Orde Baru (1998–2008)* (Jakarta: KontraS, 2008).

⁷ See Rico Marbun, "Democratization and TNI Reform," Research Unit on International Security and Cooperation (UNISCI), Discussion Paper No. 15 (Madrid: 2007). Marbun evaluates the Indonesian military by using a framework offered by Muthiah Alagappa, *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001).

⁸ Edward Aspinall, "Indonesia: The Irony of Success," *Journal of Democracy* 21,2 (April 2010): 24.

can conduct a “military operation other than war” (*operasi militer selain perang*, or OMSP), which includes a wide range of military operations starting from combating separatist movements, rebellion, and terrorism to assisting police and local government.⁹

While it is the responsibility of the military in every country in the world to deal with insurgency, the breadth of military authority in the OMSP provides leeway for TNI to intervene in social and political matters, especially in “troubled/conflict regions” (*daerah rawan*). TNI’s potential ability to intervene in politics is strengthened by the fact that it has maintained its territorial structures intact. Moreover, at local administration levels, TNI is still taking part in the Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah (Muspida, or Regional Consultative Council), which spans the provincial (*propinsi*), regencies (*kabupaten*), and subdistrict (*kecamatan*) levels. Inclusion of the military in Muspida provides a way for officers to influence local politics from behind the scenes.

In an effort to comprehend reforms within the TNI, scholars usually look at general features at the national level. While military reforms at the national level provide insight into the scope of the reform with regard to its legal and institutional aspects, analyses focused on the national level often overlook the dynamics of how those reforms are implemented. How, for example, has military reform been implemented and practiced in conflict regions?

This paper aims to scrutinize military and, in a broader sense, security reforms in West Papua, a conflict-ridden region in Indonesia.¹⁰ West Papua is important in several aspects. First, it is a border region. West Papua borders Papua New Guinea. To some extent, its proximity with Australia is considered a security concern among the Indonesian military. Second, West Papua has a separatist insurgency that occasionally clashes with Indonesian security forces.¹¹ Third, West Papua also qualifies as a “vital national asset” that requires security protection provided by the military and police.

⁹ Article 7, Section 1, in Law No. 34/2004 specifies fourteen “military operations other than war”: operations against armed separatist movements; operations against armed rebellion; operations against terrorism; securing borders; securing vital national assets; peacekeeping; providing security for the president, vice president, and their families; providing an early defense system; assisting the governments in the region; assisting police in internal security; securing foreign head of states and their missions; disaster relief; search and rescue operations; and assisting government in securing shipping and aviation against piracy, hijacking, or smuggling.

¹⁰ This paper will use the term “West Papua” to refer to two provinces, namely, *Propinsi Papua* and *Propinsi Papua Barat*. I decided to use the term “West Papua” to synchronize with the international definition of the two, chief political entities understood to govern the two great regions of the island, respectively: The Republic of Papua New Guinea in the east and Indonesia’s West Papua on the western side. I will use the term TNI to refer to the army, navy, and air force. Police will be mentioned separately. This distinction will help make it clear that the New Order’s notion of the police as part of the ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Indonesian Armed Forces) is no longer legitimate or generally accepted.

¹¹ The Organisasi Papua Merdeka, or Free Papua Movement, is an organization aimed at achieving independence for West Papua. It was established in 1965 when the Dutch ruled in West Papua. Since its establishment, OPM has launched a low-level insurgency against the Indonesian government. It has a paramilitary wing, Tentara Pembebasan Nasional (TPN, National Liberation Army), which conducts various attacks on the Indonesian security forces. OPM consists of various factions that often differ in ideologies and strategies to achieve independence. TPN is poorly armed and basically depends on the weapons it obtains from the Indonesian military. On OPM, see Robin Osborne, *Indonesia’s Secret War: The Guerrilla Struggle in Irian Jaya* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1985).

The military (especially the army) responds to these conditions by conducting three kinds of military operations¹²: Operasi Pengamanan Perbatasan (Pamtas, Border Security Operation),¹³ Operasi Pengamanan Daerah Rawan (Pamrahwan, Troubled Regions Security Operation), and Operasi Pengamanan Obyek Vital Nasional (Pamobvitnas, Vital National Asset Security). No other region in Indonesia is subjected to multiple military operations as is West Papua.

It is important to note that West Papua has experienced a vast security buildup. In the last decade, the military and police there have approximately doubled their units and personnel. In recent years, although TNI has expanded its size, it is the police who have taken a greater role in maintaining security. Police have been involved in assassinations of KNPB (Komite Nasional Papua Barat/West Papua National Committee) activists¹⁴ and conduct “military” operations against OPM.

The shift to using a police force, rather than the military, to carry out security operations coincides with developments within West Papua’s political movements. Since 2009, the dynamics of conflicts in West Papua have changed significantly. Conflict in West Papua is now characterized by two important features: mass protests, especially protests organized by KNPB¹⁵; and occasional shootings that target either security personnel or ordinary citizens by mysterious perpetrators, whom locals have dubbed as “*orang tak dikenal*” (OTK, or unknown person).

It seems that the shift of the security operations from the military to the police indicates the limits of the use of force by the military. Under Indonesia’s new security laws, the police are responsible for security while the military is responsible for

¹² It is interesting that these operations are conducted without necessarily declaring the region to be a “military operations area” (*daerah operasi militer*), as previously happened in East Timor, Aceh, and even in West Papua.

¹³ TNI is conducting military operations in Kalimantan on the border of Malaysia, in West Timor on the border of Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, and in West Papua on the border of Papua New Guinea. TNI also carries out border operations in small “outer islands” (*pulau-pulau terluar*) in six Regional Commands (Kodam). The Kodams that become the focus of these operations are: Kodam Iskandar Muda (Aceh); Kodam I/Bukit Barisan (Medan); Kodam VII/Wirabuwana (Makassar); Kodam IX/Udayana (Denpasar); and Kodam XVII/Cendrawasih (Jayapura). See Hikmat Israr, Gilang Fajar Nugraha, et al., *Peranan TNI AD Dalam Pengamanan Perbatasan NKRI* (Bandung: Dinas Sejarah Angkatan Darat/ Army Historical Service, 2012).

¹⁴ Australia’s Fairfax Media notes that there were twenty-two KNPB activists killed in 2012, three reported missing, seven charged with various offences, and two hundred more released after being detained less than three months. See: <http://goo.gl/jRGn8>, accessed December 18, 2012.

¹⁵ Komite Nasional Papua Barat (KNPB) is an organization whose members are students or ex-student activists, mainly from the central highlands of West Papua. The organization aims to review the 1969 Acts of Free Choice and hopes to hold a referendum for the future of West Papua. (A referendum is one of KNPB’s demands of the Indonesian government; however, no certain date for a referendum has been suggested.) International Crisis Group (ICG) in its report charges that KNPB had been shifting its tactics from peaceful methods to violence and that the KNPB works closely with TPN/OPM. The report also claims KNPB was responsible for several violent incidents in Jayapura, near Freeport mining, and in other places in West Papua. See International Crisis Group, “Radicalisation and Dialogue in Papua,” Asia Report No. 188, March 11, 2010. This report has been considered biased by pro-Papuan activists and academics. The ICG report follows narratives long held and spread by the Indonesian military and police. For a rebuttal to this report, see Jim Elmslie and Camellia Webb Gannon with Peter King, “Get Up, Stand Up: West Papua Stands Up for Its Rights—A Rebuttal of the International Crisis Group Report No. 188, Radicalisation and Dialogue in Papua: West Papuans Unite against Special Autonomy and for a Referendum on Independence,” West Papua Project of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (CPACS), University of Sydney, July 2010.

defense. The transfer of domestic security responsibilities to the police creates the impression that military reform is underway in West Papua. But, on the other hand, we also see an ongoing military buildup, and the army still receives thousands of troops from outside the region to support its diverse operations. The presence of a large military force presupposes that the military remains in control of security in West Papua.

These developments raise several questions: Why are the police taking a more prominent role in West Papua? How does the military conduct its operations in the region? What has changed in the military's "security approach" in the conflict regions and what remains the same? How does the military deal with the dynamics of the conflicts? What is the consequence of these military operations for overall military reform?

Several studies on security conditions in West Papua either focus on human rights abuses that have developed as a consequence of security policies¹⁶ or stress military planning and development and the strategic aspect of TNI operations.¹⁷ However, there has been no effort to relate the development of security forces in this conflict region to overall military reform and development at the national level. This essay tackles that problem.

We first look at the general features of TNI in West Papua. We will discuss the army's regional structures, strength, capacity, and operations, as well as briefly review the strength and capacity of the navy and air force. The navy's plan to build the Third Marine Division in Sorong is especially important because, at the same time, the army had planned to build its Third Division of Kostrad in the same district. The army apparently scrapped the plan as the marines moved ahead with development. The Third Marine Division will have around fifteen thousand troops. I will also discuss Indonesian police, the force responsible for internal security. It is interesting to see the interactions between the military and police in "building security" in West Papua. Then I look at the role of intelligence in West Papua, the most important part of military operations in this conflict region. The military relies on intelligence to overcome restrictions imposed by reform. Lastly, I review how the military and police conduct their operations in this troubled region and relate these operations to reforms within Indonesian security forces.

TNI in West Papua: Reorganization and Expansion

There is no doubt that the presence of security forces in West Papua has increased in the last decade. In this region, the per capita ratio of population and security personnel is 97:1—there is one police officer or soldier for every ninety-seven persons—indicating a much higher concentration of security forces relative to citizens

¹⁶ See, for example, Al Araf et al., *Securitization in Papua: The Implication of Security Approach toward Human Rights Condition in Papua* (Jakarta: Imparsial, 2011); S. Eben Kirksey and Andreas Harsono, "Criminal Collaborations? Antonius Wamang and the Indonesian Military in Timika," *South East Asia Research* 16,2 (2008): 165–97.

¹⁷ Matthew N. Davies, "TNI and POLRI Forces in West Papua: Restructuring and Reasserting Sovereignty" (2006), <http://nautilus.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/0628s-davies.pdf>, accessed August 18, 2012.

than is present in the rest of Indonesia, which has 1 (police officer or soldier) to 296 (citizens). Meanwhile, the ratio of just TNI soldiers to the West Papua population is 1 to 162. By comparison, in all of Indonesia, the ratio of just TNI soldiers to the population is 1 to 558.¹⁸ The ratio of West Papua police to the population is 1 to 247 people, while, nationally, the ratio of police to the population is 1 to 631.¹⁹

In my estimation, the total number of security personnel in West Papua is about 37,070 individuals. That number comprises 22,220 TNI personnel (19,770 army, 1,050 navy, and 1,400 air force) and up to 14,584 Indonesian police.²⁰ Meanwhile, according to the 2010 population census, Papua Province's population is 2,851,999. West Papua Province's population, according to that census, is 760,855. (For details, see the table at the end of this article.)

The Army

The army is still the most prominent security organization in West Papua, employing the most individuals compared to other security organizations. The army is organized hierarchically into territorial commands and combat units. Some territorial commands have their own combat units, but in some cases combat units stand independently.

The highest territorial command in West Papua is Kodam XVII/Cendrawasih, whose headquarters is located in Jayapura. The Kodam controls West Papua's two provinces. Kodam XVII was created in 1962 while the region was still under Dutch administration. Its first name was Kodam XVII/Irian Barat, and a year later was changed to Kodam XVII/Cendrawasih. In 1985, as part of a reorganization of the army, this Kodam was abolished and merged with Kodam XV/Pattimura, in Ambon, Maluku. The new Kodam was named Kodam VIII/Trikora. In 1999, Kodam Trikora

¹⁸ According to Wikipedia (http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tentara_Nasional_Indonesia, accessed October 21, 2012), total TNI personnel in 2009 was 438,410, comprising personnel from the army (328,517), navy (74,963), and air force (34,930). Former Army Chief of Staff Gen. Djoko Santoso, however, mentioned that the ideal number of army personnel is 0.4 percent of the total Indonesian population, or around 800,000 personnel. He said that the army will steadily increase its personnel and will add around 350,000 more troops by 2024. That would make the total number of personnel around 650,000. "TNI AD Butuh Personel Lebih Banyak Amankan Wilayah NKRI," <http://www.antaranews.com/berita/1189405696/tni-ad-butuh-personel-lebih-banyak-amankan-wilayah-nkri>, accessed October 5, 2012. It seems that the plan is more easily proposed than accomplished.

¹⁹ In 2011, the Indonesian police comprised 387,470 personnel. The total number of personnel within the police would be slightly higher if civil servants were included. There are 26,039 civil servants (whose main job concerns administrative work) within the police. This makes the total number of personnel within the police 413,509. See "Jumlah personel Polri akan ditambah besar-besaran," *Kontan*, July 25, 2012.

²⁰ For comparison, see Davies, "TNI and POLRI Forces in West Papua." Davies estimates that the total number of personnel in all security apparatuses (TNI and Polri) in West Papua is 23,900: 12,800 TNI personnel and 11,100 Polri. Former Regional Military NI Maj. Gen. Nurdin Zainal has said that the number of troops in West Papua to be added will be between 12,000 and 15,000. Tapol, a human-rights group, claims that this will make the number of troops in West Papua swell to 45,000 to 50,000. See "Military Build-up Threatens Land of Peace Campaign," *Tapol Bulletin* 179 (July 2005). The claim seemed plausible given the plan to build a new Third Kostrad Division in Sorong, West Papua. But that plan was aborted.

was dissolved and both Kodam Pattimura and Trikora were brought to life once again. The name of the Kodam changed to Kodam XVII/Cendrawasih in 2007.²¹

The Kodam is territorially divided into four Korems (Komando Resort Militer, or Military Resort Command). Each Korem has some Kodims (Komando Distrik Militer, District Military Command). As in the majority of Indonesian regions, Kodims are created to complement civilian regency administrations (*kabupatens*), although in West Papua's case, as a result of how quickly regencies have proliferated, some Kodims operate in two or more regencies. Each Kodim is also divided into several Koramils (Komando Rayon Militer, Military Subdistrict Command), which are equal to Kecamatan (Subdistrict) in the civilian bureaucracy. The lowest territorial rank in the Indonesian army is *babinsa* (*Bintara Pembina Desa*, Village Guidance Noncommissioned Officer). The role of a *babinsa* is important because this person can gather human intelligence at the village level, and the *babinsa's* function can easily be modified into a combat role.²²

In its post-New Order era, Kodam XVII/Cendrawasih has expanded its territorial and combat units. It now has four Korems: Korem 171/Praja Wira Tama in Sorong; Korem 172/Praja Wira Yakti in Jayapura; Korem 173/Praja Wira Braja in Biak; and Korem 174/Anim Ti Waninggap in Merauke. Korem 171 has five Kodims under its command: Kodim 1703/Manokwari; Kodim 1704/Sorong; Kodim 1706/Fakfak; Kodim 1710/Mimika; and Kodim 1713/Kaimana. Meanwhile, Korem 172 has three: Kodim 1701/Jayapura; Kodim 1702/Jayawijaya; and Kodim 1712/Sarmi. Korem 173 also supervises three: Kodim 1705/Paniai; Kodim 1708/Biak Numfor; and Kodim 1709/Yapen Waropen. The newest Korem, Korem 174 (est. 2005), has only two: Kodim 1707/Merauke and Kodim 1711/Boven Digul. Overall, Kodam XVII now has thirteen Kodims under its jurisdiction.

Kodam XVII also expanded its combat units. It originally had only three combat battalions. Since 2004, TNI began to create new infantry battalions on the southern coast of West Papua: Yonif 754/ENK, 755/Yalet, and 756/WMS. In 2007, these infantry battalions were placed under the command of an Infantry Brigade, Brigif 20/Ima Jaya Keramo.²³ The three battalions are complementary to the three previously established infantry battalions on the northern coast of West Papua: Yonif 751/VJS, in Jayapura; Yonif 752/VYS, in Sorong; and Yonif 753/AVT, in Nabire.

In addition to infantry battalions, the Kodam is also equipped with four combat engineer detachments (Zeni Tempur, or Zipur),²⁴ one cavalry detachment (DenKav-3),²⁵ and one training regiment (Rindam). In the future, most likely the Kodam will be developed further. There are plans to increase several reserve task forces (Bantuan

²¹ See "Sejarah Kodam XVII/Cenderawasih," <http://kodam17cenderawasih.com/page/3328/sejarah.html>, accessed April 13, 2011.

²² This was the case in Aceh during the escalation of violence in 2003. See Matthew N. Davies, *Indonesia's War over Aceh: Last Stand on Mecca's Porch* (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 61.

²³ The Brigif-20 headquarters is located in Timika, a city close to the location of US mining company Freeport McMorra. Timika is also the base for Yonif 754/Eme Neme Kangasi, while Yonif 755/Yalet is based in Merauke and Yonif 756/Wi Mane Sile is in Wamena.

²⁴ These combat engineer detachments are based in Jayapura (Denzipur 10); Merauke (Denzipur 11); Nabire (Denzipur 12); and Sorong (Denzipur 13).

²⁵ DenKav-3 is based in Timika.

Tempur, or Banpur), such as “combat engineer” and “cavalry detachment” forces, into battalions.

Three newly formed battalions (Yonif 754, 755, and 756), which are placed under Brigif-20, are the “over-strength” battalions. According to Davies, “over-strength” battalions are to “cover operational tasks previously performed by two or more battalions, i.e., routine ‘static’ point and route security tasks alongside ‘mobile’ rapid-reactions functions.”²⁶ TNI also increased the capacity of the three older battalions in West Papua by adding more personnel and weaponry. An unconfirmed report mentions that Yonif 751/VJS²⁷ has been upgraded to a raider-type battalion.²⁸

West Papua occupies a special place in the army’s personnel recruitment campaign. Although the army’s “2004–2025 Strategic-plan” emphasizes zero personnel growth, the army’s policymakers see the need to boost the presence of indigenous Papuans in the army, and this laudable motive may be used to justify increasing the number of security personnel in West Papua. In 2011, President Yudhoyono issued a presidential regulation authorizing the acceleration of development in Papua and West Papua provinces. (The regulation urges both infrastructure improvements and “human resource” development. The latter is interpreted by military leaders as justifying adding native Papuans to the armed forces.) Based on that regulation, the army chief of staff gave instructions to recruit as many soldiers as possible who are indigenous Papuans.²⁹ Soon we may expect to find army battalions in the region with a majority of Papuan natives. Such a battalion has yet to exist, however, and it may take several years for it to materialize.

Since East Timor gained its independence in 1999, and the Aceh region signed a peace agreement in Helsinki in 2005, West Papua, the region overseen by Kodam XVII/Cendrawasih, is the only region left in Indonesia that poses many security challenges. There is a wide concern among Indonesians that West Papua represents the strongest case for secession in Indonesia. Therefore, in terms of security, this region attracts serious attention and has currently become a place for multiple security “operations,” more than in any other part of Indonesia.

²⁶ See Davies, *TNI and POLRI Forces in West Papua*, p. 4.

²⁷ A murky video has appeared on YouTube about the inauguration of Yonif 751 as a Raider battalion: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gm2UmDj1_8Q, accessed October 21, 2012. Local newspapers reported that Yonif 751 has demonstrated its anti-terror capability. Yonif 751 has fifty personnel with anti-terror qualifications, according to “Teroris dan Separatis Masih Jadi Ancaman,” *Cendrawasih Pos*, October 6, 2012. On the other hand, another local newspaper, *Bintang Papua*, also reported that Battalion 755/Yalet demonstrated its anti-terror capabilities during the TNI anniversary in Merauke. It is possible that these two battalions (or perhaps more) include soldiers with Raider qualifications.

²⁸ A Raider Battalion is an infantry battalion that was said to have capabilities at three times those of an ordinary battalion. The soldiers in this battalion have to undergo six months of training for prolonged guerrilla warfare. Each Raider battalion has 747 personnel, and fifty of them have special skills in anti-terror capabilities. They were trained in Kopassus’s training center in Batujajar, West Java. The army created the first Raider Battalion in 2003, and there are now ten battalions in all of Indonesia (eight embedded in Kodams and two in Kostrad).

²⁹ “Rapim TNI-AD: Pokok-pokok Kebijakan TNI Angkatan Darat Tahun 2012,” *Palagan* 13,1, March 1, 2012. The president’s regulation is not aimed solely at the army, but also at the navy and air force, as well as the police. The navy, for example, allows thirteen Papuan youth to study in the Naval Academy. “Lantamal X Dapat Jatah 13 Putra Papua Dididik di AAL,” *Antara News*, May 25, 2012.

According to Law No. 34/2004 on TNI, there are two types of military operations: military operations in war (e.g., aggression from other states) and military operations other than war (OMSP). All military operations in West Papua fall into the second category. Unlike in East Timor and Aceh, the army has been careful not to label West Papua as a Daerah Operasi Militer (Military Operations Area, or, as it is infamously known, DOM).³⁰

In West Papua, there are three kinds of OMSP operations, as noted above: Pamtas, or Border Security Operation; Pamrahwan, or Troubled Regions Security Operation; and Pamobvitnas, or Vital National Asset Security.

Existing army battalions in Kodam XVII are clearly not capable of launching multiple operations for the whole region. The Kodam receives help from outside forces, either from other Kodams or combat units such as Kostrad and Kopassus. The outside forces are known as BKO (Bawah Kendali Operasi, Under Operational Control).³¹ The army regularly issues new policies regarding the length of BKO operations. Now, a BKO battalion stays only for six months.³² Previously, a BKO battalion could remain stationed in a place for ten to twelve months.³³

Security operations mostly involve local and BKO battalions. In each operation, a company or a detachment of a local battalion is combined with BKO battalions to form a task force (Satuan Tugas, or Satgas). The BKO battalion, however, never comes in full force. In many cases, BKO battalions leave behind their company headquarters (Kompi Markas) and Reserved Company (Kompi Bantuan/Kiban) personnel. Interestingly, in many cases, Kopassus's Tactical Unit (Satuan Taktis, Sattis) is often added to a BKO battalion (as a way to obscure Kopassus's deployment in the region).³⁴ In addition to its tactical units, Kopassus also has one detachment of Sandi Yudha (covert action) that is regularly assigned in West Papua.³⁵

³⁰ "Danrem: Tidak Ada Operasi Militer di Keerom," *Cendrawasih Pos*, July 12, 2012. Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law, and Security Joko Suyanto also denied that there is a military operation in West Papua. He said that the task of dealing with armed separatist groups is in the hands of the police. The army's role is helping the police to deal with such armed groups. "Menkopolhukan Tampik Ada Operasi Militer di Papua," *Tribun News*, July 6, 2012, <http://www.tribunnews.com/2012/07/06/menkopolhukan-tampik-ada-operasi-militer-di-papua>, accessed October 9, 2012.

³¹ Acronyms and abbreviations used in this article are from "Indonesian, Acronyms and Abbreviations—The Blue Book," Defence Force School of Languages (Australia), <http://www.rta2indonesia.com/Article/singkatan%20dan%20akoman.pdf>, accessed October 18, 2012.

³² "Rapim TNI-AD" in *Palagan*, p. 18.

³³ The main reason to shorten the term of duty in a place is to prevent "digression" by the BKO battalions, especially those that are assigned in the border areas. It is widely known that battalions that operate near the borders are often involved in illegal logging or smuggling. Units in border security posts are rotated every three months to prevent digression.

³⁴ In early 2012, Yonif 123/Bima Sakti ended its assignment as a border security task force in West Papua. The battalion has 650 personnel and 54 personnel from Kopassus's tactical unit (*Sattis*). See: <http://info.tnial.mil.id/lantamal11/tabid/224/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/144/Default.aspx>, accessed October 24, 2012.

³⁵ *Palagan*, an army monthly magazine, provides an example of the army's operations in 2009. Border security operations were conducted in East and West Kalimantan, West Papua, and East Nusa Tenggara (Timor). Troubled region operations were focused on North Maluku/Maluku and Papua; see *Palagan* 41 (September 2009). A vital national assets operation was conducted in West Papua. What's missing here is Aceh. Since 2005, Aceh has disappeared from the list as a target for military "operations."

A book recently published by the Army Historical Service (Dinas Sejarah Angkatan Darat, Disjarad) gives details of border security operations. In West Papua. According to this publication, the number of personnel deployed was 4,090,³⁶ of which Kodam XVII/Cendrawasih contributed these 1,209 personnel:

- TNI Operational Command in Papua (Koops TNI Papua): 150
- Operational Operation Command (Kolakops) Korem 172/PWY: 80
- Operational Operation Command (Kolakops) Korem 174/ATW: 80
- Kodim 1701/Jayapura: 119
- Kodim 1702/Jayawijaya: 65
- Kodim 1707/Merauke: 62
- Kodim 1711/Boven Digul: 61
- Yonif 751/BS: 196
- Yonif 755/Yalet: 196
- Yonif 756/WMS: 60
- Intelligence Task Force (Satgas Intel): 140

The number of troops deployed from outside Kodam (BKO) to secure the border in 2010 is 2,881, consisting of:

- Four infantry battalions, 650 per battalion: 2,600
- Aviation Task Force (Satgas Udara): 40
- Army Aviation Detachment (Denpenerbad): 25
- Two Covert Warfare Detachments (Densandha/Kopassus): 216

The number of personnel deployed as border security varies from year to year depending on the availability of the troops in the BKO battalion. In 2006, for example, a report from a recess visit by the First Commission of the Indonesian Parliament states that there were 2,700 personnel deployed from four BKO battalions.³⁷ The report then describes conditions of the operations: "The task force is securing 114 border posts with a strength of ten to twenty personnel in each post ... Ideally, the border should be guarded by 135 posts, and each post should have twenty-five personnel. There are 106 underdeveloped posts with unsuitable conditions that might be insecure if attacked by separatist forces."

Meanwhile, for military operations in the troubled region, the parliament report says that 1,735 Pamrahwan personnel were involved in the whole West Papuan

³⁶ See *Peranan TNI AD*, pp. 35–36.

³⁷ See "Laporan Kunjungan Kerja Komisi I DPR-RI: Dalam Reses Masa Persidangan IV Tahun Sidang 2005–2006 Ke Provinsi Papua Tanggal, 31 Juli–5 Agustus 2006." The commander of Korem 174/ATW in Merauke acknowledges that there are four battalions assigned in his area. Those battalions have a total of 2,600 personnel. "Dukung Operasi Pamtas dan Pamrahwan, Korem 174/ATW Bangun Infrastruktur," *Bintang Papua*, October 16, 2012.

region.³⁸ Although the army denies its direct involvement in dealing with Papuan separatist movements, it is hard to deny that the focus of the operation is on crushing the movements.

Unlike the border operation, little is known about operations in the troubled region. The army never mentioned where the troops were stationed, how they conducted their operations, and what results they achieved.³⁹

As for the operation to secure vital national assets (*obvitnas*), there have been significant changes in its approach and focus since 2006. The focus of the Pamobvitnas operation was to secure the Freeport McMoran, Inc., mine locations in and around Timika. However, due to reports of army human rights abuses, Indonesian police took a greater role in securing the mining site.⁴⁰ Since 2006, the security around Freeport's mining areas is controlled by joint forces called Satgas Amole. The joint forces' strength is 1,320 personnel and consists of two companies of Brimob (Police's Mobile Brigade), six hundred army personnel, and a small platoon of navy (marines) and air force (*paskhas*) personnel.

The army's three operations provide insight into how wide and deep the position of the military is in West Papuan society. As we have seen, reform and the new laws have prevented the army from becoming directly involved in domestic security. Law No. 2/2002 and Law No. 34/2004 clearly indicate that the Indonesian police must assume responsibility for domestic security, and the military can only provide backup forces to the police. Yet the evidence suggests that the military is covertly, and broadly, involved in domestic security operations.

Anti-insurgency is clearly the focus of the army in West Papua. Because TNI cannot be directly involved in counterinsurgency measures, it apparently intensified its covert actions in an effort to deal with Papuan separatist movements. This tendency is obvious in the appointment of army commanders within Kodam XVII/Cendrawasih. Several important positions are held by officers who built their careers in intelligence, in Kopassus, or have vast experience in the conflict areas.

The current army commander is Maj. Gen. Christian Zebua, a Protestant from Nias Island and former army spokesman.⁴¹ Zebua replaced Maj. Gen. Moh. Erwin Syafitri,⁴²

³⁸ Laporan Kunjungan Kerja Komisi I DPR-RI.

³⁹ One source mentioned that Pamrahwan has two tasks: combat and intelligence (per confidential telephone communication with an army officer, November 3, 2012). In 2011, Human Rights Watch (HRW) released a statement about "unlawful spying" by the Indonesian military in West Papua. Some of the documents contain the list of informants and their targets. The document belongs to Pamrahwan. See "Human Rights Watch, Indonesia: Military Documents Reveal Unlawful Spying in Papua," <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/08/14/indonesia-military-documents-reveal-unlawful-spying-papua>, accessed October 28, 2012.

⁴⁰ Antara reports that the joint team's strength is 1,320 personnel and consists of two companies of Brimob (Police Mobile Brigade), six hundred army personnel, and a small platoon of navy (marine) and air force (Paskhas). "TNI Strengthening Freeport Security," Antara, September 8, 2009.

⁴¹ Maj. Gen. Christian Zebua graduated from Akmil (Akademi Militer Indonesia, Indonesian Military Academy), Class of 1980, as a combat engineer (*Zeni Tempur/Zipur*). Among his former classmates in the military academy are Gen. Pramono Edhie Wibowo (army's chief of staff); Maj. Gen. Hudawi Lubis (former commander of Kopassus and now commander of Kodam Jaya, Jakarta), and Maj. Gen. Chairawan K Nusyirwan (former commander of Tim Mawar, a notorious Kopassus team that was involved in kidnapping activists during Suharto's era). Zebua previously served as commander of Korem 171/PVT

whose tenure in Kodam XVII was only eight months.⁴³ Zebua has no background in intelligence or Kopassus. He is, however, accompanied by Brig. Gen. I Made Agra Sudiantara,⁴⁴ an ex-Kopassus officer, as his chief of staff. Sudiantara replaces Brig. Gen. Daniel Ambat, who has also built his career in Kopassus. Each is a former commander of Kopassus's anti-terror detachment, Gultor-81.

There has been a significant change in command within Kodam XVII/Cendrawasih, as higher ranking officers have been assigned posts formerly held by lower ranking officers. Three of its Korem commander posts are now held by brigadier generals. Only Korem 172/PWY, in Abepura, is still being commanded by a colonel.⁴⁵ There are seven Korem commander posts in all of Indonesia held by brigadier generals, especially Korem commanders in the border areas.⁴⁶ By lifting the Korem commander to the brigadier general level, the army also maintains balance with other forces in the region. In Merauke, for example, the navy's Lantamal XI is commanded by a first admiral, which is equal to the rank of brigadier general.

(2005). Davies, in "TNI & Police Forces in West Papua," points out that several officers served in Kodam II/Sriwijaya prior to their appointment in Kodam XVII. Among them are Gen. George Toisutta (former Kodam XVII commander who later became the army's chief of staff); Col. Erfi Triassunu (former commander of Korem 173/PVB in Biak and later commander of Kodam XVII); Col. Joy Sihotang (the first commander Korem 174/ATW in Merauke); and Col. Christian Zebua himself.

⁴² Maj. Gen. Moh. Erwin Syafitri served as commander for just seven months. He graduated as the top student in Akmil's Class of 1982. He was a deputy at TNI's Strategic Intelligence Agency (WaKa Bais) before being appointed as Pangdam. He later transferred to security assistant (*asisten pengamanan/aspam*) of the army's chief of staff.

⁴³ It is interesting to note that during 2011–12, Kodam XVII/Cendrawasih overhauled almost all of the top commanders. Maj. Gen. Erwin Syafitri only served eight months. Four Korem commanders were replaced in 2012, with the departing commander serving for only seven months. All of the departing Korem commanders got promotions to brigadier general in their new positions. This leadership overhaul, however, is not peculiar to Kodam XVII/Cendrawasih. It occurs in other Kodams, too. There are at least two factors that create leadership problems within the army. First, the army has expanded in the last decade. It now has more territorial command and combat units. Second, there are not enough officers to fill positions in its expanded organization. The government responded to this situation in 2010 by raising the retirement age for the military from 55 to 58 (see Government Regulation No. 38/2010). Former army chief of staff Gen. George Toisutta said in 2010 that he will accelerate the "regeneration of generals" to overcome the shortage of generals because so many of them are at or near retirement age. "TNI AD Percepat Regenerasi Jenderal," *Republika Online*, <http://www.republika.co.id/berita/breaking-news/nasional/10/06/18/120354-tni-ad-percepat-regenerasi-jenderal>, accessed November 22, 2012. On the army's tour of duty, see Douglas Kammen and Siddharth Chandra, *A Tour of Duty: Changing Patterns of Military Politics in Indonesia in the 1990s* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesian Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1999).

⁴⁴ Agra also graduated as the top student in the Akmil Class of 1985. He built most of his career in Kopassus and was commander of Sat-81 Gultor, Kopassus's anti-terror detachment, from 2006 to 2008.

⁴⁵ Maj. Gen. Erwin Syafitri explained that the Korem's location is very close to Kodam's headquarters, so it is unnecessary to have a general as its Danrem. "Pangdam: Tiga Danrem di Papua Dijabat Brigjen," *AntaraNews*, June 16, 2012. Korem 172/PWY is now commanded by a native Papuan, Col. Joppye Onesimus Wayangkau (Akmil 1986). The other Papuan officer, Lt. Col. Yan Anderson Saroy (Akmil 1989), served as commandant of Kodim 1707/Merauke in 2007.

⁴⁶ The army claims that those Korems are located at the borders with countries like Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Timor Leste. Those Korems are: Korem 031 in Pekanbaru (Riau); Korem 033 (Riau Island); Korem 171 Sorong (Papua Barat); Korem 173 in Biak (Papua Barat); Korem 174 in Merauke (Papua); Korem 161 Kupang (East Nusa Tenggara); and Korem 131 Manado (North Sulawesi). Strangely, Korem 072 in Yogyakarta is also commanded by a brigadier general, though the Korem is not located at the border with any state. A possible reason for having a brigadier general in command in Yogyakarta is because the Yogyakarta police chief (*Kapolda*) is a brigadier general.

Previously, Korem 174/ATW was held by a colonel who also served as Kolakops (Komando Pelaksana Operasi, Force Operations Command) for border and trouble regions' security task forces (Pamtas and Pamrahwan). At least two platoons of marines under the command of Lantamal XI also serve as part of the task forces.⁴⁷

Navy

Similar to the army, the navy (TNI-AL, Tentara Nasional Indonesia—Angkatan Laut) has also made significant developments in West Papua since 1998. In 2009, it built a new Eleventh Primary Naval Base (Lantamal IX) in Merauke. Previously, the navy had another primary base in Jayapura (Lantamal X). The Eleventh Primary Naval Base is aimed at securing the western parts of West Papua's seas, while the Tenth base secures the seas in the eastern part of the region.⁴⁸ The Eleventh Primary Naval Base controls navy bases in Timika, Aru, and Tual, and one navy post in Saumlaki. The Tenth base in Jayapura (Lantamal X) covers the naval bases in Sorong, Manokwari, and Biak, and several navy posts in Liki and Mapia.⁴⁹ The navy also has one maintenance and repair facility (Fasharkan, or Fasilitas Pemeliharaan dan Perbaikan), in Manokwari.

Each lantamal has at least 750 personnel, and each navy base (Lanal) has around 150 to 250 personnel. The Manokwari Fasharkan has 219 personnel. From two Lantamal, four Lanal, and one Fasharkan, we estimate the navy has approximately 2,600 personnel in Papua. A report of the DPR recess visit to Papua Barat in 2011 mentions Lantamal XI has 761 personnel; Lanal Biak, 155 personnel; and Lanal Sorong, 137 personnel.⁵⁰

The most ambitious plan for the navy in Papua is to build another division of the Marine Corps in Sorong, Papua Barat province. The new division will complement two other marine divisions that already exist (Pasmal-1, in Jakarta and Pasmal-2, in Surabaya) and one brigade in Lampung (Third Marine Infantry Brigade, Brigif-3 Marinir). In the navy's strategic plan, Indonesia will be divided into three Armada Command Areas: the West (Koarmabar), with headquarters in Jakarta; the East (Koarmatim), in Surabaya; and the Central Armada Command (Koarmateng), which will be established in Makassar, South Sulawesi.

According to the plan, the East Armada Command will be moved from Surabaya to Sorong, Papua Barat.⁵¹ The future Koarmatim in Sorong will also have one division of marines, which will be called Pasmal-3. The navy is working to establish and house this third division. It is currently building the headquarters of the division and starting

⁴⁷ "Komandan Lantamal XI Mengunjungi Makorem 174/ ATW," in <http://info.tnial.mil.id/lantamal11/NewsArticles/tabid/224/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/203/Default.aspx>, accessed November 2, 2012.

⁴⁸ See Al Araf et al., *Securitization in Papua*, p. 108.

⁴⁹ "Lantamal XI Merauke Operasional 15 Januari 2009," *Jurnas*, December 30, 2008.

⁵⁰ See Laporan Kunjungan Kerja Komisi I DPR RI ke Propinsi Papua Barat dalam Reses Masa Persidangan III Tahun Sidang 2010–2011, Tanggal 10–12 April 2011.

⁵¹ "TNI Prioritaskan Pengamanan di Papua, Maluku dan Aceh," *Koran Jakarta*, January 21, 2011; and "Armamim Akan Digeser ke Sorong," *Seputar Indonesia*, October 6, 2011, <http://www.seputar-indonesia.com/edisicetak/content/view/433587/>, accessed November 2, 2012.

the recruitment process for the troops. There will be around fifteen thousand marine troops stationed at Sorong.⁵²

The decision to develop a Third Marine Division apparently caused the army's plan to establish a Third Kostrad Division, in this same location, to be aborted. The army had already formed a new infantry brigade (Brigif-22/Ota Manasa) in Gorontalo, Sulawesi, which, according to the initial plan, was to be part of the Third Kostrad Division. For unknown reasons, the plan to build a Third Kostrad division was abandoned. In August 2012, the army chief of staff, Gen. Pramono Edhie Wibowo, shifted the command of the brigade to Kodam VII/Wirabuana.⁵³

Air Force

The air force is the smallest military unit in Papua.⁵⁴ It manages four bases (in Jayapura, Biak, Merauke, and Timika). The air force focuses on two areas: Biak and Jayapura. TNI plans to upgrade the airbases both in Biak and Jayapura into Type A airbases. The Biak airbase will have a squadron of fighter planes (most likely F5Es). Meanwhile, the Jayapura airbase is left without fighter planes, despite currently being able to accommodate fighter jets' landings and takeoffs. This airbase also has several helicopters that can be used to support military operations in Papuan regions.

The air force also installed three radar stations in Biak (Radar Unit 242, in Tanjung Warari), in Timika (Radar Unit 243), and in Merauke (Radar Unit 244), and has plans for a fourth radar station, to be in Jayapura.⁵⁵ In 2010, the air force established one elite Paskhas battalion (Yon 468/Sarotama) in Biak.⁵⁶ The battalion is trained as PPRC (Pasukan Pemukul Reaksi Cepat, Strike and Rapid Reaction Force). It has commando skills similar to those of Kopassus. This battalion provides security to air bases all over Papua, to its weaponries systems (Alat Utama Sistem Persenjataan, or Alutsista), and to radar facilities. Jayapura will have an independent company of Paskhas that has commando qualifications (Kompi D BS Parako PPRC Sentani Jayapura).⁵⁷

Police

The second-biggest security force in West Papua is the police. Like the army, the regional police headquarters (Polda) encompasses both Papua and West Papua provinces. It has twenty-nine precinct/district-level offices (twenty-seven Polres and

⁵² "15.000-an Marinir akan Ditempatkan di Sorong," *Cenderawasih Pos*, September 27, 2012.

⁵³ "Brigif 22/ Ota Manasa Dialihkodalkan Dari Kostrad ke Kodam VII/ Wirabuana," <http://www.tniad.mil.id/index.php/satuan/kotama/kodam-vii-wirabuana/brigif-22-ota-manasa-dialihkodalkan-dari-kostrad-ke-kodam-vii-wirabuana>, accessed November 30, 2012.

⁵⁴ The strength of the Indonesian Air Force in Papua is around 1,500 personnel. It comes from one Paskhas battalion (around 800); four airport bases (150 each), and two radar stations (around 50 each).

⁵⁵ "Pembangunan Radar Di Papua Secara Bertahap," *Tabloid Jubi*, December 16, 2010.

⁵⁶ "KSAU Resmikan Batalyon 468 Paskhas Biak," *Media Indonesia*, September 18, 2010.

⁵⁷ In May 2012, sixty personnel of Paskhas TNI-AU were deployed to secure four airports in the remote areas in Papua. "60 Satgas Paskhas TNI-AU Amankan 4 Bandara Di Papua," <http://kodam17.cenderawasih.mil.id/media.php?module=detailberita&id=604>, accessed November 28, 2012.

two Polresta), 174 subdistrict offices (Polsek), and 165 police posts. The Polda has various agencies that handle intelligence, crime, and traffic.

The presence of police in Papua grows in proportion to the proliferation of the civilian bureaucracy. The police have offices at nearly every regency and municipality and thus have become a significant security force in West Papua. The regional police (Polda) have around 2,700 personnel. At the precinct level (Polres), police have 10,900 personnel distributed among twenty-seven Polres. In total, there are just under 15,000 police in West Papua.⁵⁸

Polda Papua also has two battalions of Brimob, which have headquarters in Jayapura and Sorong, respectively.⁵⁹ Brimob is a police paramilitary force that provides support to other police units, especially for high-intensity conflicts that need rapid reactions. Brimob is a mobile infantry force by its nature⁶⁰ and can be very flexible in its operations. It can be used to suppress riots, defuse bombs, and free hostages, and it can function as an "infantry" force to occupy some area or territory.⁶¹ Brimob personnel are not trained in anti-guerrilla combat, however, so in those cases the army still takes the leading role. Nevertheless, as more responsibilities for domestic security are now in the hands of the police, Brimob personnel have taken over many jobs that previously were done by the army.

Undoubtedly, the police assume a greater role than the military in handling unrest in this region. This is especially apparent given targeted killings carried out by Densus-88, an anti-terror detachment established following the Bali bombings in 2002 and funded by Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. It has been claimed that the killing of Papuan leader Theys Hiyo Eluay in 2001 was conducted by the army's Kopassus, but it appears that the army has stepped back from that role, for the killings of Kelly Kwalik in 2009⁶² and Mako Tabuni in 2012 were both allegedly performed by Densus-88.⁶³

⁵⁸ Polda Papua's website provides information on the district level. See <http://www.papua.polri.go.id/>, accessed April 6, 2012. Papua's police chief, Insp. Gen. Tito Karnavian, in his 2013 New Year's conference, said that the police will add two more Polres in 2013. The Polres will be established in Lanny Jaya and Memberamo Raya regencies. The decision to establish these Polres was made after an evaluation that predicted that the Lanny Jaya and Memberamo Raya regencies are prone to be the sites of greater "security disturbances" in the near future. Karnavian also said that seven hundred new personnel will be added to the police force in Papua. It will make the number of police around fourteen thousand personnel, which is "ideal in comparison with Papua's population." See "Polda Papua Akan Bangun Dua Polres Ditahun 2013," *Tabloid Jubi*, January 1, 2013, <http://tabloidjubi.com/?p=7922>, accessed January 2, 2013.

⁵⁹ See <http://papua.polri.go.id/profil/detail/5/sejarah>, accessed November 12, 2012.

⁶⁰ The concept of Brimob originated from the Dutch Korps Maréchaussee, which was created during the Aceh War in the early twentieth century. There are many similarities between Brimob and Maréchaussee. Both rely on small units, "brigades" that consist of around one hundred personnel. The other similarity is that both are "lightly armed companies organized as groups of riflemen with a bare minimum of HQ, administrative, and support 'tail.'" Davies, *Indonesia's War over Aceh*, p. 76.

⁶¹ For example, in 2009, Brimob and anti-terror Densus 88 launched an operation to free Kesepo Airport, in Memberamo Raya Regency, from a separatist group. Such an operation requires infantry personnel and, in fact, part of Brimob's training has always involved teaching infantry skills.

⁶² "Kelly Kwalik Tewas Sambil Memegang Revolver," *Kompas*, December 19, 2009.

⁶³ The killing has stirred controversy in Australia because Densus-88 is funded by the Australian government. "Australia faces link to West Papua torture," <http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2012/s3578010.htm>, accessed November 12, 2012.

The role of Densus-88 will likely be even greater in West Papua in the future. It is not surprising that the national police installed the former commander of Densus-88, Insp. Gen. Tito Karnavian, as chief of Papuan Polda.⁶⁴ How far Densus-88 will be involved in West Papuan security remains to be seen. It all depends on how good are relations between TNI (especially the army) and the police.

Indonesian Intelligence

There is no doubt that West Papua should become the focus of Indonesia's intelligence community. Security threats posed by the increased activities of separatist movements and social unrest are the main reasons to make this region a priority. There are multiple intelligence agencies operating in West Papua, and their operation is not unique to this region. Similar agencies operate throughout Indonesia. West Papua is special because intelligence has a vital role in supporting military operations.

Formally, the Indonesian intelligence community consists of Badan Intelijen Negara (BIN, State Intelligence Agency); TNI intelligence; police intelligence; the state prosecutor's office (*kejaksaan*); and ministerial intelligence.⁶⁵ The task to coordinate intelligence agencies is supposedly up to BIN, but since BIN has no control over the other intelligence agencies, effective coordination is a problem.⁶⁶

In West Papua, BIN has offices in Papua and Papua Barat provinces. Each provincial office is headed by a Kabinda (Kepala BIN Daerah, Head of Regional BIN). The BIN's Kabinda position is held by a brigadier-general-level official, which gives that official a rank equal to or higher than the other agencies' intelligence officials in the region.⁶⁷ Kabinda positions in both Papua⁶⁸ and Papua Barat⁶⁹ provinces are held by army officers.

⁶⁴ Tito Karnavian is a highly decorated police officer. He was involved in handling conflicts in Poso and in killing Jemaah Islamiyah's leading terrorists, such as Dr. Azahari and Noerdin Moh. Top. He is the rising star in the Indonesian police. He replaced Insp. Gen. Bigman Lumban Tobing, who was only in office for a year. Tobing was seen as a failure because of widespread unrest in West Papuan mountain areas during his tenure. His handling of the security situation has drawn criticism both from human rights activists and from Indonesian politicians. See, for example, "Kaukus Papua Desak Kapolda-Pangdam XVII Cenderawasih Dicopot," <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2012/06/08/14501255/Kaukus.Papua.Desak.Kapolda-Pangdam.XVII.Cenderawasih.Dicopot>, accessed December 3, 2012. Regarding the security situation in Papua, see *Indonesia: Dynamics Of Violence In Papua*, International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 232-9, August 2012.

⁶⁵ This is according to Law No. 17/2011. The Indonesian intelligence community is very complicated. Within TNI, for example, every Force (*Angkatan*) has its own intelligence agency. Even in a tight-knit institution like the army, there are multiple intelligence agencies that are sometimes involved in internal rivalries. Then there are intelligence sections at some ministries, too.

⁶⁶ Theoretically, BIN is a civilian agency. This is a cabinet-level agency that has offices all over Indonesia. Although BIN is a civilian agency, most of its personnel come from the military, especially from the army and navy. The heads of BIN have almost all come from the army, except in 2009-11, when a police general was appointed. The current head of BIN is Lt. Gen. Marciano Norman.

⁶⁷ In a province that has Kodam, the position of intelligence assistant is held by a colonel. In the regional police (Polda), the director of Directorate of Security and Intelligence (Dit Intelkam) is a Police Grand Commissioner / Komisaris Besar Polisi (Kombespol)—equivalent to a colonel. Interestingly, in Papua Barat province, Kabinda was the highest ranking military officer in the region until the Korem was led by a brigadier general.

The army is clearly dominating the intelligence community in West Papua. Kodam XVII/Cendrawasih has the most complete network of intelligence, from provincial center down to village level. The Kodam commander has an intelligence assistant who supervises Kodam's intelligence detachment (Den Intel).⁷⁰ At the Korem level, intelligence is handled by a "chief" (Kasi Intel) who supervises a platoon (Ton Intelrem). At the Kodim level, smaller units of intelligence officers (Unit Intel Kodim) are at work under a *perwira seksi intel* (Pasi Intel).⁷¹ Finally, at the lowest level of Kodam's territorial outreach, noncommissioned officers called *babinsa* may provide the best human intelligence (at Koramils' subdistrict and village levels), as noted above.

Other military intelligence units are also working in West Papua besides Kodam's territorial command. TNI's main intelligence body, BAIS (Badan Intelijen Strategis), works independently from the Kodam structure. It usually inserts its officers in other task forces—such as in the Border Task Force, in the navy's primary base (Lantamal), or in the air force's airbase (Lanud).⁷² It is not clear how the BAIS officers coordinate their work with Kodam. However, there is likely to be close coordination and cooperation among local and national military intelligence officers, because many officers assigned at the local level previously served at the national level, and vice versa.⁷³

Two combat units within the army also have their own intelligence units operating independently in West Papua. Kopassus is known for deploying the independent Tim Sattis (Tactical Unit) Tribuana in the border areas,⁷⁴ although it is deployed with other nonorganic (BKO) forces. Meanwhile, Kostrad also uses its own intelligence units whenever Kostrad troops are deployed as BKO in one region. Both Kopassus and Kostrad have Tontapur (*peleton pengintai tempur*, combat recon platoon), which are

⁶⁸ The present Papua province's Kabinda is Col. Andarias Pong Bija (Akmil Class 1985). Pong Bija is a Torajan Protestant. He has served, among other positions, as army intelligence officer, commander Korem 052/WKR Jakarta (2010–2012), and a brief stint as inspectorate in Kodam Cendrawasih (five months) before he was appointed as Kabinda. He was Korem commander when Lt. Gen. Norman Marciano, the current Head of BIN, served as Kodam Jaya's commander. The previous Kabinda is Brig. Gen. Halomoan Sidabutar (Akmil Class 1983), who served as Kopassus's Sandi Yudha officer. Sidabutar also served as assistant of operations at Kodam XVII at the same time that Christian Zebua served as commander of Korem 173/PVB.

⁶⁹ Papua Barat's Kabinda is held by Brig. Gen. Liston Arifin Simanjuntak (Akmil Class 1983). His previous appointment was as intelligence assistant at Kodam Iskandar Muda, Aceh, in 2010.

⁷⁰ The recent Asintel in Kodam XVII is Col. Abdul Haris Napoleon (Akmil Class 1988). He served as commander 1071/Jayapura in 2007. His other appointment was as Territorial Assistant to Kodam Jaya, Jakarta, and the army's Cavalry Center (Pussenkav). Meanwhile, the commander of the Intelligence Detachment is Lt. Col. E. H. Rebello. His previous post was in Kodim 1618/TTU at the border of RI-Timor Leste.

⁷¹ Kasi Intel is a lieutenant colonel-level position and Pasi Intel is a captain-level position.

⁷² In Kopassus's Quarterly Report, leaked to United States journalist Allan Nairn, it is clear that BAIS officers operated within nonorganic troops under BKO to Kodam. See: <http://www.allannairn.com/2010/11/breaking-news-secret-files-show.html>, accessed December 12, 2012.

⁷³ In fact, former Kodam XVII commander Maj. Gen. Erwin Syafitri's next assignment will be as deputy of BAIS.

⁷⁴ See, for example, "Di Waris, Seorang Anggota Kopassus Korban Salah Tembak?" *Bintang Papua*, <http://www.bintangpapua.com/headline/9726-di-waris-seorang-anggota-kopassus-korban-salah-tembak->, accessed October 28, 2012.

rapid reaction teams. Tontapur activities mix combat missions with intelligence-gathering operations.

The Indonesian navy also operates intelligence units from naval bases, Lantamal X (Jayapura) and Lantamal XI (Merauke). The Lantamal's intelligence assistant's post is held by a colonel, which makes this post equal to the similar post at Kodam XVII.⁷⁵ The navy's intelligence focus, as one might expect, is on infiltration from the sea, smuggling, and piracy. The air force also has a small intelligence team, led by a major, and is actively involved in conducting intelligence operations in Papua.⁷⁶

The Indonesian police also have their own intelligence networks. At the Polda level, intelligence is administered by the Direktorat Intelijen dan Keamanan (Dit Intelkam, Directorate of Security and Intelligence), which is headed by a Police Grand Commissioner (Komisaris Besar Polisi, Kombespol), equivalent to an army colonel.⁷⁷ Meanwhile, at the precinct level (Polres), there is Satuan Intelijen dan Keamanan (Sat Intelkam, Intelligence and Security Unit), which is headed by a Police Commissioner Adjutant (Ajun Komisaris Polisi, AKP), equivalent to an army captain. Dit Intelkam works with its equivalent, Den Intel Dam, at the Kodam level. Meanwhile, Sat Intelkam at the precinct level works with its counterpart, Unit Intel Kodim.

Some "civilian" intelligence agencies also operate in West Papua. The local state prosecutor's office, both at the provincial and regency levels, has the so-called "prosecutor of intelligence" (*intelijen kejaksaan*) function that oversees sensitive legal cases, especially involving corruption and other crimes. The other civil institution that also has an intelligence operation is immigration.

The largest civilian agency that conducts intelligence work is the Interior Ministry. The ministry has a directorate called Kesatuan Bangsa and Politik (National Unity and

⁷⁵ See "Wisnu Suwanto Jabat Asintel Lantamal XI Merauke," *Bintang Papua*, November 28, 2012, <http://www.bintangpapua.com/merauke/29068-wisnu-suwanto-jabat-asintel-lantamal-xi-merauke->, accessed November 14, 2012.

⁷⁶ In 2006, a member of the air force intelligence team and other Brimob members were killed during a demonstration at Cendrawasih University. "Intifada Memakan 3 Brimob," *Tifa Papua Online*, March 19, 2006, <http://tifapapua-online.blogspot.com/2006/03/intifada-memakan-3-brimob.html>, accessed December 14, 2012.

⁷⁷ The current director of Dit Intelkam Polda Papua is Kombes Pol Abdi Dharma Sitepu. There are lots of "interesting stories" about the career of this police officer. Abdi Dharma was caught—along with other police and army officers—by a joint battalion (Batalyon Gabungan, or Yon Gab, consisting of Kopassus, Paskhas, and Marines) in Hotel Wijaya II in Ambon, Maluku, in 2001 during the peak of Ambon's communal war. Those involved were accused of being "rogue security forces" that aimed to keep the communal wars aflame. Abdi Dharma then transferred to the Southeast Sulawesi Polda and became the acting chief of Brimob. In 2003, he was promoted to chief of Poso Precinct (Kapolres) in Central Sulawesi. Like Ambon, Poso was also hit by communal wars between Muslims and Christians. During Abdi Dharma's tenure there, Poso was the site of many terrorist acts. In 2005, along with other local officials, Abdi Dharma was accused of taking part in embezzling the state's funds allocated for the conflict's refugees. His name appeared again in the press in 2008 when he took office as director of Dit Intelkam at Riau Polda. In Riau, he has to deal with conflicts between logging and palm-oil companies, and locals and environmental activists. After a brief break for studying at Sepati (Sekolah Perwira Tinggi, School of Flag Rank Officer) in 2010, he was assigned to police headquarters in Jakarta. In early April 2010, he took over as director of Dit Intelkam Polda Papua. Just as instability and violence had marked the other locations where Abdi Dharmas served as police chief, during his tenure in West Papua the security situation became unstable, disrupted by shootings carried out by "unknown people" (Orang Tak Dikenal, or OTK) and targeted killings, especially of KNPB activists.

Politics), and one of its functions is intelligence. Provinces, regencies, and municipalities also have similar agencies called Kesbang Linmas (Kesatuan Bangsa dan Perlindungan Masyarakat, National Unity and Community Protection). These agencies replace Kantor Biro Sospol (Social and Political Affairs Bureau), which existed during the New Order. In terms of their functions, however, there are not so many differences between Kantor Biro Sospol and Kesbang Linmas.

The Kesbang Linmas includes a paramilitary arm called Linmas, formerly known as Hansip (Pertahanan Sipil), that aims to protect the public against all disturbances that may threaten the social order.⁷⁸ It is supposed to be organized from the bottom up, but, in practice, Linmas is more a top-down organization. Linmas (and, previously, Hansip) members are trained by the military and, thus, the military has immense influence over Linmas. Also, Kesbang Linmas leadership positions are often held by retired military officers. In a conflict situation, the military could easily turn this paramilitary organization into a militia, as was demonstrated in East Timor and Aceh. Linmas and other paramilitary organizations also provide human intelligence to the military.⁷⁹

As we have seen, the structure of Indonesia's intelligence services is messy, with overlapping agencies that are not communicating or coordinating with each other. In response to this situation, the Interior Ministry has created a mechanism to coordinate these agencies at the provincial, regency, and municipality levels. The coordinating body is called Komunitas Intelijen Daerah (Kominda). A governor, regent, or mayor is the head of Kominda, and the Kesbang Linmas chief is its secretary.⁸⁰

This coordinating mechanism, however, has proven to be a failure in several respects. First, ministry regulation is clearly against the Intelligence Law, which put BIN as the agency solely responsible for coordinating intelligence agencies. Second, in practice, it is very difficult for civilian bureaucrats at the local level to coordinate agencies involving the military and police.⁸¹ Third, the head of a civilian bureaucracy has no control over military and police intelligence agencies.

It is clear that the army is the dominant player in the intelligence community in West Papua. Several documents leaked to the public indicate the army's (especially Kopassus's) powerful and well-trained intelligence personnel. A Kopassus report leaked to US journalist Allan Nairn, for example, provides a glimpse into how

⁷⁸ Linmas is not the only paramilitary organization at the local level. There are other similar organizations, such as Wanra (Perlawanan Rakyat), a community organization controlled by the military and dedicated to defending the country against foreign invasion/infiltration; Kamra (Keamanan Rakyat), a paramilitary group that helps police maintain security in the community; Banpol (Bantuan Polisi), a police helper; SatPol PP (Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja), regency or municipality police; and Pam Swakarsa (Pasukan Pengamanan Masyarakat Swakarsa), a militia created by the army.

⁷⁹ Most of the militia involved in violence in East Timor or in Aceh were members of these "civilian" organizations before they turned into militia controlled by the military.

⁸⁰ See Interior Ministry Regulation No. 16/2011.

⁸¹ In an interview, the regent of Keerom, Yusuf Wally, admitted that he has no knowledge about intelligence activities in his region. He said that he tried to organize a Kominda meeting with intelligence agencies, especially in the lead up to "critical days," such as West Papua's Independence Day and the TPN/OPM anniversary. But, as he said, his meetings with Kominda personnel are like more like briefings, and he has no power to give orders to anybody in such a meeting. Interview with Yusuf Wally, October 8, 2012.

Kopassus's intelligence works. The document is a quarterly report from Satgas Ban-5 (Satuan Tugas Bantuan-5, Task Unit Support-5), based in Kotaraja, signed by First Lieutenant Nur Wahyudi.⁸² The report details Kopassus's target of operations and identifies two "enemies," which are 1) *gerakan separatis politik* (the political separatist movement) and 2) *gerakan separatis bersenjata* (the armed separatist movement). The report says that the political separatist movement is gaining ground "because they have access to the foreign countries and the involvement of foreign nationals ... in Papua."⁸³ Meanwhile, the report downplays the presence of armed separatists. Because of its emphasis on separatist political movements, the report lists fourteen individuals as political separatists. However, it chooses to focus on just two Papuans, the Rev. Socrates Sofyan Yoman M., a Baptist church minister and lecturer in several universities, and a student-movement leader named Markus Haluk.⁸⁴

In 2011, the Australian *Sydney Morning Herald*⁸⁵ publicized Kopassus's documents on Papua. The *Herald* was able to procure about five-hundred pages of documents dated from 2006 to 2009. The most important among these is "An Anatomy of Papuan Separatists,"⁸⁶ a slide presentation describing recent conditions in West Papua, which notes the names of those who support West Papuan independence. Kopassus's report expands the list of supporters of independence from just political and armed separatists to include community leaders, intellectuals, clergy, and those who are concerned about Papuans' living conditions.

From these Kopassus documents that were leaked to the public and from recent developments in West Papua, it is clear that intelligence operations are directed to contain and limit the flow of information from inside the region to the general public in Indonesia and abroad.⁸⁷ At the same time, intelligence officers are working to build public opinion that favors Indonesia's position on West Papua. There are even rumors that some journalists who work for Indonesian media are also on the payrolls of intelligence agencies.⁸⁸

⁸² Nur Wahyudi is now a captain and served as commander, Platoon-3, Third Company, Eleventh Battalion, Kopassus Group-1. He graduated from Akmil Class 2001. See [http://tniad.mil.id/pdf_akmil/\(click on "akmil01.pdf"\),](http://tniad.mil.id/pdf_akmil/(click%20on%20%22akmil01.pdf%22%22),%20accessed%20December%2012,%202012.) accessed December 12, 2012.

⁸³ The report can be downloaded from: <http://www.scribd.com/doc/41522587/Satgas-Ban-5-Kopassus-Triw> (see especially p. 5), accessed December 12, 2012.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 14–19.

⁸⁵ The reports were also published in all the newspapers that are part of the Fairfax Media chain in Australia.

⁸⁶ See: <http://images.theage.com.au/file/2011/08/13/2555328/Kopassus2011.pdf>, accessed June 12, 2012.

⁸⁷ West Papua is the only region in Indonesia where, to do their work, foreign journalists or researchers need special permits and clearance from authorities in Jakarta.

⁸⁸ One online media source reported the name of twelve Indonesian reporters who were on the payroll of the military intelligence (see: <http://www.umaginews.com/2012/06/wartawan-indonesia-di-papua-menjadi.html>, accessed November 12, 2012). This source claimed that the journalists' names were found on intelligence documents belonging to Kodam XVII, Security for Troubled Region (Pamrahwan), Task Force-6, and signed by Capt. Ahmad Fikri Musmar (NRP/Military Serial Service Number 11970044410576). *Suara Pembaruan*, a Jakarta-based newspaper, denied that its Papuan correspondent is working for Indonesian intelligence. See: <http://www.suarapembaruan.com/home/11-wartawan-di-papua-dituduh-jadi-agen-tni/21900>, accessed November 12, 2012. *Suara Pembaruan*, however, did not try to confirm whether the Kodam's document and the officer's name actually existed.

As in Aceh and East Timor, the military infiltrates civilian groups and disseminates covert propaganda. Although it is not known how far military intelligence infiltrates West Papuan organizations that oppose Indonesian rule, there is evidence that the military tried to replicate some intelligence tactics previously practiced in East Timor and Aceh.⁸⁹ The army was reportedly trying to establish a “Red and White” militia, especially during the tenure of East Timor war veteran Maj. Gen. Mahidin Simbolon as Kodam commander (1999–2002). Such a militia has not resurfaced in the recent era.⁹⁰ However, there have been some efforts to create an organization to counter the radical student movement Komite Nasional Papua Barat (KNPB, National Committee for West Papua).⁹¹

There is no doubt that the military has launched and continues to operate massive and intensive intelligence operations in West Papua. These operations are complementing and supporting the three military operations previously mentioned in this paper.

This essay’s next section tackles the issue of military reforms and how they are seen and assessed from local perspectives. On the surface, it seems that the military and police have restrained themselves from meddling in Papuan local politics. The Papua province has had no governor since July 2011, and the military seems not to care about it. Also in 2011, there were three riots in a seven-month period in three highland regencies following local elections, during which the military and police did not intervene.⁹² The vacuum of power at the provincial level and riots that claimed dozens of casualties seem not to influence the “neutrality” of the military and police. On the other hand, as we have seen, many local politicians, activists, and clergy are being targeted in intelligence operations. The military and police are often involved in covert actions that aim to create conditions that favor the military’s interests. Therefore, it is interesting to ask: Why are the military and police staying away from local politics? Or, did they stay away after all?

The Reforms: What Reforms?

As we have noted, the most important aspect of military reform is removing the military from politics and business. Although the military has successfully created the impression that it is no longer involved in the political process nationally or locally, it is not often easy to prove its detachment case by case. In conflict areas such as West

⁸⁹ On the creation of militia in Aceh by TNI forces, see Davies, *Indonesian War over Aceh*, especially chapter seven.

⁹⁰ Through a combination of manipulation, repression, and indoctrination, TNI is capable of creating loyal supporters out of ex-clandestine activists. *Ibid.*, pp. 197–98.

⁹¹ For example, a counter-organization of KNPB named Komite Nasional Pemuda Papua Barat (KNPPB) was established in November 2012. The person behind this organization is Yance Hembring, a leader of an OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, Free Papua Movement) faction. Many believe Yance Hembring is working for the Indonesian military. See: <http://bintangpapua.com/headline/28673-bp-knppb-pro-yance-hembring-dilantik>, accessed December 18, 2012.

⁹² The riots that occurred in Puncak Jaya regency on July 30, 2011, claimed twenty-three lives; in Lanny Jaya regency (September 10, 2011), no one died but many government buildings were burnt down; and in Tolikara regency (February 14, 2012), eleven were killed, more than two hundred injured, and hundreds of houses and government buildings were destroyed.

Papua, interfering in politics sometimes is inevitable. In fact, the nature of the conflict in this region is political. Native Papuans' aspirations for independence are nothing but political. Therefore, there is little doubt that Papuan natives working in civilian governments and bureaucracies are targeted by military intelligence. It is also impossible for army and police officers to avoid relying on sideline businesses, since there are never enough official funds to launch operations in remote areas. For some cash-strapped TNI and police institutions, being involved in a certain amount of business is essential to survival.

The military's involvement in nonmilitary affairs is exemplified by the former Kodam commander Maj. Gen. Triassunu's letter regarding a split within a Protestant church. In April 2011, Maj. Gen. Triassunu wrote to Papua Province governor Barnabas Suebu about the conflict between Gereja Kemah Injil Indonesia (GKII, Indonesian Gospel Tabernacle Church, or Kingmi Indonesia) and Kingmi Papua. In a confidential letter that later leaked to Australia's *New Matilda* newspaper, Maj. Gen. Triassunu "respectfully request[ed]" Papuan governor Barnabas Suebu to arrange a meeting between Kingmi Indonesia and Kingmi Papua. He offered himself as moderator for that meeting, and then went on to write that "if the conflict cannot be resolved through discussion then assertive action must be taken."⁹³

Triassunu asserted that the Church of Kingmi Papua is the voice of independence for the people of Papua. He went further by accusing the church of drawing as much money as possible from Special Autonomy funds. He also charged that several prominent Papuan Kingmi leaders were discussing Papuan independence in several seminars they organized. Triassunu believed that Kingmi Papua's separation from the Indonesian Kingmi Church was merely a ploy meant to liberate Kingmi Papua from the Indonesian church's administration and enable it actively to support Papuan independence.⁹⁴

The leaked letter drew sharp criticism both in Papua and abroad (especially in Australia) and forced Triassunu to apologize and visit the local parliament to "clear up any misunderstanding."⁹⁵ Despite apologizing, he insisted that he did nothing wrong. He said he was asked by Rev. Karel Maniani, who represents GKII Indonesia, to intervene in the dispute between GKII Indonesia and Kingmi Papua. Triassunu refused to intervene for the reason that he has no authority, but he said that the governor can take a "strategic step" to resolve the dispute. Triassunu also denied to the local (provincial) parliament that Kingmi Papua was a vehicle for the separatist movement.⁹⁶

⁹³ See <http://newmatilda.com/2011/07/07/leaked-letter-reveals-indo-army-scare-tactics>, accessed October 23, 2012.

⁹⁴ Ibid. *New Matilda* also reported several irregularities that occurred in this case. Rev. Karel Maniani himself was part of "Group Nine," which supported OPM. He was jailed for four years in the notorious Kalisosok prison in Surabaya because of his support for independence. In the dispute with Kingmi Papua, Maniani was backed also by GKII and the US-based evangelical Christian Missionary Association. Kingmi Papua is a huge church. It has about a half million members, almost a fifth of the West Papuan population.

⁹⁵ His full "explanation" of the incident can be seen online at the TNI's website, <http://www.tni.mil.id/view-27758-sikap-pangdam-xviicenderawasih+terhadap+pemberitaan+tentang+surat+rahasia.html>, accessed December 15, 2012.

⁹⁶ Erfi Triassunu ended his military career with a lucrative position at PT Timah Tbk. Since April 19, 2012, he has been an independent commissioner for that company. During his time as commissioner, he has still served as Army Chief of Staff's special staff and BIN's Deputy Director. See: <http://www.timah.com/>

Reaction from the Kingmi Papua church was equally harsh. Rev. Benny Giay, the Kingmi Papua moderator, was quick to point out that the Pangdam was trying to meddle in the church's internal affairs, and by accusing Kingmi of being a vehicle for the separatist movement, the military sought to stigmatize the Papuan Kingmi Church. Giay, who is also frequently targeted by military intelligence, wrote a long letter to President Yudhoyono complaining about Pangdam's stigmatization of his church.⁹⁷

The Pangdam's letter shows how the TNI must walk a fine line in confronting West Papua's security challenges and developing their own influence. The letter also reveals some of the peculiarities that occur in security operations. The Pangdam's intention to "mediate" (or to intervene) in church conflicts brought back memories of past episodes, especially events that took place during Suharto's years, when the military intervened and chose sides in conflicts involving churches and other religious organizations.⁹⁸

As has been noted, the police take greater responsibility than do the armed forces in managing Papua's security. The police are not only dealing with the rise of Papuan civil unrest, but also conducting "counter-insurgency operations" of their own. In 2010–11, the police launched Operasi Tumpas Matoa (Operation Annihilate Matoa⁹⁹) in Paniai and Puncak Jaya regencies. The operation involved 280 Brimob personnel. East Kalimantan's Brimob contributed 109 personnel, and the rest came from Brimob headquarters in Kelapa Dua, Depok, and Jakarta.¹⁰⁰ The number of personnel involved in Operasi Tumpas Matoa is small compared to that of TNI's Pamrahwan or Pamtas, which routinely conduct operations in these regions.¹⁰¹ If we consider the scale of this operation, which included three regencies, it seems impossible to conclude that the operation was handled by merely 280 Mobile Brigade personnel. However, there is no report that TNI personnel were involved in the operations.¹⁰²

v2/eng/tentang-kami/710052012111039/management/2810052010220107/ Board%20of%20 Commissioners/, accessed December 2, 2012. Hiring a retired army general as commissioner in a private company is not a new practice in Indonesia. Another general, Maj. Gen. Chairawan Nusyirwan, an ex-Kopassus and commander of the infamous "Tim Mawar," which kidnapped activists during the New Order, was appointed as commissioner for a real estate company, PT Cowell Development Tbk. See: <http://banten.antaranews.com/berita/17927/cowell-siapkan-rp150-miliar-untuk-tambahan-bank-tanah>, accessed November 21, 2012.

⁹⁷ "Surat terbuka Terkait Dokumen Rahasia Pangdam Erfi Triassunu Menstigma Gereja Kingmi Papua," <http://pareslwenda.blogspot.com/2011/08/dokumen-militer-terbongka-di-papua.html>, accessed December 15, 2012.

⁹⁸ The most infamous was the military's intervention in the Huria Kristen Batak Protestant Church's conflicts. The military also tried to intervene in Nahdlatul Ulama's leadership conflicts.

⁹⁹ "Matoa" is a fruit native to Papua.

¹⁰⁰ See: <http://metrotvnews.com/read/news/2011/10/25/69461/Ratusan-Personel-Brimob-Polda-Kaltim-Dikirim>, accessed September 12, 2012.

¹⁰¹ On the conduct of the operation, see International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Dynamics of Violence in Papua*, Asia Report No. 232, August 9, 2012.

¹⁰² The ICG report does not mention any involvement of the military (Ibid.). The report indicates that there was no military involvement during the operation. It acknowledges, however, that TNI maintains its active role in matters of internal security. TNI "retains an important role in intelligence gathering and acts as backup to the police in confronting unrest." The report goes on to say, "Military engineering units play a role in building roads in remote areas, and TNI posts throughout the region are used for logistic support. Even with this limited role, TNI sources estimate that 11,000 'organic' troops are stationed permanently in

Operasi Tumpas Matoa created havoc for Papuans living in the target areas and escalated violence in areas where the operation was conducted. In Paniai regency, the center of civil violence, the operation was more about curbing illegal gold mining than about suppressing TPN/OPM. In fact, the deteriorating security situation in Paniai was due to rampant illegal gold mining, where local politicians, government officials, police, and soldiers were also involved.¹⁰³

Interestingly, there is a report about the how Operasi Tumpas Matoa was financed. Local reports mention that the Paniai regent, Naftali Yogi S. Sos., contributed funds amounting to two billion rupiah to finance the operation. The money was appropriated from the regency's budget and used to rent a helicopter from a local gold-mining boss.¹⁰⁴ The regent reportedly took action after "coordination" with the precinct police chief (Kapolres) and Kodim commander.

Financing operations has long been an issue for Indonesian security forces.¹⁰⁵ It is widely known that security personnel who are sent to operation areas are poorly funded.¹⁰⁶ The commander has to find ways to satisfy his soldiers' basic needs. In West Papua, the funding problems become more pressing due to very high living costs, especially in isolated areas. Many areas cannot be reached without air transportation, and commodity prices are often more than twenty times higher than in Papuan cities. Officers often rely on local government and local businesses to get additional funding.¹⁰⁷ Local government has to set aside special funds for these security forces. Unfortunately, there is seldom accountability for how the funds are used. Lack of oversight provides opportunities for officers to enrich themselves. Moreover, besides

Papua, with another 2,000 brought in on rotation as reinforcements for operations (*bantuan kendali operasi, BKO*)" (p. 26).

¹⁰³ Ibid., pp. 10–13.

¹⁰⁴ "Bupati Paniai Cairkan 2 Milyar Biayai Operasi Tumpas Matoa 2011?," *Papuan Voices*, Desember 21, 2011, <http://telebe-netarum.blogspot.com/2011/12/bupati-paniai-cairkan-2-milyar-biayai.html>, accessed September 21, 2012.

¹⁰⁵ It is interesting to note that military officers' economic interests are partly generated by TNI's own structural problems. Within the Indonesian military are vast personal networks and rivalries. The networks can be based on military-academy class, corps solidarity, or just simply patronage. The military career of an officer usually depends on his 1) "leadership" position among his classmates (whether he is a *lurah*); 2) his political "breed" (whether he comes from an elite family, how influential his family is in politics); and 3) ability to build patronage with senior officers who will pave his way to the top position. In many interviews I conducted in 2002–03 with mid-level army officers, I often heard complaints about how hard it is to get into the army's Staff and Command School (Seskoad, Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat), especially for "mediocre" officers. One officer told me bluntly how he managed to get into Seskoad: "Bayar, Pak!" ("I paid for it, Sir!"). The payment can be a hundred times one's monthly salary, and the only way to get that money is by doing "bisnis," such as racketeering and smuggling.

¹⁰⁶ Marcus Meitzner argues that even after reform and much criticism of the military's business activities, 30 percent of military expenditure is still coming from off-budget funds. These kinds of funds are generated by officers and used freely by them without any accountability. Meitzner argues that illicit funds exist because of the failure of reform to get rid of the military's territorial command structure. See Marcus Meitzner, "Soldiers, Parties, and Bureaucrats: Illicit Fund-Raising in Contemporary Indonesia," *South East Asian Research* 16,2 (2008): 225–54.

¹⁰⁷ One Polda Papua document from its internal supervision agency (Inspektorat Pengawasan Daerah Polda Papua) mentions that even funds from Obvitnas payments (most likely from PTN Freeport Indonesia) did not get to state coffers and were, instead, being spent by the officers on personal items.

funds from the local government, officers are often involved in rent-seeking activities.¹⁰⁸

A report from a local newspaper provides a good illustration of how military personnel's claims on funds from the regency budget, and the lack of transparency and accountability, frustrate local officials. In June 2011, TNI officers in Keerom regency, a region located at the RI-PNG border, apparently asked for funding to launch operations to prevent the "celebration of the forty-first anniversary of OPM by National Liberation Army (TPN) under the Commander Lambert Pekikir." The local government agreed to disburse several billion rupiah for that operation. The money was taken from a "stability fund" in the regency budget.¹⁰⁹

The unnamed official charged that the operation was not properly conducted by reason of "rugged terrain and the soldiers' unfamiliarity with the region." He asserted that the soldiers who were supposedly conducting the operation against Lambert Pekikir were pointing their guns at civilians. The official accused TNI-Polri of fabricating reports that they had discovered guns and ammunition among civilians and claiming that those materials belonged to TPN/OPM. He further charged that the military had extorted money from the local government.

In addition, he accused the military of killing Johanes Yanufrom (age thirty), the village head of Kampung Saweyatami. The incident occurred July 1, 2012, when TPN/OPM attacked a Battalion 431/SSP convoy, led by Lt. Col. Indarto. The shoot-out went on for thirty minutes and forced Indarto's unit to retreat. As they were retreating, they shot Johanes Yanufrom, who was riding his motorcycle near the attack location. Indarto's unit then requested backup from Tribuana Post (most likely a Kopassus post), in the village of Wembi. The soldiers subsequently conducted searches in nearby villages, causing fearful residents to flee to the forests. The killing enraged the regent, Yusuf Wally, who demanded all nonorganic troops be withdrawn from his regency because their presence frightened the citizens.¹¹⁰

These incidents are examples of how military reform has been stalled at the local level. It confirms the suppositions of many Indonesian military observers that military officers are still capable of influencing politics. Moreover, military officers are still involved in business, and they enrich themselves whenever there are chances to do so, and the civilian administration is often powerless to deal with them (although, in some cases, civilian politicians may exploit their relationships with military officers to strengthen their position vis-à-vis their political opponents).

¹⁰⁸ It is widely believed that the military in conflict regions are prolonging conflicts to exploit the situation and claim economic benefits from them. Conflicts provide economic opportunities for military forces, such as providing "extra" protection services or selling small weaponry, munitions, liquor, and so forth on the black market.

¹⁰⁹ "Pimpinan TNI-Polri Diminta Transparan Soal Dana Operasi Tumpas Lambert Pekikir," *Sorong Merauke Post* (SOMERPost), July 16, 2012, <http://somerpost.wordpress.com/2012/07/16/pimpinan-tni-polri-diminta-transparan-soal-dana-operasi-tumpas-lambert-pekikir/>, accessed December 12, 2012.

¹¹⁰ "Yusuf Wally: Pasukan Non Organik Meresahkan Masyarakat Keerom," *Sorong Merauke Post* (SOMERPost), July 18, 2012, <http://somerpost.wordpress.com/2012/07/18/yusuf-wally-pasukan-non-organik-meresahkan-masyarakat-keerom/>, accessed December 12, 2012.

Conclusion

This article has discussed the building blocks of security institutions in West Papua and also looked at the number of operations conducted by the military and police there. It has examined the buildup of the Indonesian military in terms of its territorial and combat units, and outlined how the police have carried out their own buildup by adding more officers and expanding territorial units. (It is true that the development of additional police units parallels the proliferation of the civilian bureaucracy).

The changing nature of recent social and political movements in this region was briefly illustrated. Aside from low-level insurgencies, West Papuan political and separatist movements are more and more moving to urban centers, and involving Papuan students, activists, indigenous leaders (*pemuka adat*), and even clergy. The changes in Papuan political movements did not cause the buildup of security forces. At the same time, there is nevertheless a significant coincidence regarding the expansion of those forces that are responsible for West Papuan security.

It is generally accepted that the police have taken on a greater role than the military in dealing with Papuan's political and separatist movements. This perceived shift toward a greater police role has given a much-needed lift to the military's image. The military can claim that it is not involved in domestic security and that it maintains neutrality in local politics. The public image of the police, on the other hand, has plunged to its lowest level. The police are now well-known for brutality and for being generally unprofessional. In 2012, twenty-two KNPB activists were shot dead by police forces, including KNPB leader Mako Tabuni. An anti-insurgency operation by the police in 2011 ended with increasing violence in areas that then became the target of further police operations.

Yet a closer look at how TNI and the police operate in West Papua suggests a different picture than the one I have just sketched comparing the engagement of military personnel and police forces in domestic security. TNI, especially the army, is still the biggest security force in the region, and it maintains its supremacy among Indonesian security forces in West Papua. There are twice the number of army personnel as there are police. In addition, the army is also supported by vast intelligence networks. On the surface, it seems that the police are responsible for domestic security, but close examination reveals that the army is still intervening in domestic security. The situation resembles that in Aceh in 2003, at the height of Aceh's war, when TNI managed to maintain a fairly good reputation, and the police were known as the villains. One Indonesian military observer called it "good TNI, bad cops."¹¹¹

Although TNI's counterinsurgency measures are permitted under the Defense Law and TNI Law, TNI chooses not to show publicly that it is involved in such operations. Instead, it relies on intelligence operations while alerting the troops in Pamtas and Pamrahwan operations. Gathering intelligence involves covert operations to infiltrate, divide, and destabilize "enemies." This kind of secretive operation is highly political in nature, rarely transparent, and impossible to control. At worst, it can be very destructive to the fabric of a society.

¹¹¹ Davies, *Indonesia's War over Aceh*, pp. 166–69.

It could be concluded that reforms in the Indonesian military have stalled. Evidence from conflict/troubled regions such as West Papua reveals that not much has changed in the Indonesian military, which has kept its territorial structures intact. Its operations are still conducted in a similar style to operations in East Timor and in Aceh. More importantly, the behavior of officers is still mostly the same. Many officers invested heavily to win a military career in the first place, and now have their eyes on future political positions or lucrative business opportunities. Such officers need substantial financial support to advance their military careers, which in the future will determine how great a role they play on the political or business stage. This condition, which puts officers in a "rent-seeking trap," is not new within the Indonesian military, and reform has clearly failed to eradicate this culture. While Indonesia's top political leaders have been charged publicly with corruption, few military officers similarly engaged in corrupt behavior have been targeted.

TNI, Polri, and Civilian Administration in Propinsi Papua and Propinsi Papua Barat

Military (TNI)		Est. No. of Personnel	Police	Est. No. of Personnel	Depdagri	Population
Kodam XVII/Cendrawasih		1,200	Polda Papua	2,700	Propinsi Papua Propinsi Papua Barat	2,851,999 760,855
Korem 172/PWY	<u>Kodim 1701/Jayapura</u> Yonif 751 [Kipan E] Lantamal X Lanud Jayapura (Type A)	750	Polresta Jayapura Detachment A Brimob Polda Papua	903 280	Kota Jayapura	261,776
		250				
		200				
		800				
		150				
	Yonif 751/VJS [Kima; Kipan A,B,C in Sentani; Kipan D in Doyo]	800	Polres Jayapura	687	Kab. Jayapura	114,514
	Denzipur 10/KYD in Waena	280				
	Kodim 1701/Wamena	250	Polres Jayawijaya	519	Kab. Jayawijaya	199,557
	Yonif 756/WMS/ Brigif 20 [Mako, Kiban, Kipan A, B, C, D in Wamena]	1,000			Kab. Yalimo Kab. Mamberamo	51,137 43,266

			Polres Yakuhimo	157	Tengah Kab. Lanny Jaya Kab. Nduga Kab. Yakuhimo	151,384 79,520 166,716
			Polres Peg. Bintang	136	Kab. Peg. Bintang	65,399
			Polres Tolikara	191	Kab. Tolikara	114,240
			Polres Sarmi	274	Kab. Sarmi	33,263
					Kab. Memberamo	18,424
			Polres Keerom	349	Raya Kab. Keerom	48,527
Korem 171/PWT	Kodim 1704/Sorong Yonif 752 [Kima; Kipan A, B] Denzipur 13 in Klalin, Sorong	750			Kota Sorong	190,341
		250 500	Polresta Sorong	626		
		280	Detachment C Brimob Polda Papua	280		
Lanal Sorong		140	Polres Sorong	400	Kab. Sorong	70,635
			Polres Sorong Selatan	318	Kab. Sorong Selatan Kab. Maybrat	37,579 33,735
			Polres Raja Ampat	260	Kab. Raja Ampat	42,471
	Kodim 1706/Fakfak Yonif 754 Kipan E	280 200	Polres Fakfak	359	Kab. Fakfak	65,153

Lanud Timika	Kodim 1713/Kaimana	280	Polres Kaimana	290	Kab. Kaimana	48,243
	Kodim 1703/Manokwari	280	Polres Manokwari	687	Kab. Manokwari	187,591
	Yonif 752 Kipan C, D in Arfai	600	Polres Teluk Wandoma	214	Kab. Tambraw Kab. Teluk Wandoma	6,393 26,311
	Yonif 752 Kipan E.	200	Polres Teluk Bintuni	252	Kab. Teluk Bintuni	52,403
	Kodim 1710/Mimika	280	Polres Mimika	681	Kab. Mimika	183,633
	Yonif 754 [Kima, Kipan A, Kiban in Kuala Kencana; Kipan B in SP 3; Kipan C in Mapurujaya; Kipan D in Pomako. Den-Kav 3	1,000 280	Detachment B Brimob Polda Papua	280		
	Yon Army BKO Obvitnas	350	Yon Brimob BKO Obvitnas	350		
		150				

Korem 173/PWB	Kodim 1708/Biak Yonif 753 Kipan C	450 200 200	Polres Biak Numfor	433	Kab Biak Numfor	126,125
Lanud Biak (Type B)	Parako PPRC 468/Sarotama Biak [Yon Paskhas TNI-AU]	200 800				
Lanal Biak	Satuan Radar 244 Tanjung Warari	50 155				
	Kodim 1709/Yapen Waropen	250	Polres Supiori Polres Kep. Yapen	132 347	Kab. Supiori Kab. Kep. Yapen	15,861 83,593
	Yonif 753 Kipan E in Serui	200	Polres Waropen Polres Paniai	221	Kab. Waropen	24,988
	Kodim 1705/Paniai	250	Polres Puncak Jaya	279 231	Kab. Paniai Kab. Deiyai Kab. Intan Jaya Kab. Puncak Jaya	249,093 62,998 38,844 93,363
	Yonif 753 [Kima, Kipan A, B, Kiban]	600	Polres Nabire	593	Kab. Nabire	130,314
	Denzipur-12/OHN	280				

Korem 174/ ATW		750			Kab. Merauke	195,577
	Kodim 1707/Merauke	300	Polres Merauke	625		
	Yonif 755/Yalet [Kima, Kipan A, B.C, Kiban]	1,000				
	Denzipur-11	280				
	Kodim 1711/Boven Digul	250	Polres Boven Digul Polres Mappi Polres Asmat	361 233 206	Kab. Boven Digul Kab. Mappi Kab. Asmat	55,822 81,781 77,053

NOTES:

Number of TNI troops (estimated):

Total personnel of organic/local army (combat + territorial)	= 15,270
Army's border security task force (Pamtas BKO)	= 2,700
Army's troubled region task force (Pamrahwan BKO)	= 1,800
Navy	= 1,050
Air force	= 1,400

Total number of military personnel (estimated) = 22,220

Number of police (Polda Papua) (estimated) = 14,850

Number of security forces (estimated) = 37,070