

THE INDONESIAN ELITE'S VIEW OF THE WORLD  
AND THE FOREIGN POLICY OF DEVELOPMENT\*

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Indonesian foreign policy in the 1960's presented two sharply contrasting faces. Under Sukarno's leadership in the first half of the decade, Indonesia aspired to the leadership of a radical, anti-imperialist international front. Sukarno condemned the prevailing international system as an exploitative order in which the old established forces (oldefos) of the world sought through economic, political, and military means to keep the new emerging forces (nefos) in subjugation. Nefos like Indonesia had to fight to perfect and preserve their independence, Sukarno declared. He led Indonesia into a foreign policy of militant confrontation against imperialism, first against the Dutch in West Irian and then against the British in Malaysia. Convinced that the exploitative international system had to be changed before Indonesia could develop economically, Sukarno exalted self-reliance and told the United States to "go to hell with your aid." Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations in 1965 was at least in part due to Sukarno's belief that the organization had become a symbol of a world order dominated by neo-colonialism and imperialism. Nor were the Communist nations, with whom Indonesia still had cordial relations, free from suspicion. Sukarno chafed at Soviet advice to ease the confrontation against Malaysia and pay more attention to economic needs; and as Indonesia drew closer to China in 1964 and 1965, he saw the Soviets grow cooler still. Even China, Djakarta's principal supporter in 1965, was viewed with some hesitation. For example, when General Yani, the army commander, declared in 1965 that the main threat to Indonesia was from the north, meaning China, Sukarno countered that the threat came from all sides; he made no effort to deny that China was a threat. There was really no one who could be trusted.

Under Suharto since 1966, Indonesia has become something of a model of the new state that eschews flamboyance and orients its foreign policy to the needs of economic development. Western economic aid and capital investment have been eagerly solicited, the anti-imperialist crusade has been virtually abandoned, and confrontation has been replaced by passivity and talk of regional cooperation. Before the end of 1966, Indonesia had terminated its confrontation against Malaysia, rejoined the United Nations, and reached agreement with its western creditors to establish an Inter-Governmental Group (IGGI) to coordinate debt renegotiation and new aid commitments. In

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October 1966 a sweeping economic stabilization program, drawn up in consultation with the IMF, was adopted. At the end of the year a new foreign investment law, containing attractive conditions for investors, was passed. In the succeeding years western aid commitments grew progressively larger, the United States and Japan contributing two-thirds of the total. In 1969 a five year development plan was announced, with 81 percent of its financing in the first year to be derived from foreign sources. Although relations with China have remained in suspension since 1967, efforts to restore economic relations with the Soviet Union were undertaken in 1969; in 1970 Moscow agreed to the long-term rescheduling of Indonesia's debt repayments, and there was talk of new aid. Where Djakarta newspapers had once carried headlines proclaiming Indonesia's determination to fight to the death against the *oldefos*, now they told of favorable IMF evaluations of Indonesia's economic performance, efforts to win larger aid commitments, and cooperation with the former *oldefos*. No longer was foreign policy described as a struggle to preserve Indonesia's independence and overcome the forces of exploitation. Indonesia entered the 1970's firmly embarked on a foreign policy of development.

Given the striking transformation of Indonesian foreign policy, it is appropriate to ask what kind of thinking lies beneath the new policy. To what degree is Indonesia's foreign policy of development in fact supported by basic underlying attitudes and perceptions different from those which backed the anti-imperialist policy of Sukarno? Have Indonesia's present leaders abandoned Sukarno's picture of the international system as a basically exploitative order? And what do their attitudes suggest about the future of Indonesia's foreign policy of development in the 1970's?

Some light is shed on these questions by the results of a research project on Indonesian foreign policy carried out by the author in Djakarta between 1968 and 1970. As part of that research, an investigation was made of the Indonesian foreign policy elite's "view of the world." The basic source of this attitudinal data was a series of depth interviews carried out with members of the foreign policy elite, a group selected on a reputational basis by a panel of twelve prominent Indonesians representing a wide variety of political perspectives.<sup>1</sup>

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1. Of the 75 leaders rated most important by the panel, 64 were interviewed at least once, and 53 were given depth interviews lasting an average of 7½ hours. All of the interviews were conducted by the author and, with only a very few exceptions, in the Indonesian language. Some 30 second echelon leaders were also interviewed one or more times to add depth to the views of particular groups. Besides the interviews, there were several supplementary sources of attitudinal data, including a wide range of Indonesian newspapers, government documents, political party statements, and 146 essays submitted in a contest on Indonesia's national identity. The interviewer's nationality, of course, poses a methodological problem, since it is reasonable to assume that many Indonesians might hesitate to speak as critically of the west to an American as they would among themselves. As will be seen below, however, the argument advanced in this paper is that Indonesia's leaders are in fact suspicious of western intentions. The

The foreign policy elite's view of the world was analyzed in terms of two attitude constructs which represent an important dichotomy in the way Indonesian leaders look at the world.<sup>2</sup> The first is a set of assumptions and perceptions suggesting that the outside world is essentially a hostile place, in which there are always forces at work seeking to exploit and subjugate Indonesia. Every nation, of course, has its enemies. But those who perceive the outside world as hostile are worried about their "friends" as well. The implication of this view is that Indonesia's control of its own destiny is in jeopardy and that foreign policy must be used to defend the nation's independence; a foreign policy of development, based on heavy reliance on foreign aid, is considered risky because the potential aid givers are suspected of posing a threat to the nation's independence. The second attitude construct suggests not a world of hostile and avaricious powers, but rather one which includes powers that are basically willing to help Indonesia because of shared interests. Heavy dependence on foreign aid and investment is not seen as a threat to the nation's independence because of the mutuality of interests between aid-giver and recipient. Though the leaders interviewed generally inclined toward one attitude construct or the other, most reflect in their views some mixture of the two. In viewing the outside world, many tended to express alternately feelings of security and insecurity, strength and weakness, trust and suspicion, and superiority and inferiority.

#### Basic Assumptions About the Nature of the International System

The interviews reveal that attitudes stressing the hostility of the outside world still prevail, though ambivalence and inconsistency are present in the views of most members of the foreign policy elite. The data suggest that the sharp reversal of policies in 1966 was accompanied by much less change in underlying attitudes than one might have expected. Sukarno's picture of the international system as an order dominated by exploitative forces whose interests conflict with those of Indonesia still finds broad support among the foreign policy elite. This perception of hostility is shared even by a number of the young leaders (25 to 35 years old) known for their leadership of the anti-Sukarno movement and for their criticism of the former President's failure to attend to the needs of economic development. Unlike many of their elders, for whom the perception of a hostile world is a legacy of the ideological and psychological turmoil of the anti-colonial struggle and the revolution, these young people draw their conclusions mainly from their analysis of Indonesia's present weakness and vulnerability, especially vis-a-vis Japan. Given their basis, these perceptions seem likely to persist for some time.

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possibility that their criticism of the west was subdued because the interviewer was an American only strengthens the case being argued here.

2. This dichotomy and the analytical framework of which it is a part are elaborated in some detail in Franklin B. Weinstein, "The Uses of Foreign Policy in Indonesia: An Approach to the Analysis of Foreign Policy in the Less Developed Countries," World Politics (forthcoming).

### The "Pretty Girl Analogy"

The image of a hostile world is reflected in the widely accepted analogy between Indonesia and a pretty maiden who is constantly being approached by men who want to take advantage of her. This analogy, suggested by several Indonesian leaders as a way of characterizing Indonesia's position in the world, was presented to the foreign policy elite in the course of the interviews. The response was one of overwhelming agreement with the analogy. Of fifty who expressed an opinion concerning its validity, forty leaders--that is, eighty percent--saw at least some truth in it. More than fifty percent asserted that the analogy has a great deal of validity. These sentiments were by no means concentrated among surviving "old order" elements. Substantial agreement with the analogy could be found in practically every important group, though some were more enthusiastic about it than others. Strongest agreement came from the top levels of the army and the foreign ministry and from leaders of the PNI (Indonesian Nationalist Party) and the PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party).<sup>3</sup> The technocrats--academics, mainly economists, many of whom now serve in highly influential government positions--were somewhat lower but still more than seventy percent in agreement. Least enthusiastic about the analogy were the leaders of the Catholic and Islamic political parties (see Table 1).

TABLE 1  
Agreement With the Pretty Girl  
Analogy--By Major Groups

Group	It Contains Truth (Much)	It Contains No Truth
Army	9 (8)	1
Foreign Ministry	5 (5)	1
PNI	8 (6)	1
PSI	4 (4)	1
Technocrats	5 (3)	2
Catholic Party	3 (0)	1
Islamic Parties	3 (1)	2
All Foreign Policy Elite	40 (26)	10

The breadth of agreement on the validity of comparing Indonesia to a harassed pretty girl is further suggested when generational responses are examined. It is part of the conventional wisdom in

3. Though the PSI, banned by Sukarno in 1960, has not been formally rehabilitated, there remains a small, but important, group of leaders who continue to meet regularly.

Indonesia that members of the youngest generation are pragmatic, self-confident men, free of the ideological and psychological pressures fomented by the anti-colonial struggle and the revolution. Several people suggested that the pretty girl analogy represented a way of thinking designed to deal primarily with the older generation's psychological problems. It was "something the older generation told itself in order to boost its own self-image," said one young leader. Another student leader conceded that "there is a very high level of suspicion of foreigners still existing in this society," but, he claimed, it is "almost non-existent" among students. Though some have been more influenced by Sukarno's rhetoric than they would admit, it is true that the youngest generation of leaders sees itself as more pragmatic and less conscious of ideology than its predecessors. This has not, however, made them less concerned about threats to Indonesia's independence. There is no significant difference among the generations with respect to those who see at least some truth in the analogy (see Table 2). The youngest generation did show a clear reluctance to embrace the analogy with enthusiasm, partly, one may hypothesize from the nature of their answers, because of a consciousness that this was not a line of thinking which their generation was expected to accept.

TABLE 2

Agreement With the Pretty Girl  
Analogy--By Age Groups\*

Generation	It Contains Truth (Much)	It Contains No Truth
1928 Generation	6 (4)	2
1945 Generation	29 (21)	7
1966 Generation	5 (1)	1

\* The generational groupings commonly used by Indonesians are employed here. As a general guideline, the 1928 Generation refers to those born before 1910; the 1945 Generation denotes those born between 1911 and 1935; and the 1966 Generation refers to those born after 1935.

Moreover, the assumption that a pragmatic outlook is somehow inconsistent with a belief that Indonesia can be compared to a harassed pretty girl does not stand up. It would be a mistake to assume that agreement with the analogy reflects essentially the views of Indonesians who have a narrow ideological perspective. The leaders interviewed were classified, where possible, as ideologues or pragmatists. This classification was based on three considerations: the extent to which they generally tended to explain international relations in ideological terms; the importance they attached to ideology as a force in international relations; and their self-description either as pragmatists or as men to whom ideology is important.<sup>4</sup> As

4. It should be pointed out that men who see themselves as pragmatists

Table 3 shows, the pragmatists actually demonstrated slightly more agreement with the analogy than did the ideologues.

TABLE 3  
Agreement with the Pretty Girl Analogy--  
Ideologues vs. Pragmatists

	It Contains Truth (Much)	It Contains No Truth
Ideologues	13 (9)	6
Pragmatists	15 (9)	4

Clearly, then, those who attribute validity to the pretty girl analogy represent a wide diversity of political groupings, all the generations, and both ideologues and pragmatists. It would be dangerous, of course, to place too much significance on the terms of the analogy itself. It did originate with the Indonesians, and when it was raised in discussions with the foreign policy elite, many indicated that it was a frequently used image. But it would obviously be foolish to suggest that all those who agreed with the analogy would have put it that way had it not been suggested to them by the interviewer's question. More important than the specifics of the analogy itself are the reasons they found it congenial and the arguments they brought forth in the discussion stimulated by it.

Those who expounded on the pretty girl analogy as an accurate characterization of Indonesia's position in the world offered a number of explanations for their country's predicament. A common line of reasoning, particularly among military leaders, emphasizes geo-political factors. Indonesia's strategic location and wealth of natural resources are said to make the country especially vulnerable to the predatory designs of more powerful nations. It is suggested that those geographic considerations place the country in an unusual state of jeopardy, because they constitute incentives for larger powers to seek to dominate Indonesia. "Our wealth makes us vulnerable," asserted several leaders. One army general with an important role in foreign policy put it this way:

If you look at Indonesia's location, you can see that we are in a crossroads position. From all sides there are people who would like to use Indonesia for their own purposes. The Japanese see us as a source of raw materials. The Communists realize that if they

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need not necessarily be said to be without any ideology. But they tend to be less conscious of the ideological assumptions they may make and less inclined to use ideology as a referent in framing political analyses.

could control Indonesia, then the smaller nations nearby would be much easier to control. Russia is very interested in Indonesia. The United States sees the strategic importance of Indonesia too. Thus there are always threats to Indonesia's independence.

There is, to be sure, a strong and widespread belief that Indonesia's material advantages constitute a long-run asset, which will eventually help to assure Djakarta an important role in international relations, besides bringing prosperity to the land. But so long as Indonesia remains weak and underdeveloped, it is felt, its strategic location and natural resources will continue to be more a liability than a source of strength. The country's weakness is said to create a power vacuum which outside forces are bound to try to fill. The Indonesian leaders' picture of their country as a field of competition among the big powers is, of course, the product of Indonesia's long-term historical experience, as well as their analysis of the current situation. The tendency to see their material advantages as a source of danger derives from their conception of the colonial experience as one which was motivated primarily by the Dutch desire to exploit Indonesia's natural wealth. The Indonesian leaders are accustomed to the idea that their country's natural resources historically have led foreigners to take advantage of Indonesia. After independence, this belief was reinforced by the Cold War situation of the 1950's, in which Indonesia was in fact wooed and pressured by both sides. Though many Indonesian leaders today see the Americans and the British as withdrawing from Southeast Asia, they fear a new scramble for influence, led this time by the Japanese and the Chinese.

From leaders of practically every segment of the foreign policy elite, the pretty girl analogy elicited expressions of concern about economic domination. It seems evident that for a great many Indonesian leaders economic imperialism is one of the principal realities of contemporary international life. This view has been traditionally identified with the PNI (and, of course, the Communists), but it is by no means exclusively a PNI perspective. For example, a prominent Christian leader expressed doubt that the industrialized nations of the world really desire economic development in Indonesia. He compared the way Indonesians feel about the outside world to the way slum dwellers feel when a wealthy person comes to visit: there is bound to be suspicion. A foreign ministry official pointed to the fact that so much of the foreign investment taking place in Indonesia is "exploitative," that is, investors export the raw materials without building refineries, lumber mills, and other processing plants in Indonesia. One technocrat with an American Ph.D. voiced his fear that even though he did not believe that the United States intended to seek economic domination in Indonesia, it "might just happen in the course of things," because of the enormous power of American capital. Others complained about the efforts of some of Indonesia's creditor nations to attach strings to their economic aid. More than one suggested that the Japanese seem to feel they need an economic colony and regard Indonesia as a prime prospect. One of the best statements of the view that nations on all sides seek to take advantage of Indonesia for economic reasons came from a strongly anti-Communist army officer:

Sukarno said we were surrounded by imperialists. We said yes, but also by Communists. . . . I don't know whether I would use the term surrounded today, but we must accept as reality the fact that colonialism and imperialism still exist, both from the non-Communist side and the Communist

side. . . . Take for example the United States. We are trying to sell our tin, it is very important to us, and the US exerts its influence to lower the price of tin. That may be in the economic interests of the US, but we see it as imperialism. The US is trying to protect the interests of General Motors, but it is very damaging to us. The case of Japan is even more obvious. They are dependent on imports for 85 percent of their energy supply. There can be no question that they are going to continue to depress prices, to keep control of the situation. This is exploitation. . . . I am very suspicious of the motives of these countries. Maybe I am too suspicious, but I can't help it. It is the result of our experience. We have been stabbed in the back so many times.

For some, the picture of the outside world as hostile is fueled by a Marxist analysis that suggests the inevitability of capitalist attempts at economic exploitation. But for others, it owes less to Marx than to Morgenthau. Many of the more intellectual members of the foreign policy elite view international relations as a continuing power struggle in which weak nations are constantly in jeopardy of subjugation by more powerful ones. In their view, recognition of the basically hostile character of the outside world is simply a sign of political maturity. As a technocrat put it: "It is a basic rule that the powerful always try to dominate the weak for their own advantage . . . there will always be powerful nations that will try to take advantage of us, as long as we are weak." A socialist leader added: "Every big power poses a threat to our independence--whether it be China, Japan, the United States, or others." And a young PNI leader stated flatly: "No big power wants to see any other country become strong."

A more subtle, but not necessarily unimportant, consideration is the matter of race. All of the powers which threaten to dominate Indonesia are either yellow or white, and this fact does not seem to have escaped at least some of the Indonesian leaders. Though their interviewer was an American, several did not hesitate to express bluntly their continuing suspicion, rooted in the colonial experience, that the Western powers assume their whiteness makes them superior. There is a fairly widespread perception of the United States in particular as a "white racist" society. As for the Chinese and Japanese, it was perfectly clear that they are regarded as dangerous, aggressive alien forces; not infrequently were they grouped together by the Indonesian leaders as the "yellow peril." Closely tied to the race problem is the fear of cultural invasion and the resulting loss of national identity. Concern about the growing influence of western culture is especially strong in Islamic circles, but it is certainly not confined to them. The Japanese commercial onslaught worries many for cultural as well as economic reasons, and it moved one leading technocrat to prophesy that "we may wake up some day and find that everything we possess is Japanese except our wives." The depth and breadth of these concerns are, of course, very difficult to estimate, but it does not seem excessive to say that the Indonesian leaders' uneasiness about the outside world is accentuated by the racial differences between themselves and the powerful nations that potentially threaten them.



Those who failed to see any validity at all in the pretty girl analogy emphasized above all their feeling that the perception of the outside world as hostile was merely the reflection of an inferiority complex. In the words of an Islamic political leader:

The image of Indonesia as a princess constantly in danger of being taken advantage of is false. It is an expression of the inferiority complex of some Indonesians, especially Sukarno. Of course, it is always possible that there will be threats from the outside, but I would not say that the outside world . . . is a hostile place. Indonesia is a good deal safer than a lot of other countries.

Others have argued that the pretty girl analogy was an expression not of the leaders' inferiority complex but of an awareness that one prevailed among Indonesians in general. It is said that those who cultivated the image of Indonesia as a harassed pretty girl did so in the hope of ridding their countrymen of their sense of inferiority. A PNI leader put it this way:

[The pretty girl analogy] is something I hear very often indeed. It is frequently used in speeches intended to convince people that Indonesia is a rich country, and we have failed to progress because others are taking advantage of us. But I don't think it is true. It is just something which is used to unify the country and to give people confidence. I don't see the world as being full of threats.

Several leaders suggested that it is from a sense of inferiority that Indonesians have characterized their country as both more attractive and more vulnerable than is in fact the case. "Indonesians have been kidding themselves to think that they are so rich and important," asserted one technocrat, who nevertheless acknowledged that the analogy had some truth though it was oversimplified and exaggerated. An Islamic leader spoke for a number of others when he doubted Indonesia's vulnerability: "We are not nearly as defenseless as that pretty girl."

Even some of those who thought the pretty girl analogy accurately portrayed Indonesia's position in the world voiced some concern that others might be motivated to such a view by an inferiority complex. Whether or not the hostile designs of the outside world pose a serious danger to Indonesia depends on how Djakarta responds, it is suggested. But, they add, an inferiority complex may push Indonesia into an isolationist or "super-nationalist" posture. One technocrat warned that Indonesia "must not be like the pretty girl who never goes out because she is afraid of getting raped, and thus never gets married. We must have enough self-confidence to have relationships with other nations." An economist put it this way:

This situation [a hostile outside world] can present opportunities, as well as dangers. We should not have an inferiority complex. We should realize that while on the one hand we can be the victims of a clash among the big powers who are squabbling for what Indonesia has to offer, we are also in a position to use this situation to Indonesia's advantage. Thus I agree with the analysis of the dangers from outside as put forth by the super-nationalists, but I disagree on

how we should respond to that situation. We should try to exploit it. . . . Basically . . . the analogy is true. But some girls are able to make the most of that situation.

There were some, though not many, who contended that except for the Communists, the major powers seek only to cooperate with Indonesia for the benefit of all concerned. Because Indonesia's relations with the western powers are founded on a mutuality of interests, it is said, there is no need to fear exploitation. In the words of one army general:

[The pretty girl analogy] really is meant to refer to the fact that we have abundant natural resources. But the foreigners who are being invited by us to come in and help develop them are not coming as robbers. It is to our benefit to have them come and that is why we have invited them. When I look at the outside world, I don't see a lot of potential exploiters; I see nations that are prepared to help us by providing the technical assistance and capital that we lack.

Another officer compared Indonesia to a man walking in the street. He must always be alert to see whether a car is coming so that he won't get hit, but he does not assume that most drivers are out to run him down. Others suggested that the analogy might have been valid once, but no longer. "Indonesia is now safer than it has ever been before," said one PNI leader. The pretty young girl has grown older, remarked a foreign ministry official.

The foreign policy elite's discussion of the pretty girl analogy suggests some of the basic lines of reasoning that lead a majority to see the outside world as hostile and a minority to dissent from that view. One can see clearly how geography, long-term historical experience, economic weakness and other relatively permanent factors mold the basic outlines of the elite's view of the world. In the subsequent discussion of international conflicts, it is not hard to see how basic perspectives manifested in the foreign policy elite's response to the pretty girl analogy influence the perception of international trends.

### International Conflicts

One way of analyzing the foreign policy elite's picture of the international system is by probing its interpretations of some of the major international conflicts that divide the world and their impact on Indonesia. Because our concern here is with the global system, the focus is necessarily on the Indonesian leaders' assessment of the motivations underlying the behavior of the great powers in international relations. Furthermore, since our interest here is in elite perceptions of several international divisions, the domestic political considerations that influence the formation of government policies with respect to those conflicts are largely excluded from this discussion. Four major international conflicts were discussed with the foreign policy elite: the Cold War; the Sino-Soviet dispute; the Middle East conflict; and the clash between the nefos and the oldefos.

## The Cold War

Indonesia's leaders have traditionally viewed the Cold War as a source of both opportunity and danger. Cold War competition gave considerable impetus to the intervention of the great powers in Indonesia, as a result of which substantial material benefits have flowed to Indonesians. The greatest diplomatic triumph of the Sukarno years, the successful campaign to force the Dutch to yield West Irian, was facilitated by the Cold War. In the interviews, most acknowledged that the military buildup which preceded the successful negotiations was made possible by Soviet aid, and that aid, the Indonesians asserted, was inspired by Moscow's desire to thwart the west. And, they believe, it was precisely because the United States saw a rise in Soviet influence and a growing Indonesian capacity to create instability from which Communists might benefit that Washington pressured the Dutch to make concessions in 1962. Moreover, it was the competitive situation created by the Cold War that made it possible for Indonesia to draw economic, military, and diplomatic assistance from both groups without becoming dependent on either. By playing the one off against the other, independence could be maintained. As one technocrat put it:

It is a good thing [that the Cold War is still going on], because it stimulates the big powers to be interested in us. We don't want to see all the big powers withdraw from Southeast Asia in general or from Indonesia in particular. On the contrary, we want all in. It is the balancing off among the big powers themselves that provides the most advantageous situation for us.

But there was always the danger that the great powers would through their intervention acquire such influence as to impair Djakarta's capacity to determine its own policies. Especially when external or internal conditions have made it hard for them to maintain a balance in their relations with the superpowers, the Indonesians have worried about their independence. A recurrent theme in the speeches of Indonesian leaders for many years has been the fear that Indonesia would fall victim to a clash between the Cold War protagonists. A principal rationale for nonalignment has been the fear of being drawn into such a conflict. Even where Indonesians have acknowledged the benefits which the Cold War has brought them, many are nagged by a feeling that the superpowers view Indonesia essentially as a pawn in their own struggle for supremacy. Thus some Indonesians, while welcoming the material gains which the Cold War has helped their country acquire, have had the disturbing suspicion that they have been exploited to serve the purposes of others.

Today the Cold War is seen in a new light. International developments of the last decade have led some to conclude that the Cold War is essentially over.<sup>5</sup> Even among the larger number who resist such an

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5. Seventeen percent of the 54 leaders who answered this question felt that the Cold War is over. There were no significant generational differences. The 21 ideologues, as might be expected, were unanimous in holding that the Cold War is not over, while 39 percent of the 23 pragmatists disagreed. Among the major groups only the PSI showed a majority believing that the Cold War is over. Agreeing that the Cold War is a thing of the past were 2 of 5 Catholics,

extreme formulation, there are many who believe that the Cold War's importance as a factor in international relations is diminishing. This trend is attributed by the Indonesians to two developments in particular: the declining role of ideology as a determinant of the behavior of nations and the growing commonality of interests between Washington and Moscow.

Ideological conflict is named by a majority as the principal cause of the Cold War; the others thought either that the clash of national interests between the superpowers was more important, or that ideology and national interests were of equal importance.<sup>6</sup> For some, especially PNI and Islamic party leaders, ideology is still the central factor in the Cold War. As one PNI leader put it: "The world is still really divided into only two groups--the Communists and the non-Communists . . . there is division within the blocs, but when it comes to essential matters, the blocs will stand together." Several PNI and Muslim leaders used almost identical language to state their conviction that ideology will always be of crucial importance in international relations. In their words:

The Cold War is basically an ideological struggle and cannot possibly end as long as ideological differences remain. . . . Ideology has its ups and downs, its importance rises and falls in waves, and although in the present stage it is rather quiet, sooner or later it will re-emerge openly as the central consideration. . . . A nation is nothing without an ideology. Man must have some kind of ideology, something to cling to; without it, he is lost. . . .

Most, however, see ideology as a diminishing force. More than 80 percent of the PSI, Catholic, army, and foreign ministry leaders consider ideology less important than it was previously.<sup>7</sup> As a

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2 of 6 technocrats, 2 of 7 from the army, 1 of 7 from the foreign ministry and from the Islamic parties, and none of nine PNI leaders.

6. Of 40 leaders, 58 percent saw ideology as the chief cause of the Cold War, while 37 percent named national interests, and 5 percent saw both factors as equal in importance. Generational differences were slight, but there were substantial divergencies among the major groups. All 6 PNI leaders attributed the Cold War primarily to ideological conflict, as did 4 of 6 Islamic leaders, and 3 of 5 technocrats. The 4 foreign ministry officials who discussed this subject were split evenly on whether ideology or national interests caused the Cold War. National interests were emphasized by 3 of 5 from the army, 3 of 5 from the PSI, and 4 of 5 Catholic leaders. One Islamic leader and 2 PSI leaders were the only ones who saw ideology and national interests as equally responsible for the Cold War.
7. Forty-six leaders discussed the importance of ideology in international relations, and 58 percent saw ideology as a declining factor. All 5 PSI leaders and all 4 Catholics felt this way, as did 6 of 7 from the army, 5 of 6 from the foreign ministry, and 4 of 6 technocrats. Arguing that ideology was as important as ever were all 7 PNI leaders and 4 of 6 Muslims. Younger leaders

cabinet minister put it: "The Cold War is over because ideological differences are just not that important anymore." That the decline of ideologies is seen as a major reason for the easing of the Cold War is suggested by the generally close correspondence between those who agree that the Cold War is over and those who downgrade the importance of ideology.

Generally speaking, those who perceive a decline in the importance of ideology find this trend reassuring. "It is unwise to base too much on ideology," one leader asserted. Quite a few see ideology as a positively dangerous force. Ideology is commonly associated with expansionism; every ideology seeks to dominate the world, several Indonesians contended. Some see the rise of a pragmatic younger generation in many countries as a sign that ideologically-based expansionism, like that embodied in the Cold War, is becoming obsolete. In the words of one army general:

Ideology is becoming less of a determining factor in international relations. . . . The younger generation, practically everywhere, is much less influenced by ideology, much less tied to the rigidities of the past, and less inclined to be expansionist. . . . In many countries, the older generation still ruling shows traits of expansionism, ideologically based or not. In the United States the older generation is more ideological, and there even are expansionist elements there. Japan is still under the control of expansionist elements. . . . But the younger generation is less inclined to have such attitudes. . . . They just want to have a good life.

Others see the change taking place primarily on the Communist side. According to a technocrat: "The Russians have become more rational, more pragmatic." In any case, most of the foreign policy elite would agree that the decrease in the ideological content of the Cold War has enhanced Indonesia's security in two ways: it has reduced the prospect of a cataclysmic clash between the superpowers, and it has led Washington and Moscow to ease somewhat their pressures on countries like Indonesia.

But the decline of ideology also poses certain risks. The Cold War is generally seen as developing into what most regard as a less dangerous form of conflict, a kind of competition among the great powers for spheres of influence. "The rules of the game have changed," said a ministry official. "The Cold War is now not so much an ideological conflict as one of national interests. It is possible that at some point there will be a mutual agreement based on a balance of forces, but it is hard to envisage its ever ending." The problem for Indonesia, as one general put it, is that in the absence of ideological conflict there is a greater danger that the powers will in fact succeed in reaching a mutual accommodation and will divide the world into

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were somewhat more likely to see ideology as a diminishing force than were older ones. The 8 1928 Generation leaders were split evenly on the question, while 18 of 31 leaders from the 1945 Generation saw ideology declining in importance, as did 5 of 7 1966 Generation leaders.

spheres of influence. As long as the powers were motivated by global ideological aspirations, the possibility of such a de facto agreement, not to mention collusion among the powers, could safely be ruled out. Because of the decline of ideology, it is possible that Indonesia may face a more united front of big powers than would be conceivable were ideological conflicts a more potent force.

If the reduced importance of ideology as a factor in international relations has stimulated some fear that the big powers may agree to divide the world into spheres of influence, the growing commonality of interests between Washington and Moscow--the second major development seen as responsible for the diminution of the Cold War--provides even greater cause for such concern. The foreign policy elite seemed more impressed by the interests and characteristics shared by the United States and the Soviet Union than by the points which separate them. They showed a strong tendency to lump the superpowers together.

To begin with, despite the almost universally strong anti-Communism of the foreign policy elite, there was near unanimity that Washington was just as much to blame for starting and exacerbating the Cold War as Moscow; only the Muslim politicians felt that the Communists were primarily responsible for the conflict.<sup>8</sup> Although several Islamic leaders suggested that the west was "merely reacting defensively" in the face of "expansionist Marxist ideology," even among the Muslims there was some feeling that the west bore a share of responsibility for the conflict. In the words of a deeply anti-Communist leader of the Nahdatul Ulama (NU), a primarily Java-based Islamic party:

Both sides are to blame. It is accurate enough to say that it was the Communist side that was on the offensive while the west was trying to defend itself. That is natural because the Communists represent a new power while the old power resides in the west. The Communists asserted that they were morally right to replace the old power because of the injustice practiced by the imperialists. There is some truth in the Communist view . . . the west cannot escape blame for the Cold War because it was its own refusal to admit mistakes that lent some truth to the Communist allegations.

Among the rest of the foreign policy elite, the general view was that both superpowers, motivated either by ideology or by great power ambitions, aspired to control the rest of the world. There was remarkably little reticence even among some of the strongest anti-Communists to portray the United States as bent on world

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8. Of 33 leaders, 85 percent felt that responsibility for the Cold War should be shared equally by both sides. While 4 out of 5 Muslim leaders blamed the Communists for the Cold War and 1 of the 4 Catholic leaders did so, leaders of all the other groups were unanimous in asserting that both sides were equally responsible. Three out of 7 1928 Generation leaders placed the blame on the Communists, while only 1 leader in the 1945 Generation and no 1966 Generation leaders did so.

domination. For example, a strongly anti-Communist army officer, who had described the Cold War as a clash between two rival ideological systems seeking world domination, was asked whether he really meant to suggest that the United States wanted to dominate the world. He replied: "Yes, of course it did." For many, John Foster Dulles symbolized the ideologically-based expansionism of the west; no figure of either side is seen as a more aggressive Cold War protagonist than he. Those who emphasized great power ambitions rather than ideology ascribed the Cold War to efforts by both the United States and the Soviet Union to fill the power vacuum left by World War II. "Big powers always aim toward world hegemony--the first and second world wars started that way, and that is how the Cold War began," asserted a former foreign minister. According to a current foreign ministry official, it was only after "both sides realized that the dangers and the costs were too high" that they gave up the attempt to control the world.

Particularly striking as a demonstration of the foreign policy elite's tendency to lump the superpowers together despite their Cold War differences is the widespread feeling that the United States has more in common with the Soviet Union than with Indonesia and is better able to understand the Russians than to comprehend the Indonesians. Although the number of leaders with whom this question was discussed was relatively small, with only twenty-four respondents, a majority of the representatives of major groups did indicate their belief that the United States and the Soviet Union have more in common than the United States and Indonesia. This view was advanced namely by the young, by army, foreign ministry, and PSI leaders, and by pragmatists generally.

Many consider economic interests shared by the United States and the Soviet Union as advanced countries a key element in bringing the two superpowers closer together. According to one of President Suharto's economic advisers, Washington and Moscow have come to see that they have many common interests, especially economic ones. "We see the Soviet Union as another advanced nation, as an oldie, if you want to use that terminology," he declared. As one indication of the superpowers' alignment on key economic issues, he pointed to the unwillingness of either Washington or Moscow to support the demands of the less developed countries in debates on trade terms within the framework of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Indonesian leaders have also found their impressions of the changed relationship between the superpowers confirmed by the encouragement American officials have given Djakarta to seek economic aid from and better relations with the Soviet Union.<sup>9</sup> A PSI leader laid stress on the ability of the Soviets and the Americans, as economically advanced nations and world powers, to reach an accommodation on the differences between them:

The United States and the Soviet Union understand each other well, are able to think in the same terms as great powers, and are easily capable of cooperating to divide up the world into their respective spheres. They are capable of working out a . . . solid relationship based on their mutual interests as equals. With respect

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9. Reports of such encouragement came from cabinet level officials and were confirmed in talks with ranking American diplomats in Djakarta.

to Indonesia, the relationship is very different because it is such an unequal one. . . . We have nothing to offer you, no bargaining position.

A leader with advanced education in the United States compared the problem of Indonesia's relations with the big powers to the difficulties he experiences when he returns to his village in Central Java. It is practically impossible, he noted, to communicate with former schoolmates who never went beyond secondary school. They simply don't think in the same terms as he does. The United States and the Soviet Union are like two rich men who speak the same language. "It is easier for two rich men, who speak the same jargon and have many similar interests, who understand each other, to work out a deal that will serve their mutual interests," he argued. "It is very hard for a rich man and a poor man to reach such an understanding. There is always suspicion and jealousy."

Others feel that cultural factors are as important as economic ones. To many Indonesians the USSR is essentially a European country, both racially and culturally. In the words of a PNI leader:

[The United States and the Soviet Union] are both white, developed countries. The US is closer to Russia than it is to Indonesia. I have been to Russia. Since Peter the Great they have wanted to be westernized. It is a western country. They have common standards with the US--they may be behind, trying to catch up, but they operate on the same standard. Not like China. Not like us. Our culture, our ways are different. . . . It was perfectly natural for Nixon to say, as he did recently, that of all the countries he visited,<sup>10</sup> he most appreciated the reception he got in Rumania. Obviously, that is because Rumania is a European country.

Moreover, the tendency of the Indonesian leaders to perceive the US and the USSR in a similar light undoubtedly reflects the fact that Djakarta's relations with each of the superpowers focus on a number of common problems. In dealing with each superpower, the Indonesians feel they must find a way to draw material support without incurring excessive political risks. The same issues--debt repayments, terms of trade, conditions of aid, and the dangers of dependence--dominate Indonesia's relations with both Washington and Moscow.

The mutuality of interests between the Americans and the Soviets is seen as extending even to the possibility of joint military action against China. A majority of the Indonesian leaders, especially the younger ones, found a military confrontation between China and a Russian-American force a realistic possibility. Only an extremely small minority considered such an alignment inconceivable.<sup>11</sup>

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10. Indonesia was one of the countries visited by Nixon on that trip.

11. Of 41 leaders, 10 percent considered such a confrontation likely, 44 percent described it as possible, 32 percent as possible but unlikely, and only 14 percent as inconceivable. While 5 of 8 1928 Generation leaders regarded such an alignment as either unlikely or inconceivable and 11 of 24 leaders of the 1945 Generation took that position, only 3 of 9 1966 Generation leaders did so. There were no significant differences between pragmatists



That those differences which remain between the United States and the Soviet Union are gradually becoming less significant is a widely held belief among members of the foreign policy elite. More than 70 percent expressed the view that the United States and the Soviet Union are evolving in such a way that they will eventually possess similar systems.<sup>12</sup>

Clearly, then, for the Indonesian foreign policy elite, differences between the major Cold War protagonists are growing increasingly blurred, though the Cold War conflict remains important. Reviewing the discussion of the Cold War as a whole, it is evident that the changed perception of it is especially pronounced among pragmatists, younger leaders, and certain of the major groups--notably the PSI, Catholics, army, technocrats and foreign ministry officials. The PNI and Islamic leaders stand together in viewing the Cold War as an undiminishing conflict based on the clash of ideologies. Table 4 presents a composite picture of the responses of each group to all of the questions on the Cold War, contrasting those who see the Cold War as a diminishing force in international relations against those who believe that there has been relatively little change in the Cold War's significance.

As the Cold War ideological conflict diminishes and the commonality of interests between Washington and Moscow grows, Indonesians find themselves freed of many of the pressures which in the 1950's left them with the feeling that they were beset by threats to their independence from both right and left. But, as suggested above in the discussion of the decline of ideology as a force in international relations, the diminution of competition between the superpowers has the effect of reducing the protection which a balancing of Indonesia's relations with the Cold War protagonists could provide. There is now

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and ideologues on this issue. Among the major groups, an American-Soviet alliance against China was seen as not unlikely by 5 of 7 PNI leaders, 2 of 3 technocrats, and 3 of 5 Catholics. In disagreement with that judgement were all 4 foreign ministry officials, 4 of 5 Islamic leaders, and 3 of 5 from the army and from the PSI. The only leaders to describe such a confrontation as inconceivable were 2 Catholics and 1 from the PNI.

12. This question was discussed by 32 leaders, of whom 72 percent saw the United States and the Soviet Union evolving toward a similar system, with 22 percent in disagreement, and 6 percent unclear on the matter. The pragmatists were overwhelmingly in agreement on the existence of this trend, with 15 out of 18 taking that position. The 10 ideologues divided with 4 in agreement, 5 not, and 1 unclear. The two younger generations were somewhat more likely to perceive an evolution toward a similar system, with the 1928 Generation showing 4 of 6 in agreement, while the 1945 Generation had 14 out of 19 in agreement, and the 1966 Generation had 5 out of 7 in agreement. Of the major groups, only the PSI was predominantly in disagreement, with 2 of 3 taking that position. All 3 technocrats agreed that the United States and the Soviet Union are approaching each other, as did 3 of 4 Catholics, 3 of 4 foreign ministry officials, 2 of 3 PNI leaders, 3 of 5 from the army, and 3 of 5 Islamic leaders.

Table 4  
Composite Picture of Attitudes Toward the Cold War  
(in percentages)

	Answers indicating that the Cold War is a diminishing force	Answers suggesting the continued importance of Cold War divisions
<u>By Age Groups</u>		
1928 Generation (n*=51)	41	59
1945 Generation (n=164)	53	47
1966 Generation (n=47)	57	43
<u>By Major Groups</u>		
PSI (n=28)	75	25
Catholic Party (n=27)	70	30
Army (n=35)	66	34
Technocrats (n=27)	63	37
Foreign Ministry (n=30)	53	47
PNI (n=40)	35	65
Islamic Parties (n=36)	28	72
<u>Ideologues vs. Pragmatists</u>		
Ideologues (n=54)	30	70
Pragmatists (n=69)	58	42

\* In this table, "n" refers to the number of answers on all the Cold War questions.

a danger that the superpowers may cooperate in pursuing complementary economic interests in dealing with an economically underdeveloped and weak Indonesia. Moreover, the resurgent role of the Japanese, who are capable of working together with both the Americans and the Russians, exacerbates an already dangerous situation. Only China is clearly unable to cooperate with the other major powers in dealing with Indonesia. But since the Chinese threat, largely one of subversion through the PKI and, in the view of many Indonesian leaders, the overseas Chinese, is basically different in kind, there is little possibility of balancing the Chinese threat against that emanating from the other three powers. Thus, the Indonesians, once confronted by two major threats which, in the context of Cold War competition, they could balance off against each other, now face a host of potentially exploitative powers, most of whom are seen as capable of cooperating to divide up the spoils of Indonesia. The real danger in the Cold War as it is increasingly perceived--as a competition among the great powers for spheres of influence in Indonesia--is that it may not be a competition at all.

#### The Sino-Soviet Dispute

In the last years of Sukarno's rule, the Sino-Soviet dispute was important to the Indonesians for two main reasons: it symbolized

the conflict between radical and moderate approaches to changing the international status quo, and it complicated Indonesia's relations with the Communist powers. By 1963 Indonesian foreign policy had taken as one of its chief goals the leadership of those Asian and African nations that argued the need for a radical, confrontative approach. In that effort, Peking was Djakarta's principal ally. The Chinese encouraged the Indonesians in their confrontation against Malaysia and applauded Sukarno's withdrawal from the United Nations and his effort to establish CONEFO. The Soviets, on the other hand, came increasingly into conflict with the Chinese within the framework of the Asian-African solidarity movement and came to be identified with India as spokesmen for a view which emphasized peaceful co-existence rather than confrontation against imperialism. Disagreements between the Chinese and the Russians and their respective supporters threatened to disrupt several of the Asian-African meetings and were seen by the Indonesians as a serious obstacle to Asian-African solidarity. Moreover, Moscow cautioned Indonesia against excesses in its confrontation against Malaysia and expressed no enthusiasm for Djakarta's bolting of the United Nations and plans for CONEFO. Because of the Sino-Soviet dispute, Sukarno found that close relations with Peking could be maintained only at the cost of a deterioration in relations with the Soviet Union. If the Sino-Soviet dispute symbolized alternative approaches and complicated international relations for Sukarno, it did the same for the PKI. The PKI followed a domestic course closer to that recommended by Moscow, but essentially chose the side of Peking in the international relations aspects of the dispute. The PKI's identification with Peking, it is safe to assume, contributed to the cooling of relations between the Soviet and the Indonesian governments.

The Sino-Soviet dispute today is viewed primarily as a great power struggle between two nations that represent potential threats to Indonesia. Sino-Soviet rivalry no longer poses a problem for the Indonesians, with Sino-Indonesian relations in suspension, the Asian-African solidarity movement a matter of little concern, and the PKI in ruins. In fact, it is generally seen as enhancing Indonesia's security. Practically all of the members of the foreign policy elite agreed that the significance of the Sino-Soviet dispute for Indonesia is that it reduces the capacity of the Communist powers to endanger Indonesia's security in the near future and thus buys time for Indonesia to strengthen itself. One foreign ministry official noted that theoretically Indonesia would like to see all disputes settled peacefully, but "realistically we realize that the Sino-Soviet dispute benefits us." Another foreign ministry official asserted that he could easily imagine the Sino-Soviet dispute coming to open warfare, which "from our standpoint, speaking frankly . . . would not be a bad thing . . . because this would mean it would take them time to rebuild . . . and this would give us a breathing spell. You must not forget that there are still followers of both Peking and Moscow in Indonesia." Others expressed some skepticism about the seriousness of the dispute. Most of the leaders (70 percent) described the dispute as essentially a conflict of national interests among two great powers, and this view led some, especially among the Islamic party leaders, to express the fear that it might be patched up. As one Islamic leader put it: "[The Sino-Soviet dispute] is not a real dispute . . . because it is not an ideological dispute." While both were described as "egoist" powers motivated by national ambitions to lead the international Communist movement, the lack of any ideological dispute was seen as easing the way toward a reconciliation. Others suggested that China and Russia presently have

conflicting national interests mainly because they are at different stages of economic development. But whatever the basis of the dispute, there was broad agreement that both China and the Soviet Union have ambitions which pose a threat to Indonesia's independence, and there was virtual unanimity that the Sino-Soviet dispute weakens the threat from the Communist powers because it precludes their cooperation.

### The Middle East Conflict

Under Sukarno, Indonesia outspokenly supported the Arabs in their conflict with Israel. Strong assertions of sympathy for the Arabs were even backed by action when Indonesia excluded Israel from the Asian Games held in Djakarta in 1962, thus precipitating an acrimonious conflict between Djakarta and the International Olympics Committee. For Sukarno Israel was an outpost of western imperialism in the Asian-African world. Since Sukarno's removal from power, Indonesian support for the Arabs has been less pronounced. Mild verbal support, mostly in the form of agreement with United Nations resolutions and expressions of concern over incidents such as the burning of the Al Aqsha mosque, has continued. But few presently see the Middle East conflict as impinging directly on Indonesia's national interests. Despite Djakarta's official sympathy for the Arabs, 61 percent of the foreign policy elite members with whom the Middle East was discussed made it clear that they really feel little sympathy for the Arabs. There are, however, two groups which identify strongly with the Arabs and see Indonesia's interests as served by a stronger pro-Arab posture. Their perspectives on the Middle East conflict, along with those of the more apathetic majority, add an additional dimension to our understanding of the foreign policy elite's assumptions about the nature of the international system.

Curiously, the Muslim party leaders and the PNI, two groups usually at odds with each other, find themselves in unacknowledged alignment in their mutual desire for more outspoken support of the Arabs. All of those who asserted that Indonesia's support for the Arabs was too weak were either PNI leaders, navy officers identified with the PNI viewpoint, or Islamic party leaders. Although a few isolated voices have mentioned casually the hope that Indonesia might send volunteers to aid the Arabs, virtually no one takes this seriously. The principal step urged by those who feel Indonesia should strengthen its support of the Arabs is the granting of permission to Al Fatah to open a mission in Djakarta, similar to the representation accorded national liberation fronts of Vietnam and, previously, Algeria. Of the 15 leaders who argued that Al Fatah should be permitted to open representation in Djakarta, a step which the government has thus far failed to allow,<sup>13</sup> all but two

13. For an official government statement indicating the government's reservations about the validity of Al Fatah's claims to represent the Palestinian people, see Foreign Minister Adam Malik's statement reported in Abadi, May 1, 1969. Indonesian Muslims were especially upset by the government's refusal to grant visas to Al Fatah representatives who had been permitted to observe the final plenary session of an international Islamic conference held in Kuala Lumpur.

were identified with either a PNI or a Muslim point of view.

Of course, this coincidence of views between the Muslims and the PNI rests on two essentially different perceptions of the conflict. The PNI sees anti-imperialism as the central issue, and the whole Middle East conflict is interpreted as further evidence that imperialism still threatens the newly independent countries. Israel is regarded as a white, western creation, an American outpost in the Middle East and, somehow, an agent in the exploitation of the Middle East by Western oil interests. PNI leaders asserted that Indonesia's support of the Arabs has weakened because of the government's concern about maintaining good relations with its western creditors, especially the United States. Some agreed that the need for western aid precluded stronger support for the Arabs, much as they resented such pressures. As one PNI leader put it:

If we displease the west, then we will jeopardize our sources of aid. Without foreign aid, we can't do anything in regard to development. \$500 or \$600 million--where would we get that kind of money? We know that the Jews are in control of the economy in the United States, in West Germany, and France--actually in practically all of the IGGI countries.

Others argued vigorously that Indonesia should not allow its dependence on foreign aid to prevent its taking a more active role in the Middle East. Even some leaders not associated with the PNI revealed a tendency to view the Middle East issue in terms of imperialism. In the words of one young leader generally regarded as PSI-ish: "I see the Middle East issue not as Arab or Muslim versus Jew but as a colonial issue. That is, immigrants from the United States, Western and Eastern Europe have come in and colonized the Arabs living there before." Indonesians from practically all groups expressed concern about the plight of the Arab refugees. Thus for the PNI and to a lesser extent for others, the Middle East conflict symbolizes imperialism at two levels--in Israel's status as a western economic outpost in the Arab world and in the perceived western economic pressures which have led Indonesia to moderate the outspoken support it gave the Arabs under Sukarno.

The Muslims see the Arab-Israeli dispute primarily as a situation requiring Islamic unity; for example, the burning of the Al Aqsha mosque was denounced as an "insult to all Muslims." Occasionally, they even speak of a holy war in the Middle East. Although their principal basis for identification with the Arabs is Islam, the Muslim leaders do cite some additional considerations as justification for their view. They refer to a debt to the Arabs stemming from their support of Indonesia during the revolution, when certain Arab states gave recognition to Indonesian diplomatic missions. The refugee problem is often mentioned, with one leader contending that a religious state which "just throws out residents because they have a different religion" is "archaic" and should not be permitted to exist. Moreover, though they perceive the Middle East conflict as a matter of religious solidarity rather than anti-imperialism, there is evidence that many of the Islamic party leaders strongly resent both the western role in the Middle East and the western economic pressures which preclude Indonesia's giving stronger support to the Arabs. Like the PNI, the Muslims view the Middle East conflict, to some extent, as an aspect of Indonesia's relations with the United States. If the activities of Christian missionaries in Indonesia, whom they

see as supported by the United States, make the Muslim leaders uneasy about their country's economic dependence on the Judaeo-Christian west, the Middle East conflict and Indonesia's muted support for the Arabs serve as another reminder of that unpleasant dependence. Though some Muslim leaders have an inclination to be favorably disposed toward the west because of a shared antipathy toward Communism, the Middle East conflict makes them wary of the west. To the extent that the Muslim leaders see the outside world as hostile, the Middle East conflict contributes substantially to that perception.

For most of the other members of the foreign policy elite, the Middle East dispute is simply a conflict among distant nations in which there is some sympathy for the Arabs because of Israel's alleged mistreatment of Palestinian refugees, but also a good deal of contempt for the Arabs' incompetence and suspicion about their flirtation with the Russians. In foreign ministry, army, PSI, technocrat, and Catholic circles, there is a very widespread feeling that a "rational" policy for Indonesia would be to view the Middle East conflict not as a religious matter but as an issue between the Arab nations and Israel. While almost no one criticizes the present policy of "lip-service support" for the Arabs, there is practically unanimous agreement that the Arabs are unrealistic to think of destroying Israel. As one general put it: "It doesn't make any sense for [the Arabs] to talk about destroying Israel. Israel is a fact, it exists, and is recognized by the world." Many pictured the Arabs as bumbler, alluding to their inability even to agree among themselves. One newspaper editor told of being approached by Arab embassies at the time of the six-day war. He recalled that the Arabs had asked him to report the war as a defeat for the Israelis. He refused, and instead ridiculed the Arabs for their incompetence. "If Indonesians had been given such equipment, we could have fought a real war," he asserted. The Arabs' generally negative image is reinforced by animosities toward the Arab minority in Indonesia and, according to some, by a belief that the Arab leaders are unreliable allies. Rebutting the contention that Djakarta owes the Arabs firm support out of a sense of indebtedness for Arab backing during the Indonesian revolution, several leaders recalled that when Indonesia's banning of Israel from the Asian Games led to a conflict with the International Olympics Committee resulting in Djakarta's withdrawal from the Olympics, the Arabs refused to join Indonesia in leaving the Olympics. Inasmuch as Djakarta's action was considered to be a move undertaken on behalf of the Arabs, their failure to share in the consequences was portrayed as proof of their untrustworthiness.

There is, in fact, a good deal of sympathy for Israel, though it is almost never expressed publicly. Especially among army officers, PSI leaders, and technocrats, there is admiration for Israel's economic and military achievements. Several went so far as to mention Israel as the country which provides the best model for Indonesia.<sup>14</sup> One army leader put it this way:

When we speak privately among ourselves, we cannot help admiring what the Israelis have done, though we feel bound to support the Arabs. We do feel it was wrong to

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14. This was in response to a question which asked what country, if any, constituted the best model for Indonesia.

establish Israel, but that question aside, they have provided an excellent example of what a nation can do by its own hard work. They have done a marvelous job of economic development. And their concept of the citizen-soldier is very impressive. Every citizen is also a soldier, and every soldier is also a citizen, a contributing citizen. . . . True, a good deal of money is channeled to Israel from private citizens in the United States, but the Israelis have managed to defend themselves and develop their country largely by their own efforts--by self-reliance.

Suspicion about the Arabs' dependence on Communist aid is strongest in the army, but others, including even some Muslims, expressed their concern. One general defended the limiting of Indonesia's support for the Arabs by emphasizing Communist influence in the Middle East:

It is a regrettable fact that Soviet, and even Chinese, influence has penetrated so deep among the Arabs that they are no longer independent. Look at Egypt. You cannot say they are independent. Look at Syria. It is sad that those nations have become victims of the Cold War.

Al Fatah representation in Indonesia, he added, would be "very dangerous," because Communist influence in the guerrilla group is great. An Al Fatah mission in Djakarta could cause great confusion and might provide a channel for the infiltration of Communist agents, he warned. Certain Arab embassies in Djakarta are already serving that purpose, it was alleged. Another general was worried that Al Fatah representation in Djakarta might cause trouble "with those embassies here that support Israel." For example, they might try to blow up the embassy of Switzerland or the United States. "Why should we take a chance on inviting such trouble here?" he asked. Even among Muslims who lament Djakarta's timid support of the Arabs there is concern about Communist influence in the Middle East. An Islamic leader contended that some Arab countries, like Syria, cannot really be called Islamic; they are "secular, leftist." Although some Muslim leaders sought to minimize the implications of Communist influence in the Arab world and especially in Al Fatah by pointing out that Communists have played a role in many national liberation movements, including Indonesia's, most were clearly uneasy about it, some to the point that they were not so sure about the advisability of allowing the guerrilla group representation in Djakarta.

Though clearly few outside the PNI and Islamic parties would be disposed to strengthen Indonesia's support for the Arabs even if Djakarta were not economically dependent on the west, economic considerations do appear to constitute an element in their perception of the Middle East conflict. The PNI and Islamic leaders' contention that the government sees strong support of the Arabs as inconsistent with Indonesia's economic needs does not seem to be without basis. For example, one technocrat stressed the need for an accommodation with Israel in order to facilitate the re-opening of the Suez Canal, thus expediting Indonesia's trade with Europe. Another official defended the diminution of Indonesia's support for the Arabs with the argument that "well-informed" Indonesians understood that their country's "real interests" demanded restraint on the Middle East, so as to avoid jeopardizing western aid sources.

To summarize, the Middle East conflict is not a central concern for most Indonesian leaders, but those who do feel strongly reflect in their attitudes some basic presumptions about the nature of the international system. Those who sympathize strongly with the Arabs--both the Muslims and the PNI--see in the Middle East conflict further evidence of efforts by the major powers to exploit the less developed countries for their own purposes. Though one group is motivated by a concern about religious solidarity and the other by anti-imperialism, both see the Israelis as essentially western intruders and the Arabs as victims of the extension of western influence in the Middle East. And both portray Indonesia's position on the Middle East issue as a reflection of pressures arising from their country's economic dependence on the west. Those who are cool toward the Arabs criticize them for having fallen victim to a dangerous dependence on the Communist powers and admire Israel's apparent success in developing itself economically and militarily without sacrificing its independence to the foreigners who lend support. Thus, practically all of the foreign policy elite see in the Middle East conflict small nations struggling to stay independent of the big powers.

#### The Nefos-Oldefos Conflict

It is clear from the preceding discussion that the foreign policy elite sees the Cold War, the Sino-Soviet dispute, and the Middle East conflict as increasingly peripheral to Indonesia's interests. But each of those conflicts is taken by the Indonesian leaders as evidence that the international system is an essentially exploitative order in which powerful nations seek to dominate the weak. Cutting across the discussion of the several international conflicts is a tendency to emphasize the similarities rather than the differences among the big powers, and to lump together the rich, industrialized nations of the world as threatening the independence of the less developed, newly independent states. It is, therefore, by no means surprising that the concept of a conflict between nefos and oldefos, despite its identification with Sukarno, proved to be still widely accepted by the Indonesian leaders as the most meaningful way to divide the world.

Sukarno's formulation defined the nefos as the "progressive revolutionary" forces of the world, and he explicitly included the Soviet Union and "revolutionary elements" within industrialized western countries as nefos. Many of Indonesia's present leaders have recast the nefos-oldefos conflict in more narrowly economic terms, preferring to speak less of ideology and more of a clash of interests between the rich nations and the poor nations of the world. Nearly 80 percent of the foreign policy elite saw truth in one definition or another of the nefos-oldefos formulation. A similarly overwhelming majority, when asked which of the several conflicts discussed was most important from Indonesia's standpoint, chose the nefos-oldefos conflict, though roughly half of those who did so disdained use of the Sukarno terminology.<sup>15</sup> Young and old, ideologues and pragmatists, and all the major groups except the Islamic party leaders showed broad agreement on the truth of the formulation (see Table 5).

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15. Of 23 leaders, 78 percent chose the nefos-oldefos conflict as the most significant one for Indonesia, while 13 percent mentioned the Cold War and 9 percent the Sino-Soviet dispute.



Table 5  
Agreement With the Nefos-Oldefos Concept as  
a Description of the International System

	It Contains Truth (Much)	It Contains Essentially No Truth
<u>By Age Groups</u>		
1928 Generation	7 (5)	2
1945 Generation	28 (16)	9
1966 Generation	8 (2)	1
<u>By Major Groups</u>		
PNI	8 (8)	0
Army	7 (3)	1
Foreign Ministry	6 (2)	1
PSI	6 (2)	1
Catholic Party	4 (0)	1
Technocrats	5 (2)	2
Islamic Parties	2 (2)	4
<u>Ideologues vs. Pragmatists</u>		
Ideologues	14 (11)	6
Pragmatists	20 (9)	4
All Foreign Policy Elite	43 (23)	12

At the same time, the foreign policy elite's discussion of the nefos-oldefos dichotomy suggested a degree of ambivalence stemming largely from the contradictory pressures bearing on the Indonesian leaders. Those who embraced the nefos-oldefos idea with greatest enthusiasm tended to be older men, ideologues, and PNI leaders, which probably reflects the fact that those groups are the least reticent about being linked with Sukarno and his ideas. Others conceded the validity of the nefos-oldefos dichotomy as a description of international realities, but were clearly uneasy about the implications of that perspective. Especially among those directly responsible for Indonesia's aid-oriented foreign policy, enthusiasm for the nefos-oldefos idea was moderated by a feeling that they cannot afford to assume that the powerful nations with which Indonesia must deal will remain unalterably exploitative. Many who acknowledged the exploitative aims of the big powers insisted that Indonesia must nevertheless continue to seek areas of cooperation with the powers in the hope that they can be persuaded to accept the desirability of development in the less developed countries. Though most see exploitative motivations dominant in the industrialized powers, they maintain that Indonesians "cannot afford to be pessimistic."

For some of the Indonesian leaders, the nefos-oldefos dichotomy still suggests a broad effort by the powerful nations to use their political, military, and economic might to keep the poor nations from

advancing along an independent course. A few emphasized their conviction that the oldefos are motivated by racism and the arrogance that derives from being an established power. In the words of one PNI leader: "The rich-poor conflict really comes down to the racist, superior attitude of the west. . . . You see it everywhere, this attitude of racial superiority. They really recognize only three Asian countries as civilized--China, India, and now Japan. . . . World problems will never be solved until the west gets rid of its attitude of racial superiority." Another leader, who was in the United States at the time of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, recalled that even anti-Communist Indonesians were inclined to side with Cuba, which they saw as a small country threatened by the United States. Others argued that Indonesia's "concrete experience" offered ample evidence of the unwillingness of the powers to refrain from efforts to keep Indonesia down, and they pointed to instances of both western and Communist intervention in Indonesia's internal affairs. Some leaders claimed that the basic truth of the nefos-oldefos idea is borne out by great power domination of the United Nations, as represented especially by their veto power in the Security Council. In the words of one cabinet minister, the UN is "run by the oldefos, just as Sukarno said." CONEFO, he claimed, was a brilliant idea because it reflected an accurate perception of the real situation in the world, but "the world simply was not ready for it yet." The point, in the words of a PNI leader, is that the world "really is divided up that way--with the nefos trying to rise, and the oldefos trying to keep them down, to keep them dependent." Colonialism, "in the old form, not to mention the new, still exists in the world." Even many nefo countries are victims of neo-colonialism--that is to say, they "actually are controlled by oldefos," and their leaders "carry out the bidding of oldefo leaders who operate behind the scenes," a foreign ministry official pointed out. Neo-colonialism can only be overcome, it is argued, through united action by the oppressed.

But political and military pressures are generally seen as less dangerous today than economic ones. The most widespread basis for agreement with the nefos-oldefos concept as a description of the international system is the belief that the industrialized nations of the world do not genuinely desire the economic development of the less developed; on the contrary, the advanced nations are seen as in one degree or another preferring the economic subjugation of nations like Indonesia, so that the latter might be made to serve as sources of raw materials and markets for the surplus production of the industrialized states. Of course, the danger of economic exploitation was an important part of the nefos-oldefos idea, even as enunciated by Sukarno. As one leader close to the former President put it: "[The nefos-oldefos concept] was meant to refer to the conflict between the haves and have-nots--actually between the exploiters and the exploited." For Sukarno, and for many of the ideologues in the foreign policy elite, this conflict is an inevitable product of the existence of an international system dominated by capitalism. But even many of those who consider themselves pragmatists find that their personal experiences have left them with the suspicion that the industrialized nations have not abandoned the goal of economic exploitation that led to colonialism in the first place.

Those directly involved at the highest levels in the formulation and implementation of Indonesia's aid-oriented policy see the

relationship with the aid-giving countries as essentially confrontative, not cooperative. In negotiations concerning the terms of trade, aid, and investment, they have repeatedly encountered evidence of the unwillingness of the industrialized countries to help the less developed. A cabinet minister spoke for other top officials when he expressed doubt that the rich countries want the poor ones to advance. Several of Indonesia's technocrats emphasized that the relationship between the developing and the advanced countries is a confrontative one. As one of them put it:

I think it is accurate to say that there is a basic conflict of interest between the advanced countries and the developing countries. It is not basically a cooperative relationship. For example, look at the UNCTAD sessions, in which it has proved impossible to reach agreement. Or look at the recommendation that the advanced countries give 1 percent of their GNP in aid--only a very few have met this standard. One more example--the recent decision by the United States to release its rubber stockpile is a severe blow to us. Whether it is for economic or political reasons, it is clear that there is a real conflict, a real clash between the advanced countries and the developing countries. . . . It is definitely necessary for the developing countries to join together and struggle against the advanced ones to promote the common interests of the developing countries.

Foreign ministry officials argued vigorously that the industrialized countries want the developing countries to produce only raw materials. In the words of one:

Nobody wants to develop industries in another country that will compete with their own. If people here say they think other countries are interested in seeing Indonesia develop such industries, it is because they feel they must say that. But you cannot take such words at face value. The aid-giving countries are only after their own interests. They aid Indonesia because they expect to gain certain political or economic goals and not for any other reason.

Even some of Sukarno's bitterest opponents, who scorned the nefos-oldefos idea as sloganeering and dismissed it as Marxist cant, did not hesitate to assert the confrontative character of the relationship between the rich and the poor countries. For example, one who declared that he had no sympathy for the nefos-oldefos idea, however defined, went on to argue that the "advanced countries must come to realize that it is in their own interests to help the developing countries, and they must give up their ideas of trying to use aid to establish a new form of colonialism or imperialism, or merely to extend their economic influence."

Numerous arguments are made to substantiate the view that trade, aid, and investment are being used by the industrialized nations to subjugate the developing countries. With respect to trade, a general trend of rising prices for the industrial goods they buy and falling prices for the raw materials they sell has given many Indonesian

leaders the feeling that they are being exploited. Moreover, this trend is viewed as the result of a conscious exertion of power by the advanced countries, which are pictured as concerned mainly about the size of their profits. As a foreign ministry official put it: "The rich countries are too heavily motivated by the short-term needs of their industrialists, which inevitably leads them to a position which is not beneficial to us." The advanced countries, it is said, have repeatedly sought in international conferences and in negotiations on particular commodities to force down prices on Indonesia's exports. A great many Indonesian leaders have been deeply impressed by the unwillingness of the industrialized countries to agree to an easing of trade terms within the framework of the UNCTAD discussions. In the two UNCTAD meetings, held in 1964 and 1968, the western industrial powers stood against the bloc of 77 less developed countries, with the Soviet Union adopting a neutral stance, which the Indonesian leaders tend to interpret as de facto opposition. Like the PNI leader who pointed to the UNCTAD conferences and asked how anyone could say the world is no longer divided into blocs, many Indonesian leaders see those meetings as a graphic demonstration of the reality of the nefos-oldefos conflict. Another example cited by the Indonesians is the tariff system maintained by the European Common Market, which they find very damaging.<sup>16</sup> And when the Indonesians see the United States dumping its rubber and tin on the world market with serious consequences for Indonesia, they find still further evidence that they are being exploited by the powerful industrialized countries.<sup>17</sup>

The fact that some industrialized nations give aid to the less developed countries and invest their capital in them is by no means taken as proof that they genuinely desire economic development in the poor countries. Many of those who emphasized the validity of the nefos-oldefos dichotomy see aid and investment as a potential bridge to domination. The United States' relationship with Latin

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16. The Indonesians are especially concerned about the 10 percent duty imposed by the Common Market on Indonesian pepper. This concern emerged sharply in Harian Kami, July 10, 1970. That newspaper, which represents the anti-Sukarno 1966 Generation leaders, editorially accused the "six rich countries" of the Common Market of establishing high tariff walls "to strike a blow at our exports and those of other developing countries." The Common Market countries' policy of "enriching themselves is implemented by 'killing' the economy of the developing countries," asserted the editorial. See also Harian Kami, July 13, 1970.
  17. The United States' decision in mid-1970 to release its rubber and tin stockpiles on the world market evoked expressions of extreme dismay from several leading technocrats, as reported in the press. One was quoted to the effect that Indonesia's loss would exceed the amount of aid given by the United States. Harian Kami wrote editorially that the rich western countries appeared to be more concerned with their own economic growth and prosperity than with helping the developing countries. Although they give aid to the developing countries, they extract much more; the "morality of the rich countries," concluded Harian Kami, is "give 1/2, get back 3/4." See Harian Kami, July 10, 1970 and July 17, 1970; and Ekspres, July 26, 1970.

America is widely viewed as an example of the kind of danger facing all of the less developed countries. In Southeast Asia fears are focused on Japan. Many leaders, including the highly influential technocrats who formulate Indonesia's economic policies, have expressed the belief that the Japanese would like to exercise the kind of dominant influence in Southeast Asia that the United States has in Latin America. Washington's encouragement of the Japanese in the expansion of their international role only exacerbates that concern. The point here is that the economic position which the Japanese are building through aid and investment is considered merely the local manifestation of a much more general problem facing the less developed countries.

In the first place, aid is sometimes obtainable only after acrimonious bargaining which raises new suspicions about the motivations of the aid-giver. Secondly, a great many of those who see the nefarious division as crucial believe that western aid is conditional, either implicitly or explicitly, on the recipient's following certain economic policies. Especially where "banker's" institutions like the IMF are influential, aid tends to become contingent on the government's following stabilization-oriented policies, which many interpret as creating an ideal climate for foreign investment and the sale of the donor country's products through aid credits, but as seriously impeding the development of indigenous productive capacities. The majority of the foreign policy elite believe that aid is given mainly as a way of disposing of surplus production. As one leader put it: "The Japanese have decided that they need countries like Indonesia to absorb their surplus. They are aware that buying power is very low here. So they give us credits to buy their products and call it aid." Foreign investors who extract a country's resources without building processing facilities and training indigenous personnel only provide further confirmation of the fear that aid and investment are being used as a means of exploitation.<sup>18</sup>

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18. The foreign policy elite's discussion of Indonesia's aid relationships and development strategy is beyond the scope of this paper, but the views they express, which confirm the general skepticism about the motivations of the aid-giving countries suggested above, may be worth summarizing briefly here. More than 60 percent say that they are worried about Indonesia's dependence on foreign aid, and most of them admit to being seriously concerned. A similar percentage are fearful that foreign investment will gain so strong a position in Indonesia that it will jeopardize the country's independence. Even more widespread is the belief that the aid-giving countries have already attempted to attach "strings" to their aid. Some 80 percent are convinced that the industrialized countries assist Indonesia only to serve their own interests, mainly to secure markets for their surplus production. Only a third believe that the advanced countries will give wholehearted support to industrialization in Indonesia, and nearly half expect that they will give no help at all in that endeavor. Nearly two-thirds feel that Indonesia's development strategy is excessively oriented to stabilization at the expense of increasing production, while a similar majority say that the IMF has been too influential in the formulation of those policies. More than 90 percent express concern that the Japanese aspire to economic domination of Indonesia.

If there is wide agreement on the existence of a conflict between the nefos and the oldefos, there is more limited acceptance of Sukarno's recommendation that the nefos unite in struggling to overcome the forces of exploitation. Slightly more than half agree with Sukarno that the nefos must actively confront the oldefos, though few would employ his uncompromisingly anti-imperialist rhetoric. As a PSI leader put it: "It is a struggle--the poor countries must try to unite to force the rich ones to give them better terms. It is a mistake to expect, as we did in the UNCTAD meetings, that the rich will make concessions voluntarily." Leading technocrats have similarly affirmed the need for the nefos to seek a common front in dealing with the rich nations. The nefos must, in the words of an army general, "pool what bargaining power they have as a result of their possession of raw materials and try to better their common lot."

But others see such a struggle as futile. In their view, the poor countries are too weak and disunited to think of imposing any demands on the industrialized nations. "To talk of the nefos mobilizing and crushing the oldefos is unrealistic, nonsense," asserts one young leader who acknowledges the dichotomy's validity as a description of the international system. Conscious of the weakness of the nefos, most are pessimistic about their chances of bringing about any major changes in the nature of the international system. More than half indicated their belief that the gap between the rich and the poor nations is growing wider. As an army general put it: "The rich get richer, and the poor have more children. The rich nations are moving ahead at 50 kilometers, we are moving at 20--how are we going to catch up? It's impossible." Even the economists responsible for Indonesia's development plan talk not of catching up but merely of trying to move ahead. For some members of the foreign policy elite pessimism borders on despair. As one PSI leader put it: "We are so weak that it is unrealistic to talk about a conflict between the poor and rich. . . . There is a good chance that the industrialized countries will simply decide to ignore the poor countries, to let us stew in our own juices. Perhaps the prediction of Marx will come true--we will just wither away, cease to exist." Washington's mid-1970 decision to release its rubber and tin stockpiles evoked a rare public expression of despair from a newspaper representing the anti-Sukarno, 1966 Generation students:

It is truly dishonorable to rely on the pity of others. To form a bloc to challenge the strong countries is not quite realistic. . . . This helplessness is bitter indeed. It often stirs radical-revolutionary thinking in us for what use is the slogan 'stability and security and peace in Southeast Asia' when we are being treated arbitrarily. . . . People are tired of begging. . . .<sup>19</sup>

But many Indonesian leaders, especially those with direct responsibility for the making and implementation of policies, voiced the belief that they simply cannot afford to be pessimistic about the possibilities of resolving differences between the rich nations and the poor. To assume that no compromise is possible would be self-destructive, they feel. Though it is valid, as a Christian

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19. Harian Kami, July 17, 1970.

leader put it, to say that the world must be changed before nations like Indonesia can develop, it is also necessary "to realize pragmatically that we are too weak--we will fail--and thus we must try to work with elements in the advanced countries that are sympathetic" to the needs of the poor nations. The outlook is not promising, but the attempt must be made, he contends. An economic official, noting the futility of talk about confronting the advanced countries, concluded: "The only thing for us to do is to try to work out compromises in a businesslike way with the advanced countries. For example, if the Common Market countries want to have high tariffs, then we say, all right, but then you should give us aid in such and such a form." Indonesia must seek to "eliminate the areas of conflict and build on the possibilities for cooperation," as an army general put it. Several leaders suggested that countries like Indonesia might do better to seek concessions from the advanced countries on an individual basis, rather than through multilateral conferences and other forms of joint action. Whereas from an economic standpoint the less developed countries have a weak bargaining position, "political considerations," it was felt, might lead the industrialized nations to make concessions they would not otherwise consider.

Those who completely rejected the nefos-oldefos dichotomy as a description of international realities emphasized a number of points, most of which also figured to some degree in the thinking of leaders who basically accepted the nefos-oldefos idea. A few dismissed the whole idea as meaningless Sukarno propaganda. One technocrat suggested that the former President simply felt he had to have some concept he could call his own, so he contrived the nefos-oldefos idea. Others found the nefos-oldefos dichotomy repugnant because they regard it as a Marxist conception likely to lead Indonesia into an overly close association with the Communist powers. Several expressed the fear that a movement on the part of the less developed countries to confront the industrialized nations would naturally lead them into alignment with Peking as the leader of the nefos. Though most were inclined to regard the Soviet Union as an oldefo, there were a few who thought that because the Soviets want to keep the rich western countries from getting too far ahead there was a danger that Moscow too might end up leading the nefos. Others dissented in particular from what they see as the Marxist perspective which holds that economic differences necessarily mean conflict. They argue that there is a "difference" but not a "conflict" between the rich and the poor nations; it is possible to have parallel development with all benefiting. Moreover, if the advanced countries help the less developed, suggested one army general, "they know we will feel indebted to them."

The most widespread objection to the nefos-oldefos idea was the belief that the advanced nations are in fact becoming increasingly aware that it is in their interests to foster development in countries like Indonesia. Army generals, technocrats, PSI leaders, and Islamic leaders are among those who say they see "encouraging signs" that the industrialized countries will help the poor develop. The Pearson Report and the increasingly prominent role of organizations like the World Bank are cited as evidence of a growing awareness of the need to reduce differences between the rich and poor nations. The industrialized countries realize, it is said, that a developed, prosperous Indonesia will be a better market for their products than one in which buying power remains low. Besides, added one PSI leader, without aid from the advanced countries there will be no development,

and without development there will be no peace in Southeast Asia. The major powers will do what they must to prevent the further outbreak of war in this region, he predicted. There are certainly conflicts of interest, it is conceded, but that does not mean that the relationship between the rich and poor countries is essentially confrontative. As one foreign ministry official put it: "Sure there are some short-sighted people who resist giving favorable terms . . . to the developing countries because of short-term economic interests, but essentially the developed countries are aware that it is in their own interests to help us develop."

These criticisms of the nefos-oldefos concept, however, represent a minority viewpoint. For the foreign policy elite as a whole, the nefos-oldefos dichotomy remains an accurate description of international realities. Most of the Indonesian leaders do see the outside world as essentially a hostile place. It needs to be borne in mind, of course, that the perception of hostility is not unambiguous. Besides illuminating the thinking of those who reject the nefos-oldefos dichotomy, the criticisms of that concept suggest some of the ambivalence and inconsistency found in the majority's perception of the outside world as hostile. Moreover, the previous discussion of the problem of cooperation among the nefos suggests another important qualification. The Indonesian leaders see the international system as dominated by the big powers, and they tend to see the big powers as hostile; thus, the outside world is seen as a place in which the dominant forces are ones that seek to subjugate Indonesia. But this of course does not mean that all of the forces in the outside world are seen as hostile. Far from considering the other nefos a threat,<sup>20</sup> the Indonesian leaders generally see Djakarta as the natural leader of Southeast Asia and a major force in the Asian-African world. Still, though this simultaneous fear of exploitation by the big powers and self-confidence vis-a-vis the other less developed countries may heighten the ambivalence of Indonesia's leaders as they face the outside world, it does not alter the fact that from their standpoint the predominant forces beyond Indonesia's borders are hostile. Clearly, despite their many disagreements with Sukarno, the essential perception of the international system as an exploitative order is unchanged.

#### Implications for Indonesia's Foreign Policy of Development

If the foreign policy elite's basic assumptions about the nature of the international system suggest a conviction that the outside world is a hostile place, their attitudes concerning Indonesia's foreign aid relationships and development strategy, the meaning of an "independent and active" foreign policy, specific countries as potential threats to Indonesia's independence, and regional trends in Southeast Asia confirm the predominance of that underlying perception. In discussions of all those subjects, the hostile world perspective is evident in the thinking of both young and old, pragmatists and ideologues, and representatives of

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20. An obvious exception is China, perceived as both a nefo and a great power--and definitely a threat.



practically all of the major groups. Moreover, suspicion about the outside world is especially high among those with the most exposure to the world beyond Indonesia's borders--that is, among those with a foreign education or extensive experience living and traveling abroad.<sup>21</sup> Given its bases, it seems fair to regard the perception of a hostile outside world as a continuing influence on Indonesian foreign policy.

But the fact remains that Indonesia's foreign policy is drastically different from what it was before 1966. Notwithstanding the prevalence of a view of the world which is essentially similar to that which underlay Sukarno's policies, Indonesia has clearly abandoned a confrontative foreign policy and is firmly committed to a foreign policy of development. The reasons why Indonesian foreign policy changed so dramatically in the middle 1960's are complex and really beyond the scope of this paper, but it is necessary to say something of that process of change to understand the implications of the foreign policy elite's view of the world for the future of Indonesia's foreign policy of development.

The principal explanation of the change in Indonesian foreign policy lies in the relationship between elite attitudes and political structure. Because of the character of the Indonesian ruling elite and the nature of its power, there have been substantial incentives for Indonesia's leaders, both before and after 1966, to seek foreign aid. Neither the former nor the present leadership has possessed the political apparatus needed to raise domestically the resources for development. A Chinese Communist style mobilization of domestic resources is simply unthinkable for the Indonesian elite, because it lacks both the capacity and the will to implement such a coercive strategy. Sukarno's insistence on self-reliance really meant a downgrading of development, and former high officials in the Sukarno government are virtually unanimous in asserting that no one, not even Sukarno, ever really believed Indonesia could develop without foreign aid. That the present elite sees foreign aid as indispensable is manifest--78 percent asserted that development in Indonesia would be impossible without foreign aid. Moreover, foreign aid and investment present to those in power opportunities for personal profit, and some officials have been far from reluctant to take advantage of such opportunities.

Prior to 1966, however, the political risks of a development foreign policy were almost prohibitively high. The political system that prevailed in the early 1960's was competitive, in the sense that there were three real contenders for power--Sukarno, the army, and the PKI. Given the existence of a widespread perception of the outside world as hostile, it is very hard to imagine that a foreign policy emphasizing primarily the search for aid and heavy reliance on foreign advice in the planning and execution of an economic stabilization program could have been adopted in a competitive political situation. The stabilization plan of 1963 drew opposition from practically every quarter; all of the political parties were critical, while the army leadership exhibited no enthusiasm for the plan. In the first place, stabilization, a precondition for economic aid from the West, required painful sacrifices on the part of many

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21. The relationship between perceptions of hostility and exposure to the outside world is explored in some detail in my forthcoming Cornell Ph.D. dissertation.

people; it is almost never a popular policy in any country, though it may be accepted as necessary. But beyond the difficulties inherent in any stabilization program the widespread perception of a hostile world created particular dangers for advocates of a development foreign policy. Anyone who might have dared to propose such a course would have immediately laid himself open to the accusation that he was selling out the country, making a mockery of independence, and lacking in nationalist spirit. Had any one of the major competitors for power openly advocated such a course, the result would have been to give its rivals an excellent opportunity to gain political advantage.

At the same time, the existence of a competitive political system created strong incentives for the Sukarno government to pursue a confrontative foreign policy, which could be portrayed as necessary to defend the nation's independence against perceived threats. In a competitive situation, given prevailing attitudes, a foreign policy emphasizing the need to defend Indonesia's independence against external threats served a variety of political uses. For example, the policy of confrontation against Malaysia was used by all three of the chief political elements to legitimize domestic policies which each felt would enhance its political position vis-a-vis the others.

Once the political competition was resolved in favor of one of the contenders, as it was when the army came effectively to monopolize political power in 1966, the political attractions of a confrontative foreign policy became irrelevant. At the same time, the political costs to the government of a development policy were substantially reduced. Some of the development policy's principal backers have acknowledged that it was possible to enact it only because the political opposition had been so badly intimidated that it kept silent. The reticence of critics was due to a number of considerations. Fundamentally, they feared the political consequences of opposing the government at a time when their own positions were politically insecure. Only the most courageous would want to risk being branded "old order" sympathizers, or, if their anti-Sukarno credentials were impeccable, dupes. Besides, there was, and still is, a feeling that opposition would be futile. It would raise risks of embarrassing oneself politically without any real chance of having an impact on the government's policies. Apart from the political dangers of expressing their doubts, there is also the profound ambivalence of men who sincerely want to see their country develop and do not wish to hinder that effort, even if they do have misgivings about the foreign policy implications of the present development strategy. Even those directly responsible for Indonesia's foreign policy and development strategy are not insensitive to the dangers of dependence on foreign aid, but they simply see no alternative to the approach they have chosen to follow. In interviews, many Indonesians were clearly uneasy about expressing sentiments which might conceivably jeopardize their country's chances of getting the aid it needs.

Indonesia's foreign policy of development, then, is being carried out without the support of the underlying attitudes one might expect of a policy that emphasizes cooperation with the big powers and accepts dependence on the western powers for economic aid. The Indonesian leaders' view of the world makes them exceedingly suspicious of the motivations of the big powers

and deeply ambivalent about their foreign policy of development. They allow themselves to become dependent on foreign aid because they feel they have no choice, but they don't like it. This suggests that there is very great potential in Indonesia for an anti-foreign appeal. It may not be insignificant that some of those most directly identified with Indonesia's development foreign policy--that is, the foreign minister and the leading technocrats--have in the last year come under some harsh criticism in the press. In the fall of 1970 certain Djakarta newspapers published highly critical editorials with titles like "How to Sell a Nation/People."<sup>22</sup> The leader in this campaign, which eased off after the start of 1971, was *Merdeka*, whose publisher, B. M. Diah, had been selected in October 1970 as chairman of the Indonesian Journalists Association, apparently with backing from army elements close to President Suharto. To what extent *Merdeka's* editorials represented the thinking of those army elements is unclear. But given the depth of suspicion about the outside world, it will be surprising if there are not more statements of this viewpoint in the coming years, especially if the economy fails to show truly impressive progress. And to the degree that political power in Djakarta becomes more diffuse and political competition is restored, one may expect increasing challenges to Indonesia's foreign policy of development.

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22. See *Merdeka*, December 7, 1970. See also the editions of October 1, October 6, and December 4, 1970.