

MARXISTS AND IMPERIALISM: THE INDONESIAN POLICY OF THE
DUTCH SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC WORKERS PARTY, 1894-1914

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One of the great unresolved problems which the Second International bequeathed to its post-1914 successors was the question of colonial policy. Superficially, colonialism posed no particular difficulties. In 1896, the London congress of the Second International condemned colonial expansion as an expression of capitalist enterprise. The condemnation was renewed by the Paris congress in 1900 and four years later by the Amsterdam congress. However, an attempt was made at the Amsterdam congress to place the Second International on record as condemning capitalist colonial policy and not colonialism *per se*, the argument being that socialist states in Europe might retain the colonies established by previous capitalist regimes. The obvious implication of this position was that the Second International should move toward the establishment of guidelines which defined a uniquely socialist colonial policy. Although this attempt to alter the previous policy guideline on colonialism failed, the forces in the Second International which favored a revision of colonial policy tried again at the 1907 Stuttgart congress. After heated debate, the congress voted, 127-108, with 10 abstaining, to continue the formal condemnation of colonial enterprise.¹ This was the last policy position on colonies which the Second International approved before the First World War.

Although a minor power in Europe, the Netherlands was a colonial power of the first order. This status inevitably affected the Dutch section of the Second International. Seen within the context of the Second International, the Dutch section had moved further toward the establishment of a colonial program than either the British or the French sections. On the other hand, within the Dutch section itself, discussion of colonial policy problems played a minor role. Whereas the colonial question generated a theoretical literature of considerable scope and magnitude within the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), such was not the case in the Netherlands. The crucial difference between the two parties lay in the fact that left-opposition

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1. See Carl Schorske, German Social Democracy, 1905-1917 (2nd ed.; New York: Wiley & Sons, 1965), pp. 84-85, for a brief discussion of the consequences of the Stuttgart resolution for the German SPD. As will be seen, its effect on the Dutch section of the Second International was modest at best. In all citations of Dutch titles I have retained the original spelling and word formation. Thus kongres will sometimes appear as congres, etc. Throughout this essay the term Indonesia will be used instead of Dutch East Indies. The author would like to express his thanks and appreciation to the friends and colleagues who aided in the preparation of this essay: Professors Manfred Jonas and Robert Sharlet, Union College; John Laffey, Sir George Williams University; Robert Van Niel, University of Hawaii; and Eugene and Elizabeth Genovese, University of Rochester.

elements in the German party were far quicker to move on to imperialism as an issue. Beyond this, the left-opposition faction remained inside the German party until 1916. By contrast, the left-opposition in the Netherlands regrouped in 1909 and went over to the formation of a rival socialist party, the Sociaal Democratische Partij (Social Democratic Party--SDP). This SDP grouping would move on to the equation of capitalism, imperialism and war, and would also take a principled stand against Dutch rule in Indonesia. However, it remained a small, isolated, splinter party, unrecognized by the Second International. Its genesis served merely to weaken seriously the marxist² element within the recognized section of the International, the Sociaal Democratische Arbeiderspartij (Social Democratic Labor Party--SDAP).

Founded in 1894, the SDAP was the product of a split within the older Social Democratische Bond. Seeking to disassociate social democracy from the anti-parliamentary syndicalist mainstream within the Bond, a faction led by Frank van der Goes and Pieter Jelles Troelstra, founded a new party on its own.³ This party emerged from the 1896 London congress of the Second International as the recognized Dutch section of that body. From its origins, the SDAP thus contained a powerful reformist tendency. The initial strength of the party lay in the small rural communities in the northern zone of the country and it was not until the turn of the century that the party began to make inroads in the larger cities and towns. The SDAP was very small. This lack of size is apparent from the following table.⁴

SDAP membership

1901	4500
1902	6500
1903	5600
1904	6100
1905	6805
1906	7471
1907	8423

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2. Within the context of the Dutch political idiom, the term marxist was virtually synonymous with the left-opposition groupings which centered on the Nieuwe Tijd circle and later on the De Tribune faction. (These groups will be discussed later.) Although other elements in the SDAP regarded themselves as marxist, the term was effectively monopolized by the left-opposition. Just after the turn of the century, the left-opposition tended to define marxism in terms of the positions taken on various points of doctrine and policy by Karl Kautsky and his followers within the Social Democratic Party of Germany. Thus the SPD was often cited as an ideological model. Within the perimeters of a conventional left-right political spectrum, the center position in Germany was left-wing in the Netherlands. Between 1907-10, however, a process began whereby the left-opposition in the Netherlands began to move toward the Rosa Luxemburg, Leipziger Volkszeitung grouping in the Social Democratic Party of Germany.
 3. The split within the Bond is handled in considerable detail by D. J. Wansink in his doctoral dissertation, Het socialisme op de tweesprong. De geboorte van de S.D.A.P. (Haarlem: Tjeenk Willink & Zoon, 1939).
 4. The above figures are taken from the yearly report of the party secretary. The reports were bound in the Verslag of the annual party congress. The party secretary did not furnish exact figures until the 1905 Verslag.

The SDAP press and propaganda network was also rather limited. The SDAP maintained one national daily. Though this newspaper, *Het Volk*, began to publish in 1900, only in 1910 did it reach 10,000 subscriptions.⁵ Beneath *Het Volk* lay a series of regional party papers.

The limitations of size were compounded by two additional factors; suffrage restrictions and the absence of a national, social-democratic union movement. The suffrage law stipulated that in order to vote an adult male had to meet a series of (gradually relaxed) property qualifications measured by income, taxation, savings, and rent. In 1870, only 12.1 percent of the adult males had the right to vote. By 1900, the figure had risen to 49 percent, but even in 1914 it stood no higher than 67.6 percent.⁶ These suffrage restrictions insured a very modest SDAP faction in the 100-seat Tweede Kamer--the lower house of the parliament. In 1897, the SDAP elected two deputies, in 1901 six, plus a seventh who joined the faction after a 1902 by-election, and in 1905 the faction fell from seven to six deputies.⁷ The lack of a national union arm also hindered the development of the SDAP. The Nationaal Arbeids-Secretariaat, formed in 1893, was anti-parliamentary, revolutionary, and syndicalist; it would have nothing to do with the SDAP. Moreover, development of unions of any kind was hampered by the peculiar nature of the Dutch economy. In 1899, 29.6 percent of the labor force was employed in the agrarian sector of the economy. Industry and manufacture accounted for only 33.8 percent.⁸ Dutch agriculture was characterized by labor-intensive exploitation of small plots. In like manner, Dutch industry and manufacturing was typically composed of small units with a strong accent on craft-trades. The Netherlands lacked a large blue-collar concentration similar to those found in Belgium, northern France, and the German Rhineland.

The most highly developed sector of the labor force was in transportation. Yet even here, the SDAP encountered difficulties. In Amsterdam, the harbor workers were either syndicalist and thus anti-socialist, or unorganized and hostile toward the SDAP. The Rotterdam harbor workers were generally unorganized, and during the late-nineteenth century the SDAP remained relatively weak in Rotterdam. Finally, in 1905, a number of the national trade union federations formed the Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen which was cautiously linked to

5. A. C. J. de Vrankrijker, Het wervende woord. Geschiedenis der socialistische week- en dagbladers in Nederland (Amsterdam: De Arbeiderspers, 1950), p. 249.

6. Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Jaarcijfers voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden. Rijk in Europa, 1914 (The Hague, 1915), Table II, p. 315.

7. The election efforts of the SDAP are presented in detail by W. H. Vliegen in his massive survey of the party's early years, Die onze kracht ontwaken deed. Geschiedenis der Sociaaldemocratische Arbeiderspartij in Nederland gedurende de eerste 25 jaren van haar bestaan (3 vols.; Amsterdam: Ontwikkeling, 1924-38), I, pp. 186-206, 410-32, and II, pp. 58-84.

8. For a general account of the Dutch socio-economic structure on the eve of the First World War, see I. J. Brugmans, Paardenkracht en mensenmacht. Sociaal-economische geschiedenis van Nederland, 1795-1940 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1969), pp. 286-431. For greater detail, see J. A. de Jonge, De industrialisatie in Nederland tussen 1850 en 1914 (Amsterdam: Scheltema & Holkema, 1968).

the SDAP.⁹ The absence of heavy industry, the extensive petit bourgeois trade and handicraft culture, the recent and still fragile link with the trade unions, suffrage restrictions and a measure of competition from the syndicalist movement all served to cripple the SDAP as a major political party until the 1913 elections.

The SDAP built its initial electoral foundations in the northern, Calvinist areas. The 1878-95 agrarian depression in Friesland had fanned social discontent and had played a major role in the generation of a Bond following both in Friesland and in the neighboring provinces. Beyond this, the Friesche Volkspartij, a popular, democratic reform party, began to emerge in the last years of the crisis. Troelstra, who was active in both movements at the provincial and regional level, carried members of the Volkspartij and the parliamentary wing of the Bond into the SDAP in the years following its formation. As parliamentary fraction leader, he conceived of the SDAP as a popular reform party, committed to democratic ideals and parliamentary government as well as to socialism. While Troelstra considered himself a socialist and a marxist, he did not envision the SDAP as being purely a blue-collar workers' party. In Troelstra's mind, the SDAP had to draw diverse social groupings into a flexible socialist framework. The goal was the realization of a socialist state through an SDAP majority in parliament. Once universal suffrage was obtained, Troelstra was confident that a social democratic majority would follow--if the party maintained a broad construction. As leader of the parliamentary fraction, Troelstra wielded enormous influence within the party. He also served as editor of *Het Volk* until the autumn of 1903. Troelstra's devotion to the parliamentary route was paralleled by a fondness for revolutionary rhetoric. This fusion of devotion to the parliamentary path to socialism and a real, if sentimental, commitment to revolution allowed Troelstra to assume a middle position between a reformist bloc headed by the parliamentarian J. H. Schaper and the journalist Willem Vliegen and two marxist factions. In practice, however, Troelstra was increasingly forced to side with the reformist bloc, which, while satisfied with his political leadership, was often unnerved by his revolutionary rhetoric and personal instability.¹⁰

The years 1901-9 were particularly difficult for the Troelstra grouping within the SDAP. In 1896 the theoretical journal *Nieuwe Tijd* had been founded as a sort of Dutch equivalent of *Neue Zeit* in Imperial Germany. By 1900 the editorial board of *Nieuwe Tijd* was coalescing into a left-opposition bloc. While the bloc did not function as an entity until 1905-6, the agrarian debate of 1901 witnessed the birth of the editorial board's hostility towards the party leadership. The *Nieuwe Tijd* circle included Frank van der Goes, Herman Gorter, Henriëtte Roland Holst, Anton Pannekoek, Pieter Wiedijk, and F. M. Wibaut.

9. Frits de Jong provides an outstanding general history of the NVV within the context of the Dutch labor movement in his popular Om de plaats van de arbeid (Amsterdam: De Arbeiderspers, 1956).

10. The era of party debate, 1901-9, is best approached through autobiographical sources. The three most representative are Pieter Troelstra, Gedenkschriften (Amsterdam: Em. Querido, 1927-31), vols. II and III; Willem van Ravesteijn, De wording van het communisme in Nederland (Amsterdam: Van Kampen & Zoon, 1948), pp. 5-102; and Vliegen, Die onze kracht, vols. I and II. The first two plead a special case. The Vliegen volumes form a general history of the SDAP, but are written by a key party figure whose career was an integral part of the events and developments he later describes.

Their general critique of the SDAP leadership revolved around the nature of the party. The *Nieuwe Tijd* group argued for an orthodox marxist strategy and party policy guideline, looking to the Kautsky current in the German SPD as a model. The parliamentary fraction was conceived of more in symbolic, agitational than functional legislative terms. This attitude led to the debates over agrarian policy in 1901, school policy in 1902, Troelstra's role in the 1903 strike action, and electoral strategy during the 1905 runoff elections and thereby raised basic questions about the nature of social democracy itself. Enjoying support in only a handful of sections, and finding only a modest circulation for their journal, the *Nieuwe Tijd* group relied on articles in *Het Volk* and speeches at the annual party congress as the only means of transforming the party. In the course of the 1906 Utrecht congress and again at Haarlem in 1907 it became quite clear that the Dutch marxists were locked in a minority position.

In the autumn of 1907, a new opposition faction emerged. Led by David Wijnkoop, J. C. Ceton and Willem van Ravesteijn, the new grouping began publication of a weekly newspaper *De Tribune*. Like *Nieuwe Tijd*, *De Tribune* was privately financed and thus outside the control of the Partij Bestuur (the governing board of the SDAP). *De Tribune* was by and large a logical continuation of the *Nieuwe Tijd* thrust. Although the paper was written in a more popular and polemical style, by and large it took over the positions first elaborated in the *Nieuwe Tijd*. Wijnkoop was the chairman of the largest section of the SDAP, Amsterdam III, and Ceton was the section secretary. Thus the *Tribune* group was able to carry their message into the Amsterdam sections and from there challenge the party leadership in the Amsterdam Federation.¹¹ The *Nieuwe Tijd* group had never been able to launch this type of internal political offensive within the party. Its members were scattered in minor sections, e.g., Naarden-Bussum, Laren, Hilversum and Leyden. The *Tribune* group forced a crisis within the SDAP which resulted in the expulsion of the group from the party in the aftermath of an extraordinary party congress in February, 1909, at Deventer.¹² This action was to have major implications for the SDAP's Indonesian policy although the connection between the two was neither immediate nor direct.

The Official SDAP Position on Indonesia, 1894-1914

The SDAP had not moved rapidly toward the formulation of a colonial program. During the founding congress held in Zwolle on August 26, 1894, a five-man commission was named to develop a party program. The commission's report was presented to the first party congress, held at Deventer in April, 1895. The 1895 program, based upon the 1891 Erfurt program of the German SPD, was approved and served as the party program until 1912.¹³ It mentioned neither imperialism in general nor Indonesia in particular. In similar fashion, the 1897 elec-

11. Van Ravesteijn, *De wording*, pp. 5-102, embodies a semi-autobiographical account of the formation of the *De Tribune* group up to the 1909 Deventer congress.

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 95-102.

13. See Vliegen, *Die onze kracht*, I, pp. 100-107, for a brief discussion of the program by one of the men who drafted it.

tion program failed to mention Indonesia nor did it advance colonial reform demands. It was not until 1901 that the SDAP entered a parliamentary election with a colonial clause in the electoral program. The sixteenth and final point in the 1901 election program read as follows:

p. Development of the colonial administration in the direction of self-government of the colonies. Starting from this principle the following demands are presented:

1. End the Atjeh-war. Separation of finances, decentralization of the administration.
2. Elimination of forced labor and of forced coffee cultivation. Placement of pawnshops in the hands of their own operators.
3. Vigorous continuation of irrigation works. Agricultural credit.
4. Furnishing of obstetrical care.
5. Improvement of the social circumstances of the Indo-Europeans.¹⁴

In 1900, there were about 70,000 Europeans living on the island of Java alone--the vast bulk of them Dutch. While individuals maintained membership in the SDAP and supported the party in one way or another, usually through the remittance of funds, a party section had not yet been established.¹⁵ Thus there was no organizational link between the SDAP and the Indonesian island complex. In fact, the first social-democratic organization, the Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereniging (Indies Social Democratic Association), was founded only on May 9, 1914, well after a number of the Indonesian national associations.¹⁶ But bearing in mind that the SDAP membership was still slightly under 10,000 in 1910, the absence of Indonesian sections is not extraordinary. Furthermore, most Europeans in the island zone were in at least white-collar or administrative capacities and hardly formed the basis for even a small social-democratic cadre.

Henri van Kol was the architect of official SDAP Indonesian policy as it began to emerge over the coming half-decade. Born in Eindhoven on May 23, 1852, Van Kol was of bourgeois origins.¹⁷ While a student at the Delft Technical School, Van Kol joined the Dutch section of the First International. In 1876 he left for Java as an engineer in the public works sector of the colonial administration. He remained in Java until 1884 when he returned to Europe for two years. From 1886 until 1892 Van Kol was back in Java. During his years in Java he remained a socialist, joining and supporting the Sociaal-Democratische

14. Ibid., pp. 422-23.

15. F. Tichelman, "De SDAP en Indonesië, 1897-1907. Enkele gegevens en problemen," Nieuwe Stem, XXII, No. 12 (December 1967), pp. 683-723. This excellent article focuses on Van Kol and his evolution as the SDAP colonial expert. For an older study, see Daan van der Zee, De S.D.A.P. en Indonesië (Amsterdam: Ontwikkeling, 1929). Van der Zee deals with the parliamentary fraction of the SDAP and its position on various issues involving Indonesia. He does not cover discussion or debate within the SDAP itself on such questions.

16. Ruth T. McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965), p. 14.

17. Vliegen, Die onze kracht, I, pp. 93-99, contains a brief sketch of Van Kol's career.

Bond, corresponding with the Bond leader Domela Nieuwenhuis, and publishing a number of essays on colonial conditions and issues, not to mention a number of tracts on socialism.¹⁸ Upon his second return to Europe, Van Kol established ties with the opposition grouping within the Bond and was subsequently one of the founders of the SDAP.

In 1897 Van Kol was elected to parliament from Enschede in the heart of the Twente textile complex.¹⁹ Standing as a candidate in four districts, he was defeated in all of them either on the first ballot or in the runoff. However, when N. G. Pierson, elected as a Liberal from Enschede was named Minister of Finance, the Enschede mandate was open. Van Kol entered the by-election, placed second to the Roman Catholic candidate, J. H. ter Veer, and then, securing Liberal support in the runoff, carried the district on the second ballot. He thus joined Troelstra in the lower house of parliament. Given the importance of the Dutch East Indies and the frequency with which legislative questions arose, especially within the context of the annual debates over the national budget, Van Kol quite naturally developed into the party expert on colonial affairs. Since Troelstra spoke mainly to other issues, Van Kol had a relatively free hand in advancing SDAP criticism of Dutch colonial rule. Such criticism, however, did not follow either from the party program or from a mandate from the annual party congress. His statements expressed his personal views and little more.

In 1898, Van Kol published a brief essay in *Nieuwe Tijd* which clearly challenged what he considered to be orthodox marxist theory. Entitled "No Dogmas!" his essay contended that certain elements in marxian theory were in need of revision.²⁰ He pointed to the labor theory of value, the mystique of revolution, and the growing impoverishment of the labor force, as all being in one way or another incorrect. The needs for a moral basis for socialism and for attention to national particulars and peculiarities were also accented. The essay triggered a polemical reply by Frank van der Goes, who was always ready to defend Marx, in the same journal.²¹ Although no more than an incident, the exchange was an early indication of Van Kol's reformism. Within the context of the SDAP he was securely settled on the right wing of the party. The exchange also foreshadowed the conflict between the *Nieuwe Tijd* circle and the party leadership on a series of issues between 1901 and 1907.

After 1900, Van Kol played a more important role in the Second International's congresses than he did within the SDAP itself. During the 1900 Paris congress of the International, he presented the colonial resolution on behalf of the colonial commission. Adopted by general acclamation, the resolution recommended three measures.

1. That the various socialist parties study the colonial question.
2. Encouragement of the formation of socialist parties in the

18. Tichelman, "De SDAP," pp. 684-86.

19. See Vliegen, *Die onze kracht*, I, pp. 202-4, for a description of Van Kol's victory in Twente.

20. Rienzi (Henri van Kol), "Geen Dogma's!" *Nieuwe Tijd*, III (1898-99), pp. 113-19.

21. Frank van der Goes, "Dogma en Overtuiging," *Nieuwe Tijd*, III (1898-99), pp. 446-55, and pp. 616-28.

colonies where economic circumstance makes this policy possible. Such socialist parties are to join the socialist party in the motherland.

3. Establishment of relations between the socialist parties in the various colonies.²²

(The second point in the resolution is of some interest in that its implementation would have created a type of party imperialism. The colonial parties would, in all probability, have been subordinated to the social-democratic party in the motherland.)

In analyzing the Paris congress for the *Nieuwe Tijd* readership, Roland Holst warmly and enthusiastically reviewed the resolution and its implications. Noting the consensus on both the colonial and military resolutions, she concluded that "there is not, and cannot be, an imperialist minority in social democracy."²³ She then proceeded to endorse the three policy recommendations with a slight stress upon the first. "The congress could not have placed more emphasis on the great importance of colonial policy in this era of social development than by recommending--study. Because we know that we are powerless against a phenomena until we grasp and understand it."²⁴

The following April, 1901, Van Kol published the draft of his proposed colonial program for the SDAP. Appearing in the April issue of *Nieuwe Tijd*, the draft contained nine policy recommendations: a statement of principle, political rights, the judicial system, education, regulation of industry and agriculture, public health, taxation, finance, and administration.²⁵ Not one of Van Kol's points were uniquely socialist. Taken in total, the draft embodied a series of reform demands which some Dutch liberals could have accepted. Class struggle, internal contradictions, the formation of an Indonesian social democratic party--none of these appeared in the draft. Nor did Van Kol develop points 2 or 3 of the 1900 Paris resolution on colonial policy--a resolution which he himself presented to the congress on behalf of the colonial commission. The draft text opened with this statement of principle: "The welfare of the natives, their physical, intellectual and moral development must be the ultimate goal of our colonial policy. Our primary task is the advancement of economic development with as much alleviation as possible of the unavoidable transition period. The selfish administration and the capitalist exploitation of our colonies must make room for a political economy of moral responsibility."²⁶ The creation of a socialist society was not mentioned. The final point was equally significant. Bearing on administration, and entitled "Our Duty," it defined the goal of SDAP colonial policy as being "to develop the native through wise and unselfish guardianship to self-government."²⁷

22. Henriëtte Roland Holst, "Het V^{de} International Soc. dem. Kongres," *Nieuwe Tijd*, V (1900), pp. 290-91. The text of the resolution is flanked by Roland Holst's interpretation.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 291.

24. *Ibid.*

25. Henri van Kol, "Ontwerp-program voor de Nederlandsche koloniale politiek," *Nieuwe Tijd*, VI (1901), pp. 197-220.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 199.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 215.

The draft contained one final argument of interest. Van Kol contended that the Indonesian island complex was of considerable economic value to the Netherlands. This was a commonplace observation during the nineteenth century, but Van Kol added a peculiar twist. He seemed to imply that the retention of the Indonesian island complex was in the interest of the Dutch working class. "Without the possession of our colonies--as demonstrated by these few figures--the Netherlands would have less trade, less shipping and less industry, more poverty and unemployment. . . ." ²⁸ Van Kol's chief objection to Dutch colonial rule was rooted in the nature of colonial policy; he was clearly not attacking the principle of colonies *per se*. "I would only--in contrast with opinions often heard--recall that our *colonial possession* now, just as earlier, *yields great advantages*, and that it would be ungrateful to forget such." ²⁹

The Van Kol draft appeared just a few days before the annual party congress. Although it was placed on the congress agenda, the congress declined to take any action. Neither the leading organs of the SDAP nor the Partij Bestuur were planning to press colonial policy as an issue in an election year. Beyond this, the SDAP was in the midst of a debate over the party's agrarian program. Herman Gorter had charged that the 1897 agrarian program was not marxist and did not represent a socialist solution. Troelstra, acting as a parliamentarian and editor-in-chief of *Het Volk*, assumed the responsibility of defending the party program. This debate dominated the congress, hence the colonial question was pushed into the background. The sections Kampen and Breda introduced motions calling for further study, and the congress adopted the Breda motion, which was introduced by Van Kol (speaking as a delegate from the section Breda), quickly and with no debate. The colonial question was thus dispatched in a matter of minutes. The motion concluded: the congress of the SDAP "decides to name a commission, which will conduct further study of the components of the draft-program, and which will issue a report thereon at the next congress, and goes over to the order of the day." ³⁰ Henri Polak, leader of the diamond workers' union in addition to being chairman of the SDAP, suggested that "the proposal be changed so that the new program be considered not at the but at a following congress, and authorizing the Partij Bestuur to name a colonial commission in consultation with Van Kol." ³¹ The suggestion was accepted and the congress moved on to the next item on the agenda.

The implementation of the resolution had the effect of bringing the left-opposition into the formulation of colonial policy. The Partij Bestuur appointed Van Kol, Troelstra, J. F. Ankersmit, W. J. van Gogh, P. L. Tak, Pieter Wiedijk and Frank van der Goes to the commission. ³² The left-opposition in the SDAP had not been involved in

28. Ibid., p. 198.

29. Ibid.

30. Verslag van het Zevende Congres der S.D.A.P. en van het Verkiezings-Congres, p. 36 [bijlage III, Beschrijvingsbrief voor het Partij-Congres], contains the text of the original Kampen motion. A revised Kampen motion and the Breda motion were not submitted in time for placement on the formal agenda. The text of both appear in the minutes of the congress, Verslag, p. 12.

31. Ibid., p. 12.

32. Verslag van het achtste congres der Sociaaldemocratische Arbeiderspartij, p. 35 [bijlage A, Verslag van den Partijsecretaris], lists the members of the commis-

the formulation of colonial policy until this date. But once named, the commission was inactive for two years. Only in January 1904 did it suddenly begin to move toward the rapid development of a resolution on colonial policy--for presentation to the 1904 Amsterdam congress of the Second International, however, not to the SDAP. Assisted by the party commission in the drafting process, Van Kol was to present the resolution to the Amsterdam congress. After considerable debate with Pieter Wiedijk, who had drafted both a critique and an alternative statement, Van Kol finally submitted a fifth, and final draft to the commission.

This draft was adopted by the commission and was carried by Van Kol into the colonial committee of the Second International during the Amsterdam congress in August, 1904. The draft repeated a number of familiar points; retention of colonies by a socialist regime, reform and welfare policies, the necessity and advantages of colonies as raw material supply sources, and the establishment of state enterprises. The direct interests of European labor were not slighted:

It is the duty of social democracy, where a modern proletariat arises in the colonies, to make it more defensible in its fight against capital through the promotion of its organization and the protection of its health; and through an increase in its standard of living to avert the danger of competition which the cheap labor of underdeveloped peoples can present to the workers of the more developed capitalist lands.³³

The draft also called for the eventual realization of self-government within the various colonial zones.

In the process of developing the draft, the first attempt by a Dutch marxist to establish a marxist framework for a colonial policy has failed. Wiedijk's drafts were never published nor were they widely circulated. Van Kol read all three of them, as in all probability did Troelstra; the balance of the committee read only drafts two and three. It is interesting to note that Wiedijk did not carry the issue into the pages of *Nieuwe Tijd*. In fact he did not discuss the 1904 colonial commission and its draft resolutions in print until 1930.

sion. In his biography of Pieter Wiedijk, Professor Frits de Jong, *J. Saks, Literator en Marxist* (Amsterdam: Arbeiderspers, 1954), p. 121, mentions a colonial commission formed by the SDAP in 1898. However, no reference is made to this commission in the minutes of the 1901 party congress; and the Verslag of the 1902 party congress, which contains the yearly report of the party secretary, lists the new colonial commission as including Wiedijk. See p. 35.

Wiedijk confuses matters by stating in an autobiographical article, published twenty-eight years later, "Uit de oude doos," *De Nieuwe Weg*, 1930, No. 3 (March), p. 71, that in the month of January, 1904, he replaced Frank van der Goes on a colonial commission formed for the purpose of submitting a draft resolution to the colonial commission of the Second International. Yet the composition of the commission is identical to the group formed in 1902. Since the 1902 commission never reported to a congress, or even to the Partij Bestuur, it is possible that it was used to draft a resolution for the Second International and then dissolved. Writing late in life, perhaps Wiedijk's memory betrayed him.

33. J. Saks (Pieter Wiedijk), "Uit de oude doos," *De Nieuwe Weg*, 1930, No. 4 (April), p. 111.

The annual party congress of the SDAP was held in Dordrecht on April 3-5, 1904. The colonial commission did not report to the congress nor was the forthcoming report to the International on the agenda. But earlier, in the autumn of 1903, Van Kol, speaking in parliament without consulting the party, had advocated the sale of the outer Indonesian islands to foreign powers and a concentration of Dutch colonial resources on Java and Sumatra. In the April 1904 issue of *Nieuwe Tijd*, he developed his plan more fully. In the process, he advanced a clear and naked case for keeping the colonies. "Colonies are simply essential for the economic development of the globe; many raw materials would be missed, many industries would languish, considerable food and luxury articles would be missing, if the tropical territories in the hands of primitive races were simply left fallow."³⁴ Once again, the interests of Dutch labor were linked to colonies. "The development of Dutch trade and shipping there, just like industry, also benefits the Dutch worker, who has a powerful interest in the flowering of colonies."³⁵

As the Dordrecht congress approached, the section Amsterdam I introduced the following motion: "The congress urges the parliamentary faction, especially our fellow party member Van Kol, to give a further explanation of the fundamental grounds upon which a social democrat can propose the sale of a nation or part of a nation."³⁶ The motion was placed on the agenda for consideration when the congress began to discuss the report of the parliamentary fraction. It is interesting and significant to note that the Dutch marxists did not react. The April issue of *Nieuwe Tijd* contained an analysis of the congress agenda by Frank van der Goes, who, along with Wiedijk, was perhaps the leading marxist social critic in the nation. Van der Goes had no objection to the sale plan *per se*. "Van Kol has in mind a peaceful way to escape from the burden of the too extensive colony, so that the remaining section is the better for it."³⁷ As for the principle of sale, Van der Goes contended that: "From the viewpoint of abstract justice, sale is not to be condemned any more or less than retention."³⁸ In a more critical tone, Van der Goes did ask on what basis a social democrat justified the exploitation of foreign populations. He closed by noting that "the liberation of oppressed peoples outside the capitalist world can only happen after the liberation of the proletariat inside its frontiers."³⁹

On the first day of the congress, the report of the parliamentary faction, and thus the sale plan, came under consideration. Van Kol responded to the resolution of the section Amsterdam I by defending his position. Expressing regret at not having consulted the party, he argued, however, that parliamentary circumstances precluded consultation. The sale scheme was defended on familiar grounds. "We Dutchmen

34. Henri van Kol, "Inkrimping onzer Koloniën," *Nieuwe Tijd*, IX (1904), p. 259.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 258.

36. *Verslag van het tiende congres der S.D.A.P.* [Beschrijvingsbrief, p. 4]. Here as elsewhere below, pages of appendices to party congress reports are numbered separately.

37. Frank van der Goes, "Het Partijkongres," *Nieuwe Tijd*, IX (1904), p. 240.

38. *Ibid.*

39. *Ibid.*

no longer need to theorize about the desirability of colonial possessions. The colonies exist and the natives must be helped. But we have too many colonies to administer, develop, and defend properly."⁴⁰ Thus Van Kol stressed the desirability of sale. The broad goal of colonial policy would remain the same; welfare and preparation for self-government and eventual independence. "The only possibility of finding the means for such, is: the contraction of the current colonial territory."⁴¹ Van Kol prefaced these observations with a brief and critical glance at the Second International. Thus far, he argued, the International had confined itself to protests concerning colonial policy--the time had come for the formulation of a positive program.

Only two marxists, neither of whom were members of the *Nieuwe Tijd* group's inner circle, spoke to Van Kol's statement. M. Mendels, from the section Zaandam, "had absolutely no objections to Van Kol's proposal."⁴² He only regretted that Van Kol had not consulted the party first. David Wijnkoop, speaking for Amsterdam III, voiced more or less the same opinion. The other marxist delegates were silent. The sale plan had not generated opposition within the SDAP of a substantial nature, although a number of individuals did not approve of the idea.

The Amsterdam congress of the Second International was held on the following August 14-20, 1904. The Van Kol resolution, awaiting submission to the colonial commission of the Second International, attracted little attention in the Dutch social-democratic press nor was it really an issue within the party. The colonial commission received two reports; one by Van Kol, the other by Henry Hyndman. The Hyndman statement embodied a denunciation in principle of the colonial enterprise and represented the polar opposite of the position taken by the Van Kol draft.⁴³ The commission then developed a compromise draft which was eventually approved with modest debate. The congress was dominated by other issues and thus the question of colonial policy received only limited attention. During the sessions, the Dutch marxists did not become involved to any great extent in the drafting of the colonial resolution, although there were twenty-nine delegates in the Dutch fraction. Of these, two, Henriëtte Roland Holst and Herman Gorter, were drawn from the core of the *Nieuwe Tijd* group. Frank van der Goes, Anton Pannekoek and Pieter Wiedijk were not present with mandates. Of the remaining 27 delegates, seven shared the *Nieuwe Tijd* direction to one extent or another. Within this secondary marxist grouping were Jos. Loopuit, J. W. Albarda, M. Mendels, J. Pijnappel, F. M. Wibaut, David Wijnkoop and J. C. Ceton.⁴⁴

On Sunday evening, August 14, the Dutch delegates met in caucus to consider a number of issues--the most important being Van Kol's colonial resolution. As a whole they were more concerned about the

40. Verslag van het tiende congres der S.D.A.P., p. 9.

41. Ibid., p. 10.

42. Ibid.

43. For a discussion of Van Kol's role in the Amsterdam congress, see Tichelman, "De SDAP," pp. 702-5.

44. Verslag van het elfde congres der S.D.A.P. [bijlage A, Verslag van den partij-secretaris over het jaar 1904, pp. 7-8] contains a list of the SDAP representatives at the 1904 Amsterdam congress of the Second International.

debate over tactics--the major item on the caucus agenda the night before. The Van Kol resolution did, however, receive some sharp, if brief, criticism. Wibaut objected to the clause which declared colonies necessary for a socialist regime. However, his objection followed from an economic argument, not a statement of moral principle. "It is also possible that under the socialist regime of the future exchange of colonial products is possible and colonies in the current sense will be superfluous."⁴⁵ Mendels argued that colonial areas need not pass through an inevitable stage or phase of capitalist political economy and thus objected to this point in the resolution which he termed "too dogmatic and too fatalistic." Mendels raised the possibility of a socialist victory in Europe which would allow colonial territories to bypass the capitalist stage. "It is not, in anticipation, impossible that through the triumph of socialism in the old world, areas in other sectors of the globe, which are still in the pre-capitalist era, can be saved from the misery of capitalism, and allowed to share in the technical advantages of modern production."

This position was endorsed by Gorter, who considered himself a strict marxist, and by a young Amsterdam marxist, J. Pijnappel, who for a number of years was a contributor to *Nieuwe Tijd*. In fact, it was the union leader Jan Oudegeest, supporting Van Kol, who asserted that: "First every land *must* experience capitalism." Troelstra headed off a debate within the caucus by moving that the Netherlands send M. Mendels before the colonial commission with Van Kol, to ensure that both points of view would be aired.

In the aftermath of the Amsterdam congress, the *Nieuwe Tijd* faction did not react to the nonacceptance of Van Kol's draft by the colonial commission. Herman Gorter analyzed the congress solely in terms of the debate over tactics.⁴⁶ In fact, the only mention in the *Nieuwe Tijd* of the colonial resolution came before, not after, the congress. Henriëtte Roland Holst presented a brief discussion of the issues facing the congress and passed quickly over the Van Kol resolution. Her treatment of Van Kol was quite warm. In her mind, the adoption of the Van Kol resolution would merely imply that the European social-democratic parties "should not use their political power to prevent the economic development of the colonies in a capitalist direction because they know capitalism is an inevitable phase in the life of a people."⁴⁷ Pieter Wiedijk, despite his activity on the SDAP colonial commission, was silent on this particular issue.

Once again Van Kol formulated a new colonial resolution, this time without the help of a commission, and submitted it to the colonial commission of the 1907 Stuttgart congress of the Second International. Since this commission contained a revisionist majority led by Eduard David and Van Kol, a resolution was presented to the congress endorsing the principle of colonies and linking social and technological progress to the colonial experience. The resolution approved the retention of colonies by socialist regimes and justified this in terms of a civilizing mission. The latter point represented a complete

45. *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9, embodies the minutes of the August 14 delegation caucus.

46. Herman Gorter, "Het internationaal congres," *Nieuwe Tijd*, IX (1904), pp. 581-89.

47. Henriëtte Roland Holst, "Het internationaal congres," *Nieuwe Tijd*, IX (1904), p. 461.

about-face for Van Kol, who until this date had usually argued that colonies were an economic necessity or at least partially desirable. A minority bloc within the commission led by Georg Ledebour developed an alternative resolution, marxist in tone, which condemned colonies on grounds of principle.⁴⁸

The two resolutions were placed before the congress and a heated debate followed. Van Kol played a major role in leading the floor fight for the majority report which was eventually defeated 108-127 with ten abstentions. It is perhaps of some significance that the Dutch delegation did not vote.⁴⁹ Given Karl Kautsky's support of the minority resolution, it is safe to assume that Van der Goes, Roland Holst and Wibaut would have voted against the Van Kol position, thus creating at least a 4-3 split within the delegation. The absence of polemic once the delegation returned is all the more surprising since Roland Holst, in summarizing the congress for *Nieuwe Tijd* readers, drew the battle lines quite clearly. "The resolution concerning colonial policy. . . . Here is the area where at this congress the two great currents in the workers international most clearly opposed each other and where the debate was sharpest."⁵⁰ Applauding the victory of the minority report, she stripped the question of any nuance whatsoever. "Here it concerns: marxism or revisionism; an uncompromising position against the capitalist class or a policy of rapprochement."⁵¹ However, in evaluating the consequence of the resolution as adopted, she stressed its implications for the German SPD but not the Dutch SDAP.

In May 1907, Van Kol drafted the text of a report on Dutch colonial policy to the colonial commission of the Second International, a report subsequently published in *Nieuwe Tijd*. Containing four sections and a conclusion, the report reversed a number of Van Kol's previous arguments. On the basis of data presented, Van Kol concluded that: "To what extent Indonesian millions have advanced capital formation for the economic development of the Netherlands is difficult to know, but even more capital is probably drained from the Netherlands, enticed by greater profits in the colonies, profits squandered in luxury and vanishing in a passion for gambling."⁵² While admitting that "a small sector of the ruling and possessing classes" benefited from colonial territories, Van Kol now suddenly reached the conclusion that colonies did not benefit the working class. "For the *Dutch proletariat*, which must live from manual labor, the colonies offer a very scant advantage and that for a small number, barely 1/50; for the mass of the proletariat the colonies have no value."⁵³ The report concluded that in the case of the Netherlands "the retention of our colonial territory is not

48. Tichelman, "De SDAP," pp. 707-10, deals with Van Kol's effort at Stuttgart to force a revision of the Second International's position on colonies.

49. Vliegen, *Die onze kracht*, II, p. 223.

50. Henriëtte Roland Holst, "Het Internationaal Socialistische Kongres van Stuttgart," *Nieuwe Tijd*, XII (1907), p. 585.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 586.

52. Henri van Kol, "Het koloniale vraagstuk," *Nieuwe Tijd*, XII (1907), pp. 506-7.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 507.

a national interest, much less a working class interest, but simply and solely a pure capitalist interest."⁵⁴

The relatively minor role that colonial policy played within the SDAP was mirrored in the debate over the party program. In the aftermath of the 1906 Utrecht congress, the Partij Bestuur appointed a commission to study the party program and, if necessary, to recommend either revisions or a completely new program.⁵⁵ Given the defeat of the *Nieuwe Tijd* group at Utrecht, the revisionist and center groupings within the SDAP enjoyed a tight grip on the major party organs. This position of strength was further buttressed by the decision of the *Nieuwe Tijd* people to refuse to sit on the Partij Bestuur.⁵⁶ When the program commission was named, one marxist after another refused to serve. The boycott of the commission extended somewhat beyond the *Nieuwe Tijd* group, to include among others the moderate P. L. Tak. Tak contended that the Partij Bestuur had no right to name a commission without a mandate from the party congress.⁵⁷ The mandate was, however, eventually obtained at the party's 1907 Haarlem congress and on May 11, a commission was named including Troelstra as chairman, Ankersmit as secretary, and Vliegen, Schaper, Spiekman, Bruins, Kuyper, Wibaut, Van der Goes, Roland Holst, Mendels, Tak and Loopuit as members. Tak's death brought the union leader Jan van der Tempel onto the commission and Loopuit resigned on the understanding that he be replaced by Wiedijk.⁵⁸

The commission did, in fact, proceed to draft a new party program. The process spanned five years, however, and it was not until the 1912 Leyden party congress that the new program was adopted. The commission halted its work during the 1908-9 party crisis, was then reconstituted and by late 1910 had virtually completed its draft. In the meantime Wiedijk and Roland Holst had left the party. Mendels left with Wiedijk, only to return in the summer of 1909. At no time during this period did the question of colonial policy arise. The earlier program did not mention the subject, and it was conspicuously absent from the new drafts. Troelstra, Kuyper, Schaper, Pijnappel and Wiedijk submitted draft programs to the balance of the commission and the process of shifting and revision began.⁵⁹ Eventually a Troelstra-Kuyper draft was

54. *Ibid.*, p. 508.

55. Verslag van het dertiende congres van de Soc. Dem. Arbeiderspartij [bijlage, Verslag van den partijsecretaris over het jaar 1906, p. 6].

56. Vliegen, Die onze kracht, II, pp. 196-97.

57. Van Ravesteijn, De wording, p. 61.

58. Verslag van het veertiende congres der S.D.A.P. [bijlage, Jaarverslag van den partijsecretaris over 1907, p. 3].

59. The Frank van der Goes Archive, Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, folder 1353, contains the tests of the various drafts. For a discussion of Wiedijk's role in the program commissions of the SDAP and SDP, see De Jong, J. Saks, pp. 120-28. Wiedijk launched a semi-autobiographical attack on the Leyden program and its architects in the journal De Nieuwe Weg (1930-31). The polemic was serialized in installments in issues 5-12 (1930) and 1-2 (1931). The thrust was aimed at Troelstra and Kuyper.

adopted.⁶⁰ In regard to colonial policy, apart from the fact that it was ignored completely, two points must be noted. One, Van Kol was not involved in this project. Two, the Wiedijk draft did not mention the subject. In discussing the social manifestations of capitalism, Wiedijk pointed to unemployment, prostitution, and alcoholism but not to imperialism.⁶¹ Colonial policy and imperialism thus remained completely outside the SDAP's official statement of principles.

The Left-Opposition and Colonial Policy, 1894-1909

As noted above, Pieter Wiedijk was named to the 1902 SDAP Colonial Commission. Writing under the pen name of J. Saks, Wiedijk was one of the leading members of the *Nieuwe Tijd* circle. Born in the province of North Holland on February 27, 1867, Wiedijk entered the socialist movement while a pharmacy student at the University of Amsterdam.⁶² Originally a member of the Bond, he went over to the SDAP shortly after its formation. He remained in Amsterdam, gradually moving into the inner circle of the *Nieuwe Tijd* group. This brought him in close and direct contact with Herman Gorter, Henriëtte Roland Holst, and Frank van der Goes. In 1902, he became the editorial secretary of *Nieuwe Tijd*. Throughout his career Wiedijk remained a literary and theoretical figure. Although active on party commissions, he was not an effective public speaker and thus was seriously handicapped in both party congresses and his own section, Amsterdam IX. Wiedijk conceived of the SDAP as a strict marxist movement and during the era of intra-party debate emerged as one of the sharpest critics of the party leadership. He was the first, and only, member of the *Nieuwe Tijd* group to become seriously involved in the question of colonial policy.

The report which the committee finally presented to the 1904 Amsterdam congress of the Second International was not submitted to the SDAP's annual party congress at Dordrecht for prior approval. The issues and tensions within the committee were not developed by Troelstra in his autobiography nor does Vliegen discuss the committee and its charge in his massive survey of the formation and development of the SDAP. The only published source of information is a two-installment article by Wiedijk which appeared in March and April, 1930, in the journal *Nieuwe Weg*.⁶³

The way in which the report was drafted illustrates the lack of interest and attention which Dutch marxists paid the colonial question. Wiedijk opens his recollections with a revealing anecdote. Upon receiving notification that the committee was about to begin its work, Wiedijk spoke with P. L. Tak, the party authority on local government and a fellow member of the committee. "'I don't know if the Javanese are white or black.' . . . Laughing, Tak assured him that they were

60. See Vliegen, *Die onze kracht*, II, pp. 424-27, for the text of the Leyden program.

61. Frank van der Goes Archives, folder 1353. The Wiedijk draft fills pages 30-32 in the folder.

62. De Jong, *J. Saks*, pp. 25-37.

63. J. Saks (Pieter Wiedijk), "Uit de oude doos," pp. 71-74.

neither one nor the other, that they were brown."⁶⁴ Though Van Kol was not present at the initial January 1904 meeting, he submitted a draft report to be used as a point of departure. Wiedijk observed: "An invitation to judge such a fundamental outpouring from Van Kol, must, in all probability, have had the effect of a challenge to a 'marxist.'"⁶⁵ In Wiedijk's mind, the key elements in the draft were embodied in the last chapter, "Social Democracy and Colonial Policy." In broad outlines, Van Kol opened his draft by arguing that as European nations became socialist they would retain their colonies. "It began with observations concerning the foreseeable necessity of a colonial policy, even for the future socialist society; starting from the principle that when the western nations have established such, the tropical lands will be even further behind in economic development and yet will have all types of natural resources which other lands will judge useful or necessary."⁶⁶ Van Kol moved toward the conclusion that "we see in imperialism a principle of order and organization, an element of human progress."⁶⁷ The reform of colonial administration would follow as a matter of course in a social democratic polity; on this particular question Van Kol was always ready to speak and write in great detail. However, Van Kol's reform proposals were not uniquely social democratic--they could have been realized by a number of different parliamentary and governmental groupings.

The final element in the 1904 draft bore only on Dutch colonial policy and did not touch upon general or universal principles. Van Kol urged the sale of the outer Indonesian islands to a foreign power(s). He had already advanced a sale scheme in parliament, without consulting the SDAP or receiving a mandate to do so from a party congress. On the other hand, Troelstra did not disassociate the SDAP from the proposal--a step he could have taken in his capacity as the parliamentary fraction's leader. The sale plan was designed to further the implementation of a welfare policy to be applied to Java, Sumatra and a core of inner islands. It would provide for the retention of islands of economic importance to the Dutch economy and would cut the cost of colonial administration. The relative imbalance in size and population between the island complex and the Netherlands would thus be partially corrected and the fiscal demands of an ethical policy reduced.

Wiedijk advanced a critique of the Van Kol draft in the form of annotations which were then communicated to the balance of the committee. Troelstra replied that he had read Wiedijk's communication "with great interest" and suggested that Wiedijk work up a resolution of his own to counter, or balance, the Van Kol formulation.⁶⁸ The sale question was choked to death by Troelstra who agreed with Wiedijk's judgment that it should be dropped from the draft altogether. The latter point was made clear in a letter from Troelstra to Wiedijk. "The sale question does not belong at the congress, but rather at a meeting of the interparliamentary commission, which is linked to the International bureau. At the congress we deal with general tactics and resolutions of principle."⁶⁹

The Wiedijk draft attempted to advance marxist, social-democratic guidelines for a colonial policy program. One must bear in mind that Wiedijk had to formulate the draft rather quickly and does not seem to

64. Ibid., p. 71.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid., p. 72.

68. Ibid., p. 108.

69. Ibid.

have consulted with other members of the *Nieuwe Tijd* circle to any great extent. His draft was basically a critique of Van Kol's proposal and not an alternative resolution in its own right. Wiedijk argued that the problem in colonial zones, particularly in Indonesia, lay in the mode of production. Land and resources were exploited by a feudal mode; the produce was transferred by commercial capitalist institutions. This combination precluded the generation of a class-conscious industrial proletariat.

The first step in formulating a socialist colonial policy had to entail the assumption that until industrial capitalist enterprise penetrated the colonial zone socialist possibilities would be limited. Until that time, however, the same principles of class struggle, operative in industrial Europe, were to be applied in the colonial zone. The dimension of application would be limited and the expectations modest.

There are several points to note in the Wiedijk draft. First, he continually used the term "feudal mode of production" with neither reference nor mention of Marx's concept of an Asian productive mode. Second, the implied determinism of the Wiedijk model is quite striking. The colonial zone must generate an industrial base as a prerequisite to the social-democratic struggle. Third, Wiedijk did not grapple with the theoretical possibility of a social-democratic party seizing power in a European nation whose colonial zone was still feudal in its productive mode. Presumably it too would become socialist, but Wiedijk offered neither guidelines nor program. Fourth, at no point did Wiedijk expressly advance a demand for immediate independence of colonial territories.

According to Wiedijk, the counter-draft was seen only by Van Kol and Troelstra.⁷⁰ The former, sensing that the balance of the committee was opposed to his sale plan, withdrew his draft. After the subsequent meeting, Wiedijk developed a third draft. Entitled "General Aspects," this draft also contained a resolution. The new formulation embodied the same thesis as the Wiedijk critique, i.e., it stressed the importance of industrial capitalist advance in the colonial zone. Wiedijk buttressed this contention by arguing that the development of internal European industrial complexes was retarded if the nation in question held external colonies. The release of the latter would force commercial capital into the industrial sector. The British Empire was not mentioned--Wiedijk evidently generalized from what may have been his interpretation of the nineteenth-century Dutch experience. He did, however, cite the example of Spain. The modest industrial revolution then being mounted in monarchical Spain, Wiedijk quickly linked, without elaboration, to the loss of the Philippines and Cuba during the Spanish-American war.

The Wiedijk draft thus called on colonial social-democrats to support bourgeois-liberal political demands fostering industrial growth within the colony. This tactic would also be applied to civil libertarian questions, freedom of association and assembly, and education. The latter demands would serve "in the first place as a means toward 'forming a strong and conscious proletariat,' able to conduct class struggle against all the forms of capitalism."⁷¹ The resolution itself contained four paragraphs. The key policy statement lay in paragraph three:

70. *Ibid.*, p. 109.

71. *Ibid.*, p. 110.

The Congress . . . declares that, in conjunction with its historic calling, under these circumstances the aim of social democracy must be directed toward the realization of conditions for the social development of the workers in these new lands as a counterbalance to the overpowering pressure of capital and its tactic of forging new weapons, out of the misery of this new proletariat, against the workers' movement in the old capitalist lands through their importation as cheap labor.⁷²

The committee, however, declined to accept the Wiedijk draft on the grounds that class struggle following from the industrialization of colonial zones was too speculative. Van Kol, in fact, seemed to rule out class struggle in the Indonesian area completely. Wiedijk then proceeded to draft a fourth statement attacking the Van Kol thesis that colonial enterprise should be state enterprise in cases where circumstances were favorable. Wiedijk countered by arguing that "state exploitation is above all, therefore, undesirable because it embodies the most unsuitable form of capitalism with an eye to the formation of an independent, 'conscious' workers' party. . . ." ⁷³

Between the 1904 Amsterdam congress and the 1907 Second International congress at Stuttgart, the left-opposition faction centering on the *Nieuwe Tijd* group ignored the question of colonial policy completely. The year 1905 was a national election year and the SDAP focused its campaign on internal socio-political issues. It was also a very difficult year for the party. At the 1905 party congress in The Hague, the *Nieuwe Tijd* group led a drive to prevent Troelstra from returning to *Het Volk* as editor-in-chief. In the aftermath of the congress, members of the left-opposition group, particularly Anton Pannekoek, challenged the strategy of the party in the runoff elections. The debate concerning the nature of the SDAP, which in a sense had begun in 1901 when Herman Gorter charged that the party's agrarian program was not marxist, continued into the 1906 party congress at Utrecht. Between the Hague and Utrecht congresses, Troelstra was able to form a majority bloc which then passed a motion of censure at Utrecht. Although not designated by name, the *Nieuwe Tijd* group was clearly the object of the motion. The intraparty conflict continued into the spring of 1907 and dominated the discussion and debate at the Haarlem congress. Swept up in questions concerning the SDAP in the Netherlands, the *Nieuwe Tijd* group thus ignored the colonial issue. During these years, Gorter, Roland Holst, Van der Goes and Wiedijk were completely unable to draw connective lines between revisionism at home and the broad question of colonial policy.

Even the dramatic debate over colonial policy at the Stuttgart congress of the Second International had little impact on the *Nieuwe Tijd* opposition group. As we have seen, the Dutch delegation to Stuttgart was composed of Troelstra, Van Kol, Van der Goes, Roland Holst, Schaper, Vliegen and Wibaut.⁷⁴ Three of the seven, Van der Goes, Roland Holst, and Wibaut were members of the *Nieuwe Tijd* bloc, but none of them carried back into the SDAP debates the colonial issues posed at Stuttgart.

72. *Ibid.*

73. *Ibid.*, p. 111.

74. *Verslag van het veertiende congres der S.D.A.P.* [bijlage, Jaarverslag van den Partijsecretaris over 1907, pp. 1-2] lists the members of the Dutch delegation.

Apart from Van Kol, Pieter Wiedijk was the only member of the SDAP to publish a major article or essay on colonial policy during those troubled years leading into the 1909 party crisis. Wiedijk was also the only Dutch marxist to attempt a conscious marxian analysis of colonialism and colonial policy. The Wiedijk essay was published in the December, 1907, issue of *Nieuwe Tijd*.⁷⁵ The article sought to achieve two ends: one, to establish a model of colonialism; two, to indicate the proper social democratic stance vis-à-vis the colonial phenomenon. Wiedijk argued that colonies followed from the nature of the capitalist system. The capacity of productive capital exceeded the capacity of internal domestic markets to absorb its produce, thus causing an inevitable drive into pre-capitalist areas. (It should be noted here that Wiedijk used the term "capitalist" in this particular tract to designate an industrial or semi-industrial polity. He was not writing about pre-industrial mercantile societies.) The concentration of industrial capital in an ever-diminishing number of hands and the emergence of monopolistic structures created a situation in which private interests, wielding enormous economic power, controlled the bourgeois state. The state apparatus was then mobilized to advance private domestic interests. In this way, Wiedijk drew the connective links between monopoly capitalism, colonialism, militarism and patriotic chauvinism.⁷⁶

Armed with this conceptual framework, Wiedijk then sought to explain the clash at Stuttgart. The revisionist bloc failed to recognize that colonial structures were an inherent part of the capitalist system.⁷⁷ Hence reform demands would never be fully realized until the system itself was destroyed. The marxist bloc, on the other hand, while justified in its rejection of colonial enterprise as a matter of principle, failed to grasp the importance of reform demands. In the colonies, as in Europe, social democracy was at once a reform movement and a revolutionary marxist movement. The proper social-democratic colonial policy, Wiedijk argued, accepted colonialism as an inevitable manifestation of the industrial capitalist order. This necessary evil need not be endorsed. One should present the colonial structures with reform demands while working to destroy the system which generated them. "Social democracy thus rejects in principle the colonial policy of capitalism; through reform proposals social democracy attempts to improve the lot of those colonized. It opposes capitalism in principle in the colonies just as in the homeland, where principled opposition and reform do not exclude each other, but where both must support and fertilize each other. . . ."⁷⁸ The key development lay in the eventual generation of an industrial proletariat within the colonial zone itself.

There are several curious elements in the Wiedijk article. Wiedijk was one of the sharpest critics of the revisionist currents within the SDAP and yet in dealing with the Stuttgart debate he failed to draw a connection between Van Kol's domestic revisionism and his colonial policy stance. Well aware of the marxist-revisionist split within the SDAP, and within the International, Wiedijk still did not thrust it into the foreground of the colonial debate. Instead, he seemed to be groping for a middle ground between the two. Given the rigor of

75. J. Saks (Pieter Wiedijk), "Over de 'koloniale kwestie,'" *Nieuwe Tijd*, XII (1907), pp. 867-84.

76. *Ibid.*, pp. 875-78.

77. *Ibid.*, p. 878.

78. *Ibid.*, p. 880.

Wiedijk's marxist commitment, one would have expected a sharp attack on Van Kol. That such was not forthcoming is even more surprising when circumstances within the SDAP are taken into account.

As noted previously, the left-opposition within the SDAP was dramatically transformed in the autumn of 1907 with the appearance of *De Tribune*. The *Tribune* group was in somewhat different circumstances than the *Nieuwe Tijd* circle. Wijnkoop was the chairman of the largest section of the SDAP, Amsterdam III, which also corresponded with the electoral district from which Troelstra held his mandate in the lower house of parliament. The *Tribune* group aimed at the political conquest of the Federation Amsterdam from their base in section III. Wijnkoop was strengthened in III by J. C. Ceton, who for a number of years served as the section secretary. Van Ravesteijn, on the other hand, was isolated in the revisionist Federation Rotterdam and thus his contribution to the group was of a purely literary and journalistic nature.

The appearance of the *Tribune* group had a double impact on the question of SDAP colonial policy. First, by stressing the rural and petit bourgeois nature of the SDAP and by demanding an agitational offensive in the Dutch cities aimed at broadening the urban base of the party, *De Tribune* turned the intraparty debate inward. Thus the colonial confrontation which began at Stuttgart was not carried into the SDAP. *De Tribune*, instead, focused on the revisionism of the parliamentary fraction and the social fabric of the party. Second, the sharp and continuing attacks on the parliamentary fraction were accelerated in the autumn of 1908 thus forcing a crisis within the SDAP which culminated in an extraordinary party congress at Deventer in February 1909.⁷⁹ There the three *Tribune* editors were ordered either to halt publication or to face expulsion from the SDAP. They refused to be silent and thus were expelled. In March 1909, they formed a new, marxist, labor party, the Sociaal-Democratische Partij (SDP). Five hundred people left the SDAP to join the SDP, among them Pieter Wiedijk, Herman Gorter and Anton Pannekoek, who had been living in Germany since 1905.⁸⁰ The cleavage split the *Nieuwe Tijd* group as Van der Goes, Wibaut and, for another year, Roland Holst remained behind in the SDAP.

Conclusions

The era of structured and aggressive left-opposition was now over in the SDAP until the depression crisis.⁸¹ The individuals who might

79. See Vliegen, *Die onze kracht*, II, pp. 287-308, for a detailed discussion of the congress. For a different point of view see Van Ravesteijn, *De wording*, pp. 94-102.

80. Van Ravesteijn, *De wording*, pp. 103-11, deals with the initial months of the SDP's existence.

81. An opposition group began to form within the SDAP in 1924; however, it did not reach its peak until the first phase of the depression crisis, 1929-32. See H. van Hulst, A. Pleysier and A. Scheffer, *Het roode vaandel volgen wij. Geschiedenis van de Sociaal Democratische Arbeiderspartij van 1880 tot 1940* (The Hague: Kruseman's Uitgeversmaatschappij, 1969), pp. 168-77, 224-33.

later have attempted to move the SDAP on to the themes of capitalism, imperialism, and war, were isolated in a small, separate party. This small group crucially included Pieter Wiedijk, the only marxist critic in the Netherlands to attempt a systematic analysis of colonial policy for the SDAP. The formulations of Van Kol thus remained the last word on colonial policy down to the First World War. The SDAP did not adopt a formal colonial program until 1930, and by then the party had passed into another era. The colonial commission formed in 1901 never did report to the party, nor was it either replaced or reconstituted. From the Stuttgart congress until 1914, colonial issues were the province of the parliamentary fraction, and thus the inevitable domain of Van Kol.

The SDP did not move quickly on colonial issues either. The party program, largely drafted by Pieter Wiedijk, did not mention colonialism nor did it link monopoly capitalism's thrust for expansion with colonial structures. It was not until 1914 that the SDP adopted a colonial clause in the party's electoral program.⁸² At that date, the SDP demanded immediate independence for the Indonesian islands and advanced a principled condemnation of all colonial enterprise. In the era of the First World War, Wijnkoop and Van Ravesteijn both came to stress the capitalism-imperialism-war theme and this quite naturally carried over into the year 1918 when the SDP became the Communist Party of Holland. Van Ravesteijn did play around the issue in his foreign news columns in *De Tribune*, but he, too, did not write to the subject *per se*, either in terms of an essay, treatise, or program. The theoretical discussion of imperialism in the German SPD thus never had their equivalent in the Netherlands.⁸³

The nature of Dutch social-democratic colonial policy and the marxist response to it was inevitably linked to the fabric of the SDAP itself. Given the restricted suffrage and the absence of a national union framework, the SDAP had to generate petit bourgeois electoral support if it were to realize its parliamentary goals. The primacy of parliamentary goals, the final objective quite naturally being a social-democratic majority within the nation, was implicit in the very origins of the party in 1894. The operating assumption that the SDAP would be, above all, a parliamentary socialist party, was further strengthened by the injection into the SDAP of reforming petit bourgeois radicals who followed Troelstra out of the Friesche Volkspartij and into the social-democratic movement. The quantitative weakness of the movement also played a major role. Once committed to a parliamentary bent the party had to mobilize voters from sectors other than the classic blue-collar groupings, which, given the relatively modest industrial sector, were small in comparison to their Imperial German or Belgian counterparts. The social base, the suffrage laws, and, until 1905, the lack of a union arm were further compounded by the hold of the Roman Catholic State Party over Catholic labor and the deep inroads

82. Van Ravesteijn, *De wording*, p. 140.

83. For an analysis of social imperialist elements in the SPD, see Abraham Ascher, "Imperialists within German Social Democracy Prior to 1914," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, XX, No. 4 (January 1961), pp. 397-422. Ascher accents the marxist spokesmen for imperialism, including Anton Pannekoek, in an earlier article, "'Radical' Imperialists within German Social Democracy, 1912-1918," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXVI, No. 4 (December 1961), pp. 555-75. Pannekoek stressed the inevitability of imperialism, not its desirability.

of the Calvinist Anti-Revolutionary Party into the Protestant sector of the labor force.

The internal dynamic of the SDAP thus precluded a systematic development of colonial policy. The scope of party activity was by and large confined to the limits of the nation-state. The building of a strong union arm in the Netherlands, party membership drives, demands for collective bargaining, an eight- or ten-hour day, state pensions, unemployment measures, and other internal reform programs dominated the party press and the annual party congresses. This provinciality flowed in part from the relatively weak position of the SDAP in the national polity. Both leaders and the rank-and-file were more concerned with internal particulars than with the Dutch East Indies. On the other hand, there is no evidence of either a working-class or reforming petit bourgeois bloc within the SDAP which sought to support imperialism on the grounds that it was beneficial to the Dutch labor force. In the Twente textile complex, for example, one finds no trace of social imperialism among the labor force. The same is true of the Amsterdam and Rotterdam harbor workers who at no point down to 1914 articulated imperial demands. Both in the countryside and in the cities, socialists generally saw no further than their immediate socio-political surroundings. Beyond this, few Dutch socialists had personal contacts with Indonesians. The Indonesian student groups of the inter-war era had not yet arrived nor were there Indonesian laborers in the Netherlands. Lack of contact at the level both of the party leadership and of the rank-and-file only served to render Indonesia even more distant.

Under the circumstances, colonial policy became the exclusive domain of Henri van Kol--the one party leader who had lived in Indonesia and was interested in Indonesian affairs. From his first election to parliament in 1897 down to the eve of the First World War, Van Kol served as the colonial expert on colonial affairs for the party delegation in the legislature. Van Kol accepted the principle of colonial rule in the Dutch East Indies and would challenge the government in the lower house solely on humanitarian grounds.⁸⁴ Supporting the broad goals of the ethical policy, Van Kol argued for reform in the Indonesian island complex but did not press for a termination of Dutch colonial rule. Given the internal character of the SDAP and its overwhelming concern with other issues, he was able to proceed along this course virtually unchecked.

The alternative position suggested by the left-opposition, and particularly by Pieter Wiedijk, went unheeded for the same reasons. First, the left-opposition group was very small and not in a position to capture sections of the rank-and-file. Second, the *Nieuwe Tijd* circle and the *Tribune* group were primarily concerned with checking what they considered to be growing domestic reformism within the SDAP. Factional debate focused on issues internal to the Netherlands and not upon Indonesia. Third, the primacy of internal concerns and the limited human resources of the left-opposition precluded any sustained mobilization of theoretical talent for a critique of Van Kol's colonial positions. There were simply too many other concerns. By way of contrast, the Social Democratic Party of Germany commanded a membership and resources far beyond the SDAP. The very size of the movement in

84. Van der Zee, "De S.D.A.P.," presents selected texts of Van Kol's frequent speeches in parliament concerning colonial affairs.

Germany served to generate a cadre of theoreticians who could raise questions concerning the nature of imperialism. Beyond this, the Dutch cabinets were never forced to present imperialism and colonies as an electoral issue, as happened in Germany in the course of the 1907 Reichstag elections. Consequently, the Dutch socialists did not have to face charges that they were anti-imperial and anti-national.⁸⁵ In fact, Indonesia rarely figured in the parliamentary elections at all. It must be noted in closing that the other political parties in the Netherlands did not stress colonial policy either. The SDAP was by no means unique in this regard.⁸⁶

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85. For a brief discussion of the 1907 Reichstag election see Carl Schorske, German Social Democracy, pp. 59-87. The two articles by Ascher cited above provide an excellent guide to the debate over imperialism within the German party. Among the major German essays on the subject are: Eduard Bernstein, "Der Sozialismus und die Kolonialfrage," Sozialistische Monatshefte (1900); Eduard Bernstein, "Sozialdemokratie und Imperialismus," Sozialistische Monatshefte (1900); Eduard Bernstein, "Die Kolonialfrage und der Klassenkampf," Sozialistische Monatshefte (1907); and Karl Kautsky, Sozialismus und Kolonialpolitik (Berlin: Buchhandlung Vorwärts, 1907). The leading essay by a German theoretician, originally published in 1910, remains Rudolph Hilferding's Das Finanzkapital [reprinted] (Berlin: J. H. W. Dietz Nachf., 1947). The Dutch theoretician Anton Pannekoek played an active role in the SPD debate. (Pannekoek lived in Germany from 1906 until the First World War.) For a discussion of his role in the German debate over imperialism and for bibliography, see Ascher, "'Radical' Imperialists," pp. 557-59. While still a member of the SDAP, prior to 1906, Pannekoek did not write about this particular subject.
86. S. L. van der Wal makes this point very clearly in his essay, "De Nederlandse expansie in Indonesië in de tijd van het modern imperialisme: de houding van de Nederlandse regering en de politieke partijen," Bijdragen Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, I (1971), pp. 47-54.