SECURING OKINAWA FOR MISCEGENATION: A HISTORICAL AND LITERARY DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF AMERASIANS IN OKINAWA, 1945-2000

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by
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Through an extensive collection of journalistic, archival, and literary materials, I illustrate the establishment, maintenance, and controversy surrounding miscegenation between U.S. military men and Okinawan women specifically from the standpoint of Amerasians that were born as a result thereof.

As Okinawans were exposed to the raw violence of extraterritoriality of the U.S. military—most frequently expressed through the trope of sexual violence—an escape from that violence was quickly configured as a recuperation or increased protection of state sovereignty. In this way, journalists, politicians, and activists have frequently used mixed-blood children as the “evidence” in a juridical model to prove the “fact” of oppression.

However, in a declension into biopolitics via three genealogists Nietzsche, Weber, and Foucault, I illustrate the assumptions implicit in this claim. The state is posited as a repressive institution that a political group known as “we” must resist. Here, metaphor is misconceived as the relationship between the state as an external force that exerts violence onto individual bodies that are in turn called to arms in the name of resistance.

However, this rests on a causal understanding between the doer and the deed, or a political will that can be realized through sheer tenacity. Instead, I show through
Nietzsche how this function of metaphor is repressed to give rise to the fiction of a causal agent. Furthermore, I inflect my reading of metaphor with biopolitics through Esposito’s account of Nietzsche. That is, the state is not merely the repressive power that threatens life, but it must be articulated in conjunction with the power to secure life. The biopolitical state is concerned with the life of the population at large and the power of the state becomes literally infused through the veins of human bodies.

This dissertation gambles with the hope of dislodging Amerasians from a damning biopolitical dilemma: seeds of destruction of a genocidal rape (of women as victims) that must be contained to secure the Okinawan population at large or Amerasians as the embodiment of the “success” of Okinawa’s ability to secure entry into a liberalized global economy (via the bodies of women as free-willing agents).
Annmaria Mitsuko Shimabuku was born to Mitsuko Shimabuku and Thomas Schoonbeck in Muskegon, MI on January 11, 1976. From age one, she was raised solely by her mother alongside her two brothers, David and Steven O’Hanneson, and grew up in San Jose, CA from age four to seventeen. With the emotional and financial support of her mother and oldest brother, she was able to attend Middlebury College, where she majored in Japanese Language and Literature. While at Middlebury, she studied abroad to Kansai University of Foreign Languages, and completed a graduation thesis entitled “Marginality in the Literature of Ōe Kenzaburô” in 1997. After working for one year in Tokyo, she received a Monbusho fellowship to study at Tokyo University as a researcher from 1998, advanced to the M.A. course in Sociology in 1999, and completed coursework for the Ph.D. in 2004. In 2003, she matriculated into the Ph.D. program in East Asian Literature at Cornell University. While studying at Cornell, she became partnered with her long-time friend Masaki Kinjo, who joined her in the U.S. in 2006. Currently, she is Acting Assistant Professor in the Department of Comparative Literature and Foreign Languages at University of California, Riverside since 2009.
Dedicated to Mitsuko Shimabuku
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

(AASO) AmerAsian School in Okinawa

(CPN) Children of Peace Network

(GARIOA) Government and Relief in Occupied Areas

(ISAO) International Social Assistance Okinawa, Inc. (*shakai* *fukushi* *hōjin* *kokusai* *fukushi* *kai* *kokusai* *fukushi* *sōdanjo*)

(ISS) International Social Services (*kokusai* *shakai* *jigyōdan*)

(HEW) Health Education and Welfare Department

(OCS) Okinawa Christian School

(OFNCA) Okinawa Federation of Night Clubs Association

(OPP) Okinawan People’s Party (*Okinawa Jinmintō*)

(OSMP) Okinawa Socialist Masses Party (*Okinawa Shakai Taishūtō*)

(OWAAMV) Okinawan Women Act against the Military and Violence (*Kichi/guntai wo Yurusanai Kōdō Suru Onnatachi no Kai*)
(PBF) Pearl S. Buck Foundation

(RAA) Recreation and Amusement Association (Tokushu Ian Shisetsu Kyōkai)

(RAWC) Ryukyuan American Welfare Council

(SOFA) Status of Forces Agreement
INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is an outgrowth of my M.A. thesis completed at Tokyo University, Department of Sociology in 2000 entitled Teikoku, sei, konketsuji: Okinawa ni okeru ‘Amerajian’ mondai [Empire, Sex, and Mixed-Blood: A Study of Amerasians in Okinawa]. In addition to providing basic background information to the Amerasian issue in Okinawa, my M.A. thesis consisted primarily of an ethnographic study of twenty-three Okinawan-American Amerasians. I was able to come into contact with many of my informants through the Children of Peace Network (CPN) directed by an Amerasian activist, Tomiyama Maria. This Network was dedicated to the empowerment of Okinawan Amerasians that took place primarily through locating estranged fathers and prioritized autonomous Amerasian representation. I cooperated with Tomiyama in the short-lived Network (2000) as both an American-born Okinawan Amerasian herself and researcher.

In 2000, the Network was no longer able to sustain, and collapsed within only a year of its birth. One major problem was how, why, and to what end, would representations of Amerasians enter public discourse. It became painfully clear that fifty-five years after the Okinawan War, the Amerasian issue has been used, abused, and exploited at the expense of driving Amerasians into a violent allergic reaction towards any sort of attention drawn to themselves because of their purported particularity. The Network collapsed, and yet I was left with my M.A. thesis replete with radically split, ambivalent, and contradictory Amerasian voices—many of which displayed abhorrence towards their very naming as mixed.

The weight of my academic privilege fell upon me. Although it has been difficult for Amerasians to enter public discourse themselves, I was able to leverage academic privilege in order to catapult them into exposure to the outside world. Aside
from the usual critique of the “epistemic violence” of representation inherent in anthropological and ethnographic methods, there remained the problem of my precarious positionality as both insider (as Okinawan Amerasian) and outsider (researcher, and Okinawan Amerasian who was born in the US, and not Okinawa), i.e., the problem of the so-called “native anthropologist” or in my case, the “native sociologist.”

The dilemmas of the “insider out” have already been noted by numerous other scholars. In particular, I found Linda Tuhiwai Smith in *Decolonising Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples* useful a guide for indigenous scholars to carry out more indigenous research in a field that is dominated almost entirely by the majority.  

While I think it is possible to answer these theoretical dilemmas within the parameters of sociological methodology, I have become increasingly interested in literature and critical theory as a stylistic choice. While the process of the implicated themselves (*tōjisha*) coming to articulate their own condition is crucial, I have chosen the genealogical method of discourse analysis to problematize how power is generated and intensified through representation itself. Michel Foucault showed in *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1* that contrary to Freud’s repressive hypothesis, where sexuality is posited as a forbidden truth that must be confessed by subjects, the very act of positing sexuality as a truth generates, and not represses, an entire discourse obsessed with sexuality. The priest, schoolteacher, and parent, concerned with repressing sexuality and extracting the truth of its presence produces an obsession with sexuality as an unintended consequence. Yet, while Foucault is notorious for denying the existence of a “truth”—a potential hiccup for any positivist or empiricist that falls back on the artifact, document, or data to backup claims about reality—he nonetheless

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shows a persistent and constant affinity for historical texts as the medium through which he makes his arguments throughout almost all of his works.

This is important for a study of Amerasians because much of their aversion towards representation stems from being treated or exposed as the “evidence” of colonial violence exercized by the U.S. military in Okinawa. In particular, in both reportage and literature, Amerasians have been represented as the evidence of a violation of state sovereignty in Japan, and subsequently Okinawa. In this dissertation, I draw attention the power-effects that arise when Amerasians are treated as evidence that corroborates the so-called “fact” of extraterritoriality resulting from occupation in a state bereft of sovereignty. Instead of focusing on the veracity of the evidence per se, I use discourse analysis to show how positing Amerasians as evidence puts forth a conception of resistance as a mobilization of a unified political will against power. In other words, by deploying Amerasians as evidence in the battle for truth over power fails to entirely register the condition of “total defeat” in a colonized people such as Okinawans who were not able to wrest free from the chains of colonialism in the post Potsdam Declaration (1945) era. In tandem with this understanding of the political will is a conception of the state as an institution that exercises destructive violence that can only be avoided by seeking security under the protection of sovereignty.

Even though I am not primarily concerned with the veracity of the evidence per se, my dissertation is nonetheless empirically dense. I have collected surveys, documents, articles, and texts since 1999 by collaborating with social workers, scholars, and activists and also through my own archival research at the Okinawan Prefectural Archives as a Fulbright-Hays scholar in 2008. My dissertation is perhaps the most concentrated amalgamation of empirical evidence on Okinawan Amerasians in both English and Japanese. Although my dissertation could potentially be of practical use to policy makers or of interest to bona fide (social) scientists, (and with
that open to critique because of my failure to adhere to the methodology of a strictly empirical approach), I must reiterate again that the status of the evidence in this dissertation is not golden. Rather, I intend to show how waging evidence as a truth claim produces discursive formations infused with a power to delineate the types of subjects through which so-called mixed Okinawan individuals are able to emerge as social, or even human beings. It is only after the rigors of this discourse analysis are wrestled with and embraced that the ground can be cleared to appreciate the weight of the evidence. Hence, while my dissertation does not adopt an empirical methodology, it may also go against the grain of the type of literary analysis that prioritizes language over the so-called “real.” Instead of positing a binary opposition between the literary and the real, the seven body chapters described below aim for a performative dialogue between both that takes places through a historical and literary discourse analysis of texts that deal specifically with Okinawan Amerasians.

I discuss Amerasians during and directly after Japan’s Allied Occupation in Chapter 1, entitled “Stillborn: Amerasians and the Restoration of Japanese Sovereignty.” The purpose of this chapter is to provide a primer and relief for the Okinawan case. In Japan, the RAA, or equivalent of “comfort stations” that catered to the Allied Forces during occupation, was set up to protect the so-called purity of “good” Japanese women. Here is an implicit understanding that occupation is synonymous with an infringement of sovereignty as in the inability to protect the infiltration of a destructive foreign state into the body politic, geographical space, and reproductive capacities of women. Although the RAA was quickly shut down by the Allied Forces, constant anxiety towards miscegenation as a crisis of sovereignty remained. Amerasians were used as point and case evidence by anti-military, communist, and anti-American leftists for the infringement of Japanese sovereignty by the Allied Forces. Specifically, I trace the emergence of the reportage genre that
focuses on the iconic prostitute and her mixed-blood child directly after Japan’s 1952 recuperation of state sovereignty as soon as the weight of censorship was finally lifted. Furthermore, I carry out the first detailed analysis of Diet discussions from 1952 amongst politicians about the mixed-blood issue in which it was determined that the true problem was not mixed-blood children who benefitted from state protection (often found in international marriage or other bilateral arrangements), but the mixed-blood children that were the end result of Japan’s violation of state sovereignty by the U.S. The U.S. media quickly responded to Japanese anxieties out of a concern to deter what could potentially develop into a “communist threat” and started to show its democratic sympathy for the plight of mixed-blood children. Japan was America’s most important ally in East Asia, and spoiling the alliance with complaints of sexual violence and mixed-blood children could undermine relations, much like it does in Okinawa today. Although there was an effort to export children born as a result of extraterritoriality through international adoption, the Amerasian issue in Japan quickly fizzled in the post-independence era. While (South) Korea became a leading exporter of children including Amerasians in the postwar era, Japan was able to shift the problem of U.S. military bases—and the miscegenation attached to them—to Okinawa. Hence, the purpose of this chapter is to show that Japan’s political resistance against state violence and its plea for sovereignty was propped up by the existence of an outside—Okinawa. It is in the sense that it retained its ability to posit an outside through which it could displace its violence that Japan was lacking in “total defeat” as suggested by Takeuchi Yoshimi in the postwar era.

In Chapter 2, entitled “Petitioning Subjects: The Management of Sexual Relations in Okinawa from 1945 to 1952 and the Crisis of Sovereignty,” I contrast Okinawa’s experience with U.S. occupation and Japan’s experience with Allied occupation with specific reference to the management of sexual relations and
mixed-blood children. Like Japan, Okinawa quickly became sensitive to the establishment of so-called “entertainment districts” from 1949 as it became clear that the U.S. would secure Okinawa in the long-term as the “Keystone of the Pacific.” However, unlike Japan, Okinawa lacked an outside through which it could displace state violence, and arguments for and against the establishment of entertainment districts was framed as a doomed opposition between “reality and ideals.” It is in this sense that Okinawa knew of “total defeat.” Hence, in the face of total defeat, Okinawans were transformed into what Tomiyama Ichiro refers to as “subjects of negotiation.” That is, the argument hinged upon the sanctity of a will, in which Okinawan women are either “free willing agents” who prostitute themselves or “determined victims” stripped of an autonomous will (or political sovereignty), collapses. Okinawans were both put in an utterly defeated position in which they had no choice but to submit to sexual domination, and yet exercised their agency in securing better conditions under this inevitable circumstance of domination. Hence, the emergence of these new types of subjects of negotiation is crucial for understanding the precarious position of mixed-blood children as either a product of two willing agents (neoliberalism) or evidence of destructive violence (determinism).

In Chapter 3, entitled “The Power of Resistance: Let the Amerasians Die and Make the ‘Japanese’ Live in the All-Island Struggle, 1952-1958,” I further develop the importance of subject formation as a productive power that magnifies and not diminishes the will to power by introducing Foucault’s concept of biopower. During the era towards reversion to the Japanese administration, many pro-reversion activists and politicians delineated a conception of the state as a negative destructive power exemplified by the licentious behavior of the G.I.s and the draconian policies of the U.S. military in Okinawa. By doing this, they implicitly and explicitly suggested Okinawa’s only recourse towards security was under the protection of the state
sovereignty of Japan. On the other hand, the reversion movement was opposed by the 
Okinawa Federation of Night Clubs Association (OFNCA) who instead conceived of 
security as liberalization of the military base-economy that included the right to 
prostitute Okinawan women. After the alarming resistance of the “all-island struggle” 
or *shimagurumi tōsō*, USCAR responded by replacing draconian land confiscation 
policies with a liberalization of the Okinawan economy in 1958. Yet, Okinawan 
intellectuals such as Higaonna Kanjun in his 1957 article “Konketsuji” or 
“Mixed-Blood Child” continued to posit the state as a solely destructive force and 
mobilized mixed-blood children as evidence of genocidal rape. Instead of reading 
Higaonna as a confirmation of the negative effects of the US military and destructive 
power of the state, thereby adding to my ammunition in resistance against it, I instead 
offer a reading of power as a productive force. That is, when Higaonna advocates the 
prevention of mixed-blood births and increase in full-blooded births in support of 
Okinawa’s incorporation into the Japanese state, his emphasis is not on killing, but the 
ability to aggressively “make [the Japanese] live” and passively “let [the Amerasians] 
die.” Hence, his is a discourse that uses the so-called “evidence” of extraterritorial 
violence to inform his imperative to secure the survival and prosperity of the 
population as a whole under the state’s protection.

In Chapter 4, entitled “Responsibility for Consequence: Testimony of Okinawan 
Women and Amerasians in the Road to Reversion, 1958-1972,” I show how 
management of sexual relations between G.I.s and Okinawan women and the ensuing 
mixed-blood children became an object of medical and social welfare inquiry. More 
importantly, I focus on the problems of the reportage genre that uses “real life 
testimony” as a tool that combats oppression. I deploy Max Weber’s genealogical 
account of journalism in “Politics as a Vocation” to show how reportage suppressed 
the radically split nature of the subject so that a collective “resistance” of unified
subjects could be waged. Far from being agents ready for resistance, I showed through
an analysis of articles in the 1972 edition of The UshiÔ how Okinawan women and
Amerasians are subjects of negotiation who actively partake in their own subjugation
to oppression out of both a sense of hope and hopelessness as they attempt to survive
it. Hence, they are not streamlined subjects of resistance waiting to be discovered by
the pen of a journalist, but radically split subjects whose will to power cannot be
contained under any one political banner. The inability to recognize this radical split
led to the disastrous inability to take what Weber calls “responsibility for
consequence” in which Okinawan women and Amerasians are left exploited through
representations of their oppression.

In Chapter 5, entitled “The Question of Resistance in the Age of Empire:
Between Genocide and Compulsory Nationalization, 1972-2000” I argue that the
shelter of Japanese sovereignty did little to relieve Okinawa of its colonial-like status
precisely because oppression cannot be reduced to the destructive power of the state
which justifies the need for state protection. Instead, the nation-state form is
manipulated to serve the ends of a U.S. and Japanese transnational network of Empire
as suggested by Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt. In this sense, state sovereignty is
exposed as a ghost concept, posited to create discursive effects in which resistance
against state violence produces an investment into the state at the expense of failing to
recognize its transnational network of power. This presents challenges for the
emergent transnational feminist movement in Okinawa that joined hands with other
women across the globe against state violence because even though they “transcend”
the state, they nonetheless posit it as a destructive force against women and neglect
recognizing its productive nature. Specifically, this becomes a problem with Okinawan
Women Act Against military Violence (OWAAMV) because they become theoretically
limited in dealing with so-called “Amejo” or women who see the U.S. military as an
instrument of opportunity and actively pursue relationships with G.I.\textquotesingle s. After outlining the three discursive trends in Amerasian issues in the post-reversion era (1.) the problem \textit{mukokusekij\i} or stateless children; 2.) the emergence of the AmerAsian School in Okinawa (AASO); 3.) the Children of Peace Network (CPN) organized by adult Amerasians themselves), I focus on the problems of adult Amerasians coming out. Because they are wedged amidst a political landscape of anti-military activism where they are used as “evidence” of oppression and the strategy to make mixed-blood children binational “doubles,” Tomiyama Maria describes the utter paralysis experienced when speaking out in her piece “Yûki” [“Courage”]. Whether the US military is posited as an oppressive force, or the U.S., English language, and American culture is posited as an instrument of opportunity, both are merely two sides of the same coin that force a compulsory subject formation along the lines of national boundaries for Amerasians. The problem is not the inability to conform to either side, but rather the denial of the radically split nature of subjects and imperative to force them into subject formations dictated by the nation-state form.

Chapters 6 and 7 deal more explicitly with the theoretical problems outlined in the previous chapters. In Chapter 6, entitled “A Genealogy of Sex under a US Military Regime in Okinawa: Postcolonial Children in Exile who ‘Must Nonetheless Endeavor to Live,’” I carry out a detailed analysis of Tanaka Midori’s published memoirs, \textit{Harukanaru maboroshi no chichiyo [My Distant Specter of a Father]} to show how she attempts to navigate her identity as born to a woman locked in the damning binary opposition of “determined victim” versus “free willing agent.” Alternatively, I attempt to identify both as different moments in the same Nietzschean will to power. I argue it is possible to recognize the agency of women who actively form relationships with G.I.s without falling into the trap of liberalism that neglects the effects of structural violence, while also dare to understand victimization as predicated by agency instead
of stripping the victim of any sort of will whatsoever. By affirming the will to power in both instances, I attempt to open up the possibility for Amerasians to exist as something other than “evidence of violence” or the “bridge between two nation-states.” Instead of forcing unification of the subject along either lines of victim of extraterritoriality or victor of a bilateral nationalism, I advocate for a performative reading in which each moment is not reduced to its political face value, but for the will to power in a radically split and very human subject. This is the only way that Tanaka can find “hope” in the damning binary opposition that governs her life as perpetually member of a “people in exile.”

In Chapter 7, entitled “Securing Okinawa for Miscegenation: A Biopolitical Reading of Nagadō Eikichi’s ‘Tent Village of Garama,’” I unleashed a full-bodied biopolitical analysis of miscegenation in Okinawa, and paid particular attention to one of its most thorny concepts—security—through Roberto Esposito’s interventions with biopower in *Bios*. The “Tent Village of Garama” tells of the dilemmas of genocidal rape. In one sense, the U.S. military uses brute force to secure the island as a military outpost and for its sexual demands. In another sense, Okinawans respond by attempting to increase their security through protection of the state. This imperative is not only exercised through sex, but takes on racial implications as Okinawa maximizes its security from the so-called internal “threat” of a racial genocide that takes place through miscegenation. The protagonist of the story struggles with what to do with this “threat,” *i.e.*, her “carrot top” grandson born as a result of the gang rape of her daughter. After attempted infanticide, she finally spares the child’s life and embraces the vulnerability to risk as a new way of creating a new technology of the self. In this new way of being, she avoids aping the U.S./Japan beast that denies security as the impetus to incite the Okinawan drive to maximize its security at the cost of literally sanitizing itself to death.
CHAPTER 1

“Stillborn: Amerasians and the Restoration of Japanese Sovereignty”

In his sexualized title *Embracing Defeat*, John Dower assumes a metaphorical relationship between political sovereignty and autonomy over the female body during the occupation of Japan. That is, the U.S. embraces an utterly defeated Japan. This political condition is expressed at the level culture and “popular consciousness” in which the so-called “panpan,” or Japanese prostitute who caters to the Allied forces, becomes an iconic figure. In this formulation, sexual politics stand in for political conflicts; inner experience is a reflection of outer reality. It goes without saying that this metaphor assumes a normative Euro-American male sexuality that embraces a feminized Japan.

In the effort to subvert a male-centered approach to understanding war, political scientists such as Cynthia Enloe have long argued that “gender makes the world go round” and elucidated the role sexuality plays in international politics. This social constructionist approach exposes the fallacy that biology is destiny, and instead shows how social practices become institutionalized through repetition. While recognizing this approach risks falling into relativism, feminists such as Ueno Chizuko have nonetheless pushed forward a gendered analysis of wartime and postwar Japan in efforts to make space for this perspective.

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My analysis attempts to push a little further. My intent is not to expand the purview of political power to include gender in as much as it is to alter assumptions about the nature of it altogether. I attempt to do this with Foucault’s notion of biopower. Feminists such as Hiroko Takeda have already introduced biopolitics into an analysis of wartime and occupied Japan where her focus on sexual reproduction dramatically alters the terms from which political power is understood. This is particularly illuminating as Japan followed the global trend toward a total war regime in which power became dispersed throughout the entire social body and permeated not just political institutions, but also the bodies and everyday lives of all individuals. Hence, her title *The Political Economy of Reproduction in Japan: Between Nation-state and Everyday Life* illustrates the tension between these two poles. Here the violence done unto the so-called private sphere of the family and female body is not through shadowing its role while exploiting its use-value, whereupon a feminist could shed light upon it in the attempt to resist marginalization. Rather, it is to demonstrate how politics needed to transform and upgrade its techniques to accommodate a manipulation of an all-inclusive population. It is in this way, sexual reproduction, as the cite where the population is not only biologically but also politically reproduced, fell under a new technology of power concerned with multifarious effort of governing the population instead of the more singular effort to discipline individual bodies within institutions.  

This chapter is concerned with the biological production of Amerasian children in occupied Japan. This serves two purposes. First, it is a point of comparison for the emergence of Amerasians in Okinawa during the same period and thereafter which is the topic of this dissertation. Second, it serves a different way in to approaching the

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problem of sovereignty in the formation of the postwar Japanese state.

This second point is more illuminating. Most historians matter-of-factly state that Japan regained its sovereignty in 1952 upon the enactment of the San Francisco Peace Treaty when Japan became “independent” from Allied occupation. The assumption here is that sovereignty is a pre-existing entity that can be lost and regained. In his genealogy of power however, Foucault shows how sovereignty, like sexuality, is not a transhistorical entity, but is a power-effect that is discursively produced. That is, Victorian society’s attempt to repress sexuality paradoxically fostered an explosion in sexual discourse and with it a magnification of power that circulated through it. Likewise, positing the repressive power of the king, the law, or the state—in essence, the sovereign—resulted in an intensification in the importance attributed to sovereignty as the portrait of political power *par excellence*.

If the point of genealogy is to lay out the discursive threads that lay beneath power-effects, then I am concerned with the discursive production of the idea of “sovereignty” as the prize won in postwar Japan. As Japan attempted to resist against the repression of occupation in order to achieve this prize called “sovereignty,” it unwittingly necessitated constituting itself as a subject in relation to the oppression. However, this subject constitution rendered unintended consequences that are often elided in a positivistic account of postwar history. That is, in order to become “Japan” worthy of regaining its “sovereignty,” it must at once dispose of its colonial past and manage the boundaries of its postwar future. That is, even though “Japanese subjects” formerly comprised of Ainu, Okinawans, Taiwanese, and Koreans, Japan quickly disposed of these ambiguous identities that made an earnest attempt at “becoming Japanese” while it also attempted to erase the ambiguous existence of Amerasians born between Japanese women and Allied troops. After all, how is it possible to become a subject in resistance against an oppressive force when Japanese children
look like the oppressor? Likewise, if occupation is defined as the temporary management of a state by “foreign” military, then how is it possible to “occupy” Japan if the Japanese are children of the occupiers?

In this chapter, I show how the protest against the “violation of Japanese sovereignty” lodged during and after occupation exploited the symbolic value of miscegenation as proof of the political violation through bodily form. In other words, miscegenation took center stage when complaints about the violation of Japanese political sovereignty were lodged. Apprehensive that Japan would become engulfed with communism, the U.S. paid attention to these complaints, and secured Okinawa as the “Keystone of the Pacific” as the precondition to the restoration of Japanese sovereignty. Clearly, the problem of mixed-blood children was unpleasant for both parties. While my intent is not to uncover documents that prove a causal relationship to a Japanese aversion to Amerasian births and the offering of Okinawa to the U.S. as a military outpost of the Pacific, I am interested in how the concept of sovereignty comes to obtain coherency at the point of this certain kind of biological reproduction. Here, the relationship between real politics and sexual politics is not just a metaphorical one, but the function of metaphor as two distinct variables that can stand-in for each other breaks down. Power is not registered only in the mode of real politics, but it permeates the bodies of occupation so miscegenation becomes the very ground through which the discourse of political sovereignty is produced. As children born outside the protection of international law—that is, law mutually recognized by two sovereign states—Amerasians indicated the crisis of sovereignty, or lack thereof. This crisis also involved the problem of racism as children who must come forth as ambiguous, unclassifiable, and untranslatable if the binary opposition between “Japanese” and “American” were to obtain. This fixation on figuring out whether Amerasians were really “Japanese” or “American” is analogous to the discourse
described by Foucault in *History of Sexuality* where it is always important to determine if, when, and how one was sexually transgressive. What is important is not the “true essence” of Amerasians or sexual perverts, but the power that circulates through the discourse to figure them out. It is in this way, Amerasians were stillborn into postwar Japan. They could only emerge into the world as unintelligible objects of ontological confusion in order for the constitution of Japanese subjects as essentially different from foreign Others to take place. In this way, they became subjects in need of erasure in the postwar landscape of US-Japan mutually complicit nationalisms even as they were being created. Here, I show the history of erasure through the attempt to adopt Amerasians out of Japan, which ultimately failed as the Japan traded Okinawa—an area similarly with a historically ambiguous identity—for its sovereignty.

**Miscegenation between the Allied Forces and Japanese Women**

The Allied occupation of Japan sought to demilitarize, democratize, and immunize Japan from the rising tide of communist influence. The human rights order of October 4, 1945 allowed for the formation of political parties where this was not possible in Okinawa until 1947. In the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal of May 1946 to November 1948, the Allied Powers avoided draconian punishments so Japan would not be driven into the arms of communist resistance and would be secured as a postwar ally. There, the so-called “comfort woman” issue was not even addressed. The new “Peace Constitution” was promulgated in 1947, which included the famous Article 9 in which Japan “renounced war.”

In preparation for the arrival of occupation troops, sexual politics topped the

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Japanese agenda. Japanese nationals frightened of the ghost of the “Nanking Massacre” now feared not only the sexual violence they unleashed unto the women of their conquered territories in China, but also the precedent set by territories Japan left vulnerable to American invasion such as Okinawa and Manila, would translate into sexual violence for Japanese women. Accordingly, on August 18, 1945, the Home Ministry Police Security Chief (naimushō keihōkyokuchō) sent a secret wireless message regarding the establishment of sexual comfort facilities to the police chief. The message stipulated that 1.) facilities would be limited to designated areas for the occupation forces; 2.) Japanese would be prohibited from using the facilities established by the police chief; 3.) the police chief would provide instruction and implement the following establishments promptly: sexual comfort facilities, dining/drinking facilities, places of amusement (gorakujo); 4.) geisha, public/private prostitutes, barmaids, and women who already exhibit a history of lewd acts will be prioritized to fulfill the establishments. On August 29, the RAA (Recreation and Amusement Association, Tokushu Ian Shisetsu Kyōkai) was formally recognized. By the first recruitment, 1,360 women had signed up.

RAA was a relic of the Comfort Woman system of sexual slavery employed by the Japanese Imperial Forces during the Pacific War. While other militaries have commonly established informal measures for procuring sexual services for its soldiers, Japan is unique in institutionalizing the system both during the wartime period for its own Imperial soldiers, and postwar period for the Allied Forces. A formal ceremony to kick off the establishment was held in the imperial palace courtyard. According to the

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8 Ibid., 128-129.
message, the women were called upon to sacrifice themselves “to protect the racial purity (junketsu) of one million.”\textsuperscript{10} Vice Premier Kondo Fumimaro had similarly urged the national police commissioner to “Please protect the daughters of Japan.”\textsuperscript{11} This put into place the idea of a “breakwater of the flesh,” which meant that a select group of Japanese women would show their patriotism by sacrificing themselves for the “purity of the people (minzoku no junketsu).”\textsuperscript{12}

The occupation authorities eventually abolished public prostitution in January 1946, less than five months after the establishment of RAA. Publically, occupation authorities claimed that prostitution was a violation of women’s human rights and a deterrent to Japan’s democratization. However, the more practical reasoning lies in the fact that the spread of venereal disease (VD) was rampant. By March of that same year, it was reported that 90% of the prostitutes and 70% of certain units of the U.S. Army were infected.\textsuperscript{13} The high incidence of VD amongst the soldiers shows that extent the majority took advantage of the sexual exploitation of a foreign population abroad under the pretence of “democratization” when they knew such behavior was considered illegal and amoral back “home” in the U.S.

Although the system of public prostitution was officially banned, its meaning and parameters were left open to interpretation. In the following February 22, 1946, Home Ministry Police Security Chief Tanigawa Noboru instructed officials of each district that the SCAPIN-642 prohibition applied to only sexual slavery and “lewd acts (baiin kōi) committed by an individual’s free will” is a “different matter.”\textsuperscript{14}

From the beginning, RAA did not limit itself to prostitution, but included a

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., 188.
\textsuperscript{11} Kanzaki, \textit{Ketteiban/baishun: Kanzaki repōto} [The finale edition/ prostitute: The Kanzaki report], 129.
\textsuperscript{12} Kanzaki Kiyoshi, \textit{Yoru no kichi} [Bases of the night] (Tokyo: Kawade Shobō, 1953), 4.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 384.
dining section (for cabarets, cafes, bars, dancehalls), a comfort section, an amusement
section (pool, shooting range, golf, tennis), an arts section (theater, film, music) and a
special facilities section (hot springs, hotels, sight seeing, fishing). It was the comfort
section that was divided into geisha, prostitutes, barmaids, and dancers. The order to
abolish sexual slavery merely renamed public prostitutes working for the state as
private prostitutes who purportedly operated on their own free will. The Yoshida
cabinet of November 14, 1946 designated these areas of prostitution as an “area of
special restaurants” (tokushu inshokuten no chiiki). Because the police outlined these
areas on the map with red lines, activities of the RAA’s former “comfort section”
became known as the “red-line district.” Furthermore, activities not directly associated
with prostitution that fell under the “dining,” “amusement” and “arts” section were
labeled as the “blue-line district.” As volumes of literature on Japan’s occupation
attest, these individuals were made into an icon called “panpan” that would haunt not
only the women but also their children for decades.

Importantly, both the Japanese government and Allied occupation authority,
Supreme Commander of Allied the Powers (SCAP), was opposed to state coercion and
were committed to the symbolic principle of “free will” of all individuals as part of
their plan to “democratize” Japan and eliminate so-called feudalistic remnants of
militarism that co-opted the state. Naturally, a variety of relationships developed
between Japanese women and G.I.s that ranged from downright violent, coercive, to
passionately loving, or all of the above at any given moment. Discourse of free-love
emerged in opposition to sexual slavery and came forth as a purported sign of progress
between two former enemy nations.

At first, the legal status of international marriage was ambiguous precisely

15 Ibid., 176.
16 Ibid., 179.
because of the legal ambiguity in the newly emerging postwar Japanese state. On May 31, 1946, SCAP declared that American personnel who wished to marry Japanese nationals must abide by the Japanese civil code and ordered the Japanese government to arrange a “mutually satisfactory mechanical procedure for registration of the marriages of American citizens.”

However, because the 1924 Immigration Act barred entry of anyone who was 50% or more of Asian ancestry from entering the U.S. as non-quota immigrants, they were not able to bring their wives back home with them.

As the U.S. established a global empire of military bases after WWII to fill in the vacuum left from the outdated Japanese and European imperialisms, G.I.s everywhere petitioned their government to allow them to bring their foreign brides home. Congress responded by passing Public Law 271, the War Brides Act in December 28, 1945. This law enabled G.I.s to bring their spouses and children back as non-quota immigrants. However, since Congress assumed that G.I.s would be bringing their white (mostly German and Italian) brides home, Japanese brides and their children were refused. By 1947, Congress finally took measures to allow Japanese brides in the U.S., and passed an amendment to the War Brides Act that allowed spouses to enter the U.S. between 1947 and 1948, and then again from August 1950 to February 1952 (Public Law 272 and Public Law 141-144). However, anti-miscegenation laws still existed on the state level in the U.S., and bureaucratic hurdles effectively kept brides out. Japanese women were not only required to produce their register of domicile, resume of past three years of employment, proof from their municipal official, and tax returns on fixed assets from two guarantors to the American

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Embassy, but they were subjected to screening from the Japanese police. Although guidelines for the screening were obscure, they at least had to prove to the Japanese police that they were not prostitutes, had no criminal record, what kind of family they belonged to and the soundness of their ideology. This complicated process was made especially difficult for white soldiers trying to marry Japanese nationals versus their black or Nisei counterparts.\textsuperscript{19} While women divulged every detail of their lives to the U.S. military, Ariyoshi Sawako illustrates in her novel \textit{Hishoku (Colorless)} how women knew very little about their husbands. Although they were conquerors with godlike status in Japan, many brides were shocked at the social position of their husbands in the reality of their hometowns in America.

Real changes did not occur until the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. President Truman signed Public Law No. 126 on June 28, 1947. This allowed the brides to immigrate to the U.S. with their husbands as non-quota immigrants if they were married in a window between July 23 and August 21, 1947. On August 22, a day after the month long window expired, 823 marriages took place with 597 Nisei, 211 white, and 15 black grooms.\textsuperscript{20}

\textbf{Japan Deals with “The First Occupation Present”}

The first mention of the mixed-blood children came on June 28, 1946 approximately nine months after the onset of occupation through a radio announcement that described a baby of Japanese and American parentage as “the first Occupation present.”\textsuperscript{21} The story broke the English-speaking world in the June 19, 1948 edition of \textit{The Saturday Evening Post} by an article entitled “Japan’s Occupation

\textsuperscript{19} Kanzaki, \textit{Yoru no kichi} [Bases of the night], 102-107.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 157.
Babies” by Darrell Berrigan.

Berrigan reported an unofficial estimate of 1000 to 3000 “occupation babies,” and lamented “[t]here never will be [an official estimate] so long as the Allied authorities have anything to say about it.” Proposal for a census by the Welfare Ministry’s Population Problems Research Institute in 1947 was blocked by Colonel Crawford F. Sams, chief of the Public Health and Welfare Section, because he said it would “be unwise to probe so serious a sore.” Berrigan critiqued “[m]ilitary law” that “frees the soldier or officer all but moral responsibility to the child or its mother” when the mixed-children were created as a result of the occupation. Colonel Sams attempted to contain the problem through a stern policy of nondiscrimination:

The worst thing that can be done is to call a child a G.I. baby or to stigmatize him in any way...The kindest thing that we can do is not to segregate them. They have to stay here after we’ve left. They should be raised the same as any other Japanese. Some of our wives wanted to give them special treatment: clothing, candy, and so forth. We’ve opposed that. Our fundamental interest is in the children. The Japanese are not a race, but a hodgepodge mixture of Chinese, Koreans, Malayans and others. There’ve been Eurasians in Japan for many years. They’ve not been a problem at all. They’ve all been absorbed very well by the population.

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In his attempt to sweep the troublesome problem under the carpet, Colonel Sams resorted to a description of Japan as a multi-racial nation that would absorb the mixed-blood children in due time. He perhaps succeeded in diverting attention from the issue with a tenuous argument about Japan’s anthropological origins at the early stages of occupation, but it would not hold water in the long-term.

SCAP’s Public Health and Welfare would set the precedent on how Amerasians would be dealt with after the war. On one hand, SCAP welfare policy was an extension of the New Deal designed to curb social unrest and prevent dissention from building up against the occupying forces. On the other hand, it displayed a color blind policy designed to mobilize potential minority threats of the population into the welfare state. Hence, SCAP’s policy of nondiscrimination, state based assistance, and need-based assistance served this objective. Mixed-blood children would be given no special treatment. Doing so would foster a minority population in Japan that would accentuate the contradictions of Japan’s postwar, destabilize the nation the U.S. sought to secure as an ally, and potentially lend itself to the spread of communism as will be discussed below. State-based assistance was introduced to prevent special interest groups from the privilege of providing for certain segments of the population, and instead created a dynamic where the people must uniformly present themselves as a subject of assistance before the state. Need-based assistance as well prevented favoritism amongst the population.

Hence, while SCAP officials such as MacArthur were using the rhetoric of national identity to erect the idea of a monolithic Japanese race separate from the Ainu, Okinawans, Taiwanese, and Koreans who were once Japanese subjects, Colonel Sams tenuously asserted Japan’s multiracial origins. In order to release the U.S. from responsibility of creating a racially mixed population as a byproduct of its massive empire of bases abroad, Colonel Sams instead made it into a “Japanese problem.”
Consequently, his own logic forced him to implicitly recognize a minority mixed population in Japan even if it was on the pretext of absorbing it through a welfare policy of nondiscrimination before the state.

As Berrigan’s article suggests, orphanages such as Our Lady of Lourdes Home in Yokohama and Sawada Miki’s Elizabeth Saunder’s Home built especially for mixed-blood children were not encouraged by SCAP precisely because of their segregationist tendencies. Sawada became particularly conspicuous. As her story is frequently told, Sawada first came across a mixed-blood child on a train in Gifu Prefecture in February 1947. As she unwrapped a purple bundle stored on rack above her seat, she saw the dead body of a half-Japanese half-black baby.26

Due to her prior life experiences, Sawada was interested in the issue before ever coming into physical contact with it. As the granddaughter of Iwasaki Yataro, samurai turned founder of the great Mitsubishi zaibatsu, Sawada was groomed from childhood to become a diplomat wife who could navigate Japan in the international world through its competition with European imperialisms. As a young girl, she learned English from Umeko Tsuda, a graduate of Bryn Mawr and one of the first Japanese women to study abroad.27 Her aunts were both wives of prominent diplomats and arranged her meeting with Miki’s future husband, Sawada Renzo.28 After their marriage, Renzo became part of Shigemitsu Mamoru’s faction, and served as diplomat of the Foreign Ministry in London. During her time there, Sawada volunteered at the Barkingside home dedicated to helping orphans once a week. Sawada was inspired by the founder of the home, John Barnardo (1845-1905), who is said to have “rescued and educated sixty thousand homeless British children” and made dramatic

27 Hemphill, The Least of These: Miki Sawada and Her Children, 23.
28 Ibid., 36.
contributions to child welfare. Hence, by the time Sawada came across the emergence of mixed-blood children in postwar Japan, she brought her extraordinary experience as a diplomat’s wife during Japan’s imperial period to the table. In this way, she writes of her reaction to the June 28, 1946 radio announcement of the birth of Japan’s first Amerasian children.

This newscast aroused something that had long been concealed deep in my heart. That was the evening glow that I had watched in the woods of Dr. Barnardo’s home in England fifteen years before. The reflection of that beautiful glow flamed up and touched off a fire in my heart. I felt strongly that the work to which I should devote myself was right there in this glow.

Sawada paid SCAP headquarters a visit in May 1947 and negotiated to purchase her father’s estate in Oiso to establish an orphanage for children euphemistically described as “victims of the war” or “born because of the war” without mention of their “mixed-blood.” The request was granted as not an individual, but a religious institution out of ignorance of the mixed-blood situation, and Elizabeth Saunders Home was established on October 26, 1947.

Shortly thereafter, Sawada decided to confront Colonel Sams about U.S. military policy on mixed-blood children. The Berrigan article, which pitted Sawada against Colonel Sams may have exposed the stark reality behind the situation of the mixed-blood children.

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“occupation babies,” but like so many other exposés that will follow, it merely complicated the delicate position of subject who asks for assistance and subject who assists, and got Berrigan himself fired from his own post to boot. During the meeting, Colonel Sams reiterated his belief that “if the Japanese people are patriotic, then they will send their children to orphanages” for the Japanese population at large, and not segregated facilities. According to Sawada, “what he really meant was to gather children bearing baggage of the morally weak was undesirable, and even a nuisance.”32 When Sawada asked if the children would be left behind or taken with the occupying forces when they left, the confrontation abruptly ended. Thereafter, Colonel Sams attempted to shut down the orphanage, and support from U.S. military personnel and their wives dwindled away out of fear of being punished for insubordination within the military.

Sawada herself admitted that she was completely opposed to “Sam’s occupation policy of ‘non-discrimination, non-segregation, and absorption within the Japanese from the beginning.’”33 Even though she stated she should raise the children as Japanese who live in Japan, it was for the most part lip service. She adhered to a policy of segregation to give the children self-confidence in their most important formative years before elementary school so they would have a solid foundation throughout their life.

Although Colonel Sams and Sawada appeared to be at odds, their opposition was perhaps symptomatic of temporary historical circumstance rather than an inherently contradictory logic. Colonel Sams’ policy, or lack thereof, for mixed-blood children came at a time when the State Department was still unsure whether Japan could be secured as an ally in the Pacific, or if it would revert to pre-defeat militarism.

32 Ibid., 32.
33 Ibid., 213.
or succumb to communism. Hence, he attempted to extinguish potential internal dissention that could exploit the children for anti-American objectives.

Ambiguous Products of a “Violated Japanese Sovereignty”

In actuality, Colonel Sams was right on target in forecasting how the Amerasian issue would be mobilized into anti-American, anti-capitalist, and anti-military politics in Japan, Okinawa, and beyond. Because of censorship, there were only a handful of articles published in Japanese about the issue until 1952 when occupation officially ended. However, much to the shock of the American public, reportage published after the end of Japan’s occupation in 1952 and shortly thereafter indicated the degree to which the issue had been festering below the surface during the entire occupation.

_The Washington Post_ was quick to pick up on this new discursive trend in its May 16, 1952 article: “Japan’s independence was signaled by a rash of articles critical of the Occupation. A favorite theme was illegitimate children fathered by occupation soldiers.” Many of these exposés of the injustices of the occupation came in the form of reportage. Shimizu Ikutarō, Miyahara Seiichi, and Ueda Shōzaburō in _Kichi no ko_ (Children of the bases) attempted to appeal to the raw lived experience of U.S. military bases purportedly through the most untainted of all sources—innocent children. In their foreword, the authors argued that “...Japanese nationals who have long looked down upon the Asian races have fallen into a new colonial condition” vis-à-vis the U.S. military. The collection contains a chapter of seven essays on

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34 Koshiro, _Trans-pacific Racism and the U.S. Occupation of Japan_, 266 ft. 13.
36 Shimizu Ikutarō, Miyahara Seiichi, and Ueda Shōzaburō, _Kichi no ko_ [Children of the bases] (Tokyo: Kōbunsha, 1952), 4. In genre of reportage, also see Shimizu Ikutarō, Kimura Kiharō and
“The Pitiful Mixed-blood Child.” Not surprisingly, the adolescent contributions corroborate their adult editor’s assertions, and portray mixed-blood children as evidence of Japan’s victimization to the U.S. military. One middle school student writes that the 8 million yen G.I.s leave behind each month during their R&R from the Korean War is good for impoverished Japan, but “the humans (mixed-blood children) they leave behind are not appreciated.” The students showed no hesitation in blaming not only the fathers, but also Japanese women “who devote night and day in pursuit of a vainglorious and flashy lifestyle” without thinking of the consequences their actions. Interestingly, although all of the children condemn mixed-blood existence as a living spectacle of Japan’s sexual subjugation to the U.S. military, they perform a duplicitous double function. On one hand, they are an aggressive actor that eliminates any other possibility for mixed-blood existence and on the other hand, a passive spectator that appears to benevolently sympathize with them. A middle school girl expresses this in a poem called “A Child with Tainted Blood.” “When the U.S. military exercises are done/Children are given gum and pocket money, and [the G.I.s] seek out the dwellings of young women/As [one] wonders if this is okay/Blood is tainted/And [a woman] is made to have a baby/How pitiful that baby.” “Even though the Peace Treaty has been signed,” one middle school boy laments that Japan “is still treated as an occupied nation.” He hopes Japan “will be quickly liberated from this situation” so a “fine Japanese culture can be constructed.” Another boy closely

Inomata Kōzō, eds., *Kichi Nihon* [Base Japan] (Tokyo: Wakōsha, 1953). This volume adopts the same theme of infringement of Japanese sovereignty, or “so-called extraterritoriality,” which is expressed through the sex industry amongst other examples. Pages 72-73 deal with “blameless children” that are born as a tragic result. Also in the reportage genre, these following volumes cover both sexual exploitation and mixed-blood children in their ongoing criticism of the occupation. Kanzaki, *Yoru no kichi* [Bases of the night], 258-292; Kanzaki, *Ketteiban/baishun: Kanzaki repōto* [The finale edition/prostitute: The Kanzaki report].

37 Shimizu Ikutarō, Miyahara Seiichi, and Ueda Shōzaburō, *Kichi no ko* [Children of the bases], 210.
38 Ibid., 216.
39 Ibid., 213.
40 Ibid., 217.
resonates, suggesting that this is none other than a genocidal contamination of the Japanese race.

If the status quo continues, then I worry that all of Japan will be brimming with mixed-blood children in the next few years. American G.I.s and *panpan* will turn today’s Japanese race into a hybrid (mixed-blood child) of the Americans and Japanese...

If mixed-blood children continue to be born and American culture is integrated [into Japan] without careful thought, then I suppose that the unique Japanese culture brought down from our ancestors will disappear. We need to protect Japanese history, and Japan’s unique beautiful culture.41

This explosion was not only expressed in the media, but also voiced through the national Diet. Due to heavy censorship, the first mention of mixed-blood children only brushed the surface. When Japan tried to reconstruct its eugenics policy after the war, the problematic of miscegenation arose in lengthy debates on how to punish crimes of adultery (姦通罪) or other indecent acts (不貞行為) in judicial committee hearings August 13 and 19, 1947. Next, mixed-blood children were brought up in the welfare committee. When Yamazaki Michiko asked how the government would deal with the growing number of mixed children on October 2, 1947, Welfare Minister Hitotsumatsu Sadayoshi answered that volunteer and religious organizations would greatly contribute to their care.

And as if open the floodgates, discussions were unleashed in 1952 after

41 Ibid., 218.
Japanese “independence” was secured.\(^\text{42}\) Yamashita Yoshinobu consistently posed questions from February 21, 1952 in welfare committee hearings reminding the Diet that “we no longer need to hold back out of concern for the occupying forces” in regards to what he alternatively referred to as mixed-blood children (konketsuji), international children (kokusaiji), or international orphans (kokusai koji). In response to his question, Takada Masami of the Welfare Bureau Children’s Section (厚生省児童局) repeated the occupation policy of nondiscrimination. Yamashita countered that because the children were singled out by their peers, they required special attention. Just as Colonel Sams feared, special attention entailed not only naming a divisive minority population in Japan, but compelled Japan to turn to the U.S. to take responsibility.

Whether it is the [U.S.] military, or any other military, to make Japanese women bear children, leave them neglected, and then return [to their own country] is something we cannot allow from a humanitarian standpoint. Furthermore, whether or not the women who bore these children are of a questionable [character], whatever their particular line

\(^{42}\) Kazahaya Yasoji in February 20, 1952 in budget hearings; Yamashita Yoshinobu in February 21, 1952 in the welfare committee hearings; Tokano Satoko in the February 27, 1952 Foreign Affairs Committee hearings; Takada Nahoko in the March 25, 1952 in the plenary session of the upper house; Umez\(\text{u}\) (梅津錦一) in July 7, 1952 Diet Management Committee hearings; Dazai Hirokuni (太宰博邦) of the Welfare Committee hearings in February 11 and February 28, 1952; Yajima Mitsuyoshi (矢崎三義) in the December 9, 1952 Education Committee hearings; February 2, 1952 by Ministry of State Yamagata Katsumi in the plenary session of the Upper House; February 20, 1953 by Nagata Ryōichi in Budget Committee hearings; Fujiwara Michiko in the February 27, 1953 plenary session of the Upper House; Fukuda Masako in the Foreign Affairs Committee and Tanaka Hisao in the Education Committee hearings on February 28, 1953; Fukakawa Tamae in the March 9, 1953 Budget Committee hearing; Koyama Shinjirō in the Cabinet Committee hearings in March 14, 1953; Dazai Hirokuni in the July 3, 1953 Welfare Committee hearings; Kojima Tetsuzō (小島徹三) of the Welfare Committee Hearings; Koyama Ryō in the March 3, 1957 Budget Committee hearings; Uked\(\text{a}\) Shinkichi (受田新吉) March 31, 1959 Cabinet Committee hearings.
of work, or whatever their circumstance, I do not think we can just neglect them. Therefore, the parents of these children must take responsibility. In particular, the responsibility of the father is of considerable significance. To overlook this or to look upon it lightly just because they are the military is something I don’t think can be allowed from a humanitarian standpoint...I would like to request the military to take them home; to take responsibility by taking them back.

Aside from his greatest wish of having them removed from Japan, Yamashita also inquired about the legal jurisdictions involved in requesting child support (a problem that made no ground until the late 1990s in Okinawa and is still unresolved today as will be discussed later). The desire for an outright uprooting “in light of the current population problem in Japan” was shared by Tokano Satoko in the February 27, 1952 Foreign Affairs Committee hearing, to which the foreign Minister Okazaki Katsuo reiterated the official position of the Japanese government to look after the children.

Takada Nahoko representing the Socialist Party (shakai-tō) on March 25, 1952 in the plenary session of the Upper House mobilized Kanzaki Kiyoshi’s reportage into an impassioned and lengthy protest of the conditions created by the bases that remain in Japan. She proclaimed that, “the atomic bomb is not the only thing that can destroy a race.” “In order to protect the purity (純潔) of Japan this contamination cannot be washed out until all foreign troops are turned away.” This “contamination” includes the increase of “many relatives who have fallen to women of the night called panpan girls,” the 1,700 children in Yokosuka who have been corrupted by witnesses these lewd acts on a daily basis, the rise in teen abortion, and the “so-called occupation baby or mixed-blood children who are born as a result of acts of prostitution.”

43 Criticism of the US military and a demand for the US government to take responsibility was also
With the hype about mixed-blood children reaching a breaking point, Dazai Hirokuni declared that budgetary allowances would be made for a survey into the problem in the November 11 and November 25, 1952 Welfare Committee hearings. Thereafter, real politics met real life when Sawada Miki was summoned on December 6, 1952 by the Diet to give testimony on her trip to the U.S. to lobby for revisions in the Immigration and Naturalization Act. According to Sawada, she had cared for 231 children over the past four-and-a-half years. Forty of those children were taken in by American families stationed in Japan, but because of U.S. immigration policy, only 16 were able to emigrate with their adopted families to the U.S. The remaining 24 children were hanging in limbo waiting for immigration clearance—a process that could take years.

As a skilled diplomat, Sawada warned the Diet of turning it into a bilateral issue between the U.S. and Japanese governments. She learned in her visit to the United Nations that Japan must succumb to “weak-kneed diplomacy” (nanjaku gaikō). There, she explained she made the mistake of declaring that she wanted the “fathers to take responsibility for the support of mixed-blood children” and “their father’s country to come half way until the children reach the age of eighteen” right off the bat. In particular, by asking for “funds for a special school,” she immediately “broke the ice with the talk of money.” However, she learned about the “extremely delicate psychology” of America from Pearl Buck\textsuperscript{44}. As Buck advised her, “you should show them that you have been carrying a large burden as a single Japanese person; you should not stick responsibility in their face; they need to save face, so striking a dramatic pose will be a problem… if you are thinking about the future of the children

\textsuperscript{44} Pearl Buck, and the Pearl S. Buck Foundation Inc., that assisted Amerasians will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.
in the long run.”

The “extremely delicate psychology” of America is perhaps symptomatic of the fear of unleashing a chain reaction of claims in other areas touched by the expanding empire of U.S. military bases in the postwar era. This would not only cause tension in the U.S.-Japan Alliance, but holding the U.S. responsible would cause a blowback for Japan. Accordingly, Yamashita Yoshinobu quickly responded, “If the Japanese do not first settle their responsibility for mixed-blood children that the Japanese left in places such as Indonesia then I have the feeling that the Japanese will not be in a position to say anything about the mixed-blood children in Japan to the Americans when it comes to pursuing responsibility of the state.” This idea was dismissed by Fujiwara Michiko, who toured Indonesia, as she stated, “I had a few conversations about the mixed-blood children, and rest assured… Indonesian women are thorough about taking responsibility for their own children.” As a result, abandoning the issue of bilateral negotiation for mixed-blood children not only created a difficult situation for Okinawan Amerasians, but also for so-called “Japinos” or Japanese-Filipino children as will be discussed later.

The results of the survey called for by Dazai three months earlier were reported by the Minister of State Yamagata Katsumi in the February 2, 1953 plenary session of the Upper House. Despite reports of 20,000 mixed-blood children, which Sawada Miki reduced to 10,000 in her official guestimation, the Japanese government survey only came up with 5,013. Four-thousand-two-hundred-and-five children were half-white, 714 were half-black, and the remaining 914 were unknown. The survey was conducted by inquiring the nation’s public Health Stations (保健所), midwives, and doctors. According to Takada Masami of the February 28, 1953 Foreign Affairs Committee hearings, questionnaires were distributed to document births from after the war to August 31, 1952, and relied on the memory of those questioned since there
were no official records. Takada questioned the authenticity of the results. Very importantly, it did not take into account the number of children who died, and as Yamagata pointed out, “it does not include situations of birth in foreign hospitals, adoption out of the country, and cases where mixed-blood children went to foreign countries in other situations without adoptive parents.” Inclusion or exclusion of these children who were born, or adopted into, the protection of American sovereignty as opposed to children who remained in the crevices of Japan’s “lacking sovereignty” will become a central issue shortly.

The position that mixed-blood children did not belong to Japan continued more explicitly in 1953 as expressed by Tanaka Hisao in the February 28, 1953 Education Committee hearing out of concern for the matriculation of mixed-blood school children in Japanese public schools.

The mixed-blood problem in America is not that significant because it is a state that has lived from the practice of mixing of many races from the beginning. However, our Yamato race, for better or worse, risks witnessing a great human tragedy if mixed-blood children start appearing within our race tied together by one blood…

Teranaka Sakuo delivered the same “nondiscrimination” rhetoric in response to these fears, and later, the Minister of State Okazaki Katsuo reiterated the Japanese government’s position to not ask for special treatment for mixed-blood children in Japan through bilateral government negotiations on March 9, 1958. As expected, he stated that “I imagine that it would be difficult for Japan to ask for special treatment because America would have to apply the law to every state.”

However, with the exception of representatives such as Koyama Ryō in the
March 4, 1957 Budget Committee hearings who were eager to exploit the mixed-blood children as evidence for Japan’s victimization to the U.S. military, serious inquiries about government policy and intervention into the issue dwindled off after Dazai Hirokuni’s July 3, 1953 report on results from additional surveys in the Welfare Committee hearing.

According to this decisive report, 482 children were under the care of welfare institutions as of March 1, 1952. However, the survey was based on the 3,490 (approximately 3,000 white and 400 black) children who lived outside these institutions. Although doubts were cast as to the veracity of the figures reported on previous February 2, 1953 survey, Dazai was more resolute this time proclaiming: “I feel that the target (taisho) number of our so-called mixed-blood problem is more less 4,000 and perhaps 5,000 at the most.” Next, Dazai reported that 1,708 children, approximately half, were “recognized” by the father. Although the intent of the survey was to determine how many children were recognized by Japanese civil law, the respondents interpreted “recognition” as the father’s knowledge of the mixed-blood child, which Dazai pointed out, does not always mean the father recognizes the child as his own, nor carry any legal implications. The dubious nature of recognition was corroborated by the fact that approximately 70% of the children were raised by their Japanese mothers or maternal relatives.

Most importantly, the survey suggested that over half of the families were “understanding” about the situation. This led Dazai to the conclusion originally suggested when the issue was opened on October 2, 1947—that the Japanese government should adhere to a policy of nondiscrimination, integrate them into Japanese schools, rectify the problem of discrimination by through training and development (keihatsu) of educators and adults, and most of all, have philanthropy cover the loose ends with the spirit of volunteerism.
With this survey, the official Japanese government position came full circle. What is significant is that although the survey narrows its subjects down to “children born between foreign military personnel and their affiliate (軍人軍属等) fathers and Japanese mothers,” as opposed to mixed children between “Chinese or Koreans” where their “skin color, eye color, and hair color are not so different from the Japanese,” the crux of the problem really focuses on a specific type of Amerasian. That is, “the target number of our so-called mixed-blood problem is more less 4,000 and perhaps 5,000 at the most.” Whereas reports on the initial February 2, 1953 survey suggested the number was diminutive because “it does not include situations of birth in foreign hospitals, adoption out of the country, and cases where mixed-blood children went to foreign countries in other situations without adoptive parents,” Dazai was no longer concerned with these other cases. He comes to the conclusion that the mixed-blood children who were the seeds of the real problem were children born without international protection deserving of a sovereign state that resulted in their Japanese mothers having to raise the children alone—children born on the outskirts of state sovereignty. These children were insignificant enough as a number that they did not pose a threat to the Japanese population as a whole. In fact, in the preceding mention of mixed-blood children in the Diet on the March 13, 1953 Cabinet Committee hearing, Koyama Shinjirō suggested precisely this. In his discussion on the “improvement on the quality of the population,” he stated the following.

…take for example the mixed-bloods that have been problematized recently. It is a fact that with the black mixed-bloods in particular, this is something that the Japanese race has not experienced with as much enormity as it does now. What kind of influence will this have on the quality of the race? Fortunately, in terms of the numbers, it is insignificant
enough to not pose a problem.

Colonel Sams and Sawada Miki initially confronted each other as adversaries on the opposite end of the table. However, both of their positions came into harmony in the Japanese Diet a year after occupation ended. The “real problem” identified by Dazai was insignificant enough to be absorbed by the Japanese population as a whole, and therefore, could adopt Colonel Sams’ original policy of nondiscrimination. However, Sawada was also instrumental in containing the growth of the mixed-blood population in her efforts to lobby the U.S. government to revise their immigration and nationality laws. This would reduce the number of children who posed a “real problem” by transforming them into an number unworthy of being counted—those children who are shipped out of Japan and become an out of sight out of mind problem for the Japanese government.

America’s Reaction: Checking the “Pawns of the World’s Ideological War”

The U.S. military quickly sensed the danger in the “collateral damage” exploited by leftists in Japan and attempted to do damage control. In a *Washington Post* article featuring Miki Sawada and the “100,000 illegitimate children left as an aftermath of the occupation,” the author argues that, “this is a situation the Communists easily turn into propaganda.” Malvina Lindsay, a female columnist for *The Washington Post*, also became uneasy about the situation. According to Lindsay, the Soviets lost no time indoctrinating their own occupation babies in East Germany by sending some 29,000 of them off to Russia to take their father’s citizenship by age five and then re-implanting them in East Germany where they are given a communist education. They even went so far as to do the same to 467 occupation babies of

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African-American descent. Foreshadowing the cold war arms race, Lindsay argues that “the thousands of half-American nameless children around the world who are products of war’s displacements” are “now pawns of the world’s ideological war.” She continues, “Their care and education is in this Nation’s long-range interest.”46

When a Reverend L. H. Tibesar of the National Catholic Committee of Japan wrote that “Responsibility for these orphans rests very clearly with ‘army regulations’ and the American Government,” Army public relations officers were quick to point out that “the regulations the priest referred to actually were the responsibility of Congress, not the Army” because of discriminatory immigration laws that prevented soldiers from marrying local women in occupied areas.47

Meanwhile, in the U.S., Congress passed a new piece of law called the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 (Public Law 414). In October 1952, Rosalind Bates, chairman of the Southern California Women Lawyers appeared before the Commission of Immigration and Naturalization hearings requesting the immigration law be “amended to allow the adopting parents to give their children nationality to the adoptee” in regards to “Japanese-American war orphans” “whose fathers are American.” Under this proposal, adoptees could be naturalized in Japan and emigrate to the U.S. with their adoptive parents’ American nationality thereby eliminating the need to count them under the quota system. In the same month, James Finucane, Associate Secretary of the National Council for the Prevention of War gave testimony in behalf of what he guessed to be “between 150,000 and 300,000” children fathered by “American soldiers…in almost every corner of the globe.” He requested:

A United States Commission should be set up to examine into the

records of every one of these cases, and, where the evidence supplied by the mother or an admission by the father warrants belief in American paternity, the child should be granted American citizenship…

In addition, Government support should be given to projects…for the adoption of some of these children by American families.48

Their recommendations however, fell upon deaf ears when the law was enacted in December 1952. The Act defined more specifically the immigration and naturalization conditions for Asians in general, Asian war brides, and Amerasian children. It approved immigration from the Asian-Pacific Triangle, which included most of South and East Asia. While ending exclusion of Asians, the new law was still racially discriminatory in intent and design. Countries within the triangle were allowed only one hundred immigrants each while Europeans were allowed to enter on the more generous quotas of the 1924 immigration law. War brides, however, were able to enter the United States as non-quota immigrants.

For the first time, the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 made a serious attempt to recognize the birth of a child to one U.S. citizen and one alien parent in a foreign territory. However, the immigration law was still discriminatory in regards to sex. The restrictions put on a child born of a U.S. citizen father and alien mother in a foreign territory are overwhelming, making it difficult for the child to attain citizenship unless he/she is conceived in wedlock, and if the father is willing to make the necessary arrangements for citizenship acquisition. However, for a U.S. citizen mother, there are close to no real barriers to transferring citizenship to a child born to an alien father in a foreign territory.

48 U.S. House of Representatives, Hearings before the President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization, 82d Cong., 2d sess., September 30-October 29, 1952 1215-1217 (Bates); 1742-1750 (Finucane). Koshiro, Trans-pacific Racism and the U.S. Occupation of Japan, 184.
After the Act went into effect, concerned politicians such as Rep Frances P. Bolton continued to speak out. Bolton brought the issue before Congress in July 6, 1953 after she read Malvina Lindsay’s *The Washington Post* article mentioned earlier. She warned the U.S. should take interest in the issue as a problem of threat containment: “One of the results of our neglect of this difficult and complex problem will quite certainly be a group of rootless, discontented young people who will be fertile soil for any and all ‘isms.’”

Pressures on Congress, however, never amounted to much. The Refugee Relief Bill of 1953 established a 4,000 quota for “orphans.” However, only fifteen Japanese-American “orphans” were sent to the U.S. under the bill. Additionally, Congressman Francis Walter put forth private bills and admitted about 350 mixed-blood and pure-blood Japanese orphans for adoption in the U.S. by 1956. Considering the fanfare attributed to the issue, the numbers of actual mixed-blood children adopted out to the U.S. were marginal.

According to Yukiko Koshiro, the mutual racisms of Japan and the U.S. found common ground at this point. Precisely those children exposed to bare life without international protection found in Japan as a sovereign state were the ones who would be catapulted into the liberal democratic dream of multicultural America. However, as I will argue in the next chapter, there is a third element to this equation. That is, much of the anti-military rhetoric both argued in the Diet and in the media that was not shy to use mixed-blood children as evidence of Japan’s victimization succeeded in reducing the U.S. military bases while they watched on as Okinawa was transformed into an outright military base colony with a brutality unknown to the Japanese.

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51 Koshiro, *Trans-pacific Racisms and the Occupation of Japan*, 199.
“Petitioning Subjects: The Management of Sexual Relations in Okinawa from 1945 to 1952 and the Crisis of Sovereignty”

Both Yukiko Koshiro in “The Problem of Miscegenation”\(^\text{52}\) and Kanô Mikiyo in “The Problem of ‘Mixed-blood Children’ and the Formation of the Myth of a Monolithic Race”\(^\text{53}\) have most recently contributed to scholarship on the mixing of blood between U.S. military personnel and Japanese women. Koshiro brilliantly elucidates the mutually constitutive racisms between the U.S. and Japan against mixed-blood children. She writes, the “preservation of mutual racism was the compelling force for promoting the U.S.-Japan friendship” that resulted in the “mutual abandonment of these children.” Kanô provocatively illustrates how Japan constructed a transhistorical myth of a “monolithic race” in the postwar by disposing of their remnant colonial subjects such as the zainichi Koreans on one hand and forthcoming mixed-blood children of a new U.S.-Japan Alliance on the other.

My position combines both theses. In place of Koshiro’s “racisms” and Kanô’s “myth of a monolithic race,” I choose the key concept of “sovereignty.” If racism is defined as those who are allowed to “let die” versus those who are allowed to “let live,” then the U.S. and Japan both collaborated transpacifically in their racisms toward Okinawa. That is, as was shown in the previous section, precisely at the moment when Japanese politicians, activists, and civilians vehemently protested the

\(^\text{52}\) Koshiro, \textit{Trans-pacific Racism and the U.S. Occupation of Japan}, 159-200.
“infringement of Japanese sovereignty,” sexual relations between G.I.s and Japanese women and the ensuing birth of Amerasian children held prime symbolic value in reinforcing their claim. Furthermore, in America’s Cold War competition with communists who quickly integrated mixed-blood children born as a result of foreign occupation, the U.S. was afraid of allowing the “occupation baby” become “fertile soil for any and all ‘isms.’” On one hand, a newly formed South Korea was attempting to deal with the problem by emerging as a leading nation in the export of children—Amerasians being among them. However, the great efforts that went into exporting Amerasians to the U.S. from Japan turned into a dead issue. The U.S. and Japan was able to cope with the situation by sending U.S. military bases—and the sexual politics and Amerasian children along with them—to Okinawa as the condition for a “restoration of Japanese sovereignty.”

As Kanô shows, Japan constructed a postwar monolithic identity by attempting to erase zainichi Koreans as a living relic from the past while simultaneously erasing Amerasians as living embodiments of the U.S.-Japan Alliance of the future. Hence, her analysis beautifully captures the essence of the postcolonial condition in Japan, which is ongoing colonialism that continues from the prewar past that dominates East Asia through a postwar U.S.-Japanese Alliance. This analysis can be extended, perhaps with an even sharper clarity, to the production of Amerasians in Okinawa.

In this section, I will discuss how Okinawa attempted to deal with the crisis of sovereignty, or lack thereof, through the management of sexual relations between G.I.s and Okinawan women, and the emergence of Amerasian children.

The “Forgotten Island”: 1945-1947

Although the Ryukyu Kingdom was annexed into the Meiji State in 1879 through military force, Japan never formally defined Okinawa Prefecture as a colony
as it did Taiwan, the Korean peninsula, and Manchuria. Yet, Okinawans, along with Koreans, experienced harsh discrimination during the colonial period in mainland Japan. Okinawa was the only inner territory (naichi) that came to host “comfort stations” found abundantly in Japan’s outer territories (gaichi). Although the Japanese government was well aware they were fighting a losing battle, they nonetheless prolonged war in Okinawa so land battle would not spread to the mainland. As a result, Okinawa lost over one-fourth of its entire population in the only land battle fought in the Japanese state.

While Japan lost its colonial acquisitions, Okinawa was thrown once again into an ever ambiguous state of uncertainty. According to the Potsdam Declaration of July 1945, “Japanese sovereignty should be limited to the four home islands and to such minor islands as we determine.” While many former colonial subjects of the outer territories (gaichi) of Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria, and beyond celebrated their “independence” from Japanese colonial rule and national subjects of the inner territories (naichi) of Honshū, Hokkaidō, Kyūshū, and Shikoku were vested with “Japanese sovereignty,” Okinawa was left hanging in suspension to endure a U.S. military occupation qualitatively different from Japan’s occupation by the Allied forces.

The general consensus at the onset of the Japanese occupation was that it would someday terminate and the Japanese state would regain its “sovereignty.” Hence, the human rights order of October 4, 1945 quickly allowed for the formation of political parties whereas this was not possible in Okinawa until 1947. Japan enjoyed its first

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election in April 1946, while the inhabitants of Okinawa, the Amami Islands, Ogasawara Islands, and ethnic Koreans and Taiwanese in Japan were excluded from the democratic process on the grounds that their register of domicile (honseki) was in territory no longer considered Japanese.55

In this way, while the Japanese were complaining about a violation of their “sovereignty,” Okinawa was entirely stripped of the opportunity to exert anything even remotely resembling a “will of the people,” and left at the mercy of the international community to determine their future. The foremost Okinawan intellectual historian and “father of Okinawan studies” himself Ifa Fuyû (1876-1947), in perhaps the most well-known and harrowing piece of writing he left behind before his death, expressed exactly this regarding Okinawa’s “problem of belonging” (kizoku mondai).

The issue of Okinawa’s belonging (kizoku mondai) will be discussed at the upcoming San Francisco Peace Conference. Even if Okinawans have the freedom to express their hopes on the issue before the conference takes place, they must know that they are not in a position to determine their own fate amidst the whirlwind of current world affairs. Even if they are able to hope that their descendents will come to have this capacity in the future, they themselves are in no position to command their descendents to be in possession of it…The only choice Okinawans have is to throw themselves before the will of their descendents after them.56

While the Japanese took for granted the very existence of “sovereignty” in their protest against its violation, Ifa made it clear that Okinawa was never even bestowed the luxury.

Furthermore, as the Japanese complained of the occupying forces “infiltrating” their communities and “contaminating” the sanitation of the Japanese spirit, body, and politic, Okinawa’s experience of occupation was composed of a radically different spatial dynamic. As historian Nakano Yoshio notes, “the confiscation of land by the U.S. military in Okinawa was not like the situation in Japan where the military only confiscated necessary land on an individual basis. First, the U.S. military completely occupied the entire island of Okinawa, confined citizens who survived the war into camps, and only then allowed for the land not needed by the military to be free for return.”

Devoid of a territory or body to call its own, Okinawa was at best a spirit that haunted its oppressors, yet never allowed to express a “will” of its own. Therefore, before any lump sum critique of U.S. military occupation experienced by the “people of Asia” can occur, this qualitative difference between occupation in Japan and other

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57 Nakano Yoshio, Sengoshiryō: Okinawa [Postwar documents: Okinawa] (Tokyo: Nihon Hyōronsha, 1969), 27. According to Nakano, the U.S. military started granting permission to Okinawan civilians to return to their former residence gradually from October 1945. At the end of the war, there were sixteen camps covering northern and central Okinawa in which survivors were interned.

58 The Okinawa spirit/soul or mabui is often associated with women because women presided over the spiritual and religious realm during the age of the Ryukyu Kingdom. With the onset of modernization upon the annexation to Japan, this spiritual role was pronounced “uncivilized” and “barbaric.” Yuta or noro shamanesses continue to practice in Okinawa today, and are more often than not the target of an Orientalist gaze from the outside. Popular culture depictions of “grannies” or obā are described as drawing their endless vitality and cheer from this Okinawan spirit. However, fiction writer Sakiyama Tami takes issue with these portrayals in a way that is not incongruous from the lack of a will that Ifa speaks of. Sakiyama describes mabui in terms of absence. That is, “The instability and difficulty of an everyday life with no basis. Sorrow towards a sad history that is never soothed…A loss of words before a real life experience which [they] cannot bear to look at directly.” Just as Okinawa was isolated from the outside world which would not even entertain the idea that it had a political will, Sakiyama writes mabui can be read in the “expression of resignation towards an outside which has been severed.” Okinawa is devoid of a political will and sovereign territory, just as mabui is “without a voice and without a figure.” Sakiyama Tami, Kotoba no umareru basho [The place where language is born] (Sunagoya Shobō, Tokyo: 2004), 16-18.
territories such as Okinawa must be made clear. The U.S. occupation of Okinawa already incorporated aspects of Japanese colonialism in Okinawa.

In discussing the future, a subcommittee of the House Naval Affairs Committee initially recommended in 1945 the U.S. “take outright” Okinawa.\(^59\) Others favored placing the Ryukyus under a trusteeship because it would appease the 1941 Atlantic Charter declaration that signatories “seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other,” the 1943 Cairo Declaration that “the three great allies…covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion,” and the 1945 President Truman statement at Potsdam that “there is not one piece of territory…that we want out of this war.”\(^60\) It was clear that the U.S. had learned from the mistakes of European and Japanese imperialism. It would draw a distinction from these empires so it could impress its power upon the world as a leader of democracy. In this way, the Department of State delivered a more sober opinion: the “Ryukyu Islands should be regarded as minor islands to be retained by Japan and demilitarized” because the “Okinawans who inhabit these islands are closely related to the Japanese in language and culture.”\(^61\) Finally, President Harry Truman presided over the issue. He stated that the Ryukyus would be placed under a U.S. trusteeship until a peace treaty could be forged with Japan at a later date.\(^62\)

Leaving the disposition of the Ryukyu Islands undefined merely worsened its problems. Since the U.S. government did not know whether it would keep the islands in the long term or return them to Japan, they did not develop its public works, economic infrastructure, and political administration as it did in Japan. As a result, the

\(^59\) Eleanor Lattimore, “Pacific Ocean or American Lake,” *Far Eastern Survey*, vol. xiv no. 22 (November 7, 194): 313.
\(^60\) Ibid., 314.
Ryukyu Islands became a “dumping ground for Army misfits’ and crimes involving American soldiers were rampant.” The soldiers were not only incompetent and unmotivated but miserable from boredom and the sweltering heat. Heinous crime, and sexual assault in particular, became such a problem that the Commanding General, Island Command, General Wallace threatened the death penalty in a vain attempt to curb the instance of rape.

In addition to the “misfits” were black soldiers and the more cheaply contracted Filipino Scouts. The U.S. military was pressed to make use of its minority population and started to integrate African-Americans in its ranks. Not only did African-Americans such as W.E.B. Du Bois argue that the Negro would be able to be finally recognized if allowed to fight and sacrifice as Americans, but the U.S. was weary of the fact that “Japanese propagandists have…made the most of the anti-Negro discrimination” and realized racisms would only hurt American interests abroad. This was really no different from the Okinawan desire to be recognized as first class Japanese citizens by serving with Imperial Japanese forces. Thrust into a total war, the U.S. military was compelled to make use of its minority population just as Japan had, and allowed African-Americans into the ranks. The famous Tenth Army that invaded Okinawa contained a large number of black units, and an all black 24th Infantry arrived in Okinawa in August 1945.

In April 1946, Director of General Affairs Lt. Comdr James Watkins noted that “fear of cruelty, rape, and violence replaced respect for American authority” and recommended the withdrawal of blacks to “avoid further compromising the American

63 Quoted in Mikio Higa, Politics and Parties in Postwar Okinawa (Hong Kong: Cathay Press, 1963), 8. See also Kano Masanao, A Sketch of Postwar Okinawan Thought [Sengo Okinawa no shisōzō], 94-100.
66 Fish, Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 1945-1950, 83.
potion in the eyes of the Okinawans.”\textsuperscript{67} The 24\textsuperscript{th} Infantry left Iejima for Gifu and Osaka on January 28, 1947.\textsuperscript{68} In their place came 2,339 Filipino Scouts of the 44\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Regiment (歩兵連隊) on January 23, 1947.\textsuperscript{69} Some suggested the Scouts were more dangerous than African-Americans as purportedly evidenced by American Director of Public Safety crime statistics.\textsuperscript{70} As the first postwar editor in chief of \textit{The Uruma Shimpō}, Ikemiyagi Shui wrote, the Scouts “unleashed resentment from the atrocities experienced in the Philippines at the hands of the Japanese military onto the Okinawan civilians.”\textsuperscript{71} Although the Filipinos represented the U.S. military while not being full-fledged Americans, and Okinawans represented the Japanese military without being equal Japanese nationals, they were mutually positioned to looked upon each other as representatives of their respective oppressors. The Filipino Scouts left Okinawa in 1963.\textsuperscript{72}

In this way, Okinawa quickly became a cesspool for the bottom rungs of the U.S. military, ethnic minorities, and colonial subjects, all with an opportunity to compensate for their slighted masculinity through an utterly defeated people. Hence, it is not surprising that the U.S. military developed a taste for sexual violence in places such as Okinawa. M.D. Morris offers a rare first hand account from as an American military affiliate in Okinawa in 1946.

Regardless of regulations or consequences, the men had to find women. Nurses and civilian women were quartered in guarded compounds, and had to be escorted by armed males on their evenings out. Later, dependent

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., 83.

\textsuperscript{68} “Sayonara!! Kokujin butai Nihon he shinchū” [“Goodbye!! The Black unit gets stationed in Japan”] \textit{The Uruma Shimpō}, February 7, 1947.

\textsuperscript{69} “Hijimajin butai: Okinawa shubi sanka” [“The Filipino unit: Joining the Okinawan garrison”] \textit{The Uruma Shimpō}, February 7, 1947.

\textsuperscript{70} Fish, \textit{Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 1945-1950}, 86.


wives and daughters lived in special communities and were put under the same regulations... Very few “noncoms” ever went out with these girls, therefore the natural attention of the vast majority of enlisted men was turned upon the Ryukyuan girls. The idea that all female Okinawans were fair game for the conquering heroes was soon dispelled by military authorities reluctantly paying heed to the outraged protests from local leaders. Nevertheless there were always isolated incidents of violence...  

Here, it is evident that the principle of allowing women of the lower rungs of one population—in this case Okinawans—to serve as the breakwater (bōhatei) from sexual contamination to protect women of the higher echelons of society—military dependent wives, daughters, and nurses follows a similar logic as the Imperial Japanese Army’s so-called “comfort woman” system.

Sexual contact between Allied troops and Japanese women primarily came under the regime of occupation. By contrast, sexual contact with the U.S. military in Okinawa first occurred during the Okinawan War when Okinawa was still formally a Japanese territory. While so-called “comfort stations” were banned in the inner territories, Okinawa was treated as a “semi outer territory” (jungaichi) in that it became the host of “comfort stations” in 1944. Okinawa’s wartime governor Izumi Shuki, a Japanese politician from Yamanashi Prefecture, initially rejected the order to establish “comfort stations” on the grounds that it would “corrupt public morals” (fūki no binran) and humiliate Okinawans who made such an effort to be treated as full-fledged Japanese. Women from the Korean peninsula, Taiwan, and local

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73 Ibid., 60-61.
74 Hong, “Okinawa kara hirogaru sengo shisō no kaonosei” [The possibility of a postwar thought extending from Okinawa” in Ōgata shisō no politikusu [The politics of postwar thought], 117. According to Hong, the “comfort women” were brought to Okinawa in greater numbers during 1944 along with an increased concentration of Japanese forces during the Okinawan War.
Okinawan women who formerly worked in the *tsuijiyûkaku* (prewar Okinawan pleasure quarters) were called upon to service the Imperial Japanese Army.

From this experience, the concept of a “breakwater of the flesh” where certain women “sacrificed” their bodies to protect the chastity of “Japanese national subjects” was firmly ingrained into the Okinawan psyche. Simultaneously, Okinawan women who had the “privilege” of receiving an imperial Japanese education learned that the U.S. military would “humiliate” women and kill enemy civilians if captured were driven to “protect” their chastity in the name of the Japanese emperor through “compulsory group suicide” (*shudan jiketsu*).

Contrary to the propaganda, the U.S. military did not annihilate Okinawans but instead placed them in internment camps as soon as they were captured. In this way, Okinawa’s lack of “sovereignty” was expressed in the spatial configuration of wartime and occupation through internment camps. It was in or around the internment camps where countless rapes occurred. The extraterritoriality exercised here by the U.S. military forces is of a somewhat particular nature because the Okinawans were both “potential enemies” as “Japanese national subjects” and “victims” deceived by a Japanese military regime as “Ryukyuans.” In any which way, they were completely devoid of sovereignty. Firstly, their protection that should have been extended to them as members of the sovereign state Japan was betrayed, and secondly, the U.S. subjected them to an immense violence on the pretence of possessing sovereignty which they did not enjoy in the first place.

As Okinawans were released from the internment camp and “repatriated” to a now U.S. military occupied Okinawa, sexual violence continued to penetrate their

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everyday lives. Accounts from Okinawan women are voluminous.76

Stories of [G.I.s] sneaking into civilian dwellings and raping women were told on a daily basis…For American G.I.s, occupied Okinawa was an area of extraterritoriality. Women could not go outside with ease. Even if they stayed in their dwellings, they did not know when a G.I. would find their way inside.77

In fact, it was the infamy of sexual violence in Okinawa and Manila that prompted the Japanese to take preemptive measures and establish the RAA. Officer Taniuchi of the Security Division of the Police Department posed as a reporter to ferret out information from American reporters about what to expect from the Americans soon to arrive in Japan. What he learned was unsettling:

The soldiers who have already taken up base in Okinawa and Manila and are first in line for occupation in the Japanese mainland are under the great expectation that women will surely be prepared for them.78

According to the group for pre-treaty settlement of loss and reparation, there were 76 reported crimes against women between 1945 and 1949.79 Of course, it goes without

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saying instances of sexual violence went mostly unreported and therefore cannot be accurately reflected in the statistics.

Since men of all ages—adolescent, conscription age, and elderly—were mobilized into the Okinawan War effort, a disproportionately larger female population was left behind in the postwar to care for a disproportionately high number of underage, elderly, or incapacitated dependents. With chronic sexual violence threatening women on one hand and the responsibility to save their families from starvation on the other, many were driven to prostitution. Morris continues his account with the development of a so-called “willing” submission to the soldiers as follows:

…there were local girls in sufficient numbers who were willing, for a consideration, to entertain the soldiers’ wants. Naturally any such traffic could not be organized officially. But for the common good, some wiser, saner heads worked out of an off-the-record arrangement whereby all interested girls were assembled in a single area in which drinking, money, medical examinations, and an orderly movement of actually thousands all were controlled closely without creating any disturbance from the outside. After duty hours, military buses from several areas unofficially would take and return the troops. For a while this appeared to be a satisfactory solution. Then some chaplains and others had the bus service prohibited from stopping at the area in question. The buses continued to run, and slowed down to a low-gear crawl, so that all would be able to leave and enter without mishap…

The U.S. Military Government (米国軍政府) made efforts to contain the situation

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80 Morris, Okinawa: A Tiger by the Tail.
through a series of special proclamations in March 1947. Special Proclamation No. 14 declared, “Prostitution Prohibited with Members of the Occupation Forces.” Special Proclamation No. 15, “Venereal Disease Control” called for the establishment of clinics to treat VD, isolation of infected patients, requirement for all health care providers to report all cases of confirmed or suspected VD, and compulsory treatment. Special Proclamation No. 16 declared “Female Sex Slavery Prohibited” for women and girls under the age of eighteen.

In this period, Okinawa is often referred to as the “Forgotten Island” after the well-known *Time* magazine article attesting to the subhuman conditions, international apathy, and U.S. military neglect. Okinawans attempted to fend for themselves as the G.I.s entertained themselves with a free for all looting of the island and its women.

“Keystone of the Pacific”: 1947-1952

The management of sexual relations in Okinawa, however, took a turn as Okinawa approached its “reverse course” of occupation and emerged as the “Keystone of the Pacific.”

Political talks were rekindled by the increased fear of the spread of communism in 1947. Terasaki Hidenari, Advisor to the Emperor, relayed the following message in September 1947 regarding Okinawa:

> The Emperor hope[d] that the United States w[ould] continue the military occupation of Okinawa and other islands of the Ryukyus. In the Emperor’s opinion, such occupation would benefit the United States and also provide protection for Japan…the Emperor fe[lt] that such a move would meet with widespread approval among the Japanese people who

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fear not only the menace of Russia, but after the occupation has ended, the growth of rightist and leftist groups which might give rise to an ‘incident’ which Russia could use as a basis for interfering internally in Japan.”

General MacArthur quickly made use of the message, and made public his intention to retain the Ryukyu Islands upon the justification that they were not Japanese.

The Ryukyus are our natural frontier...[T]here was no Japanese opposition to the United States holding Okinawa since the Okinawans are not Japanese and because the Japanese foreswore war...[M]aintenance of the United States air forces in Okinawa is of real significance to Japan and an obvious guarantee of her own security. 82

Discrepant positions between the Department of State and U.S. military started to come together in February 1948 when George Kennan, director of the policy planning staff in the Department of State met with MacArthur in Tokyo. The issue focused on how to strike a delicate balance between the U.S. and Japan. MacArthur made it clear that “American troops would become a divisive issue in Japanese politics” and that it was best to “keep U.S. bases out of postoccupation Japan.” 83 The constant infringement of Japanese sovereignty by the Allied forces was humiliating and could possibly foster a strong anti-American sentiment that found its ultimate expression in communism. However, if the U.S. succeeded in wooing Japan as an ally against communism, it would also need to protect itself from attack. This posed a

complication because rearmament would surely be unfavorable to other U.S. Allies in East Asia and former colonized territories with memories of Japanese militarism still fresh in their minds. The way out of this dilemma was to secure Okinawa as a base island so the U.S. could at once monitor Japan and protect it at the same time without inviting further anti-American sentiment. The Kennan-MacArthur position marked a fundamental transition in State Department thinking. Once it hit the U.S., it stagnated until 1950 since nothing could be done until a formal treaty with Japan became immanent. Negotiating the Japanese peace treaty fell upon John Foster Dulles of the State Department.

Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru attempted to salvage as much of the Ryukyu Islands as possible once it became clear to him that the U.S. position vis-à-vis Okinawa was starting to solidify. He was under attack from the nationalist right wing that wanted to retain as much of its colonial legacy as possible, and even the liberal left who accused him of selling out to the U.S. too much. Previous considerations of annexation or trusteeship would leave the U.S. open to charges of imperialism, which it has historically tried to avoid in order to define itself as a democratic leader markedly different from the European and Japanese colonial legacy. Dulles finally arrived at the legal concept of “residual sovereignty,” expressed in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Conference. The U.S. would have exclusive use of the military facilities and the civil administration could revert back to Japan once the balance of power in East Asia permitted.

Once the U.S. plans for Okinawa became concrete occupation policy began to focus on “democratization” with the appointment of Maj. Gen. Joseph Sheets in October 1949. As the U.S. military got settled into the idea of investing in a long term occupation, including the construction of U.S. military facilities and the building of a

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84 Ibid., 50.
civil administration, city planning to ensure a distribution of sex without offending the general public became a central issue.

Similar to the debate that occurred in Japan, residents complained that the unpleasant display of prostitution taking place in plain sight in their neighborhoods was a bad influence on young children and led to juvenile delinquency. For example, according to Shima Masu, the so-called “mother of social welfare” who worked in the Goyeku Village of Koza City after the war, young women inhabited small rooms in Koza where they would not only raise their children but also attempt to provide for them through prostitution. Because such incidences rose to the level of widespread social phenomenon, the Goyeku Village leader Shiroma Seizen, vice-president of the women’s club Shiroma Eiko, Miyazato Etsu, and Shima herself met daily to discuss a policy for environmental cleansing (kankyō jyōka) and a prevention of juvenile delinquency. According to The Uruma Shimpō, the Mawashi Womens’ Club (Mawashison Fujinkai) supported establishing a “special zone” (tokushu chitai) for “eateries” (ryōriya) because “toddlers and school children who do not know the difference between right and wrong are starting to imitate the obscene acts that take place in eateries near the village.”

The U.S. military as well was becoming more desperate to curb the flagrant spread of VD completely undeterred by the 1947 special proclamations that resulted from the lack of management of sexual relations. According to Shima, the Okinawa Civilian Administration (渉綱民政府) followed “suggestions” (shingen) from the U.S. military in August 1949 to set up “special drinking quarters” (tokuingingai) in Koza, Naha, Maebaru and Ishikawa to service U.S. military personnel.


86 Hokama Yoneko, “Kutsujoku to eikō kara no shuppatsu” [A departure from humiliation and glory] in Okinawa/onnatachi no sengo: shōdo kara no shuppatsu [Okinawa, Women’s postwar: A departure from the scorched earth] (Naha: Hirugisha, 1986), 44. See also Okinawa-shi, Urasoe-shi, Ginowan-shi,
Its objective is clearly explained by the following August 30, 1949 *Uruma Shimpō* article.

Considering the need to prevent sexually transmitted disease that has rapidly increased in the postwar, the Okinawan Assembly (民政) has discussed the moral propriety (*fūki*) for the need of dancehalls or other comfort amusement establishments from every angle. In particular, the Ogimi Public Sanitation Chief (*kōshū eisei buchō*) has worked on a plan with this as the only way to suppress sexually transmitted diseases, and is currently furthering talks with the Police Department. However, the governor has stated that the establishment of this kind of pleasure facility should be further examined as a social policy issue. All types of documents are currently being gathered. Establishment of a special area for amusement is almost entirely supported by men and opposed by women.87

The issue was hotly debated throughout Okinawa, amongst the Women’s Association (*fujin rengōkai*), Okinawan Civilian (民政府) officials, political party representatives, priests, and youth group representatives at a town hall forum in Naha on September 30, 1949. The future Naha City Mayor (1956) Senaga Kamejirō of the Okinawan People’s Party (*Okinawa Jinminton*), expressed his opposition to the U.S. military through the issue.

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Mr. Senaga stated that dancehall is merely a beautiful name to a prostitution district considering it institutes a system for monitoring syphilis. Hence, speaking from a position [that advocates] the protection of human rights and women’s liberation, he expressed his absolute opposition.88

However, Okinawans directly involved in securing the everyday safety of civilians such as village leaders and the police reluctantly supported the establishment of the special quarters as the lesser of two evils. The article continues:

The Goyeku Village leader and Koza Police Chief both contested of the wretched conditions of Chubu Chiku [Okinawa’s middle district], and supported the establishment of a breakwater [of the flesh] that would maintain the social peace by gathering the prostitutes in one area as a policy for preventing depravity of the youth and harm to the residents.

Quickly, the issue became polarized and set the tone for the rest of the occupation. Shima Masu captured the essence of the dilemma.

These two positions were representative of the debate that took place that day. Both were serious arguments. Residents living around the bases, however, were troubled by the fact that ideals could not solve the very real problem at hand. This debate took place in every corner of

88 The Uruma Shimpo October 4, 1949.
Okinawa, and finally, everyone was resigned to accept the establishment of a special drinking district (tokuingai).\textsuperscript{89}

Headlines for the \textit{The Uruma Shimpó} directly after the town meeting made the exact same characterization: “The Great Dilemma of the ‘Entertainment District’: A Debate between Ideals and Reality.”\textsuperscript{90} While this situation became an opportunity for counterparts in Japan to decry the infringement of Japanese sovereignty, interlocutors in the Ryukyus had no such recourse nor were they able to extricate the problem out of the confines of their state and bodies as Japan exported the violence of the U.S. military to Okinawa. At this point, they violently hit the limits of sovereignty. They could no longer posit resistance as recourse to a preexisting autonomous will, if restored, would liberate them from the yoke of oppression. This model of resistance divides the community between those with a strong versus weak will; between those who are politically correct versus those marred with false consciousness. However, as Shima poignantly attests, this bipolar division between strong and weak, correct and false collapsed. As if to echo Ifa’s last words at the end of the war, “The only choice Okinawans ha[d] [wa]s to throw themselves before the will of their descendents after them” because an autonomous will was not a luxury afforded to them. Instead, this irreconcilable choice between “ideals and reality” folded into the sheer will to survive. The residents who lived around the bases internalized this radical split precisely at the moment when they could no longer posit an outside to power.

Perhaps this is the moment of “defeat” referred to in the writings of Kiyota Masanobu after the 1956 \textit{shima gurumi tōsō} or “all-island struggle.”\textsuperscript{91} No longer was

\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., 91.
\textsuperscript{90} “‘Kanrakugai’ daiyure: risō to genjitsu no ronsô” [The great dilemma of the ‘entertainment district’: A debate between ideals and reality], \textit{The Uruma Shimpó} December 4, 1949.
\textsuperscript{91} See Kinjo Masaki, “Dōtei to ridatsu: Kiyota Masanobu no kijutsu o chūshin nishite” [Identification and eparture: The writings of Masanobu Kiyota] in \textit{Shokuminsha he: Posutokoroniariizumu toiu}
it an issue of whether or not to reject the U.S. military wholesale, but rather how to best negotiate the terms upon which land would be leased to the U.S. military. Similarly, it was no longer feasible to adhere to the ideal of eradicating prostitution, but rather, the issue was now how to best negotiate the boundaries of territorial, in tandem with the bodily control over the sexual relations between G.I.s and Okinawan women. This marks an important distinction between a “subject of resistance” and a “subject of negotiation.” It was precisely the discourse of “off-limits” that negotiated these boundaries at the moment of defeat and accentuated this subjective technology.

According to The Okinawa Times, “Tall off limits signs have been posted between the military and Okinawan civilians ever since the onset of occupation.”92 After the September 1949 town hall forum, Koza was released from its off-limits designation on December 8, 1949, and “opened up as a commercial town for U.S.-Ryukyuan friendship.”93 The famous “Business Center,” abbreviated as “B.C. Street,” and renamed today as “Park Avenue,” was established on that day explicitly for the amusement of the G.I.s. Sensitive to anti-military politicians such as Senaga, The Uruma Shimpô was compelled to start off the introduction of B.C. Street with the defensive subheading “Lets Do Away with Misconception.” The first few lines read:

The establishment of the Business Center is a place for light-hearted, righteous, and sound business as well as amusement (goraku basho)

chôhatsu [To the colonizer: A postcolonial provocation] (Kyoto: Shôraisha, 2007) 381-433. Kinjo gives an in-depth analysis of this poet’s concept of “defeat” in relation to the role of literature amidst Okinawa’s postwar political crises. Kinjo reconceptualizes the meaning of “postcolonialism” as the philosophical confrontation with “defeat.” This is particularly important for Okinawa, because while other territories celebrated their “independence” from the yoke of Japanese colonialism as a sort of “return” to precolonial autonomy, the content of oppression in Okinawa remained firmly in tact albeit the form—from Japan to America to a US-Japan Alliance—changed.

92 “Toriharawareta off limits kinshi kuiki” [Off limits have been repealed], Okinawa Taimusu [The Okinawa Times] January 13, 1950.
93 “Bijinesu sentâ Beijin to Okinawajin no akarui gorakujo” [Business Center: A light-hearted amusement center for Americans and Okinawans], Uruma Shimpô December 9, 1949.
between Americans and Okinawans, but naysayers of the entertainment
district (kanrakugai) went so far as to hold a forum and espouse their
misconception of the problem as a military appointed prostitution district.
According to the Governor’s comments yesterday at the assembly, the
Deputy Military Governor [Sheetz] expressed to the Governor [Shikiya] that “The Business Center is a light-hearted place of amusement found in
any civilized country. Nonetheless, there is an individual94 around Naha
with a misconception that it is a replica of the tsujiyûkaku [prewar
Okinawan pleasure quarters] and rousing up opposition. This is truly
unacceptable.”

Koza, in middle Okinawa, was followed by a lifting of the off-limits restriction in
Naha of southern Okinawa in January 1950. The Okinawa Times reported the G.I.s
delight in “looking forward to meeting the young Okinawan ladies on the street.”95

After seeing how off-limits areas profited from the infiltration of G.I.s into the
community, northern Okinawa as well petitioned Sheetz to lift the Okinawan ban. According to Ikemiyagi Shui, village leaders justified their request to the U.S. military
by stating, “contact with Americans would promote democratization,” “friendship with
American officers would edify English language studies” and “friendly relations
would heighten the level of trust between the villagers and American officers.”96

This put Sheetz in an awkward yet desirous position. Okinawans were poised as
subjects who petition for prostitution while Sheetz was poised as the authority that

94 Since the Japanese languages does not make a distinction between singular and plural, it is unclear if
“there is an individual” or if “there are individuals.” However, it is clear that Senaga, and perhaps his
supporters, are implied here.
95 “Beijin no tachiri kyoka: Koza de shikentekini jissi” [American’s allowed entry: Enforced on a trial
basis in Koza”], Okinawa Taimusu [The Okinawa Times] Toriharawareta Off Limits kinshi kuiki”
January 13, 1950.
43.
bestows the privilege for Okinawans to prostitute themselves. Of course, in light of the 1947 special proclamations, he was at the same time compelled to publically display his outright opposition to sexual slavery and prostitution as a violation of individual free will. Ever conscious of the opposition from Senaga and his Okinawa People’s Party (OPP), he cautiously welcomed the off-limits removal for the following five reasons: 1.) to promote friendship between the people of the U.S. and the Ryukyus; 2.) to give the people of Okinawa an opportunity to make money; 3.) to prevent American soldiers from entering villages; 4.) to establish souvenir and art shops; 5.) to establish recreation halls. Furthermore, “in the recreation hall, [he] intend[ed] to create the opportunity for young good Okinawan women to dance in a morally sound manner.” Sheets was clear that he did not want to be mistaken for establishing a brothel for the U.S. military and said, “I am absolutely opposed to prostitution.”

Of course, Okinawans not only saw through the ludicrousness of Sheetz’s statement, but as will be shown later, VD statistics proved it. Ikemiyagi’s sarcastic response, for example, captured the general sentiment.

Sheetz長官 forgot that the soldiers were young men. He seemed to be under the “misunderstanding” that they would embrace these youthful “good women” in their arms as they danced, and then just go back to the barracks of their respective units. Or perhaps the Major General was convinced the soldiers of the U.S. military were all Puritans like himself who would never embrace a sullied prostitute.

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97 Ibid., 45. See also “Kanrakugai no ikô: Kôshôsei niwa hantai” [The intent of the entertainment district: Opposition to a system of prostitution], Okinawa Taimusu [The Okinawa Times] January 12, 1950.
98 Ikemiyagi Shui, Okinawa no Amerikajin [Okinawa’s Americans], 45.
99 Ibid., 45.
While most were able to see through Sheetz’s rhetoric, interpretations on the “truth” behind it tenaciously revolved around the concept of free-will. That is, prostitution was either justified by the “local girls in sufficient numbers who were willing…to entertain the soldiers’ wants”\(^{100}\) on one hand, or condemned because they were forced to “prostitute themselves to G.I.s as a means of ‘living’ and ‘eating’”\(^{101}\) on the other. That is, whether or not that will was respected or violated, the sanctity of an autonomous will was nonetheless posited. In this register, Sheetz’s strategy was to highlight Okinawan agency and downplay any instance where political opposition can dig up evidence of slave-like exploitation to criticize the draconian force of the U.S. military.

By freeing ourselves from the constraint of this register however, we can alternatively ask what is at stake with the emergence of this type of subjectivity of a subject that petitions for his/her own subjugation out of a sheer desire to survive. As was the case in Japan with the abolishment of RAA in 1946, and in Okinawa with the issuance of the 1947 special Proclamation No. 16 “Female Sex Slavery prohibited,” it was clear the U.S. military was particularly opposed to the logic of slavery in facilitating sexual contact. Additionally, “slave wages” or “starvation wages” wielded upon Okinawans to compensate for the U.S. military’s lack of labor reserves bred deep anti-American sentiment in 1948.\(^{102}\) It was actually through this experience of slave-like conditions that transformed Okinawans such as Senaga from U.S. military appointed collaborators to recalcitrant anti-American politicians and ushered in the emergence of political parities such as the “trouble making” OPP.

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\(^{100}\) Morris, *Okinawa: A Tiger by the Tail*.

\(^{101}\) Okinawa-shi, Urasoe-shi, Ginowan-shi, Gushikawa-shi, Ishikawa-shi, oyobi Nakagami-gun Rōjin Fukushi Sentā Unei Kyōgikai, *Chūbu chiku shakai fukushi no kiseki daiikkan sōron* [The origins of social welfare in the Middle District vol. 1 introduction], 65-66.

Because of the Okinawan resentment of being treated as a “forgotten island,” wasteland for America’s most undesirables, and object of unabashed extraterritoriality, Sheetz attempted to diffuse dissent by conscientiously reflecting on the occupation’s “mistakes” and rectifying them with the promise for democratization precisely at the moment when it needed to secure Okinawa as the “Keystone of the Pacific.” Although a commitment to human rights and democracy is one way of explaining this transition, it can also be argued that slavery is an inhibitor of capitalist expansion because it does not create laboring subjects that consume as they produce. As Marx clearly showed, slavery impedes capitalist expansion because consumers must be produced to absorb surplus value generated by production. Hence, it is no surprise that Sheetz found outright exploitation an impediment to the base construction of Okinawa as a military outpost of the Pacific.

When the U.S. military confiscated land to build military bases, farmers were separated from the land from which they drew subsistence, and thrown into the military dominated capitalist economy as laboring subjects. Not only was this true for base-construction laborers, but for the formation of a sexual labor force.

Originally, the formation of the special drinking quarters (tokuingai) was not designated by the U.S. military. Most of the hostesses that worked there were individuals who lost their means of production through activities such as farming to the bases.103

Again, such Okinawan accounts repeatedly point out that prostitution was not “designated by the U.S. military.” Instead, farm girls who formerly found their means

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103 Okinawa-shi, Urasoe-shi, Ginowan-shi, Gushikawa-shi, Ishikawa-shi, oyobi Nakagami-gun Rōjin Fukushi Sentā Unei Kyōgikai, Chābu chiku shakai fukushi no kiseki daiikkan sōron [The origins of social welfare in the Middle District vol. 1 introduction], 65-66.
of production in the land were transformed into “hostesses” who petition the Americans who confiscated their land for wages. The relationship to their land and bodies is not just metaphorical in the sense of Okinawa’s political exploitation symbolized by an exploited woman. Instead, metaphor breaks down as the confiscation of their land means that they not only have a new relationship to the Okinawan terrain, but a new relationship with their very own bodies that literally become a terrain rich in sexual resources that they must work in order produce in a new base-centered economy.

Precisely at this time, when Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan in December 1949, and on the eve of the June 25, 1950 start of the Korean War, capital started to pour into Okinawa. Congress allotted a $74 million construction budget for fiscal year 1950 followed by $25 million in Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) funds and an additional $37.8 million through fiscal year 1952. As a result, laborers flooded in from the Amami Islands, mainland Japan, the Philippines, and the U.S., thereby exacerbating the market for prostitution centered around base-construction. At the end of the prewar period in 1940, the total working population consisted of 74.22% agriculture and forestry versus 58.12% in the postwar era by 1950. This 16.1% difference is predominately accounted for by the introduction new category of military labor (gunsagyô), which represented 15.05% of total labor. Separated from the land, male labor became mediated by the military through base construction and did female labor through sexual services. By 1950, there were an estimated 7,000 prostitutes and 1,500-1,600 sex slaves in Okinawa.

Sheetz’s was therefore sincere in his opposition to all forms of slavery. His ultimate aim was not either to protect or violate the free will of Okinawans, but rather it was to allow for the emergence of the technology of a “petitioning subject.”\textsuperscript{107} Okinawans not only produce goods and services, but they produce themselves as subjects. The fact that prostitution did exist, and women were exposed to sexual violence is only an incidental fact that will go on to correct itself in the future as security tightens. In this sense, merely “exposing” Sheetz’s rhetoric as a trick to violate the autonomy of Okinawan women does not step outside of the register of free will, but unwittingly reproduces it. Again, the ultimate goal here is not to negotiate for more autonomy and better protection of the inviolable human will, but it is to produce subjects who negotiate.

International marriage, on the other hand, has traditionally been posed as the happy ending to the nightmare of sexual violence (rape) and sexual exploitation (prostitution) because the former is a sexual relationship recognized by both the U.S. and Japanese states while the latter is a consequence of the infringement of state sovereignty. Children born to such relationships, such as Grace M. Cho, suggest the so-called “yanggongju” (as she renders “Yankee whore” from the Korean) and “war bride” are two moments in a single continuum.

Both the Korean and U.S. dominant cultures severely stigmatize the overt exchange of sex for money and, to a lesser extent, the more subtle exchange of sex or companionship for material goods. That is true, of course, unless such exchange takes place within the context of marriage. Immigration to the United States through marriage

represents an opportunity for the Korean woman who is associated with military sex work to shed the stigmas of the past by legitimizing her sexual labor, to the extent that it is no longer legible as sexual labor...The war bride, as the pioneer of Korean migration to the United States, then operates as a figure for the disappearance of geopolitical violence into the realm of the domestic.\footnote{Grace M. Cho, \textit{Haunting the Korean Diaspora: Shame, Secrecy, and the Forgotten War.} (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2007), 14.}

International marriage is a legal recognition between two states of a domestic union; its function is parallel to bilateral agreements as a legal recognition of the political sovereignty between two states. Although sexual relations between native women and U.S. military men often transgress realms of bodily autonomy and political sovereignty simultaneously, the normative function of international marriage is absolutely crucial because it installs the goal of domestic and state protection precisely for those who are always left exposed without it. Hence, because “international marriage” is the ultimate goal of miscegenation, “The war bride, as the pioneer of Korean migration to the United States, then operates as a figure for the disappearance of geopolitical violence into the realm of the domestic.” In other words, the war bride is needed to establish the norm between “unprotected bad women” and “protected good women,” and cementing the logic that the only form of escape from the former is to aim for the security of the latter.

Unlike South Korea, however, international marriage was not legally sanctioned at first.\footnote{For more on marriage with G.I.s, see \textit{The Uruma Shimpô} June 27, 1947; August 15, 1947; September 5, 1947 (marriage with black G.I.s); September 12, 1947 (marriage with black G.I.s); September 3, 1948.} On August 1, 1947, \textit{The Uruma Shimpô} reported the first marriage between an Okinawan woman and a G.I. RYCOM (Ryukyuan Command) post engineer from
Ohio by the name of Frank Anderson and twenty-three year old Higa Hatsuko from Ginowan visited the incumbent Okinawa Civilian Administration (沖縄民政府) governor Shikiya Kōshin requesting a marriage certificate. The couple had already registered their marriage in Ginowan, but the public liaison officer explained that there was no U.S. order formally permitting the marriage between a U.S. citizen and Japanese national.

Because of anti-miscegenation laws and Asian discrimination in the U.S., second generation Nikkei soldiers (called Nisei), many of whom were of Okinawan descent, clamored for the right to bring home their foreign brides. This gave way to the Soldier Bride Act of 1947, Public Law 213 that allowed for a one month window for soldiers to bring their brides home, and later revised to extend for additional marriages. During this period, sixty-three marriages were recognized in Okinawa: 53 with Nisei grooms, 8 with white grooms, 1 between a Nisei groom and bride, and 1 with a black groom. The breakdown in Japan consisted of 825 total marriages, 397 with a Nisei groom, 211 with a white groom, 15 with a black groom.

According to the April 1, 1948 special order 28 “Marriage between Ryukyuan Civilians and Occupying Soldiers,” “any intention to marry between Ryukyuan civilians and occupying forces without coercion is invalid irrespective of any objective.” The definition of marriage includes common law unions. Of course, if a couple transgressed the order, the “Ryukyuan civilian will pay the fine of ? yen or a maximum of five years of imprisonment, or both.” Punishment for the offending G.I. is not mentioned.

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110 Also see Ikemiyagi Shui, Okinawa ni ikite [Living in Okinawa], 315-316.
111 Takushi Etsuko, Okinawa/umi wo watatta beihei hanayometachi [Okinawa’s GI Brides: Their lives in America], 116.
112 The Uruma Shimpō, September 5, 1947. Also see Ikemiyagi Shui, Okinawa ni ikite [Living in Okinawa], 266-269.
113 Nakano, Sengo shiryō: Okinawa [Postwar documents: Okinawa], 10. Also see coverage in Okinawa Times September 3, 1948 for when the ban was lifted on international marriage.
Like other military orders in Okinawa, such as the prohibition of prostitution for starters, this law was largely unimplemented, but served to formally discourage romantic relationships. It remained in effect until the June 27, 1952 McCarran-Walter Act which kept discriminatory immigration quotas vis-à-vis Asia seen in the 1924 Immigration Act in place, but did make an allowance for war brides and their Amerasian children to immigrate and acquire U.S. citizenship.

Infectious Life

Sheetz’s strategy was not to inhibit life’s force and contain it through coercion, but rather to unleash it and utilize its energies in order to facilitate self-producing subjects. His gamble with the productive power of life, however, poses risks and excesses that lie beyond his control. It always threatens to undermine the military system even as it fuels it with vitality. This productive power of life is not just metaphorical, but literally expressed through ensuing biological consequences. Once such important consequence was the flourishing of VD.

The original intent to limit prostitution to designated geographical areas and designated bodies was to secure the entirety of the population from the detriments of sexual violence and the spread of VD. Hence, certain segments of the Okinawan population petitioned for their security by dividing the geographical and biological terrain between zones of extraterritoriality, where autonomy was constantly violated, and sovereignty, where autonomy was supposedly protected. Of course, by affording Okinawa this security, the U.S. military had most to gain as it not only needed to quell anti-American discontent in Okinawa, but also increase productivity amongst its soldiers and laboring Okinawan population by reducing the immense cost of managing VD.

However, the explosion of VD showed to the dismay of the U.S. military that
the biological force always fails to be completely policed by boundaries. Syphilis cases rose 583.8% (111 to 759), gonorrhea cases rose 112.5% (711 to 1511), and chancroid cases rose 980% (10 to 108) from 1949 to 1950.\textsuperscript{114}

Okinawa Prefecture, trailing only behind Kyoto, had the second best score for low VD contraction in Japan before the war.\textsuperscript{115} However, this trend was reversed in the postwar era. Compared to the ratio of VD infections per 10,000 persons, the Ryukyu Islands had 1.2 (1956), 1.1 (1957), 1.3 (1958), 2.0 (1959), and 2.6 (1960) times the ratio of syphilis cases, and 7.5 (1956), 6.6 (1957), 14.5 (1958), 32.9 (1959), and 23.9 (1960) times the ratio of gonorrhea cases compared to Japan.\textsuperscript{116}

Table 1 VD in the Ryukyu Islands and Japan from 1956-1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>The Ryukyu Islands</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Syphilis</td>
<td>Gonorrhea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actual cases</td>
<td>Per 10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{114} Inafuku Seiki, Okinawa no igaku: Igaku/hoken tôkei shiryôhen [Medicine in Okinawa: Medicine and health statistics edition].
\textsuperscript{116} Incidentally, Okinawa Prefecture is second only to Tokyo for ratio of HIV and AIDS cases in proportion to the total Japanese population today. See “Kako saita o kôshin: jinkôhi 2i” [Breaking the past record: Second in the nation in proportion to the population], Okinawa Taimusu [The Okinawa Times] November 15, 2007.
Amidst the city planning centered around permanent U.S. military bases and accommodating its sexual wants, Colonel Sams visited Okinawa on December 10, 1949 to discuss the establishment of Health Stations (*hokenjo*)\(^{117}\) that would provide “health services” to civilian Okinawans.\(^{118}\) Health Stations were first established in Naha and Koza in July 1951, Nago and Yaeyama in October 1951, and Miyako and Amami in April 1952.\(^{119}\) According to Dr. Teruya Zensuke, former Chief of the Environment and Health Section (環境保健部長), “the reason the U.S. military put so much passion into establishing the Health Stations ‘arose’ from VD.” In fact, Dr. Inafuku Zenshi (全志), former Koza Health Station Director (コサ保健所長) testifies that the Health Stations were established not so much to protect the health of Okinawans as it was to protect the U.S. military from VD that they circulated through the civilian population. He states, “I don’t want to speak badly about America, but I want to leave behind the truth.” In the ten great causes of death in postwar Okinawa—gastroenteritis, colitis, tuberculosis, pneumonia, senility, measles, nephritis, bronchitis, cancer and malignant neoplasm—nowhere was VD to be found.\(^{120}\) Even though doctors were desperate about the severity of the situation, they became livid as they were told by the U.S. military, “This is someone else’s problem, you guys just take care of the VD.”\(^{121}\)

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\(^{117}\) Health Stations were also established in Japan. However, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, they were systematically different in Okinawa because unlike Japan, Okinawa did not fall under the purview of the anti-prostitution law until 1972. Accordingly, USCAR funded and used Health Stations in Okinawa to curb the spread of VD.

\(^{118}\) A Japanese version of Colonel Sams’ article published two days after his arrival in Okinawa can be found in Teruya Zensuke, *Sengo Okinawa no iryô: watashi no ayunda michi kara* [Postwar Okinawan medicine: From the path that I travelled] (Tokyo: Mejikaru Furendosha, 1987), 221. The headline of the article reads, “Improve the Medical System: Emphasis on the Eradication and Prevention of VD,” which reflects the US military’s primary interest—VD—in improving health care at that time. I have yet to locate the original English article.


\(^{120}\) Ibid., 10.

\(^{121}\) *Okinawa sengo no hokenjo no ayumi: hokenjo 30 shûnen* [A history of postwar Okinawan health
Dr. Teruya Zensuke found it particularly troubling that he was forced to become a VD tracer when he returned to the Ryukyu Islands in December 1947 after training when there was an acute shortage of doctors. “Even though demand for physicians was in such a state that I ‘wanted to borrow even a cat’s paw,’ I was given the assignment to become a ‘Investigator of VD Perpetrators’ that did not require physician’s [qualifications] and I was subsequently branded a VD doctor.”

During this time, there were only 131 doctors in Okinawa in a population of 600,000, or 4,581 civilians to 1 doctor compared to 750:1 in the U.S., 870:1 in England, and 1,300:1 in Japan. An article in the November 17, 1950 edition of the Ryukyuan Review pokes fun at the situation as follows.

Looking for a long life?? It doesn’t pay an Okinawan to become a doctor! The newspaper Herald claims the medical profession has the highest death rate on the Island…there are only 131 doctors to care for a native population of close to 600,000.

Could not be overworked.

Okinawan doctors, literally working themselves to death, were ordered to become VD tracers to protect the health and efficiency of the U.S. military via the Special Proclamation No. 15 “Venereal Disease Control” mentioned above, renewed by the July 13, 1950 Order No. 21 “VD Enforcement Act” (性病取締・性病取締規則).
The former reads as below.

The local civilian police authorities will, upon request of the Civilian director of Public Health, or his agents, apprehend all persons suspected or known to be afflicted with venereal…and deliver them to the proper civilian public health authorities for examination, treatment and other necessary action.

All persons having venereal disease shall be confined at a venereal disease civilian hospital for treatment and quarantine until…such person is cured…of the disease.

It is prohibited for anyone knowingly to conceal a person who is afflicted with any venereal disease, harbor such person, assist in his escape or interfere in his apprehension. It shall be the duty of any person who suspects he has or who actually has a venereal disease to report to…a hospital for medical examination...

The new “VD Enforcement Act” was passed less than a month after the June 25, 1950 start of the Korean War to secure the health of the military reinforcements from the war’s new founded launching pad—the Ryukyu Islands. The U.S. Civilian Administration Public Health and Welfare Section (米国民政府公衆衛生部顧問) tried to ameliorate the situation in 1950 by training forty “public sanitation nurses” (公衆衛生看護婦) to act as VD tracers out of the Health Stations.¹²⁵

From this period, “off-limits” took on a new meaning. Establishments that catered to G.I.s would be declared off-limits if female employees were found infected with VD. In a memo dated October 20, 1950 to Deputy Military Governor Sheetz, off-limits restrictions were removed from certain areas in the South for a trial period of thirty days. It reads:

This letter will request the Mayors to cooperate in this experiment insofar as matters of law, order, and sanitation are concerned. This letter should further advise the Mayors that individual establishments not properly maintained as to sanitation, or which are scenes of disorder, may at any time be placed off-limits by the Commanding General during the trial period.126

It is clear here that “properly maintained…sanitation” is the control of sexually transmitted disease. This eventually led to the establishment of the “A-sign” system after 1952, which formally instituted regulations and punishments for establishments to which the spread of VD can be traced. As I will discuss in the next chapter, Okinawans petitioned the U.S. military to lift “off-limits” restrictions and restore their “A-sign” designation in order to make a living.


127 The A-Sign system was abandoned in 1957 when the sanitary inspection of restaurants and bars was turned over to the GRI. By 1962, however, it was re-introduced, and a mass serology screening of all bar hostesses was carried out with the bar owner’s association agreeing to pay the cost of VD treatment by private physicians. See National Archives and Records Administration; Record Group 260: Records of the United States Occupation Headquarters, World War II; Records of the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR); Department: The Health, Education and Welfare Department; Box No: 129 of HCRI-HEW; Folder No: 1; Title: Robert T. Jensen. This can be located at the Okinawa Prefectural Archives, Document No. U800703B.
The Biological Embodiment of Postwar Life

Just as the spread of VD was enabled by life’s productive expanse, so was the production of Amerasian children. In Japan, the first media reports of mixed-blood children came from sightings of murdered or abandoned babies left on trains, garbage cans, and ditches. To my knowledge, the first mention of an Okinawan Amerasian child was reported similarly as an act of infanticide. The headline of a handwritten *The Okinawan Times* article dated August 13, 1948 reads “Pleas for Abortion Knocking on the Door of Underground Doctors (yabui).” When a 49 year-old man was arrested for suspicion of performing illegal abortions, it became known to the authorities that it was not an isolated case but a growing social phenomenon amongst mostly unmarried women who could not bear the consequences of having mixed-blood children. When investigated, many women proclaimed they were merely victims of “pure love.”

The women were outraged at the investigator’s assertion that they exchanged their chastity for material goods from the military and instead proclaimed they were living in pure love. They were all unmarried and ranged from ages 20 to 25. But when they thought of the reality of childbirth, they didn’t know what else to do, and ultimately resorted to the crime for which they candidly apologized and then burst out into tears.

One woman did not get an abortion because she hoped to give birth to her husband’s child. When this was not the case, she quickly resorted to infanticide.

Soon after getting married this past June, Maemura Hiro (age 22, pseudonym)…gave birth to her first child. When she realized it was an
illegitimate child with skin of a foreign race, she was arrested three
days after delivery for suffocating and murdering the child in her
underarm as she breastfed it.

This massive article, which filled up an entire page, recognized the complexity of
postwar social issues, but at the same time, unabashedly placed blame on the women
for their “irresponsibility.” A male researcher pointed out that “these women face a
crisis that cannot be handled by the old morality due to the drastic changes in the
[postwar] environment.” At the same time he thinks, “they should be blamed for the
irresponsibility of taking a new life.” The Shuri Youth Group president thought that
the public was “too lenient toward the ‘social cancer’ of the times.” A female worker
from A.J. Futenma Camp sympathizes with the women because it is “a sad reality of
the postwar era” while at the same time admits they are a “nuisance” to “the numerous
working women” who “protect their purity” while “working seriously” because they
are categorically “scorned” by society.

Since the Allied powers had more at stake in Japan’s occupation from its onset,
heavy censorship prevented mention of mixed-blood children and dammed up a
deluge of information that would not be released until 1952. By contrast, the lack of
interest in the “forgotten island” in the first few years of U.S. occupation resulted in
inadequate control of the mass media. Hence, this 1948 article is a chance glimpse into
the native response to mixed-blood children. It seems to be an extension of the
mounting tensions around miscegenation that was not yet regulated by the release of
“off-limits” districts at the center of the 1949 town hall debate discussed earlier.

The Uruma Shimpô published the statistics on mixed-blood children in a
September 23, 1949 article entitled “A Colorful Assortment of Mixed-blood Children:
Most Numerous of Caucasian Descent.” The article describes them as “born either as a
crystallization of international love that transcends borders or by accidental misfortune,” perfectly encapsulating the two polarities between bare life and protection under the law.\textsuperscript{128} Significantly, this article appears in October 1949, amidst the widely contested debate on the establishment of “entertainment districts” for G.I.s, and is strategically positioned below an article entitled “Dancehall: Establishment in the Four Districts of Naha, Koza, Ishikawa, and Maehara.”

Table 2 Mixed-blood Births for 3 Years as of September 1949

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Filipino</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Nisei</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Uruma Shimpô report on Police Department Security Division (Keisatsu Hōanka) findings.

A September 22, 1949 article in The Okinawa Times provides a different breakdown of mixed-blood children statistics from the Naha Police Department covering only Naha (39), Mawashi (21), Oroku (20), and Minato (14), yielding a total of 94 children in those districts. Particularly in these areas in Naha City, half Filipino children (53) were the most conspicuous, followed by half white children (21), half black children (17), and half Nisei children (3). There were 52 mothers between ages 17 and 23, 27 mothers between ages 24 and 27, and 15 mothers above 27. Only 2 mothers were married under Naha City jurisdiction, 1 woman in her forties was a victim of rape, and 28 fathers of the children had already repatriated to their respective

\textsuperscript{128} A February 26, 1950 article entitled: “A colorful assortment of mixed-children: 445 crystallizations of international love” in the Uruma Shimpô summarized statistics taken from the same September 1949 purportedly featured in the article here. The numbers, however, are slightly different: 208 half-white, 167 half-Filipino, 41 half-black, 12 half-Chinese, and 17 half-Nisei, yielding a total of 445 mixed-children.
Unlike Japan, reports on mixed-blood children started to trickle out into the media before 1952. However, since Okinawa was politically paralyzed, the issue merely sat on the table garnering a few superficial comments about the tragedy of “accidental misfortune” of sexual violence and the exotic “crystallization of international marriage.” In Japan, it was very clear both during and after occupation that the political goal was to “restore sovereignty” and reduce or eliminate the deplorable military presence. Of course, it was sexual violence and exploitation that took place around the bases which best symbolized the “violation of sovereignty,” which is why the issue of miscegenation was immediately exploited for its political value in 1952 when Japan escaped the direct or indirect repression of occupation censorship. In contrast, Ifa stated immediately before the 1951 San Francisco Peace Accords, “The only choice Okinawans have is to throw themselves before the will of their descendents after them.” Although it is unlikely Ifa had mixed-blood children in mind amongst these “descendents,” what is significant is that Okinawans were not only incapable of deciding their own political future, but “they themselves are in no position to command their descendents to be in possession of it.” In other words, the inability for Okinawans to exercise political autonomy equated an inability to bestow commands to the future generation; they could only throw themselves at the feet of their children after them. These children were not yet stillborn, but were born into the indeterminate open air of uncertainty and exposed to a world in which their parents had no control. It is precisely in the inability to determine Okinawa’s future that Amerasians remained the potential children of Okinawa.

And so, Okinawans could not determine the fate of their most vulnerable children yet, the Amerasians. Afraid of the backlash from the “forgotten island,” and
eager to transform it into the “Keystone of the Pacific,” the Military Government issued Special Proclamation No. 37 on June 30, 1950, which promised direct elections for a general assembly in September and governor in October. Compounded by the fact that Okinawa Prefecture was never allowed to elect an Okinawan governor when it was a part of the Japanese administration since they were always appointed by the Japanese government, and the mounting desire to exercise some form of political autonomy, heated campaigning amounted to an 88.8% voter turnout at the 1950 general elections. The winner, Taira Tatsuo like his friend Senaga, was critical of the old guard of Okinawan elites who promoted assimilation during the “Yamato age” (Yamato yû) and later acquiesced to U.S. occupation during the “American age” (Amerika yû) like chameleons hanging to the seasonally changing leaves of power. After he was elected, he mobilized to form the Okinawa Socialist Masses Party (OSMP, Okinawa Shakai Taishûtô) and put forth the first platform advocating “reversion” back to the Japanese administration that had purportedly purged itself of the remnants of militarism with the new Peace Constitution bestowed upon it by the Allied occupation. As soon as political expression began to take form, the theoretical dilemma of sovereignty quickly surfaced, and with it, the mobilization of Amerasians into the political landscape of the post U.S.-Japan Security Treaty era.
CHAPTER 3


April 28, 1952 marked the promulgation of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Presented with the nightmare of a violation of its sovereignty, Japan celebrated the realization of its dream for liberation. In Okinawa, however, this same day is known as the “day of humiliation.”

In essence, the Japanese became nationals of an independent state in exchange for stripping Okinawans of their status as Japanese nationals due to the graces of Japanese democracy. This is tantamount to the Japanese celebrating the militarized colonization of Okinawa by means of violence. 129

Japan exchanged Okinawa for its sovereignty. Okinawa became the outside of the law that constitutes Japanese sovereignty. Okinawa became the very limit of Japanese sovereignty. And as the limit, it is Giorgio Agamben’s homo sacer in that its exclusion, and hence exposure to bare life (zôê) outside the protection of the law is what constitutes the inner space of Japanese sovereignty.

Indeed, Okinawa’s position vis-à-vis Japanese sovereignty has been expressed through the logic of Agamben’s state of exception. Agamben’s argument is a biopolitical one, in the sense that he theorizes that it is the sovereign, who possesses

power over bios (life in a political form), but more importantly exercises power by catapulting the homo sacer outside of the law to be exposed to the bare life of zôê (life common to all living beings). Hence, the sovereign’s relationship to the state of exception delineates a structure of inclusive exclusion, in which the homo sacer is the limit that constitutes the law through its exclusion. It is not a far stretch to see Okinawa as a limit to Japanese sovereignty, catapulted outside its protection, and exposed to the raw destructive violence of extraterritoriality implicit in U.S. military occupation.

Although Agamben’s argument can certainly be “applied” to the Okinawan historical condition in certain instances, I am not sure if it is necessary to also adopt the rigid structural ontology implied in his methodology. Specifically, Agamben’s treatment of biopolitics clings steadfastly to the sovereignty-discipline doublet that was only a point of departure and not a point of arrival for Foucault precisely because Agamben emphasizes the thanatopolitical, or negative side of biopolitics that takes life.

In Foucault’s 1977-1978 lectures at the Collège de France, however, he tries to depart from the classical disciplinary model of sovereignty sketched out in Discipline and Punish, and work through—albeit inchoately—a liberal biopolitics that takes security dispositifs working on a population at its core. In other words, where sovereignty and discipline are concerned with war, coercion, and surveillance, security dispositifs are concerned with a cost calculation inside a series of probably events.

…the problem is no longer that of fixing and demarcating the territory, but of allowing circulations to take place, of controlling them, sifting the good and the bad, ensuring that things are always in movement, constantly moving around, continually going from one
point to another, but in such a way that the inherent dangers of this circulation are cancelled out.\textsuperscript{130}

Here, there is no good or bad, but merely a complex physics to rearrange so phenomena are “cancelled out.” Key to this new technology of power is that in order to be effective, subjects must have mobility and circulation in order to achieve \textit{freedom}.

In Chapter 1, I suggested that Japanese charges against American military presence in Japan was portrayed as exposure to the raw violence of extraterritoriality when state sovereignty is lost or violated. While Japan was able to purge itself from the humiliation of Allied occupation and celebrate the “victory” of postwar independence, Okinawa experienced a total defeat because it was incapable of positing an outside to power. In essence, Okinawa became the \textit{homo sacer} of the 1952 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, but the question as to how it would survive in the post 1952 era still remained open. This is where the shift between the sovereignty-discipline doublet emphasized in early Foucault to a liberal biopolitics in the late Foucault can be useful in thinking about Okinawa in this era.

On one hand, the \textit{shimagurumi tōsō}, or all-island struggle of 1952 to 1958 kicked the movement for reversion. The movement did not necessarily oppose the U.S. military per say, but rather exposure to its raw violence without the protection of a sovereign state. In this sense, state violence is understood as a repressive and destructive force that can only be contained by seeking shelter under state sovereignty. Once unchecked, stateless people automatically become the \textit{homo sacer}, or victim exposed to raw violence. However, this only captures the negative moment of power,

and fails to articulate its relationship to productive power. In other words, the very act of emphasizing the horror of extraterritoriality—which incidentally occurs most poignantly through the trope of miscegenation—produces discursive effects that cannot be adequately accounted for through a simple understanding of power as a negative force. As I will show through my analysis of Higaonna Kanjun’s essay “Mixed-blood Child,” this is precisely the production of a discourse that prescribes the preventative birth of mixed-blood children for the sake of securing the livelihood of pure-blood Okinawans who seek to become Japanese nationals in the full sense of the term. In this way raw violence acted as food for the imagination of a future without the law, thereby inciting a desire that orients the creation of a subject of the law. It is only when a subject imagines a future of violence, or what Tomiyama Ichirō calls “presentiments of violence” (bōryoku no yokan), that they are moved to petition (shinsei) for the law’s protection, thereby constituting and reinforcing the law itself. In other words, if subjects are catapulted outside of the law’s protection, it is not merely to desecrate, but to produce subjects who yearn for its protection. This is a performative reading of Agamben’s state of exception, which otherwise risks a rigid structuralist fate. Hence, I do not deny the negative moment of biopower as seen in Agamben’s work, but I attempt to articulate it vis-à-vis its productive moment of a genocide that takes the security, prosperity, and the propagation of the population as its aim.

On the other hand, not everyone in Okinawa “resisted” against the U.S. military if “resistance” means they advocated reversion to the Japanese administration. Again, this does not mean anyone in Okinawa ever welcomed the U.S. military, but as a people who experienced total defeat, many became proactive “subjects of negotiation” and advocated the liberalization of the base-economy as an opportunity to better their lives. Contrary to any romanticization of Okinawans as a people in resistance, their
condition of total defeat dictated that everyone was obliged to collaborate in order to secure their lives. Although the logic of the U.S. military base as representing a negative raw violence seems to clash with the U.S. military as representing a positive field of economic opportunity for a better life, I would like to preserve the productive mode of power to thread together the latter side of Okinawa’s history—that which has collaborated, negotiated, and “benefitted” from its participation with the U.S. military. This was evident in Chapter 2, where Okinawan’s turned into “subjects of negotiation” precisely at the point where they hit the limits of sovereignty. Not coincidentally, this took place through the debate on the creation of a sex industry that caters to the U.S. military. In this chapter as well, I will show how subjects of the sex industry do not stop at “negotiation,” but actively seek liberalization of the base-economy.

The All-Island Struggle

When U.S. forces landed in Okinawa, they took possession of certain areas needed by the Army of Occupation. This was permissible “under the laws and customs of war and land” of the Hague Convention, No. 4, of October 18, 1907. U.S. forces occupied some 42,000 acres, or 12.7% of the total landmass of Okinawa that resulted in about 40,000 landowners loosing their land. The U.S. forces confiscated this land without payment on the justification that it was their right as an occupying nation and that documentation proving ownership could not be confirmed since it was destroyed during the war.

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131 To say Okinawa has “benefitted” from collaboration is certainly a risky statement. The multi-valance of this word and its irony is precisely what lies at the heart of the problem of biopower.
134 Arasaki Moriteru and Nakano Yoshio, Okinawa mondai nijûnen [Twenty years of the Okinawa
As a result of the 1952 Peace Treaty, it became imperative that the U.S. military acquire the lands legally. Land surveys were conducted from 1948, and by 1951 an official assessment was made. This prompted landowners to demand payments for use of their land. In response, USCAR introduced a series of ordinances to instigate the legal process. According to Ordinance No. 91 (Authority to Contract) issued on November 1, 1952, USCAR would retroactively pay from June 1, 1950 to April 27\textsuperscript{135}, 1952 at a rate of 1.08 B yen for one tsubo. Additionally, the USCAR proposed a 20-year contract. However, because of the low payment and lengthy contract, only two percent of total landowners accepted.\textsuperscript{136}

Because of the opposition, USCAR was obliged to issue Ordinance No. 105 on March 23, 1953,\textsuperscript{137} which was “authority to accomplish execution of leases and rental payment on privately-owned Ryukyu lands occupied by the United States of America for the period from July 1, 1950 through April 27, 1952.”\textsuperscript{138} This ordinance withdrew the abhorred twenty-year lease contract, and approximately 900 landowners accepted although the vast majority still refused to sign.

USCAR next issued Ordinance No. 26 in December 1953, which stipulated that because it is illegal to use private lands for public purposes according to the U.S. constitution, USCAR is obligated to pay rent even though an official contract was never agreed upon. While espousing the language of rights and legality, the design of this ordinance was to force contract upon Okinawans.

USCAR exacerbated tension with the introduction of Ordinance No. 109 (The Land Acquisition Procedure) on April 3, 1953. This proved to be the worst land

\textsuperscript{135} Nakachi says 28, and Nakano/Arasaki say 27. Check for accuracy.

\textsuperscript{136} Arasaki and Nakano, \textit{Okinawa mondai nijûnen} [Twenty years of the Okinawa problem], 72.

\textsuperscript{137} Nakachi, “Ryukyu-U.S.-Japan Relations: The Reversion Movement, Political, Economic and Strategic Issues, 1945-1972,” 100.

\textsuperscript{138} Verify accuracy of date from \url{http://www.asunaro-thoki.com/ronkou.html}.

ordinance of all because outlined the compulsory acquisition of private land when landowners refused to execute a lease contract. For example, USCAR informed residence of Mawashi Village its intention to acquire 158, 000 tsubo (126,400 acres) of land on April 3, 1953, and that it would start to level the lands in seven days. With “bulldozers and bayonets,” the U.S. military violently flattened dwellings without notice. Such events also became scenes of sexual violence. The USCAR attempted to deal with the dispossessed landowners by purchasing land in Yaeyama Island to transfer families there.

Finally, one year later in March 1954, USCAR announced its plans for a lump-sum payment on lands for which the lease period was projected to be over five years. USCAR also proposed that the 3,500 families displaced by the lump-sum purchase of their lands settle in Yaeyama Island.

Plans for lump-sum compensation incited opposition across the board in Okinawa. The Ryukyu Legislature unanimously passed the well-known “Four Principles for Solving the Military Land Problems” resolution on April 30, 1954 as follows:

1.) The United States should renounce the purchase of land or permanent use thereof and lump-sum payment of rentals.
2.) Just and complete compensation should be made annually for the land currently in use.
3.) Indemnity should be paid promptly for all damage caused by United States forces.
4.) No further acquisition of land should be made, and the land that was not urgently needed by the United States government should be restored promptly.

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139 Arasaki and Nakano, Okinawa mondai nijūnen [Twenty years of the Okinawa problem], 74.
At the same time the resolution was passed, the government of Ryukyu Islands (gyôseifû), the Ryukyu legislature (rippôin), the Mayor’s Association (shichôsonchô-kai), and the Landowners Federal Committee (tohirengô-kai) formed the Council of the Four Organizations (yonsha kyôgikai).

When USCAR was not responsive, the Council of the Four Organizations decided to directly appeal to the United States Congress. In response, a six-member House committee on Armed Services headed by Charles Melvin Price was formed to visit Okinawa and entertain their grievances. They responded with the Price Recommendation on June 9, 1956, in which they maintained the intention of lump-sum payment for lands while adjusting the method of compensation.

The Ryukyu legislature immediately convened and maintained a tenacious adherence to the Four Principles for Solving the Military Land Problems. Headquarters Demanding the Four Principles (yongensoku kantetsu honbu), made up of primarily the Council of the Four Organizations, adopted a seven point platform on June 16, 1956: 1.) to form an organized body in solidarity; 2.) to transcend individual interests with a ethnic consciousness to protect of land and territorial rights based upon justice; 3.) to renounce all forms of violence in resistance; 4.) to struggle against the policies of the U.S. and respect the human rights and character of individual Americans; 5.) to eradicate all forms of criminal activity; 6.) to exercise self-governance amongst the people; 7.) to overcome complications in strict adherence to the four principles. ¹⁴⁰

The careful wording of the platform was neutral enough to capture the interests of residents across the board: there is no mention of anti-American, anti-base, or anti-communist sentiments. At this stage directly after the announcement of the Price

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 81-82.
Recommendation, the Council of Four Organizations was able to boast of “will of 800,000 residents” in protest. It is significant that, according to Arasaki and Nakano, resistance was not yet organized at this stage amongst the population at large: “The residents rallies were not made possible by organized mobilization, but rather through the spontaneous will of individuals (jihatsuteki ishi).”\textsuperscript{141} Because the Price Recommendation instigated a unanimously united front their resistance was termed the “all-island struggle” or \textit{shimagurumi tōsō}. Okinawans were able to attend rallies with a “strong feeling of solidarity” because “they were not obstructed by anything,” thus allowing them to “clearly express their own will.”\textsuperscript{142} In their historicization of Okinawan resistance towards the U.S. military, Arasaki and Nakano identify a paradigm change from the “dark ages” where it was difficult for organized resistance to congeal to a “new age” where “people could be confident in their power” to resist.\textsuperscript{143}

What is significant about this stage of the struggle is that it was largely unorganized. The point of commonality was found in the resistance against the threat of USCAR confiscating the land, or in other words, crippling and potentially devastating the people’s ability to forge a life for themselves and their families. However, when this energy was channeled through the telos of a political goal, the movement divided into two directions: those who conceived of “freedom” as protection under Japanese sovereignty and those who conceived of “freedom” as the ability to participate in the base-centered economy.

Politics became more sharply defined as four representatives were chosen to plead the Okinawan case to Japan from June 27, 1956. On July 12, 1956, Asato Tsumichiyo (Okinawa legislature = \textit{Okinawa rippōin}, Okinawa Socialist Masses Party

\textsuperscript{141} Ibid., 83.
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid., 84.
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid., 85; 84.
= Okinawa shakai minshū-tō iinchō), Chinen Chōkō (Okinawa legislature = Okinawa rippōin, Independent), Onaga Josei (Mayor of Mawashi, Okinawa) directly appealed for the protection of the Japanese Diet in negotiating with USCAR and for a formal Okinawan reversion to the Japanese administration.

So long as [Okinawa] is not protected by the power of a state with sovereignty it is not possible to completely solve the land issue and military-land issue. Therefore, the correct [course of action would be that Okinawa] should basically revert to the Japanese administration, and have the independent state of Japan legally deal with the independent state of America from a position of equals. In this way, it is the wish of all Okinawan residents that basically the administrative rights quickly return to Japan.¹⁴⁴

It is clear that at least in front of the Japanese Diet, Okinawan representatives pleaded for protection under Japanese sovereignty as the way to escape the violence of the U.S. military, and not the elimination of the U.S. military per say. In this respect, the Japanese Diet Member Sarumata asks, “What is the general opinion of Okinawan residents regarding the idea that no resistance be waged if America absolutely requires military bases? What about the idea that no resistance be waged if American military bases were provided for in certain areas where the Japanese right to rule extended, as in the inner territory (naichi) of Japan?” To this question Chinen succinctly answers, “Presently in Okinawa there is no anti-military base voice.”¹⁴⁵

Ultimately, the Okinawan plea for protection from the Japanese state fell upon

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.
deaf ears. Japan experienced economic recovery at the end of the Korean War by virtue of Article 9 of the Peace Constitution that renounced war while enjoying the protection of the U.S. military stationed in Okinawa. Instead, Diet Member Sekô Hiroichi tried to deflect the problem from the Japanese state and redirect it to the international community from a human rights standpoint by taking issue with mixed-blood children and women’s rights.

In the report, it states that there is a 20:1 ratio of mixed-blood children. Here it says from October 1953 to the present, there are 250 of them. I think it is a rather important for the young children to determine what kind of measures the U.S. government is taking regarding the right of subsistence (seikatsuken) and protection of these kinds of mixed-blood children. At the same time, I think the rights of subsistence and protection of women therein implicated should be a big human rights issue that is taken up on the international level.\footnote{July 12, 1956 Japanese Diet, Lower House, Legal Affairs Committee (hōmu iinn-kai). Sekô Hiroichi.}

Asato responded as follows:

…there is the issue of mixed-blood children. I do not have a grasp of an accurate number, but the number is greater than what you just stated now. I think it is fair to say that there is no special protection taken [for these children.] Furthermore, whether or not America has any special interest [in these children], I think it is safe to say not in the slightest.
Although Sekô attempted to deflect responsibility from the Japanese state to the international community, Asato quickly recuperated the issue back to a problem of Okinawa, lacking in sovereignty, and therefore subject to the abuses of the U.S. military and in need of Japanese protection. Asato continues:

And, just as you stated, soldiers are conducting politics under the military administration. The *modus operandi* in place is such that if only we have food and money then we shouldn’t have trouble eating; [supposedly] freedom is at least recognized under the name of democracy…However, what I want to state here is if the mentality is that [a good] life in Okinawa means adequate food or things to wear, it is fundamentally erred. This might not be an appropriate example, but in recent days prison life—or in other words—the life of a prisoner, is highly protected democratically. If the problem is not having any worries about having something to eat, then it is possible to say that the prisoner chained to the prison has the most stable life of all. We are exposed to the anxiety of unemployment and danger; our human rights are ignored. On the contrary, the life of a prisoner who doesn’t worry about eating enjoys more stability. The only difference is that the life of a prisoner enjoys freedom limited to a prison cell; the tall fence that surrounds them robs them of their freedom…I think the meaning of our way of life is that we are inside a prison right now. The frame of our fundamental freedom is rigid. It is applicable to this example because we cannot go one step without
it.\footnote{July 12, 1956 Japanese Diet, Lower House, Legal Affairs Committee (hōmu iinn-kai) Asato Tsumichiyo.}

For Asato, the problem of mixed-blood children is not one of human rights, but merely another manifestation of a lack of sovereignty that must be recuperated through reversion to the Japanese state. The desire for sovereignty is expressed here as the desire for what he conceives is true freedom: “prison life, or in other words, the life of a prisoner, is extremely protected democratically,” yet democratic protection is not enough. Okinawans are fed, clothed, and cared for, but their “freedom [is] limited to a prison cell.” Freedom is not being cared for in prison, but having the sense of security to walk outside the fence of the prison complex with the confidence of the law of a sovereign state behind them.

Before the Japanese Diet, Asato is an Okinawan subject that petitions for protection of law. Here, the law does not exist \textit{a priori} in which it can merely be applied to an Okinawan subject, thereby affording them freedom. Asato is a subject that is constructed by virtue of being at the limits of the law. That is, as Tomiyama Ichiro states, “the person standing at the limits of the law is the person at the side of a dead body.” In other words, precisely because Asato knows the violence of being outside the law, he is transformed into a subject that begs for the law’s protection. Begging, or in Tomiyama’s words, “petitioning” (\textit{shinsei}) for protection of the law is none other than an expression of a “presentiment of violence” (\textit{bôryoku no yokan}). Here, the emphasis is placed on the “presentiment” and not the “violence” as it stands nakedly by itself. As if to echo Asato’s own language, Tomiyama writes, violence no longer works on the level of “the physical violence as a tool owned by the state or state terror itself” such as outright war or extraterritoriality waged upon Okinawans,
but it is “rediscovered through the imagination of looking outside of a prison.”

As Asato states himself, Okinawans are cared for as a prisoner may be cared for by the prison, yet the real violence that constructs him into a subject that begs for protection of the Japanese law is the one that dares to imagine life outside prison walls. Hence, this illustrates an important distinction between violence conceived as a destructive force wielded by tools of the state and violence discovered in the imagination of what lies beyond protection of the law. This is a distinction Asato himself may or may not be aware of.

It is precisely at this point that the movement bifurcates into two directions that both have the protection of life at its object: subjects that petition for protection under Japanese sovereignty and subjects that request USCAR to lift of economic sanctions for the freedom to participate in the base-centered economy. This becomes evident back in Okinawa, where the united movement increasingly displayed factionalism, became subject to the divisive tactics of the U.S. military, and began to fall apart.

First, the Chief Executive Higa Shûhei and Naha City Mayor Tôma Jûgo started to express opinions sympathetic with USCAR while the Association of Four Organizations, which had grown to the Association of Five Organizations with the addition of the Mayor’s Legislature (shichôson gikai). While this was organized in a top down fashion, the Land Protection Association (tochi wo mamoru-kai) was organized from the bottom up amongst the Okinawan Teachers Association, the Okinawan Socialist Masses Party, the Ryukyu Democratic Party, the Federal Committee of Landowners, and the Okinawan Commerce Committee on July 18, 1956. It elected Yara Chôbyô who came from the Okinawan Teachers Association. Yara took leadership of the mass movement on the platform of reversion to the Japanese

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administration, and called for the resignation of Chief Executive Higa and Mayor Tôma at a prefectural rally of 150,000 islanders on June 18, 1956. Furthermore, at the rally, they heard report backs from the four representatives that pleaded the Okinawan case to Japan, and elected a second group of representatives including Senaga Kamejirô, who was recently released from prison due to the 1954 Okinawan People’s Party Incident, and Kaneshi Saiichi who was branded a “communist.”

USCAR took advantage of the division by once again enforcing an off-limits directive on August 8, 1956. This was devastating, as there were 3,500 businesses that catered specifically to the bases; thirty-eight percent, or $49,930,000 of Okinawa’s total GNP ($131,300,000 in 1953) constituted income from the base economy.\footnote{149} When students of Ryukyu University and Okinawan students in Japanese universities planned a rally opposing the lump-sum payment on August 8, 1956 in Koza City where many of the bases are concentrated, the Okinawa Federation of Night Clubs Association opposed the demonstration.\footnote{150}

The next day on August 9, President Ôshiro Seiji (大城盛治) of the Okinawa Federation of Night Clubs Association (Okinawa fûzoku eigyô kumiai rengô-kai, herein known as OFNCA), issued a petition translated into English to USCAR. I could not locate this document, but instead found a supplementary report and petition submitted on August 13.\footnote{151} OFNCA stated that they stand by the Four Principles for


\footnote{150} Ibid., p. 113.

\footnote{151} Mention of only the August 13 petition is found in: National Archives and Records Administration; Record Group 260: Records of the United States Occupation headquarters, World War II; Records of the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR); Department: The Administrative Office; Box No.: 48 of HCRI- AO; Folder No. 4; Title: General Administrative Files, 1956: Barred or Restricted Areas (Off Limits, Passes for). The actual August 13 petition is in the same Box, Folder No. 3; Title: General Administrative Files, 195: Morals and Conduct (Military). Also in this file is a document from the National Archives and Records Administration noting that the entire folder of 250.1 Morals & Conduct (Military) was withdrawn from the file because it contained “Otherwise Restricted Information.” Hence, there is possible the August 9 petition was suppressed. These documents can be found at the Okinawa Prefectural Archives, Document No. 000000780.
Solving the Military Land Problems and pleaded to “[s]eparate clearly Off Limits from the land problem.” However, they were not shy in demonstrating their open hostility towards the growing leftist faction of the popular movement, in particular, the platform put forth by the Land Protection Association at the June 18, 1956 prefectural rally. The document 1.) accused Yara Chóbyô of co-opting the Land Protection with “Anti-American Ideology,” suggested those “Okinawan future leaders” and “pure-minded students” were corrupted from “being under the bad leadership”; 2.) boasted of their attempt to “stop the meetings and demonstrations” directed by Chief Yara of the Land Protection Association; 3.) reported their resistance to representatives of the board of directors of the Land Protection Association; 4.) advocated the “[e]stablishment of Pro-American underground organization and Intelligence…under the cooperation of Military Intelligence and CID” to counter the “people’s party and other bad ideologists” that “have an underground organization”; 5.) articulated a plan to “stud[y] measures against” “Mr. Senaga and Mr. Kaneshi” as they “make an Anti-American Propaganda”; 6.) stated that they “not call our representative Democrats legislators from now if they don’t make any reflection.”

What is impressive about this document is it shows how the political left advocating sovereignty came to appear as enemies to their own brethren. In order to secure the right to participate in the base-economy, which essentially meant the right to prostitute, OFNCA was willing to go so far as to advocated the “[e]stablishment of Pro-American underground organization and Intelligence” since they emerged as a threat to their very survival. In a sense, OFNCA clearly identified the theoretical limitation to vesting Okinawa’s security in terms of sovereignty of the state. The political left adhered to an ethics of conviction that viewed protection of a sovereign state as its ultimate goal. At this cost, it was forced to sacrifice the “subjects of negotiation” that struggled for a life amidst the base-economy and literally could not
afford to “resist.”

On the other hand, OFNCA became embedded in the “game of freedom and security [which] is at the very heart of this new governmental reason” of biopower. On the other hand, OFNCA became embedded in the “game of freedom and security [which] is at the very heart of this new governmental reason” of biopower.¹⁵² That is the “productive/destructive relationship with freedom” in which “[l]iberalism must produce freedom, but this very act entails the establishment of limitations, controls, forms of coercion, and obligations relying on threats, etcetera.”¹⁵³ OFNCA “fought” for its freedom, even at the cost of turning in leftist Okinawans as “threats” when hit with off-limits restrictions. Here, freedom is “not a given, it is not a ready-made region which has to be respected,” but rather it is “something which is constantly produced” through the very undulations of the market and controls imposed on the market.¹⁵⁴ By petitioning for freedom, OFNCA members are transformed into subjects of the population. Bases are transformed into a commodity, as an object of desire that can be fought for or cruelly deprived.

In this way, the land issue became increasingly one of economics (freedom for circulation in the market) instead of politics (freedom from extraterritoriality). After the second group of representatives was chosen, they travelled to the U.S. and negotiated directly with the State Department and Department of Defense. Both sides were able to reach an agreement to the effect that: 1.) the U.S. government consider the opinions of the Okinawan representatives in good will; 2.) the representatives completely understand the importance of Okinawa as a anti-communist base outpost; 3.) negotiations regarding finer details would be made on site at Okinawa. As a result, on November 26, 1958, the U.S. announced abandonment of the lump-sum payment proposal, payment on a yearly basis, reassessment of lands every five years, and payment of more than six times for rent than was originally agreed upon in the Price

¹⁵³ Ibid., 64.
¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 65.
Recommendation. This was a drastic change of heart considering the U.S. tenaciously stuck by the Price Recommendation for two years prior.

The U.S. once again learned that threatening the livelihood of Okinawans did not create a people that wielded to the needs of USCAR. Instead, USCAR abandoned the lump sum payment and adopted reassessment, thereby creating a base-land lessor class. Shortly thereafter, it eliminated the B-yen currency and introduced a dollar currency into Okinawa and also eliminated restrictions on international investments thereby opening Okinawa up to foreign banks. Although this ultimately resulted in American investment in Okinawa, it was nonetheless a pivotal shift towards the liberalization of Okinawa’s economy to the global market and released from the stagnation of insularity.

In sum, the movement split into two directions: subjects that seek protection from Japan and subjects that seek a lifting of restrictions on the base-economy. Both appear to be at odds with each other. The former, advocating reversion to the Japanese administration, increasingly relied on examples of how Okinawa was exposed to the violence of extraterritoriality as ammunition to justify the need for protection under the Japanese law. This ammunition included examples of sexual violence and mixed-blood children. Although they portrayed power as a negative force that destroys, it was nonetheless productive in that it incited a desire to petition for protection under the law. Here, the law is not given beforehand, and subsequently “applied” to subjects, but is reinforced, recreated, and re-established through the desire for it and fear of being expelled from it.

The latter on the other hand, taking distance from anti-American sentiments, instead petitioned for their right to prostitute Okinawan women to the U.S. military. By enforcing the off-limits sanctions during the all-island struggle, the bases came forth as a commodity through which subjects oriented their desire. Instead of coding
each position as “pro-Japanese” and “pro-American,” it is perhaps more productive to understand each as a subjective technology which takes the production of “freedom” at its aim. In fact, far from being inherently contradictory, the subject of the law and subject of free circulation came closer together, resulting in the “success” of reversion to the Japanese administration. That is, liberalization of the market in Okinawa became more and more closely related to Japan’s economic, and later, administrative authority over Okinawa. As will be argued in the next chapter, all the hoopla over sovereignty ended up becoming largely a moot point.

Higaonna Kanjun (1886-1963)

At the realization that Okinawa was restricted from even entertaining the fantasy of political sovereignty, Ifa Fuyû stated, “The only choice Okinawans have is to throw themselves before the will of their descendents after them.” Although it is doubtful he had Amerasians in mind when he spoke of these “descendents,” what is important is that precisely at the point where he felt Okinawans were deprived of a political will, the “descendents” of the future appeared as an indeterminate category. Ifa had no choice but to recognize his vulnerability to the future and his future descendents.

Higaonna Kanjun (1886-1963) by contrast, posited the acquisition of Japanese sovereignty as the goal through which exposure to extraterritoriality, configured as miscegenation, must be delivered. As shown in Chapter 1, miscegenation served as one of the most politically charged symbols of the violation of sovereignty. As soon as Higaonna posits sovereignty as his goal, it became immediately clear which “descendents” are worthy of protection and which “descendents” must be prevented from being born.

As a prominent Okinawan historian, Higaonna contributed to a newspaper series entitled “Okinawa, Present and Past” that ran in 1957, amidst the all-island struggle.
To my knowledge, his piece “Mixed-Blood Child” is the first social commentary on Okinawan mixed-blood children undertaken by an intellectual. He writes:

When the representative petitioners travelled to Tokyo last year to advocate the Four Principles [for Solving the Military Land Problems], the occupying U.S. military ordered the soldier’s red light district off-limits on the grounds that it would reduce friction with the locals. Accordingly, the district business owners fell onto hard times. When I heard them complaining it was the revenge tactic of economic pressure, I thought as people who purport to protect the land and protect their everyday life (seikatsu), their argument was suicidal. Rather, we became livid and felt that these types of unhealthy businesses should be completely eliminated. Nonetheless, they countered that ideals and reality are different. These kinds of business are proof that they have come to think it is a natural given that mixed-blood children are growing in numbers every year primarily out of these kinds of districts.

Higaonna is clear in his criticism of OFNCA’s acquiescence and collaboration with USCAR. Unlike Ifa, who understood Okinawa’s condition of total defeat, Higaonna posits a dichotomy between Okinawans with a strong political will, and the “unhealthy business” owners who have fallen to the false consciousness to the point they think

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their decrepit way of life is a “natural given.” Hence, by positing state sovereignty as a
goal, he submits to a conception of a political will that prevails if only enough effort is
expended towards it. His is a view that is profoundly lacking in defeat. Instead of
recognizing Okinawa as the limit of sovereignty, where it is impossible to posit an
outside in order to ground a political will filled with “hope” for the future, he grounds
Okinawa’s future in the state sovereignty of Japan, and catapults the mixed-blood
children as those who must inevitably be prevented from being born. What is tragic
about Higaonna’s accusation that the OFNCA destroys Okinawa’s political solidarity
through the “suicidal” nature of their acquiescence is that it fails to properly
understand the nature of power as productively working through his very claims of
resistance as he posits his own brethren as the enemy and thereby ironically realizes
his dreaded division as an unintended consequence.

Higaonna is very clear that he is not against miscegenation per se. As a
historian, he is aware that the Han Dynasty for example experienced miscegenation
(zakkon) because of troops stationed in the periphery for the purpose of defense mixed
with locals. However, “in these cases, even if it was a mixing of blood in the end, it
was akin to what we would call international marriage today.” What he opposes is
miscegenation that occurs without the protection of state sovereignty. In this way, he
understands the presence of mixed-blood children in the red-light district as evidence
of a genocidal rape that is designed to biologically destroy the Okinawan population:

The mixed-blood children that creep out of the present red-light district
are nothing but scars of war damage that have inherited the inferior
genes of both parents. Of course, these children are not guilty of sin or
blame. However, regarding their birth, they are nothing but the
crystallization of disgrace that was not planned for nor hoped (kitai) for.
They will eternally be an enormous liability for society. Letting such a liability go, or worse yet grow larger in numbers, will condemn our communal life to darkness. We probably have no choice but to look after those already born. But it is to our greatest dissatisfaction that in these times where a limitation on the number of births in the healthy sector of society is recommended, there is no check on these unhealthy births.\footnote{Ibid., 386-388}

Although Higaonna portrays genocide—configured here as the violent impregnation and birth of mixed-children without the protection of the law—as a negative power that is “suicidal” for those subjected to it, his prescription for the preventative birth of mixed-children so they do not overpower the “pure” population is precisely the productive power of biopower. Race comes forward as a technology through which the state legitimizes itself against that which threatens from within the purity of the social body. Hence, Higaonna’s discussion is not one where death is wielded as a destructive power of the state, but rather the prevention of certain lives from being created becomes the imperative for the survival and prosperity of the population at whole under the state’s protection. Here the emphasis is not on killing, but the ability to aggressively “make live” and passively “let die.” “Let the Amerasians—children of an undesirable future—die and make the Okinawans, as potential Japanese nationals, live.”

Higaonna’s view of mixed-children born in extraterritoriality as threats to Okinawa’s ability to assimilate into the Japanese state is analogous to the Japanese anxiety towards mixed-blood children born around the bases of the Allied forces during and directly after occupation. While a continuation of Japanese nationalism of
the Cold War era, Higaonna’s writing kicks off an era where mixed-blood children are mobilized as the “evidence” to illustrate the monstrosity and horror of abuses of extraterritoriality to American hands amidst the movement to revert to the Japanese administration. Here, transpacific racism is more than a mutual recognition between the U.S. and Japan’s respective racisms. It is an intricate dynamic in which the fight for Japanese sovereignty is wielded as an inevitable historic truth that must be defended and mixed-blood children are presented as the “evidence” proving the sting of its violation. However, mixed-blood children do not “evidence” Japan and subsequently Okinawa’s victimization to the extraterritoriality of their respective Allied and U.S. occupations. It is through the very act of a limit subject who catapults an Other into the outer limits of the law out of tenacious denial of total defeat and false “hope” that the outside secures the status of a subject under the law. Hence, the aim and object of transpacific racism should not be confused with skin color or the sovereign power of the state for it is instead about the creation of biopolitical subjects of the population that manipulate race and state sovereignty as mere variables to enhance its momentum.

Nonetheless, the discourse that utilizes mixed-blood bodies as “evidence” for Okinawa’s depravation of Japanese sovereignty not only became a crippling psychological burden on the Amerasians themselves—a population Higaonna never imagined would read his works—but failed to sustain both in theory and reality as liberalization of the market took precedence over debates on political sovereignty as will be shown later.

On his historic trip to Okinawa on August 19, 1965, Prime Minister Sato Eisaku declared, “I know very well that the postwar period will not be over as long as Okinawa is not restored to the motherland.” This statement exemplifies the idea that the U.S. occupation of Okinawa is an extension of war, extraterritoriality, and the depravation of sovereignty in the state of Japan. In order to end the postwar period, the last part of Japanese sovereignty deprived (i.e., Okinawa) must be restored. Sato’s words were well received by the pro-reversion contingency in Okinawa. However, what lurks beneath his words is a symbolic understanding of war and violence as a destructive force. In actuality, the U.S. military was gradually forced to realize brute force was no longer effective nor efficient for ensuring unrestricted use of the “Keystone of the Pacific.” Reversion was less about an escape from violence than a radical transformation in the way in which power was exercised in Okinawa. The U.S. was willing to let go of Okinawa precisely at the point where it was secure that its unrestricted use of the island could be attained without direct coercion.

Harvard University professor of Japanese history Edwin Reischauer played an important role in the discursive shift from outright submission of Okinawa by the U.S. military to an integrationist policy that emphasized economic and social reforms aimed for “parity with the mainland,” or hondo nami. This was an extension of his greater vision to extend incentives, and not brute threats, to Japan to secure it as a key partner of the U.S. and its interests in East Asia. In 1961, Reischauer was sent to

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Tokyo as U.S. Ambassador. Around the same time, President Kennedy met with Prime Minister Ikeda from June 20-23, 1961 in Washington, and a joint communiqué was issued which affirmed the cooperative efforts of both Japan and the U.S. to improve economic and social conditions in Okinawa. Shortly thereafter, Reischauer advised Kennedy during his visit to Japan on February 4, 1962 that Okinawa should not be kept separate from Japan. Thereafter, U.S. policy towards Okinawa more specifically recommended that, “the United States seek a sharing of the costs of both short and long-term economic development programs with the Japanese, on the basis of the United States’ assumption of about two-thirds of the total.”\textsuperscript{159}

Even though Kennedy’s policy towards Okinawa was favorable to allowing Japanese support and intervention, it was actually implemented by the appointed High Commissioner Paul Caraway and the Ambassador Edwin Reischauer. As a former member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and military official, Caraway was inclined to resist any Japanese intervention and felt that an outright display of U.S. military might onto Okinawa was the best way to ensure America’s guarantee to unrestricted use of the island. Caraway stated, “the Japanese bases are useful only so long as the United States retains free and unrestricted use of Okinawa as an operational base and that if and when Okinawa is returned to Japanese administrative control, its use as an operation base will inevitably be impaired, and the Mutual Security Treaty will then become a net liability to the United States.”\textsuperscript{160} Hence, the militarist Caraway position of hard power clashed with the academic Reischauer policy of soft power.

Caraway’s hard-line authority on the island naturally garnered him disfavor from Okinawans. The Chief Executive Ôta was forced to resign, and political parties

\textsuperscript{159} Quoted in Nakachi, “Ryukyu-U.S.-Japan Relations: The Reversion Movement, Political, Economic and Strategic Issues, 1945-1972,” 135.
\textsuperscript{160} Quoted in Nakachi, “Ryukyu-U.S.-Japan Relations: The Reversion Movement, Political, Economic and Strategic Issues, 1945-1972,” 40.
mobilized against Caraway’s policies. Ultimately, Reischauer’s pro-reversion policies prevailed. Japanese aid began to gradually pour into Okinawa from fiscal year 1962, increasing significantly each year thereafter.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 144.}

The U.S. became increasingly open to the idea of reversion as they became confident in Japan’s ability to execute U.S.-Japan interests in East Asia and assurance that they would still maintain liberal use of the U.S. military bases in Okinawa. At the Sato-Johnson Summit Meeting in November 1967, Prime Minister Sato endorsed the U.S. position in Vietnam in exchange for President Johnson’s understanding of the Okinawan situation. In the Sato-Nixon Joint Communiqué of 1969, both states agreed that the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of 1960 would be kept in force, administrative rights over Okinawa would revert to Japan in 1972, the U.S. would retain military facilities in Okinawa under the same conditions as in Japan, Japan’s remaining restrictions on foreign trade and capital investment would be reduced, Japan’s aid program in Asia would be improved, and sensitivity towards the storage of nuclear weapons in Okinawa would be taken into consideration.

Far from the fantasy of liberation, which entailed Okinawa’s escape from the raw violence of extraterritoriality be found in the security of Japanese sovereignty, it merely became more efficient economically and politically for the U.S. to turn over administrative rights to Japan once assured that it would still be able to freely use the bases in Okinawa. Hence, the reversion movement was able to attract more subjects of negotiation before the law that aimed for “parity with the mainland” both economically and politically.

Reversion and the Sex Industry

Prostitution continued to grow during the pre-reversion period due to the buying
power of the U.S. dollar and increased number of Vietnam War soldiers stationed on the island. Japan already passed its anti-prostitution law in 1957 and implemented it in 1959. The Okinawa Women’s Association (Okinawa fujin rengôkai) took this lead and petitioned for similar legislation in Okinawa in 1958. The law did not pass through the Ryukyu Legislature because of the qualitatively different political and administrative infrastructures between the U.S. occupied Okinawa and sovereign Japanese state. The Health Station System (hokenjo seido) in Okinawa, as discussed in Chapter 2 monitored and treated the spread of VD for the U.S. military, and was publically funded since 1964 as part of the revision to the 1962 VD Prevention Act (Seibyô yobô hô). In other words, civilians did not need to pay for treatment. Purportedly this was due to the fact that Okinawa lacked a national health care system that was implemented in Japan, civilian income was low, health care facilities in the region were not well established, and VD continued to spread rapidly around bases because of the lack of an anti-prostitution law. USCAR funded 89% of the VD prevention costs, and in fiscal year 1970 funded 74%, or $45,960 of the VD budget. It was not until 1970 that the anti-prostitution law was passed in Okinawa, and implemented in the year of reversion, 1972. As of 1969, the Police Department reported approximately 7,385 suspected prostitutes in Okinawa. This figure is consistent with reversion year (1972) estimates of 7,400 although it was suspected that

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163 Okinawa-ken Fukushi Hoken-bu Kenkô Zôshin-ka, Hitobito no kurashi to tomoni 45nen: Okinawa no chizai hokenfu katsudô [Fort-five years alongside lives of the people: The activities of the health station nurses in Okinawa] (Naha City, March 1999), 65.


165 Okinawa Shakai Fukushi Kyô-gi-kai, Okinawa no shakai fukushi 25nen: Okisha Kyôsôritsu 20shunen kinenshi [Twenty-five years of Okinawa’s social welfare: A twentieth anniversary commemoration edition from Okisha Kyôsôritsu], November 1971, 304. “Indebtedness upon contract” refers to the system of sexual slavery in which women incurred large debts upon the time of contract for lodgings or exigencies, or were forwarded money to repay a prior debt. It became difficult to repay the debt after countless deductions, and amounted to a form of indentured sexual slavery.
the number was actually greater than 10,000.\footnote{Sugatani Naoko, “Okinawa no baishun mondai: fukki nikagetsumae” [Okinawa’s prostitution problem: Two months before reversion], Fujinmondai konwakai kaihô [Journal of Women’s Issues Forum], no. 16 (1972): 7.}

On one hand, business owners in the entertainment districts opposed reversion because they feared the loss of business. On the other hand, women’s rights became point and case for the violence of the U.S. military. For example, the Japanese Women’s Conference Central Headquarters (\textit{Nihon fujin kaigi chûô honbu}) stated their solidarity with Okinawan women and clamored for reversion.

\ldots the problems women in Okinawa have come to face under the U.S. administration is in a structure of oppression that is twice or thrice times worse than what women in the mainland face…

Even though it may be incomplete, in postwar mainland, there was a period where the administration (\textit{taiseigawa}) encouraged women’s liberation and in some way or another managed to cement the spirit of human rights in the constitution.

However, for Okinawa, which was deprived of such things, women are sacrificed, used to an obedient way of life, have their human rights trampled on through prostitution, have their slave-like bodies confined, or are resigned to the idea that indebtedness upon contract is unavoidable.\footnote{Okinawa-ken Sokoku Fukki Tôsôshi Hensan linkai ed., \textit{Okinawa-ken sokoku fukki tôsôshi} [History of Okinawa Prefecture reversion to the fatherland] (Naha: Okinawa jiji shuppan, 1982), 1206.}

The extension of sisterhood towards Okinawan women by Japanese women is noteworthy. However, it is not entirely unproblematic since it is framed under the...
nationalist rubric of reversion, in which the state is conceived as a repressive force that preys upon the vulnerabilities of women in particular. These problems in the feminist movement will be inherited by Okinawan women, particularly in their difficulty in reaching out to women who exercise their sexuality in an attempt to improve their lives as will be discussed in Chapter 6.

Mixed-Blood Children in the Reversion Era

The mixed-blood children emerged as a social welfare issue in the 1950s. International Social Services (ISS = kokusai shakai jigyōdan) was established in Okinawa in 1958 and became one of the most important organizations assisting mixed-blood children in Okinawa.168 ISS maintains its headquarters in Geneva, and established a branch in Japan in 1952 after the inauguration of the Japan-American Joint Committee for the Assistance of Orphans.169 ISS later changed its name to International Social Assistance Okinawa, Inc. (ISAO = shakaifukushi hōjin kokusai fukushi kai kokusai fukushi sōdanjo) in 1974 and was established in Okinawa in 1958.170 The role of ISS was to promote international adoption, provide welfare services for mixed-blood children, and solve social problems that result from international marriages such as child abandonment.171 As an organization with an international base, ISS was relatively free from both explicit American and Japanese influence in their casework and was operated and directed by mostly native Okinawans.

171 Ibid., 71.
The Pearl S. Buck Foundation (PBF) was established in Okinawa in 1967 (and closed in 1992). Pearl Buck is known as the 1938 Nobel Prize winner for literature, but was also an active social activist in East Asia. Born in China, Buck’s novels such as her debut book *East Wind West Wind* (1930) depicted a child born to a Chinese father and American mother. Buck first started to use the term Amerasian in advocating the establishment of the PBF. John Shade, who took presidency of the Foundation after Buck’s death in 1973, estimates that there has been approximately 2 million children born to U.S. military fathers in Asia since the 1898 invasion of the Philippines.\(^{172}\) The Foundation is still dedicated to assisting with adoption and welfare for not only Amerasian children, but other children in need in Asia. PBF formed its headquarters in Pennsylvania (1964), while branches were established in Korea (1965), Taiwan (1966), Okinawa (1967), the Philippines and Thailand (1968), and Vietnam (1970).

While ISS was international in nature, the PBF was clearly informed by an American nationalist agenda although it functioned in the private sector that most often than not was at odds with governmental policy.

> We have rejected the thought that the Amerasians are somehow responsible for their own plight, because to have such responsibility one would also have to be responsible for one’s own birth…We cannot, we must not, now reject our own children.

> We utterly reject the notion that somehow America cannot economically handle this burden of human problem solving and we are contemptuous of the suggestion that nothing need be done

because these Amerasians are only half-American! Such perspective is not only patently racist, it is un-American.

Responsible action by American citizens is indicative of the traditional national love of children. Not only those which it has fathered, but a love of all children. American action in this instance would be both a proper and moral consideration for America.\(^\text{173}\)

PBF garnered criticism from ISS because it purportedly granted assistance to Amerasian children non-discriminatory and not on a need basis. Hence, this emphasized Amerasians as different from their Okinawan counterparts.

The Ryukyu-American Children’s Foundation was established in April, 1967 by Father Dominic and registered as a Delaware Corporation. I was unable to locate any records of this foundation other than a USCAR document dated August 25, 1970. Additionally, when I informally spoke to former members of ISS and PBF, there was little recollection of the details of this foundation. According to USCAR, the prime purpose of this foundation was to “support Amer-Asia children (currently 21) in schools where they may receive an English education.” Father Dominic took a special interest in children who were born of a legal marriage, had claim to U.S. citizenship, and were inclined to go to the U.S. No other information on this foundation can be located, and it is suspected to have dissolved, particularly since the document reads, “He [Father Dominic] is concerned that the work may collapse if anything should happen to him.”\(^\text{174}\)

\(^{173}\) Ibid., 12-13.

\(^{174}\) National Archives and Records Administration; Record Group 260: Records of the United States Occupation Headquarters, World War II; Records of the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR); Department: The Health, Education and Welfare Department; Box No: 99 of HCRI-HEW; Folder No: 2; Title: Reading File, August 1970. This can be located at the Okinawa Prefectural Archives, Document No U8080137B.
These three organizations represent the main social welfare services extended to mixed-blood children during the pre-reversion era. Each was funded by different sources and exercised different ideologies, but all worked together like patchwork to cover the needs of mixed-blood children. Furthermore, all were instrumental to USCAR in its objective of relegating the mixed-blood problem to the private realm.

What was USCAR’s position vis-à-vis Amerasians? During the occupation of Japan, the Allied Forces addressed the mixed-blood issue primarily through Colonel Sams of the Public Health and Welfare Section who insisted on a policy of nondiscrimination in order to make mixed-blood children a problem of Japanese socialization and not a concern of military policy as discussed in Chapter 1. During the occupation of Okinawa, the USCAR addressed the mixed-blood issue primarily through Colonel Jensen of the Health Education and Welfare Department (HEW) in the Ryukyuan American Welfare Council (RAWC). RAWC was established in 1952 to coordinate private welfare activities in Ryukyu Islands and comprised of both “Ryukyuan and American representation from business, religious and fraternal groups, women’s clubs, the Okinawa Social Welfare Council, the U.S. military and HEW USCAR.”

Hence, the U.S. military attempted to deal with the problem as a private issue and denied the existence of discrimination towards mixed-blood children.

Colonel Jensen implicitly recognized that the production of mixed-blood children is a result of the sexist and exploitive attitude of the military, but nonetheless only recommends the “American community at large (not the government)” should take responsibility. In a memo dated August 25, 1970 entitled “Assistance Programs

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175 National Archives and Records Administration; Record Group 260: Records of the United States Occupation Headquarters, World War II; Records of the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR); Department: The Health, Education and Welfare Department; Box No: 51 of HCRI-HEW; Folder No: 6; Title: Public Welfare Program, 1970: Miscellaneous. This can be located at the Okinawa Prefectural Archives, Document No U80800273B. This memo addressed to HICOM from Colonel Robert Jensen is dated March 19, 1971 and entitled “HICOM Request for HEW Memo on the Future Status of the Ryukyuan American Welfare Council (RAWC).”
for Amer-Asian (mixed-blood) Children on Okinawa,” Colonel Jensen writes to this effect:

So long as there are armies there will be camp followers. The American government has never taken a position of accepting responsibility for the abandoned offspring of their soldiers in foreign lands.

…where the total responsibility for the American child has been left on the Okinawan partner, I feel the American community at large (not the government) should act as the conscience of the delinquent American and offer assistance.

…The military chaplains should investigate the type of advice given G.I.’s by company commanders, etc. I was aware 20 years ago in Japan that company level lenders were advising the G.I.’s to get one girl, set her up in a house, and stay with her. This was done because it was in the long run cheaper for the G.I., kept the G.I. from catching VD, and made the G.I. more stable in his work. What was not recognized, however, was the fact that it was mainly from these unions that the illegitimate children issued. Certainly it would seem that the chaplains should take a role in counseling the American soldier who is involved in this type of set up.176

Colonel Jensen further tried to intervene with the issue through the private sector by

176 National Archives and Records Administration; Record Group 260: Records of the United States Occupation Headquarters, World War II; Records of the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR); Department: The Health, Education and Welfare Department; Box No: 51 of HCRI-HEW; Folder No: 6; Title: Public Welfare Program, 1970: Miscellaneous. This can be located at the Okinawa Prefectural Archives, Document No U80800273B.
holding a study conference on February 19, 1971. He started off the conference in a
defensive posture with his Introductory Remarks:

We are not here to lay blame or to preach. Whenever two
cultures exist side by side, there will be mixing. There is no point
in advertising the problem—no point in magnifying the problem.

Furthermore, he stated from the beginning where responsibility lie:

This is not usually recognized as a government responsibility.
Therefore, it becomes a responsibility for concerned men and
women acting in and through private organizations such as the ISS,
PBF, RACF, Holt Adoption Agency and others. One of our major
concerns is the legal status of these organizations after reversion.\textsuperscript{177}

The study conference was represented by sociologist Heidi Knight, Father Dominic of
the Ryukyu-American Children’s Foundation, Mr. Wakeman of the Pearl Buck
Foundation, CPT Scurfield of the Holt Adoption Agency, Ōshiro Yasutaka of ISS,
Kabira Chosei of Ryukyuan Radio and Television amongst others.

Heidi Knight downplayed discrimination and disadvantage and argued
mixed-blood children have a victim consciousness. She states that the mixed-blood
child “considers himself a victim” and “usually fails to realize the extent to which he
has chosen the particular problem and has vested interest in it.” She concludes that

\textsuperscript{177} National Archives and Records Administration; Record Group 260: Records of the United States
Occupation Headquarters, World War II; Records of the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu
Islands (USCAR); Department: The Health, Education and Welfare Department; Box No: 129 of
HCRI-HEW; Folder No: 1; Title: Robert T. Jensen. This can be located at the Okinawa Prefectural
Archives, Document No U80800703B.
creating special programs, particularly ones that aim for the entry of mixed-blood children into American society, will only inflate the misconception that the victimization is real, and handicap the mixed-blood child from dealing with it on an individual basis.

Furthermore, it is likely that an International child who is handicapped in a particular area in one culture would be handicapped in the same area, or corresponding area, in another culture. All of which is my way of saying that the areas and degree of handicaps ought to be measured on an individual basis before International children become candidates for “programs.”

Thus, if you give the very handicapped International child what he asks for—the means to go to the States—what have you done? First, you deprive him of the cultural and social supports of the society in which he was raised. Second, you assault his cultural and racial ambivalence with the rather frightening racist scene of America today. Third, you teach him the inferiority of his differentness from the established “white” standard of beauty, dress and behavior. The cumulative effect is a further distorted, negative self-concept.¹⁷⁸

While it is possible to recognize the danger in indulging in the one-sided desire to “become American” as the means from which mixed-blood individual escape discrimination, Knight wholesale dismissal of “programs” or services designed to reach out to their introduction into American society seems more to be informed by a

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.
desire to divert responsibility from the U.S. and once again reduce the issue to an “individual problem.”

Chosei Kabira provided an assessment of the problem of mixed-blood children in the Ryukyus. Chosei Kabira was president of Ryukyu Radio and Television, married to an American woman, and father to the well-known present day television and radio announcers Jinei (Jay) and John Kabira. As a father of mixed Okinawan children, Kabira recognized that there was discrimination in Okinawa, but “felt that it might be harmful to set these children apart from the rest of the community,” and hence endorsed integration into Okinawan society. He supported an integrationist approach that preserved individual particularity. This perhaps was a viable strategy for his family since his children had the benefit of an elite Okinawan father in a patriarchal Japanese society, two parents, and a bilingual education. Kabira came to recognize this himself, as he somewhat problematically separates his children’s circumstance from other Amerasians born to sexual violence in his memoirs.

The conference ended with the view that “the primary emphasis should be to encourage the success and the acceptance of bi-national children in the local communities” and that “where special problems do exist that they should be dealt with on an individual basis.” On one hand, the American side was able to avoid addressing the production of mixed-blood children as a structural issue and instead encouraged the various organizations such as ISS, PPB, and RACF to continue social welfare services to contain the issue in the private sector. ISS, directed by Ôshiro Yasutaka, put

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179 Kabira has recently published his memoirs raising his now famous sons. See Kabira Chosei, Inu ha dareda, boku ha gomida: waga ya no kosodate kiroku [Who’s the dog, I’m the trash: A record of child rearing in my home] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2007).

180 National Archives and Records Administration; Record Group 260: Records of the United States Occupation Headquarters, World War II; Records of the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR); Department: The Health, Education and Welfare Department; Box No: 129 of HCRI-HEW; Folder No: 1; Title: Robert T. Jensen. This can be located at the Okinawa Prefectural Archives, Document No U80800703B.
the welfare of the children first, and hence, was not in a position to make political
claims vis-à-vis the military. Ôshiro’s disagreements with PBF were noted, since
PBF’s main objective was to treat the children as American envoys in Asia, which was
evidenced by a support program of $7.50 per month for 150 Amerasians “given
without reference to other support the child may be receiving.” Hence, the object was
to give support to Amerasians based upon their identity as Americans rather than based
on their ability to survive in Okinawan society as equals with their peers. Regardless
of the emphasis on their American identity which actually clashed with the U.S.
military’s policy of nondiscrimination, it was still useful to the U.S. military to the end
that it provided financial support. 181

Statistics

Where there is social welfare to care for the population, there are surveys and
statistics aimed at identifying the population. The earliest comprehensive survey 182 I
was able to locate is the 1955 Education Budget and Administration Survey
Documents (kyōiku gyōsei ni kansuru kenkyū chōsa shorui) from the GRI
Department of Education Division of Surveys (Ryūkyū seifu bunkyōkyoku kenkyū
chōsaka). 183 These results were obtained by asking the principal at each school to

181 Ibid.
182 According to Ôshiro Yasutaka, the earliest survey taken of mixed-blood children was three years
later in 1958 through the Middle District Social Welfare Association (Nakagami chiku shakai fukushi
kyōgikai), organized by Shima Masu (see Chapter 2 for more on Shima) on school age children from the
Nakagami Education Association District (Nakagami kyōiku rengōku). Perhaps he was unaware of the
Education Budget and Administration Survey. I have located the 1958 survey Ôshiro speaks of, and will
discuss it below. The results of this survey were announced by the incumbent Koza City Mayor Oyama
Chōjyō and Shima Masu in July 1961 although there is no date given for the year the survey was taken.
See Ôshiro Yasutaka, “Kokusaiji no kakaeru mondai” [Problems of international Children] in Okinawa
no bunka to seshin eisei [Okinawan culture and mental health] (Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1984), 74. Ôshiro was
a case worker at ISS from 1965 and also became director.
183 Ryūkyū seifu bunkyōkyoku kenkyū chōsaka [GRI Department of Education Division of Surveys],
Kyōiku gyōsei ni kansuru kenkyū chōsa shorui [Education Budget and Administration Survey
Documents], 1955. This survey can be viewed at the Okinawa Prefectural Archives, serial number
R00162804B.
report to the agency and surveyed for conditions of 1.) living environment; 2.) mother; 3.) father; 4.) ability to adjust to the education within the school; 5.) physical traits. According to the survey, there were 386 mixed-blood children enrolled in elementary school (115 at age 6, 120 at age 7, 102 at age 8, 48 at age 9, 11 at age 10, 2 at age 11). Regarding living environment, 5.18% lived in poverty, 7.77% lived in occasional poverty, 51.8% were average, 27.45% lived well stably, 6.93% lived comfortably, and the status of 0.77% was unknown. Hence, they were assessed to live in normal or slightly above normal conditions. Zero point seventy-seven percent were raised by public facilities, 5.43% by an unrelated person, 29.45% by grandparents or aunts/uncles, 49.72% by the mother, 9.84% by both parents, 6.73% unknown. Race of the father was judged by the physical appearance of the child: 89 (23.05%) were Filipino, 25 (6.47%) were black, 231 (59.82) were white, 7 (1.80%) were Chinese, 20 (5.18%) were something else, and 14 (3.62) were unknown. Only 23.05% knew the name of their father while it was unknown for 76.92% of the children. Two-hundred-ninety-one (75.11%) received no financial assistance, 22 (5.69%) received some assistance, 50 (12.95%) received total assistance, and it was not possible to determine if assistance was received by 23 (5.95%) caretakers. Lastly, regarding school performance, 28 (7.25%) received extremely bad grades, 57 (14.76%) received bad grades, 154 (39.88%) received average grades, 112 (29.00%) received good grades, 27 (6.99%) received extremely good grades, and grades of 8 (2.07%) were unknown.

The next survey I was able to locate was conducted by the Middle District Social Welfare Association (Nakagami chiku shakai fukushi kyōgikai) on school age children from the Nakagami Education Association District (Nakagami kyōiku rengōku). The results of this survey were published by the incumbent Koza City Ōyama Chōjyō and the so-called “mother” of postwar social welfare Shima Masu (for
more on Shima, see Chapter 2) in July 1961 although the date the survey was conducted is not indicated.

Table 3 Middle District Social Welfare Association Survey of Mixed-Blood Children

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Elementary School</th>
<th>Middle School</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Ages 0-6</th>
<th>Grand Total</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>786</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Compared to the 386 elementary school mixed-blood children surveyed and reported in 1955, the 1,584 in Okinawa’s Middle District *only* indicates that the previous survey may have not taken an accurate head count of mixed-blood children ten years after the end of the Okinawan War. Of the 655 children between ages 0-6, 195 were born in wedlock, 232 in common law marriage, and 228 out of wedlock. Furthermore, only 25 were raised by both parents, 244 by the mother, 69 by the father, 27 by the grandparents, 1 by a father-in-law, 4 by an aunt and 285 through a non immediate family member, friend, or service. Because of the high number of young children who were not taken care of by immediate family members, 30 hoped for adoption. Although the standard of living appeared good with 217 above average, 340 average, and 98 below average, only 248 of the 655 received any support from their father,
while the remaining 407 did not.

The following 1970 and 1976 surveys were more comprehensive as they also took into account mixed-blood children that attended private American schools in Okinawa. The April 1970 survey was conducted by ISS. Results were obtained by distributing the survey to 336 school, of which 286, or 85.12% responded.

Table 4 April 1970 Survey of Mixed-Blood Children Attending Schools in Okinawa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Elementary</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>OCS</th>
<th>Kings</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>909</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 5 April 1970 Survey of Racial Background of Mixed-Blood Children

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Filipino</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>847</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Former director of ISS Ôshiro Yasutaka estimates that judging from the available statistics, there were at approximately 100 mixed-blood children born per year that remained in Okinawa. This number does not include children who attended Department of Defense Schools on base or children who were not registered in their mother’s family register (koseki).\(^{184}\)

Reportage and the Reversion Movement

In the small island of Okinawa, where political oppression is intense and the entanglement of human relations incredibly dense, politics and literature make up an intimately interwoven fabric of the mental and social landscape. Literary scholar Okamoto Keitoku, in his study of postwar Okinawan literature, writes that because the personal life of every Okinawan was continually yanked by the string of political crisis—U.S. military occupation, the “all-island-struggle” that conditioned a permanent U.S. military presence in the face of the Cold War, and “reversion” to the Japanese administration—“Okinawan literary activities were also heavily determined by political conditions.”\(^{185}\)

This intimate relationship has manifested structurally. With political interests in mind, the U.S. occupying forces encouraged the establishment of The Uruma Shimpō (currently known as Ryūkyū Shimpō), Okinawa Times, and Okinawa Mainichi Shimbun (currently out of print), which first provided a space for literary expression after the war.\(^{186}\) Because of these close connections, many newspaper reporters wrote

\(^{184}\) Ôshiro Yasutaka, “Kokusaiji no kakaeru mondai” [Problems of international children] in Okinawa no bunka to seshin eisei [Okinawan culture and mental health], 75. Also see Ôshiro Yasutaka, “Kokusaiji ni kansuru mondai to taiô no jidai kubun shian” [A draft broken down by time period concerning the issue of and engagement with international children] in Okinawa chiiki fukushi kenkyū: Nihon shakai fukushi gakkai dai 49 kai zenkoku taikai kaisai kinen go [The Study of Okinawa Community Development: Commemorative Edition of the 49th Conference of JSSSW], October 20, 2001, 4-5.

\(^{185}\) Okamoto Keitoku, Gendai Okinawa no bungaku to shisō [modern Okinawa literature and thought], (Naha: Okinawa Taimususha, 1981), 90.

\(^{186}\) Ibid., 94.
fiction and novelists turned into journalists. Hence, when key member of the literary journal *Ryūdai Bungaku* (Ryukyu University Literature) Arakawa Akira became editor in chief of *Okinawa Times* after the war, it was merely a reflection of the widespread mixing of the recording of social fact in the public sphere—journalism—and creation of fiction that draws its inspiration from private inner life.

Amerasians were first introduced through political writings after the war in the concern for miscegenation as seen with Higaonna Kanjun. Similar to Japan, mixed-blood children were rendered as “evidence” of violence that results from a deprivation or infringement of sovereignty. In Japan, this “evidence” was mobilized as ammunition against the infringement of sovereignty after 1952. Likewise, in Okinawa, the experience of mixed-blood children was mobilized as “evidence” to justify the need for Okinawa to revert to the Japanese administration as an escape from the violence of the U.S. military. It was not until the Vietnam war era, where not only the number of Amerasians increased, but the volume of writing on them flourished through the style of reportage—a style ranging from journalistic “real life accounts”

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187 “Kichi no otoshigo; Bâgai ni konketsu shôjo: shôgakusei ga beihei ni mono uri” [Castoff children from the base; A bixed-blood girl in the bar district: Elementary school students sell to GIs], *Asahi Shimbun* (August 15, 1965): 18; Ôshiro Kiyoko, “Konketuji no niji wo kakaete” [With two mixed-blood children] in *Okinawa no hahatachi: Sono seikatsu no kiroku* [Okinawan mothers: A record of their lives], ed. Nihon kyôshokuinkumiai/Okinawa kyôshokuinkaikyô, (Tokyo: Gôdô Shuppan, 1968), 171-177. This essay is a first-hand account from a mother of two mixed-blood children. The volume is prefaced by the pro-reversion Okinawan Teachers Association President (*kyôshokuinkai-chô*) Yara Chôbyô mentioned above. For reportage on the crimes of a mixed-blood Japanese youth that occurred in 1972, see “‘Haha’ heno zôaku to fukushû: kokujin konketsu shonen gôkan satsujin jiken” [“hatred and revenge towards ‘mother’: The murder and rape incident by a black mixed-blood youth], in *Hanzaishatachi: Môhitotsu no dôjidaishi* [Criminals: Another history of a common generation] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobô, 1976), 53-83. For reportage style written after reversion about the pre-reversion period that includes references to Amerasians, see: Ryûkyû Shimpô-sha ed., *Okinawa no kora* [Okinawa’s Children], (Ryûkyû Shimpô-sha: Naha, 1980); Isa Chihiro, *Okinawa no ikari: Koza jiken/beihei shôjo bôkô jiken* [Okinawa’s anger: The Koza incident/rape incident of a young girl by GIs] (Tokyo: Bunshun Bunkô, 1996), pp. 70-74. Isa writes of a fifteen-year-old Amerasian girl named Ishikawa Bailey who works at a bar, and finds herself in the middle of the Koza Riots of 1970. Bailey is taken aback as Okinawans suddenly overturn US military cars, throw coke-bottle bombs, and chase GIs back into the base. When one Okinawan man mistakes her for an American, she yells back to him in her native *Uchinâguchi* tongue whereupon she is immediately recognized as an *Uchinânchu* and released.
to peaks into the private lives of Amerasians through literature. In stride with the hybrid combination of politics and literature, Amerasians were quickly mobilized into the problematics of allegory that dissolves the distinction between the political and poetic through the genre of reportage.

Reportage mobilizes private experience into the service of the political. It is precisely this intervention that Max Weber speaks of in his discussion on the ideal type of journalist in “Politics as a Vocation.” For Weber, the journalist is a type of “paid professional politician” whose attempt to manipulate public life produces “inner demands” that are “especially difficult.” The conflict between private “inner demands” inspired by personal circumstance, and vocation as a public manipulator of political life is mapped onto his struggle between an “ethic of conviction” and “ethic of responsibility” where his/her beliefs on one hand must also correspond to his ability to take responsibility for the consequence of those beliefs on the other. For example, proclaiming an absolute anti-military political position must be able to confront the realities of those who cannot eat without income generated from the bases, Amerasians who simply long for their biological fathers, or those who are just not on the same page as him/her politically. In short, his/her political conviction must be made congruous with a social reality that has not yet, or cannot be fully translated into political leverage.

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188 Kishaba Jun, “Kurai hana” [Dark Flower], Ryudai Bungaku [Ryukyu University Literature], vol. 10 (1955). This is one of the first pieces of Okinawan literature that introduces the birth of a mixed-blood child. It depicts an Okinawan woman who becomes an only to a G.I., and is quickly discarded by him after she gives birth to a mixed-blood child conceived by rape as she worked as a maid on base. Tanaka “Konketsuji” [Mixed-Blood Child], Shin Okinawa Bungaku [New Okinawan Literature] 1972. Next are works of literature that represent mixed-blood children set in the pre-reversion era, but are written in the post-reversion era. Nagadô Eikichi,“Garama no tento mura” [In the tent village of Garama], Shin Okinawa Bungaku [New Okinawan Literature], vol. 24 (1973). I discuss this story at length in Chapter 7. For fiction on Japanese mixed-blood children, see Asahara Rokurô,“Konketuji Jyôdi” [George, the mixed-blood child] in Gendai nihon bungaku zenshû, 86 [Complete works of modern Japanese literature, 86] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobô, 1957), 267-281); Ariyoshi Sawako, Hishoku [Colorless] (Tokyo: Kakugawa shoten, 1967).

So, can the journalist-cum-politician take responsibility for the consequence of an anti-military conviction when this may entail cutting off his/her own brethren who are not up to speed whether by “choice” or by “circumstance”? From the other side of the spectrum, if the journalist-cum-politician thinks too endearingly about his/her responsibility to the public (i.e., he/she has to worry about Okinawans starving to death, Amerasians facing debilitating identity crises, etc.) then what happens to his/her political conviction?

It is no wonder that the “inner demands that are directed precisely at the successful journalist are especially difficult,” pointing to the near incommensurability between translating private experience into politics. The journalist-cum-politician must make conviction and a responsibility for consequence meet in harmony when they are at the very roots perpetually in violent conflict. The journalist-cum-politician is hence, made to homogenize, unify, and totalize his/her persona when modern conditions make it endemically schizophrenic. “It is not astonishing that there are many journalists who have become human failures and worthless men.”\(^{190}\)

Hence, an intervention into the contentious space between private experience and politics such as reportage is not inherently positive or negative. Rather, the problem lies not only in the inability to take responsibility for consequence, but also in silencing the outcry of incommensurability between “inner demands” of the private sphere and political action in the public sphere. By concealing the former for the sake of the latter, the schizophrenic condition is unaccounted for and merely repressed. Inability to meet the high demands that Weber sets for an adroit journalist, savvy politician, (and objective scholar as he goes on to argue in his twin essay, *Science as a Vocation*), has resulted in devastating consequences for Amerasians in Okinawa as their personal experiences have been mobilized as a commodity for

\(^{190}\) Ibid., 99.
political struggle.

The 1972 reversion year edition of *The Ushio* provides more than adequate illustration of how rhetorical device is deployed into the service of politics: Okinawan women become allegories of sexual domination and Amerasians become metonymies of effect in their reportage. *The Ushio*, a journal established by the Sōka Gakkai International (also known as the “International Value-Creation Society,” a Nichiren Buddhist sect that supports the Kömei Party) in 1960, compiled a special edition featuring the project: “The Experience of Prostituted Japanese: The Actual Condition of Prostitutes and Mixed-blood Children Told by 100 Impacted Individuals.” A group of Japanese collaborators compile the central reportage piece in the journal where “prostitutes” and “mixed-blood children” put forth sensational first-hand accounts of their experience alongside immodest photojournalism.

For these writers, Okinawan women and children are the last frontier of political resistance in Japan. To write about themselves—Japanese men—would be inadequate because they do not lie at the brutal center of an engulfing oppression as do women and children. This is suggested by political philosopher Kamishima Jirō for example, who balances his reportage with an equal amount of commentary in his contribution, “Okinawa’s Culture of Resistance: Prostitutes and Mixed-blood Children.”

...under capitalism, the proletariat—deprived of everything when exploitation has saturated all—are none other than prostitutes who, stripped to their last threads of existence, have only their flesh and blood to sell. They live in the contempt of others, in a vortex of discrimination, and in total desperation.
In my survey here, I took notice of the following two statements.

“I think of my work now (prostitution) as an occupation. If I can carry on with it for the rest of my life, I will.”

These words clearly reflect a new perspective, and a will. Of course, even though there is danger in these words, they have the potential to become a kernel of resistance if taken in larger context.

“I have become more confident. Mixed-blood children are not Japanese nor are they foreigners, they are a new mixed-race of people.”

These words clearly reflect a new perspective, and a will…these words…have the power to challenge the “hard power” engulfing today’s world.\textsuperscript{191}

Stripped of their “last threads of existence,” the direct quotes of an Okinawan woman and Amerasian represent the last hope of resistance against “hard power” for Kamishima. By recruiting private testimony to speak to the facts as an act of political resistance, the recruiter is implicated in the violence of a legislative model, giving rise to unintended consequences in spite of benevolent intentions. Amerasians are silenced under the heavy weight of their induced testimony through the above reportage. This is exactly what Murphy-Shigematsu speaks of in the following passage.

The private lives of Amerasians have been subject to

sensationalized writing, exaggerated statistics, and flat one-dimensional depictions. As a result, the diversity of their real experiences has been completely ignored, and the group called Amerasians have been tainted with a disgraceful name. Even if the writer possesses good intentions, he/she reduces humans to a fixed image for a political cause, in which fairness and accuracy becomes victim. Moreover, they produce consequences that most have never imagined.\(^{192}\)

The radical split between “good intentions” and “consequences that most have never imagined” described here are precisely what lies at the heart of Nietzsche’s genealogy and Weber’s cry for a more objective interpretive sociology.

Murphy-Shigematsu points to a second problem: how the reportage form is wedded to a model of resistance that cannot account for the “diversity of their real experiences.” This critique of resistance is not particular to Amerasians, but is rather a problem of social activism that cuts across literature in politics in Okinawa. For example, poet Kiyota Masanobu, a highly neglected figure of the Ryūdai Bungaku circle, took critical distance from “resistance literature” (“teikō bungaku”) that emerged after the all-island struggle (shimagurumi tōsō) and harshly attacked reportage that purports to mobilize raw experience into a politics of resistance characteristic of the period. He warns against poets who “try and turn ‘language’ (‘kotoba’) into “power of the hand” without any mediation.”\(^{193}\) Searching for pockets of resistance, Kiyota observes that these hybrid literary-journalistic figures are


“lacking in defeat (zasetsu).”

Kiyota’s “defeat” here does not suggest “failure,” but rather, seems to turn the idea of it on its head. It is not the dreaded end of a total subjugation to oppression (which can only be comforted by the fantasy of finding a last pocket of resistance), but suggests a new beginning that acknowledges (capitalist) oppression is all-encompassing, penetrates every crevice of the social strata, and infects every possible pocket of pure resistance. Instead of insisting on “flat, one-dimensional depictions” of actors of resistance in order to add leverage to a political front, Kiyota suggests an acknowledgment of the inherently schizophrenic condition of the radical split within each oppressed subject as a point of departure. In this way, Kiyota writes of the internal contradictions of the all island-struggle that was reductively mobilized as a ground of primordial resistance for reportage journalists.

When I read his record of sitting amongst the farmers and talking the night away about the land issue, I couldn’t help but recall my memories of the air raids that occurred nineteen years ago. The soldier-turned-village-hanchō rounded us up and took us to the air raid shelter.

The same men who were complicit with the Japanese imperial army before the war become leaders of the village after the war, but are yet flattened into figures of pure “resistance” for Japanese reportage. Further, while lodged in the language of “resistance,” their experience, condensed into “direct-appeal and petition,” “tragically gets absorbed in a bureaucratic system (taisei)” of “direct appeal and lobbying” to

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194 Ibid., 221.
195 Ibid., 222.
institutional power.\textsuperscript{196} The point that Kiyota makes is not that activism is useless, or to place blame on the farmers who struggle to survive, but rather to suggest the sometimes contradictory multiplicity of subjects of resistance is repressed in order to gain political leverage behind a placard of a united stance. Shifting hope for social change to a system of “direct appeal and lobbying” instead of facing these terrifying contradictions within becomes a “thought lacking in defeat” and “produces petty bureaucrats through politics and activist devoid of all creativity through literature.”\textsuperscript{197}

Acknowledgement of a radically split subject does not undermine the possibility for resistance, but as I will show in Chapter 6, it opens up a narrow yet crucial possibility for Amerasians to work through the dilemma of being both born to either “violated victims” or “complicit sell-outs.”

\textsuperscript{196} Ibid., 223.
\textsuperscript{197} Ibid., 221.
CHAPTER 5

“The Question of Resistance in the Age of Empire: Between Genocide and Compulsory Nationalization, 1972-2000”

Okinawa reverted to the Japanese administration on May 15, 1972. Even though reversion was carried out on the platform of “hondo nami” or “parity with the mainland,” the proportion of U.S. military bases in Japan decreased by approximately 1/3, compared to only a few percent in Okinawa, thus widening the disparity with Japan even more after 1972.\textsuperscript{198} Today, the U.S. military presence in Okinawa Prefecture is authorized by the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, ratified in 1951 only hours after the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Even though the Treaty is an agreement between the two states that stipulates the terms of the U.S. military base presence in the entire state of Japan, 75% of all U.S. military bases there are conspicuously crowded into Okinawa Prefecture. In some areas such as Okinawa City, 20% of the land is consumed by military installations. In total, 24,874 military personnel, 1,355 affiliated military personnel, and 22,424 family dependents, make up 3.6% of the 1,313,770 in Okinawa’s total population.

Concentrating U.S. military bases in Okinawa is even more questionable when the Japanese government enthusiastically provides an “omoiyari yosan” or “sympathy budget” that is instrumental in maintaining them. Thus, the U.S. military bases are not single-handedly imposed by the United States, but because of generous funding from the Japanese government, the United States cannot afford to not have bases in the Japanese state. As the former Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord stated in 1995,

“Japan provides almost $5 billion a year in Host Nation Support to our forces, more than any other ally. This covers approximately 70% of the costs of our forces and means that it is less expensive to maintain forces in Japan than in the U.S.”199 As a result, U.S. bases in the Japanese state are not only disproportionately concentrated in Okinawa, but as political scientist Umebayashi Hiromachi points out, U.S. military bases in the Asian Pacific Region and entire world are abnormally concentrated in the Japanese state.200

Japan’s ability to reap the benefits of the Treaty is therefore contingent on the unspoken condition that its undesirable effects of occupation are contained in Okinawa. The United States enjoys military dominance in East Asia, Japan enjoys protection of the Treaty; the interests of both are guarded by the pretense that Okinawa Prefecture is an equal part of the Japanese state, thereby obscuring the colonial relationship that is manifested by the egregiously disproportionate number of bases in Okinawa. Ultimately the shelter of Japanese sovereignty did little to relieve Okinawa of its colonial-like status. That is to say, although many pro-reversion critics criticized the “military colonization” or “American imperialism” of the U.S. military bases, colonial oppression in the end had very little to do with a specific nation-state form. Rather, whether Okinawa is outside or inside Japanese state sovereignty, the transnational network of Empire as suggested by Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt manipulates the nation-state form as a means through which the condition of continued oppression of Okinawa obtains.201

The Feminist Movement in Okinawa Today

200 Umebayashi, 45.
The feminist movement in the post-reversion era flourished. Not only did it start to connect with the feminist movements of the 1960s and 1970s, but it also became part of the global movement towards women’s rights catalyzed by the United Nations declaration of 1975 as the “Year of the International Woman.” Women in Okinawa were organically forming a feminist movement and philosophy of their own stimulated by these global changes. To celebrate the “Decade of the International Woman,” Okinawan women joined in on the tenth year United Nations Conference in Nairobi, Kenya in 1985. Shortly after returning from this conference, Minamoto Tetsumi (Radio Okinawa producer), Takazato Suzuyo (Former Naha City Councilwoman), Miyagi Harumi (Women’s Historian) coordinated a yearly Unai Festival to celebrate women’s accomplishments, learn about women’s history, provide a space for grassroots groups concerned with gender, and address problems still looming in the future. Many of these same women went on to become part of Okinawan Women Act Against Military Violence (OWAAMV), established yet another decade later, immediately after their participation in the Beijing Women’s Conference in 1995.

Taking inspiration from the global feminist movement that problematized both state and militarized violence against women, OWAAMV declared that the military is structural violence against women in Okinawa. On one hand, OWAAMV avoids the pitfalls of nationalist feminist resistance in that it posits the state, and its militaries by extension, as a patriarchal violence antagonistic towards women regardless of their national origin. In this sense it appears that feminism transcends the state. However, as the post-reversion Okinawan case clearly shows, while pro-reversion activists attacked the state violence of the U.S. and clamored for protection under Japanese state sovereignty, in the end Empire also transcended the state and merely manipulated it specific form to serve its end. Hence, what does it mean when feminism transcends the state when Empire transcends the state as well? These issues will be theoretically
fleshed out in detail in Chapter 6 and 7.

The problems with the growing feminist movement do not end there. As discussed earlier, positing the U.S. military as a negative destructive violence not only overlooks the productive nature of power, but it also cannot adequately account for a liberal biopolitics in which the U.S. military does not prevent but instead provides for the life needs of the population. Not only could many women buy their way out of poverty by either servicing or marrying G.I.s, but as the economic gap between local Okinawans and U.S. military personnel closed after reversion, many women continued to pursue G.I.s even though they possessed a higher earning power backed by the Japanese yen. Hence, even though OWAAMV boasts of a global network of feminist solidarity, the diasporic network of Okinawan women who married G.I.s are almost entirely alienated. For example, in a special collection of essays on (domestic) “partners” (tsureai) of Heisei, a journal dedicated to the Japanese in America, an Okinawan woman who married a G.I. and immigrated to Sacramento, California writes the following:

If a war broke out as a result of a terrorist act [such as 9/11], then the American bases in all parts of Japan, and the U.S. military bases in Okinawa in particular, will take on an important duty. Japan is a nation that gives America ample support. The Japanese government should make an effort to appeal to the American people with this fact. Then the Japanese could carry more pride and confidence.202

It is clear that when given the opportunity to talk about her “partner,” the author took a

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defensive position as a Japanese national that supports the military strategy of the U.S.

In light of the number of U.S. citizen males in Okinawa, it is no surprise that there is an inflated rate of international marriage between U.S. men and Japanese women. While U.S.-male/Japanese-female marriages make up only 0.17% (1,318) of all marriages in Japan, the same combination makes up 2.8% (238) of all marriages in Okinawa, putting Okinawa 16.47 times that of the national average. While the largest percentage of international marriages in the nation occurred between Chinese-female/Japanese-male couples at 24.48%, 61.15% of all international marriages in Okinawa are between U.S.-man/Japanese-woman. In fact, a closer examination of foreign-male/Japanese-female marriages reveals that 86.55% are of the U.S.-male/Japanese-female combination in Okinawa, while the same combination only makes up 17.28% in all of Japan. Here, the presence of U.S. military bases is clearly reflected as a structural pattern in peripheral areas such as Aomori (72.88%), Nagasaki (70.00%), and Kanagawa (31.19%) which all have far higher percentages than the so-called “international” metropolis of Tokyo (19.55%).

Table 6 The Number (#), Percentage (%) and Rate (X) of U.S.-man/Japanese-woman Marriages in the Total Marriage Population

<table>
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<th>1999</th>
<th>1991-1999 Average</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1,318</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>2.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aomori</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0.56</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nagasaki</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0.45</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kanagawa</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>0.50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>321</td>
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In addition to the phenomena of international marriage, Okinawa has seen the rise of so-called *Amejo*, or Okinawan/Japanese women who possess the buying power over G.I.s. For example, Hayashi Chika does exactly this in her essay entitled “*Amejo*” published in a collection designed to capture the curious gaze of Japanese readers amidst the height of the Okinawan boom. *Amejo*, refers to women who chase after only American men. There is speculation that this term was misinterpreted by Japanese people who read the “*jo*” as “woman” instead of the native Okinawan “*jyōgū*” after “*saki jyōgū*” meaning "lush." Along with racy descriptions of escapades with G.I.s, Kobayashi presents the voice of one Okinawan woman in the following way:

In essence, they [*Amejo*] feel a sense of superiority from going out with an American, and are only attracted to their American citizenship. There are facilities larger than entire small towns in America. It is America, but when you go outside the base, it is Japan and you can get by with the Japanese language. Okinawa is the best environment for getting a little taste of America. If you really went to America, then you wouldn’t have anyone to count on, and you wouldn’t be able to show your friends your American husband and cute *haafu* child. So really, there is no fun in going out with Americans in the long run.²⁰³

These descriptions were also adopted by the U.S. media that ironically attempted to assign agency to Okinawan women in their pursuits of G.I.s when Okinawan feminists

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made charges of sexual violence. For example, during the 2000 G8 Summit that was held in Okinawa Prefecture, many media hooks focused conspicuously on sexual relations between U.S. military personnel and Okinawan women. The Asia edition of *Time* magazine, for example, featured an image of the club scene in Okinawa on July 24, 2000. Two African-American military personnel dancing with two Okinawan women, contrasted against a World War II battleship shooting missiles to invade Okinawa. The Summit was held in Okinawa that year to gloss over the fact that the U.S. and Japan wanted to build yet another military base in the northern area of Henoko, Okinawa and encountered vehement protest against it in Okinawa. A strikingly similar image was found a year later on August 13, 2001 on the same magazine cover: an African-American serviceman behind a drunk Okinawan woman, when an African-American Air Force Staff Sergeant was accused of rape that year. The growing gap between feminists against the U.S. military and women who live alongside the military will be approached as a theoretical issue in Chapter 6.

**Amerasians after Reversion, 1972-2000**

The fact that Okinawa has the highest rate of Amerasian births in the nation points to structural characteristics in its landscape—that being of course the overwhelming 38 military installations on the island. First, it is clear that the vast majority (71.67%) of so-called international children (*kokusaiji*) in Okinawa Prefecture are born to U.S. citizenship holding fathers and Japanese nationality holding mothers. Second, when isolating U.S. father and Japanese mother births in the total population, Okinawa’s conspicuous difference is revealed. Okinawa consistently shows 12-13 times the rate of these births as compared to the rest of Japan with an eight-year average of 13.01.
Stateless Children and the Revision of the Japanese Nationality Law

There were three main discursive trends that centered on Amerasians in the post-reversion era of 1972-2000: 1.) the problem of *mukokusekiji* or stateless children; 2.) educational rights framed around the AmerAsian School in Okinawa (AASO); 3.) the emergence of Amerasian voices in the Children of Peace Network (CPN).

The problem of stateless children was a logical extension of the reversion to the Japanese administration.²⁰⁴ Now that Okinawa had at least nominally recuperated from its statelessness through reversion, it now became a point that the stateless children, most of whom were Amerasians living in Okinawa, have the right to a nationality. According to a report by the Japan Federation of Bar Associations in 1981, approximately 80-100 *mukokusekiji* resided in Okinawa, making it difficult for children to matriculate in school, marry, find work, or receive medical treatment and social welfare benefits. In fact, the situation of stateless children in Okinawa became so intense that both the Japanese and U.S. governments were compelled to make revisions to their to nationality and citizenship laws. Since issues of acquisition of U.S. citizenship for Amerasian children have already been addressed in Chapter 1, I will focus on the Japanese side here.

Many Amerasians in Okinawa became stateless because of the complicit relationship between both Japanese nationality and U.S. citizenship laws. In Japan, the phenomenon of “international marriage” and the resulting mixed-children were not only a key factor in prompting the Meiji Regime to conscript the Japanese Nationality Law, but the Law was racially and sexually designed in such a way as to encourage the exclusion of mixed-children born to Japanese mothers. In *The Emergence of ‘Kokusai Kekkon’ (Kokusai kekkon no Tanjyō)*, Itsuko Kamoto illustrates the relation between

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²⁰⁴ For more on stateless Okinawan children, see the following: Honda Hideo, *Sonzai shinai kodomotachi: Okinawa no mukokusekiji mondai* [Children who do not exist: The problem of Okinawa’s stateless children] (Tokyo: Chôbun-sha, 1982).
“international marriage” (kokusai kekkon), the legal status of mixed-children, and the invention of the Japanese Nationality Law. According to her thesis, international marriage is a made in Japan product. She points out that while in the United States, the marriage of two people from different ethnic groups has traditionally been referred to as “intermarriage,” “exogamy,” or “miscegenation,” Japan has referred to similar phenomenon as “international marriage.”

In this respect, the Meiji Regime was pressed with the legal dilemma of how to process “international marriages” between Westerners that already possessed citizenship to their respective countries, when their Japanese partners that belonged to a country that had not yet developed corresponding laws. The first mention what would later become known as “international marriage” and “nationality” was in 1872, just four years after the establishment of the Meiji Regime, by the Dajōkan 103rd Order regarding “stipulations for marriages with foreigners” (gaikokujin koni jōki). The Order did not use the term “nationality” (kokuseki) simply because no concept existed in Japan at the time. But it did mark the first attempt at forming notions of Japanese nationality through the concept of bungen, defined as a “condition; place; social position; circumstances; station in life.”

Interestingly, bungen and marriages with foreigners were introduced as a pair because notions of nationality were only deemed necessary when confronted with the legal complications of marrying Westerners who were already citizens of another established nation.

It was not long before the Dajōkan Order inspired the first Japanese Nationality Act of 1899. According to the Act, “women who marry foreigners must subdue to their husband’s nationality.” This principle of “same nationality amongst couples” (fūfu kokuseki dōitsu shugi), was coupled with the principle of patrilineal jus

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206 Gaikokujin to kekkon shita josei ha, sono otto no kokuseki ni shittagau.
sanguinis to ensure nationality would only be transferred via blood of the father. In other words, the father’s blood was the validating factor in determining the child’s legal national affiliations. If a Japanese mother gave birth to a child whose father was a U.S. citizen, the child became stateless unless he/she was able to obtain U.S. citizenship.

These two principles in the Nationality Act—same nationality amongst couples, and patrilinieal jus sanguinis—were instrumental in the construction of Japan during the Meiji era as a Family State (kazoku kokka) with the Emperor-Patriarch positioned at its pinnacle. By requiring patrilineal jus sanguinis, the blood of the father was the only legitimizing force in the construction of a Japanese subject. It is here that the principle of same nationality amongst couples comes into play. Although foreign husbands were allowed to take Japanese nationality provided they take their wives last name, in actuality these cases were very rare, and still are today. Instead, it was common practice for wives to take on the citizenship of their Western husbands in a vast majority of international marriages. Hence, Japanese women who took their foreign husband’s citizenship, and their mixed-children were deemed outsiders of Japanese society; foreign men who took their Japanese wives’ nationality were incorporated into the framework of Japanese Family State, reproducing its constructs by when handing down Japanese citizenship to his mixed-children as the “assimilated” new patriarch.

After World War II, Japan’s Constitution was revised in 1946 under the close supervision of the occupying U.S. military. Article 10 of the New Constitution dictated that, “The conditions necessary for being a Japanese national shall be determined by law.” The Nationality Law was accordingly revamped in 1950. The same nationality among couples (fūfu kokuseki dōitushugi) provision was changed to a system of individual nationality among couples (fūfu dokuritsu kokuseki seido). While it
appeared to be a step in the right direction since a wife and husband could stay married with differing nationalities, it kept in tact the principle of patrilineal *jus sanguinis*. Hence, patriarchal framework for the construction of a national Japanese subject was left in tact, meaning that a Japanese woman still had no right to transfer citizenship to her children.

While the pre-war Japanese Nationality Act presented problems for un-wed Japanese mothers of mixed-children, the post-war landscape of occupation by hundreds of thousands of U.S. military men gave way a widespread *mukokusekiji* problem. Children born of rape, prostitution, or fleeting relationships had close to no chance of obtaining the proper paper work necessary for the acquisition of U.S. citizenship.

Since children in Okinawa were being denied rights to nationality, and Okinawan women were being denied the right to transfer Japanese citizenship to their children, the problem of *mukokusekiji* was addressed as a both a children’s rights and a feminist issue not only in Japan, but around the world. In regards to the former, Japan took measures to adopt the Declaration of Rights of the Child Principle 3 that states, “The child shall be entitled from his birth to a name and a nationality” on December 1978 during ordinary the 87th Japanese Diet Session.

In regards to the later, sweeping feminist movements prompted Germany to remove the patrilinear *jus sanguinis* provision in the German Citizenship Law in November 1974, followed by Denmark and Sweden in 1979. In fact, according to the United Nations Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women signed in 1979, Part I Article 9.2 explicitly stated that, “Parties shall grant women equal rights with men with respect to the nationality of their children.” If

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207 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 34/180 of December 18, 1979.
Japan signed the declaration, it would be compelled to change Article 2.1 of the Nationality Act.

In 1980, the Second World Conference on Women by chance took place in Denmark, where Takahashi Nobuko had been serving as the first female Ambassador from Japan. She surprised Japan by signing the declaration and made a public promise to have it implemented by 1985.

Meanwhile, back in Japan, Doi Takako, who would become the first woman to lead a major political organization in Japan in 1986 and first chairwoman of the Japanese parliament in 1993, petitioned the House of Representatives to change the Nationality Act in February 1979. She argued that the principle of patrilineal *jus sanguinis* embodied in Article 2.1 of the Nationality Law conflicted with Article 14.1 of the New Constitution which states, “all nationals are equal under the law, and are to be free of political, economic, or social discrimination based on sex.”

In addition, the Tokyo Supreme Court handed down a decision March 30, 1980 that asserted Article 2.1 and 2.3 of the Nationality Act was discriminatory, while falling short of resolving the *mukokuseki* problem. Instead, the Supreme Court made provisions to prevent the occurrence of multiple-nationality by introducing a “simple naturalization system.” However, the new law was far from simple, and full of contradictions. Although a “foreigner” is technically an individual who possesses citizenship of another country besides Japan, *mukokuseki* were required to prove that they were “foreigners who did not belong to a country” in order to be granted Japanese nationality. The lengthy process included translated numerous documents, providing the reason why their foreign father was not available—a process that demanded a formidable level of English competency and economic power to pay for legal fees.
However, the Japan Federation of Bar Associations asserted that nationality is a right, not something to be granted, and that patrilineal *jus sanguinis* was in violation of Article 9.2 of the United Nations Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. According, whereas “father” stood alone, Japanese Nationality Law Article 2.1 was changed to read, “A child shall, in any of the following cases, be a Japanese national: (1) When, at the time of its birth, the father or the mother is a Japanese national.” Hence, patrilineal *jus sanguinis* was eliminated, allowing mothers to grant their children Japanese nationality for the first time in Japanese history.

In addition, the Nationality Law was revised to prevent individuals from possessing multiple nationalities, which was the point of contention for the 1980 Supreme Court case. While the Japanese government sends letters to multiple nationality holders, in reality there are numerous individuals who continue to possess their multiple nationalities despite restrictions. These changes were implemented in 1985 where the *mukokusekiji* problem drew to a close.

AmerAsian School in Okinawa

After the *mukokusekiji* problem, Amerasians for the most part stayed out of the public eye for thirteen years. It was not until 1998, when a group of Amerasian mothers established the AmerAsian School in Okinawa (AASO) and popularized the double capitalized term “AmerAsian” in the Japanese language media that it became a public issue again. Many of the mothers had enrolled their children in

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Okinawan Christian School (OCS) in Yomitan because they wanted their children to have an English language education. However, alleged emergence of toxic fumes caused many of the students to become ill. OCS denied the problem, and the mothers felt compelled to put their children in a different school. However, OCS was the only more affordable English language school in Okinawa, since most Amerasian children are ineligible for Department of Defense schooling on base unless their fathers are in active military duty in Okinawa. Additionally, because they had already heavily invested in an English education, it was difficult to return the children to Okinawan public schools.

The concept behind AmerAsian lies in the founders’ assertion that children born to an American father and Asian mother “want to have pride as a daaburu [double] and not a haafu [half].”\textsuperscript{209} They argued that a bilingual education in English and Japanese was essential to the acquisition of a double identity. AASO is not recognized as an educational institution. However, students are allowed to maintain their school registration in regular Okinawan public schools while in attendance at AASO, enabling them to advance to high school. The establishment of the school in 1998 created a media storm.\textsuperscript{210}

### Alienation of Amerasians from AmerAsian Discourse

Because of the media attention to AASO, many Amerasian adults contacted the school and started to converse with each other. This provided a rare opportunity for Amerasians to come together when they are generally isolated from each other in Okinawan society. One such adult was Tomiyama Maria who went on to found the...


\textsuperscript{210} There are simply too many articles on AASO or indirectly related to AASO to list up here. I have collected articles from the two local Okinawan newspapers, Okinawa Taimusu and the Ryûkyû Shimpô since 1998, as well as other hits from major Japanese and American newspapers and magazines.
Children of Peace Network (CPN). This Network was dedicated to the empowerment of Okinawan Amerasians that took place primarily through locating estranged fathers and prioritized autonomous Amerasian representation.

Although the Network was enabled by the event of the establishment of AASO, it naturally took on a different direction. AASO was committed to creating a “double” identity by providing a bilingual and dual national education. However, many Amerasians who have already grown into adulthood experience problems precisely because they are in-between and not quite American nor Japanese aside from the complicated issue of their Okinawan identity. In fact, fighting for the “right” to an English education in Okinawa for Amerasians risks reinforcing the stereotypical norm that Amerasians must become American and speak English and denies their identification with Okinawa as a place that has historically experienced a precarious position vis-à-vis the nation-state. In other words, if many Amerasian adults are troubled because of their failure to conform to the norm of “compulsory Americanization,” then AASO does little to modify it.\footnote{I pose this problem in “Konketsu Okinawakei Beikokujin Nisei wo ikiru” [Mixed, Okinawan, and second-generation] Okinawa Taimusu [The Okinawan Times] February 17, 2003.}

This does not necessarily stand counterpoint to the mission of AASO for a “double education.” In fact, in South Korea, Reverend James Kang-McCann, a black Korean Amerasian himself, established the Amerasian Christian Academy\footnote{http://amerasian-christian-academy.com/index.html Accessed August 27, 2009.} in 1999 in Dongducheon, South Korea, which is also the site of a U.S. military base camp town. When I spoke to Reverend Kang-McCann in South Korea in 2002, he explained to me that an English education was the most expedient and practical way to stand up against the overwhelming discrimination towards Amerasians in South Korean society. When I asked about Amerasians who had already grown into adulthood without the benefit of an English education, he admitted that there had been attempts to start a
group, but they failed to reach a critical mass and dissipated easily.

Hence, Tomiyama stood in between two discursive trends: one that used Amerasians as evidence of U.S. military violence in the intense anti-military culture in Okinawa/Japan, and one that sought to use assets of English that the U.S. has to offer as a way to combat discrimination. On one hand, she was able to get Amerasians to come out of the woodwork by offering assistance in the search for their fathers—a personal need that she herself had experienced. On the other hand, she started to develop an overtly critical consciousness of the U.S. military presence in Okinawa through conversations with “Amerasians from abroad” such as myself. Tomiyama describes the widening of this cleft below.

Many Amerasians abroad oppose military bases. It is only the Amerasians in Okinawa who do not oppose bases.213 I have been told [by Amerasians in Okinawa], “Oh, what an embarrassment, how can you guys oppose bases?” But then I replied, “quite naturally.” I said, “There are many people who have been victimized by the bases. People die when planes fall out of the sky, and there are girls who have been raped.” In fact, Amerasians from abroad are able to say matter-of-factly, “Since, by virtue of our birth, Amerasians are constantly burdened with afflictions (kizu), who else is in a better position to oppose the bases if we can’t?” At first, I was very

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213 Tomiyama’s statement that there are “many Amerasians abroad” who oppose military bases requires careful contextualization. Including myself, I can think of four or five other Okinawan Amerasians living abroad who have actively participated in anti-military activities in the past ten years, while I know of two Amerasians in Okinawa who actively participate there. Rather, I think Tomiyama is pointing to the fact that Amerasians abroad are not burdened to the degree as Amerasians in Okinawa are with such narrow and reductive determinations of their identity. Furthermore, it is worth mention that the East Asia – U.S. Women’s Network Against Military Violence, co-founded by Margo Okazawa-Rey, a Japanese Amerasian, is a social fact that has not been left unappreciated. Tomiyama participated in the 2000 Women’s Summit, where she came into contact with Okazawa-Rey and others who brought the Amerasian issue to the table under the rubric of international women’s solidarity against militarized violence.
surprised to hear this, but at the same time, it made me think.\textsuperscript{214}

Although Amerasians are still routinely used in women’s anti-military movements today, the stark reality that Tomiyama speaks of above is that most Amerasians in Okinawa themselves are appalled by political activism. There is no naturally inclined subject of resistance to be found here, but rather, a collective trauma intensely distrustful of the failure for novelists, journalists, politicians, activists, and scholars alike to take “responsibility for consequence” in using them as leverage against a political cause.

While starting to “come out” about her political views on the U.S. military bases, the reality of juggling intense personal emotions on the part of Amerasians in the private sphere, while trying to make an intervention in the public sphere dominated by the causal interpretation of Amerasians as “base castoff kids” was overwhelming. She writes that ultimately, she could participate with Okinawans in public anti-military displays of protest “in spirit only.”

This year, a second human chain formed around Kadena Airforce Base. Personally, I wanted to oppose the bases and join hands with others, but I simply couldn’t. By participating, many haafu will say, “Hey, Maria is opposing bases. If you go over there [to her organization], you will be made to do the same thing. Opposing bases with an American face is embarrassing for Okinawans, so I (boku) don’t want to do it.” Feelings such as these keep me at bay. In other words, people in need of consultation will cease to confide in me, and no one will come to the network. Since my priorities lie with these more vulnerable individuals, I could not participate.

\textsuperscript{214} Tomiyama Maria 2001a, 23.
in the human chain around the bases. In spirit only.\textsuperscript{215}

When Tomiyama saw the contradictions amongst Amerasians themselves, she did not attempt to camouflage them in the hopes that no one would notice, nor did she attempt to bury them alive so she could lobby “the cause” in a preexisting politically resistant activist culture. As she states, her “priorities lie with these more vulnerable individuals” and not with lobbying the system. Hence, through her delicate attendance to the messy realities of oppression felt on a pre-organizational level, precisely at the point where they \textit{appear} useless to political maneuvering, she challenges the notion that the political can be defined purely in terms of quantitative leverage towards institutional change. Like Murphy-Shigematsu’s paralysis as a scholar, Tomiyama stood hesitant as an activist, and the CPN eventually welcomed Kiyota’s defeat.

\textsuperscript{215} Tomiyama Maria 2001a, 27.
Evidence of their Mother’s Victimization

In September 1995, a group of 71 Okinawan women, who called themselves “NGO Beijing 95 Forum Okinawa Action Committee,” attended the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, China. It was at this critical moment that Okinawan women changed the history of the movement against military bases in Okinawa. In contrast to other movements dominated by men, their all female leadership re-framed the movement in terms of the gendered effects of militarized violence on women and children. Through participation in international conferences on women, gender, war, and militarism such as the 1985 International Women’s Conference in Nairobi, they succeeded in tapping into the global women’s movement, thereby catapulting the Okinawan issue onto the international stage like no other movement before them.

Of course, it was the well-publicized 1995 rape of an Okinawan girl by three U.S. military personnel that became the definitive catalyst to their full-scale emergence at the forefront of anti-military protest. This incident occurred on September 4, 1995, at the very moment the women were participating in the Beijing conference. The elated energy the women brought back from the conference when they deplaned at Naha International Airport was met with an air of immanent crisis as they were informed for the first time of the incident. Thereafter, the soon-to-be Okinawan Women Act against the Military and Violence (OWAAMV), co-founded by Takazato Suzuyo and Itokazu Keiko in October 1995, quickly mobilized to issue one
of the first public statements against the incident, and thereby released the floodgates of island-wide outrage and protest. On October 21, 1995, 85,000 individuals gathered in Ginowan Marine Park to protest the incident.

Although OWAAMV is undoubtedly a new force to be reckoned with in Okinawa’s anti-military culture, their refreshing feminist perspective does not necessarily exempt them from facing the same critical questions of movements that predate them. What is the meaning “resistance” amidst Okinawa’s postcolonial condition? Like all movements, they must deal with the material effects of exploitation on one hand, and the psychic effects of accommodation on the other. For OWAAMV, this translates into the material effects of rape, prostitution, and other forms of gendered exploitation endemic to the patriarchal structure of the U.S. military. Further, the psychic effects of accommodation have become conspicuously manifest in post-reversion years as the diminishing economic gap between U.S. military personnel and Okinawan women brings forth a new culture of “free love.” No longer are the relationships of sexual exploitation “forced” through wide-spread prostitution, but are increasingly carried out under the pretenses of “free will.”

These two poles were identified at the 1995 Beijing Conference in the workshop, “Structural Violence of the Military and Women.”216 Because it is one of the few explicit attempts to tackle the thorny issue of resistance amidst a growing culture of psychic accommodation to the U.S. military bases, I will quote at great length here.

...Easing the policy for base gate entry marks a stark contrast to the

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time when the strong dollar lured G.I.s to play off-base where strict policies on sexually transmitted diseases and public health covered the Okinawan islands. Even though current conditions represent a reverse phenomenon of the past, the essence remains completely the same…

In Okinawan society, those who date G.I.s are looked upon as loose women in the pursuit of sex and are discriminatorily labeled “Amejo.” This occurs in relation to the pain of the war experience in Okinawa and the strong feeling of resistance towards the bases that continue to exist. For the purposes of this workshop, we interviewed women who date G.I.s. As a result, we learned that women currently in junior college and universities who study predominantly English literature, or who graduated from such programs, mix with G.I.s to improve their English language acquisition skills. Different from women who sold sex to G.I.s in the struggle to make ends meet amidst postwar poverty, these so-called normal young women meet G.I.s, fall in love with them, and start dating them. They generally meet on-base at beach parties or carnivals, or off base at discos or on the beach. They almost uniformly state the reason for dating G.I.s as: “Compared to Japanese men, they know how to approach women and they are so nice.” They think they are getting a taste of liberation that cannot be experienced within the oppressive norms and customs of Japan, and date the men intoxicated by the sweet illusion of an American foreign culture. G.I.s who conduct combat training on base only appear as “Americans” to them once they are clad in civilian
clothes outside base gates. Most of the women date them without any sort of awareness that they are in fact military personnel.

Most women who can only see the G.I.s as “Americans of the private sector” are not only ignorant of bases and the organizational structure of the military, but they also accept the illusion of bases=U.S. (a foreign culture of longing) amicably into the depths of their hearts. This also leads to a consciousness where they recognize the organization of the military without resistance.

However, these issues cannot be simply dismissed as an “individual problem” of the women. Even the Okinawan society that looks down upon them as “Amejo” have actively accepted the pacification tactics of on-base universities, on-base home stays, and on-base carnivals under the pretence of international exchange… Rather, women labeled “Amejo” are a product of such a society. Therefore, the issue should not be problematized as simply one of dating G.I.s, but rather understood as an alarm for a society that has become numb to a prolonged presence of the military as an organization of internalized violence.217

The title of the workshop, “Structural Violence of the Military and Women” is inspired by John Galtung’s concept of “structural violence.” Galtung draws a distinction between “violence where there is an actor that commits the violence as personal or direct, and to violence where there is no such actor as structural or indirect.”218 The purpose of this concept is to underscore the role of institutions in producing violent

217 Ibid., 223-225
effects that significantly reduce the “potential realization” of livelihood of certain groups of people irrespective of individual intention. Although an individual may proclaim, “I didn’t intend to do any harm,” structural violence points to the “unintended” “consequence”\textsuperscript{219} of violence enabled by institutions.

Appropriating this idea, Takazato powerfully asserted that the U.S. military was state sanctioned violence against women.

In addition to the fear and anxiety over invasion directed at people during armed conflict or war, women, by virtue of their sex, are subject to another kind of violence. Historically, this has been viewed as an accessory to military invasion, or the natural course of action expected of a victor nation. However, women have started to question the veracity of this logic. What came clear at the other end of the tunnel was the structure of violence.\textsuperscript{220}

The “structure of violence” against women here is violence directed at women “by virtue of their sex,” and enabled by the institution of the military. There are no individual actors in Takazato’s account, but a sexist institution on one side, and a violence experienced by “virtue of [ones] sex” on the other.

The description of young Okinawan women who date G.I.s above then is an attempt to frame “free love” under the rubric of structural violence against women as one successive stage after a long history of rape and prostitution. According to the

\textsuperscript{219} Ibid., 171. Galtung also notes that his development of structural violence is similar to Stokely Carmichael’s critique of “institutional racism.” 187.

\textsuperscript{220} Takazato, \textit{Okinawa no onnatachi—Josei no jinken to kichi/bôryoku} [Women of Okinawa: Women’s rights, bases, and the military], 22.
workshop, Okinawan women “who fall in love” with G.I.s are “intoxicated by the sweet illusion of an American foreign culture” and mistake representatives of the U.S. military as individuals “of the private sector.” Here, although women exercise agency, they do so as brainwashed\(^{221}\) individuals merely acting out on a stage pre-designed to entrap them. This is because in “stark contrast to the time when the strong dollar lured G.I.s to play off-base,” the diminishing value of the dollar caused the military to resort to new “pacification tactics” such as on-base carnivals, bazaars, beach parties, home stays, and university education. Although new tactics that play on the individual agency of Okinawan women and portray G.I.s as ordinary “Americans of the private sector” have added a personal touch to the institution formerly associated with the ruthless destruction of Okinawan society, the workshop argues that the “essence remains completely the same”—that is, the appropriation of Okinawan female sexuality for the institutional needs of the U.S. military.

This critique is a powerful and reasonable response to discourses that stresses the “individual free will” of Okinawan women in an attempt to disguise the material effects of a prolonged U.S. military presence in Okinawa.\(^{222}\) However, in the end we are left with an age-old dichotomy between determinism and free will. On one hand, the “determinist” argument holds that Okinawan women are uniformly victims in all relationships with U.S. military personnel “by virtue of their sex.” Their attempt to exercise agency is socially recognized only insofar as it resists against structural violence. This however, creates a paradox, since agency is already predicated on a

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\(^{221}\) Galtung includes “psychological violence” that “works on the soul” such as “brainwashing, indoctrination of various kinds, threats, etc. that serve to decrease mental potentialities” in his definition of structural violence. This resonates closely with the “pacification tactics” described above.

\(^{222}\) For example, see my critique of Hayashi Chika’s attempt to portray so-called “Amejo” as women breaking out of the binds of Japanese patriarchy from an Amerasian perspective: “‘Okinawa’ wo kataru katei wo shikōsuru koto no igi” [Narration and positionality in postcolonial Okinawa], *Buraku Kaimō* [Buraku Liberation], no. 507 (2002): 19-27. I argue that such attempts to underscore the agency of Okinawan women who actively pursue G.I.s masks the debilitating effects of the U.S. military, and neutralizes her own positionality as a majority Japanese woman implicated by Japan’s systematic discrimination of Okinawa.
determined status as passive victim. On the other hand, the argument for “free will” reduces the very real effects of violence to matters of personal concern that can be overcome, and even exploited by strongly willed agents.

This opposition between determined victims and free agents further dovetails with the opposition between “material effects” and “psychic accommodation” introduced above. When seen as victims of structural violence, psychic accommodations must be subsumed into the category of material effects through the rubric of “illusion” or “brainwashing.” When seen as “free willing agents,” material effects of violence are absorbed by the purported power of psychic accommodation.

The purpose of this chapter is not an attempt to solve the conundrum of determinism versus free will in the movement against militarized violence on its own terms from a neutral position. Rather, insofar as the movement has claimed to ground itself in the standpoint of “women and children,” it is an attempt to reformulate the problem in terms of Amerasian identity. This is a subtle, but crucial differentiation. OWAAMV, in addition to similar groups in the Philippines such as Buklod, South Korea such as Durebang (My Sister’s Place) and Saewoomtuh (Sprouting Land), and United States such as Women for Genuine Security have all cited Amerasian issues as a grievance of Asian mothers vis-à-vis U.S. military fathers who fail to take responsibility for their children. However, the presence of Amerasians in

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223 For example, in the same workshop, the feminist framing of structural violence includes children in addition to women: “The human rights of women and children who live amongst total social collapse resulting from armed conflict, military occupation, and the stationing of militaries are violated.” Takazato, Okinawa no onnatachi—Josei no jinken to kichi/bōryoku [Women of Okinawa: Women’s rights, bases, and the military], 229. This is only one example of many. The distinction between Okinawan children, Amerasian children, and male and female children is left vague. From context, “children” presumably includes all of the above.

224 This organization is also previously known as the “East Asia-US-Puerto Rico Women’s Network Against Military Violence.”

225 Since my study focuses on the context of Okinawa, I am not qualified to comment on the relationship between women’s groups and Amerasians in areas in Asia except for Okinawa. However, as an outsider, I have observed that Buklod has consistently sent an Amerasian representative to international women’s solidarity conferences. When I visited their organization in 2002, I was pleasantly surprised to see Amerasians take on significant leadership roles where they were not merely
OWAAMV is nearly nonexistent. Furthermore, although the Women for Genuine Security holds an “International Women’s Summit” once every two years, attracting all of the groups above plus others under the attempt to “redefine security for women and children,” Amerasian men are been banned from participation on the pretences of maintaining a female-only safe space. In this case, Amerasian men fall into the category of “children” insofar as they can be claimed by their mothers as a feminist issue, and have no grounding as Amerasians in the feminist movement against militarized violence on their own terms. The point here is not to critique the exclusion of Amerasian men, but merely to recognize a normative claim that has already been implicitly made in the Women for Genuine Security that mediates the common ground for all other groups to come together at the summits. Hence, in this chapter, I am concerned with developing a gender critique from an Amerasian perspective, and not using Amerasians as evidence for the ends of a feminist critique from the perspective of Asian mothers.

Specifically, this chapter seeks to find an alternative to the determined victim versus free agent dichotomy from an Amerasian perspective. Not only does the dichotomy present a contradiction in Amerasian identity, but it imposes a significant influence on the development of their sexuality. On one hand, if Amerasians are born as a result of the passive victimization of Okinawan women through rape, prostitution, or misguided “sweet illusions” for the glamour of American culture, they are brought into the world as either collateral damage or as a humiliating mistake. How can an

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peripheral to the organization, but a central component. When an American-born Korean Amerasian Kwok Sajin representing Durebang, myself, and two other Okinawan Amerasians came together in Okinawa to discuss Durebang’s project to film an Amerasian documentary throughout Asia, differences in opinion between the four Amerasians and the organization arose, resulting in Kwok’s expulsion. I was pleasantly surprised to see Amerasians frequent Saewoomtuh when I visited their organization in 2001. Again, these are only observations from an outsider dependent on the crutch of translators that mediated my interaction.

I have maintained personnel correspondence with Amerasian men banned from conference participation in 1996 and 2002.
individual attribute meaning to his/her life when his/her beginning has already been predetermined as the end-result of violence? The logical conclusion to this equation would be that Amerasians, as a mistake, should be undone or erased. On the other hand, how are Amerasians to deal with their mothers, who far from being passive victims, are active caretakers that powerfully intervene with their children’s lives? While the psychic accommodation of Okinawan women who subscribe to the lure of G.I.s on a personal basis without paying heed to the effects of the structural violence of the military can be subsumed under the rubric of brainwashing, their actions can nonetheless yield material effects on their children.

Navigating an Identity between Determined Victims and Agents of Free Will

In Tomiyama Maria’s piece, “Living as an Amerasian,” she identifies two moments in the lives of Amerasian mothers. “There is discrimination that crushes upon women” who have Amerasian children; “I want those women to muster the strength to overcome discrimination…That is the responsibility—the love—that they owe to their children.”227 Here, women are victims and women are mothers who are asked to take responsibility for their children despite their victimization. Clearly, the dynamics of a real life parent/child relationship overrun the boundaries between mother as victim and mother as agent of responsibility (and potential object of blame) entrusted with the fate of her child.

Tomiyama’s tumultuous relationship with her mother as both victim and potential victimizer as both attempt to survive the consequences brought on by Tomiyama’s father and the U.S. military that stationed him in Okinawa, is a common theme found throughout Amerasian literature and ethnographic study. In this paper, I would like to turn to Tanaka Midori’s memoirs, My Distant Specter of a Father to

think about this theme. Although I am aware of two other memoirs/pseudo-fictional works currently in the making, Tanaka’s work is the only published full length memoirs to date written by an Okinawan Amerasian.

Tanaka is a white Amerasian woman, born in Okinawa in 1954, and raised by her mother alongside a full-blood Okinawan younger brother and younger sister. Her book is structured from beginning to end as a search and discovery. She is an omniscient writer speaking in the voice of “I,” from the teleological position at the end of her discovery. The missing object, as suggested by the title, is first her “specter of a father.” Her text however, is more than a simple detective story. The quest for her father takes her on a journey through which she attempts to make sense of her identity in relation to the absence and then discovery=presence of her father. Tanaka realizes, at times with great ambivalence, that her entire identity is seemingly determined by the existence of her father. However, as she matures and becomes more socially aware, it quickly becomes apparent that her identity is rather determined by the status assigned to the material existence of her father by Okinawan society.

I made a new friend in middle school. One day, I went to her house. She lived by the part of town where all the bars were concentrated—so-called A-sign bars. G.I.s were abound. I saw big men drunk, shouting rambunctiously up close for the first time in my life...

The men all looked like big red giants. The women were dirty, vulgar, and always laughing in a lascivious tone.

It didn’t take me long to put two and two together. This social landscape overlapped with the face of someone with a “foreign male father and Japanese female mother.”
I thought to myself,

“Men make women their playthings and fool around with them…I wonder if I was also born out of a relationship between such a woman and man.”

As a fatherless “haafu,” a cloud of doubt always hovered about me: “Was I born to a knocked up woman?” However, the image was never quite as lucid as what I saw in the bar district. I realized it was those feelings that had prevented me from asking my mother about my father that entire time. This also explains the twisted feelings that are conjured up each time I was called “Amirikā!”

Tanaka’s imposed identity as “Amirikā” is mediated by the attitude toward miscegenation under U.S. military domination in Okinawan society. She provides numerous accounts of bullying in which she is called “Amirikā” that are commonly shared by white Amerasians in Okinawa. Tomiyama speaks of a similar experience in elementary school that occurred after “peace education,” a special education day on June 23 in Okinawa that commemorates the end of the Okinawan War.

I became a second grader in elementary school. We had our lesson in peace education. There were no videos in those days, so the children were escorted to the public hall. The children formed a line to walk through a display of countless pictures. For the first

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time in my life such terrifying images came before my eyes. In each of the pictures, there was a fleet of ships that looked like the U.S. military, conducting a naval bombardment on the very island that I was living on. Okinawans committed group suicide with grenades. Their bodies were shredded to pieces…

My father’s country invaded my mother’s island with war. From the eyes of a young child, I thought, “Why was I born out of a relationship between enemies?”

…A boy turned to me, and started to scream.

“Hey, there is an Amerikā right here. This Amerikā’s fathers came to our island and killed people. A child of a murderer. A child of a traitorous woman. Why does this come to our elementary school? Go back to the base. Go back to the base! Get out! Get out!

Everyone started clapping, and joined in the screaming. I became surrounded by one, then two, and soon about twenty or thirty people…”

From this account, many of the elements that contribute to the bullying of Amerasian children become clear. Bullying occurs out of a sense of victimization by the U.S. military because of first, the war and ensuing colonial-like relationship of occupation, and second, the sexual relationship between U.S. military men and Okinawan women. Both are material violations. Because of invasion and occupation, Okinawans were physically killed, deprived of food, and lost control over the land from which they

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made their livelihood. Miscegenation under the U.S. military presence entails a loss of control over the female body, sexuality, and reproductive rights. Hence, Amerasians are bullied because they are determined as the material result of these two material violations: “A child of a murderer. A child of a traitorous woman.”

Victimization for Okinawan society at large is based on material violations that cause them to unleash their anger on the so-called physical end-product—Amerasians. On one hand, the expression of anger is a reasonable reaction. To ask Okinawans not to resist the threat to their material existence would entail asking them to quietly lie down and die. However, while Amerasians become the target for Okinawan anger against the U.S. military, they at the same time share the same anger as Okinawans. Tanaka expresses her experience living during the tumultuous Vietnam War era in 1965 as a junior high school student in the following way:

I thought in the depths of my child-like heart, “What in the world is America up to? My father’s country that I longed for became sullied….The “A” in A sign bar means the U.S. military sanitation office deems “it suitable for entry.” Is there anything as insulting to the Japanese as this? The arrogance of white people who think that they are the only ones who are human is appalling.\textsuperscript{230}

And:

My adverse reaction increased in strength at the sight of G.I.s who walk around like they own the place, flaunting the enormous strength of the dollar, and the America that brought the crisis of war

\textsuperscript{230} Tanaka, Harukanaru maboroshi no chichiyo [My distant specter of a father], 69.
to Okinawa.\(^{231}\)

How is it possible for Tanaka to both feel the material violation of the U.S. military in a similar capacity as Okinawans, but at the same time suffer bullying for being rendered as the end-product of the material violation?

Herein lies the most damning moment in Amerasian identity. As Tomiyama states, “Why was I born out of a relationship between enemies?” As Tanaka states, “Am I a child born of sin?”\(^{232}\) Embodying material violation produces an immense sense of alienation in Amerasians—particularly those of white ancestry whose fathers are the undeniable oppressor—from their own bodies. For example, Tanaka states, “To think that I was ‘a child born to a knocked-up [woman], a child of a disgusting sin’ always caused me sadness and an impotent anger.”\(^{233}\) Here, she is both disgusted with G.I.s, and with herself as the product of a “disgusting sin.” However, since she is both, she is only left with “sadness and an impotent anger.”

These feelings are also felt by Amerasians born in the U.S. For example, a white female Amerasian born in the U.S. in the 1980s states, “I live everyday with the blood of the oppressor running through my veins.” Another white male Amerasian born in the U.S. in the 1970s states, “I feel total alienation from my body. I am disgusted with my whiteness. I feel ugly. Every time I look in the mirror, I wish I could erase every physical characteristic of the rapist who made me.” Here, the “rapist” is the target of a murderous emotion, but directed onto the self, whereupon murder and suicide become confused, rendering another “impotent anger.”

How is it possible to go on living when the meaning of Amerasian life has so brutally been determined by Okinawa’s condition of victimization? How is it possible

\(^{231}\) Ibid., 73.
\(^{232}\) Ibid., 72.
\(^{233}\) Ibid., 73.
to go on living when an Amerasian feels the same anger of material violation as other Okinawans at the hands of the U.S. military, but are rendered the end-product of that same violation? How is it possible for an Amerasian to go on living when this anger is intensified each time they look at his/her own face in the mirror? How is it possible for Amerasians to feel good about themselves, when they are punished for their father’s sin on one hand, and envied for their association with America on the other? How is it possible to understand Okinawa’s conditions of victimization without leading to self-hatred amongst Amerasians?

One response has been the psychic accommodation of playing down the victimization of Okinawa altogether. One white Amerasian male born in Okinawa in the 1950s states, “Okinawa is just like Hong Kong. If America didn’t come here like England went over there, then we would not be rich. I didn’t like being bullied as a kid when Okinawa was poor. But now Okinawans like America, and my daughters even think it is cool to have 1/4 white blood in them.” How is it possible to criticize such an Amerasian? Is it possible to dismiss them as “manifesting their latent white genes into feelings of superiority”?

It is not surprising then, that in the most recent incarnation of psychic accommodation taken out on a political scale by the well-known “Okinawan Initiative,” one of its primary leaders Takara Kurayoshi has ingeniously incorporated Amerasians and their mothers into a full-scale attack on Okinawa’s history of victimization.

Takara is well known for accusing Okinawan intellectuals of a “victim mentality” when they discuss cultural assimilation policies, the massacres of Okinawans during the war, and the U.S. military presence. For him they adhere to a “dark” and “victimized view of history.” Instead, he asserts:

By embodying the pain of being treated as a minority, Okinawans should embrace their strong resolution to despise war and love peace. Speaking from a universal position about this experience is Okinawa’s greatest “asset,” making Okinawa a soft power. In this way, I want to emphasize that Okinawa’s “historical problems” can be overcome by becoming a partner in the construction of an all new Japanese state in the twenty-first century…One aspect of this is praising the role of “Okinawa’s bases” that serve as the fundamental significance linking the U.S.-Japan Alliance together.”

Takara re-appropriates Okinawa’s experience as a “minority” in a way that contributes to the U.S.-Japan Alliance that allows for the U.S. military presence in Okinawa. This accommodation extends to Amerasians and their mothers—two figures who have been systematically discriminated against in the name of resistance rooted Okinawa’s victim mentality. Instead, Takara represents these two figures in a supposedly more positive light.

“I got married and bore two kids, but when my G.I. husband said one day he had a drill, I never saw him again,” says a woman as if she were talking about someone else. “Before pay day, G.I.s are so broke, I don’t know how many times I was taken for a free ride,” laughs off a former prostitute. One haafu rock musician

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states, “when I’m on stage, right away I can tell which soldiers are going to Vietnam the next day. When I see guys like that, I get all worked up in my performance and want to send them off to war.”

Takara takes the “victims” of Okinawa’s excessive victim mentality (i.e., Okinawan women and Amerasians), and instead emphasizes the positive attributes to their hybrid existences. As more Amerasians such as Tanaka and Tomiyama come out with stories of how they were bullied as children by an Okinawa society imbued with a victim consciousness, a theoretical vacuum on understanding resistance along the lines of complete victimization and complete accommodation has been created. In an increasingly politically correct culture, Okinawans can recognize bullying Amerasians was a clear violation of their human rights. However, this still falls short of investigating victim mentality apparent across the board in activists and intellectuals alike in Okinawa. It is precisely this gap that Takara’s discourse fills.

On the other hand, while Takara accurately identifies an instance where victim mentality has led to gross human rights violations of Amerasians, it is also difficult to wholeheartedly agree with his logic. Just because whiteness or American-ness in one instance is a deplorable quality does not automatically presume it can be immediately converted into an admirable quality for Amerasians. For example, even though Tanaka finds work selling cosmetics because of her white skin (she was denied work in other occupations such as an airline stewardess because she is mixed-race), she feels uncomfortable when she is admired for it as a young adult.

At that time, things were a little different from preceding years.

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236 Takara, Ryūkyū Ōkoku [The Kingdom of the Ryukyus], 6-7.
The *Golden Haafu* gained popularity, and suddenly everyone was making a big fuss over “haafu.” I even became the object of envy. After having been bullied so much during my childhood, this just didn’t sit right with me. I was at a total loss.\(^{237}\)

Aaron Köchi Pedroni, an American raised Okinawan Amerasian of Italian ancestry born in the 1970s speaks of similar perplexing feelings.

While the removal of the bases in Okinawa may reduce the economy for a brief time and lessen the creation of half Okinawan-American children like me, it is something I believe can easily be dealt with and looked upon with great optimism. Upon my visits to Okinawa, I am always shocked to speak with women who wish more than anything to have half Okinawan and half American children. It is from constant reinforcement of American values and impositions of military culture that my people now believe that their own lives and culture is inferior.\(^{238}\)

As Pedroni suggests, how is it possible to remove the bases without also undermining the meaning of Amerasian life? While he supports the removal of bases, he nonetheless understands it will “lessen the creation of half Okinawan-American children like me.” He shows strong distaste for the conditions under which he was born, “always shocked to speak with women who wish more than anything to have

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\(^{237}\) Tanaka, *Harukanaru maboroshi no chichiyo* [My distant specter of a father], 145. *Golden Haafu* is a pop group popular in the early 1970s comprised of white Amerasian singers.

\(^{238}\) Pedroni, Aaron Köchi. *Nichibei Times.*
half Okinawan and half American children.” He at once has “great optimism” for the future, while ambivalent feelings about the oppressive past from which he was born.

These examples illustrate how Amerasians fall into the crack between victim mentality and the discourse of a strong free will. Amerasians such as Tomiyama, Tanaka, and Pedroni have straddled both waves while desperately trying not to founder under them and become engulfed by the undercurrent common to both: an understanding of causality where a “doer” can effect a “deed” in the world by virtue of their sheer free will.

A Genealogy of Sex under Military Regimes

The purpose of this section is to delineate the structure of miscegenation under military regimes, and find an alternative to the determined victim versus agent of free will paradigm found in Okinawa and Okinawan women from an Amerasian perspective.

The work of Georges Bataille provides possibilities for tying sex and war together. On the battleground, the self encounters the enemy as a member of a certain nation, race, political entity, etc. on one hand, but also experiences an intensely intimate experience with the enemy as mutually embroiled in a death struggle. Likewise, in the erotic experience, the self encounters the other as male or female in one instance, but also shares a mutual recognition of ensuing death with the other through the sexual act precisely at the point where the two bodies come together to form a new entity.

Sperm and ovum are to begin with discontinuous entities, but they unite, and consequently a continuity comes into existence between them to form a new entity from the
death and disappearance of the separate beings. The new entity is itself discontinuous, but it bears within itself the transition to continuity, the fusion, fatal to both, of two separate beings.\textsuperscript{239}

Here, the fusion—the offspring—entails the death of its parents. Hence, the parents work on the level of their individual bodies during the sexual act, but at the same time, work at a different level of continuity in the face of death within which both parties are alienated as self-contained individuals: “they share in a state of crisis in which both are beside themselves.”\textsuperscript{240} Bataille calls this experience of the self which dissolves into the continuity of death that goes beyond the individual “inner experience.”

Sexual reproduction does not just produce new life, but rather for Bataille, it is the call of death: “reproduction demands the death of the parents who produced their young only to give fuller rein to the forces of annihilation.”\textsuperscript{241} His concern for the reproduction of death is interwoven with his emphasis on the disposal of excess in his theory of political economy. Communities do not come together because they have an \textit{a priori} lack, and need to fill the lack by working together in much the same way humans do not necessarily come together because they have sexual urges. Rather, communities come together in order to dispose of excess. Eroticism allows for the disposal of an excess of sexual energies of the laborer.

Bataille is not necessarily advocating war or sexual violence in order to attain a heightened sense of “inner experience.” Rather, it can be argued that his point of

\textsuperscript{240} Ibid., 103
\textsuperscript{241} Ibid., 61.
wedding both death and sex with prohibition and religious significance is to make manifest in our normal everyday lives the violent end results of a suppression of pain.

In the will to suppress pain, we are led to action, instead of limiting ourselves to dramatization. Action led in order to suppress pain moves finally in the opposite direction from the possibility of dramatizing in its name: we no longer tend towards the extreme limit of the possible—we remedy pain (without great effect), but the possible in the meantime no longer has any meaning.  

Hence in the general economy of the U.S. brimming with profligate beings and a constant flow of excess, it is worth paying attention to the way in which “movement of energy on the globe,” i.e., the dumping of sexual energies and surplus takes place in areas that host the U.S. military. The military provides a community designed around the disposal of sexual energies to the effect of producing more efficient soldiers of a more virile nation. Militaries and eroticism result from the overflow of surplus in the general economy generated in the U.S. and its allies, and dispensed around U.S. military facilities around the globe. The disposal of excess sexual energies only reinforces the military machine. Hence, OWAMV’s concept of “structural violence” against women in the military correctly observes that the military organizes itself around the disposal of sexual energies of its soldiers on local or imported women. Women become an “outlet” as Takazato states: “[t]he organizational sexual pillage of


the military against woman is tacitly accepted as an outlet for...dissatisfaction and fear of the valorized will to fight.” This is precisely the point of the Beijing workshop presentation quoted at length earlier when they discuss the relaxing of base-entry policies to accommodate the sexual demands of the G.I.s amidst a changing economic landscape.

Instead of providing a true inner experience in the sense that Bataille intends, i.e., a dissolution of the self in relation to the continuous realm of death, violence in the U.S. military is recuperated in order to ensure the reproduction of the military machine. Precisely because Bataille finds possibilities in the dissolution of the boundaries of the self in communication, failure occurs when the self narcissistically adheres to the subjective experience of the individual. A heightened sense of death at the moment of conception between two separate individuals no longer is an eternal realm that both dissolve into, but the drive to live on slips over to a desire to transfer the material nature of the parent onto the child: “the discontinuous being does not disappear altogether when he dies but leaves traces that may last for ever.”244 The pangs of death are assuaged by the blind faith that the new life will inherit his characteristics and guarantee him immortality. Bataille continues:

At the highest level the sexual being is tempted, indeed obliged, to believe in the immortality of his separate existence. He looks upon his “soul”, his discontinuity, as the deepest truth of his own being, for he is taken in by the survival of his physical being although this may be only partial and its constituent parts may decompose.245

244 Ibid., 97.
245 Ibid., 97-98.
While “the female partner in eroticism was seen as the victim, the male as the one who sacrifices, both during the consummation losing themselves in the continuity^246^” occurs during communication, the possibility of a dissolution of the male and female sex, of the oppressor versus the oppressed is lost once the “survival of his physical being” is used to secure immortality of the parent. In the former, there is the possibility of to “return to il y a in which no sex can be one” as argued in Zeynep Direk’s reading of sexual difference in Bataille in relation to Irigaray.\(^247\) The former allows for offspring to emerge free of the constraints of its parents who burden it with an obligation to ensure their “survival of [their] physical being.” This is perhaps the state that Tanaka Midori refers to when she writes, “I want to release myself from the relationship with my mother, and make my own family registry (koseki). I want to release myself from the relationship with blood, and weave the threads of my own genealogy (reki wo oriageyou).”\(^248\) However, when complete dissolution of the parents in face of a new life fails, sexual difference is exaggerated, and the child is burdened with the unresolved baggage of its parents embroiled in a war of the sexes.

In this scenario, women have an edge over their male counterparts when it comes to transferring part of her being onto the child because of her material existence. The experience of pregnancy and child rearing on the part of the woman does not allow such an easy material separation from the body of the child from the body of the mother. The father cannot absolutely know part of his body will result in the child (it

\(^{246}\) Ibid., 18.  
\(^{248}\) Tanaka, Harukanaru maboroshi no chichiya [My distant specter of a father], 92. Note that the “family registry” that Tanaka speaks of here refers to the system of public records under which the birth, marriage, divorce, adoption, address change, and death of individuals in the Japanese state are recorded at city halls.
could be some other man’s offspring), he is incapable of such a liminal experience such as pregnancy, and he will not necessarily be around after the child is born. The “survival of [the father’s] physical being” therefore, is not only compromised by the ambiguous boundaries between fetus and maternal body, but the materiality of the maternal body disturbs the logic grounding continuity in death and discontinuity in new life altogether.  

Precisely because man is the weaker sex when it comes to sexual reproduction, he must usurp the power of pregnancy. When the reproduction of death is pushed to its extreme under military regimes, children are produced to mimic their fathers—to produce a next generation of soldiers that will dominate the “different nation and different race” of their mothers. The most egregious example of this is the “genocidal rape” as seen in the Bosnia-Herzegovinia conflict where soldiers forced pregnancy and childbirth upon the women of the enemy so mixed-blood children, bearing the imprint of their father’s “strength,” would be disseminated into the community and remind them of their purported humiliation.

Inflicting the pain of sexual violence on the battlefield is not a show of man’s physical superiority vis-à-vis both the enemy who may kill him, and woman, whose reproductive powers challenge his ability to live on beyond death. Rather, it is quite the opposite. The purpose is to use pain as an imprinting device from which the female retroactively comes to cite the “inferiority” of her body vis-à-vis man. It is predicated

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249 This is the reading the feminist standpoint philosopher Nancy Hartsock provides in her critique of Bataille. She critiques Bataille for assigning greater emphasis on death in sexual reproduction over life, and questions the ability for the (female) parent to view the new growth as “impersonal.” For Hartsock, it is the very experience of pregnancy that dissolves the ego boundary between self and other that is assumed by Bataille’s conception of death. See Nancy Hartsock, The Feminist Standpoint Revisited and Other Essays (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), 122-123.


251 For a similar analysis of feelings of vulnerability and weakness as a rational behind rape, see Ken Plummer’s study of prison rape. Ken Plummer, “The Social Uses of Sexuality: Symbolic Interaction, Power and Rape.” Perspectives on Rape and Sexual Assault, ed. June Hopkins (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1994).
not on her passivity, but rather, it is an acknowledgement and manipulation of her ability to create meaning in the world as an agent. Precisely because he cannot win on the level of the body, he must resort to infecting woman with his own value-system, whereupon the power to kill reigns over the power to birth, through the act of sexual violence.

This is why in Nietzsche’s discussion of pain is most important in understanding how agency is needed to establish victimhood, instead of understanding victimhood as the stripping of the pre-existing agency of an autonomous subject. Just as “victims” of sexual violence are not simply reacting “naturally” to a violation of a superior body onto an inferior one, Nietzsche stresses that humans are not puppets devoid of any agency that move when pulled by the st(r)ing of pain. Rather, pain is entirely an intellectual affair predicated on the agency—not passivity—of the victim.

Pain is an intellectual occurrence in which a definite judgment is expressed—the judgment “harmful,” in which a long experience is summarized. There is no pain as such. It is not being wounded that hurts; but the experience of the bad consequences being wounded can have for the whole organism expresses itself in that profound shock that is called displeasure…

The really specific thing in pain is always the protracted shock, the lingering vibrations of a terrifying choc in the cerebral center of the nervous system: —one does not really suffer from the cause of pain (any sort of injury, for example), but from the protracted disturbance of equilibrium that occurs as a result of the choc. Pain is a sickness of the cerebral nerve centers...
That pain is the cause of reflex actions has appearance and even the prejudice of philosophers in its favor: but, if one observes it closely, in cases of sudden pain the reflex comes noticeably earlier than the sensation of pain. It would go ill with me if, when I stumbled, I had to wait for the fact to ring the bell of consciousness and for instructions how to act to be telegraphed back. What I notice with greatest possible clarity is rather that the reflex of my foot follows first to prevent my falling, and then, at a measurable distance in time, the sudden sensation of a kind of painful wave in the front part of my head. Thus one does *not* react to the pain. Pain is subsequently projected to the wounded place—but the nature of this local pain is nonetheless not an expression of the kind of the local injury; it is a mere place-sign corresponding to the force and pitch of the injury the nerve centers have received. That as a result of this *choc* the muscular strength of the organism is measurably lowered does not warrant our seeking the *essence* of pain in a diminution of the feeling of power.

To repeat it again, one does *not* react to pain; displeasure is not a “cause” of action. Pain itself is a reaction, the reflex is another and *earlier* reaction—both originate in different places—²⁵²

Here, Nietzsche is careful not to plot a causal chain where the infliction of a wound

causes pain. Rather, “[p]ain itself is a reaction.” In the same way, “sexual violence” (as it comes to be termed) does not cause pain. Rather, the pain of sexual violence is an “intellectual occurrence” on part of the victim. Her body is not the passive material medium from which the concept of a painful experience is rendered immediately translatable into language. Instead, it is the reactive force of the conscious—her intellect—that evaluates the consequence the act has on her whole being: “the experience of the bad consequences being wounded can have for the whole organism expresses itself in that profound shock that is called displeasure.” It is through this evaluation, which occurs on the conscious level of her intellect, that she interprets the infliction of sexual violence as pain: “we first make a thing painful by investing it with an evaluation.”253 In this account, victimization is not a direct result of material violation of the body, as in rape, but rather it is predicated on the victim’s ability to interpret as an agent. In other words, victimization is paradoxically predicated on the agency of the victim.

More than simply one body violating another, sexual violence is hence the infection of ressentiment from one subject to another. The soldier uses his sexual faculties to dominate a female, thereby creating a value-system where the masculine power to kill reigns over the feminine power to birth, despite of the fact (or rather precisely because of the fact) he is in an inferior relation to her sexual reproductive capabilities. As in Nietzsche’s ascetic slave/priest/philosopher, the soldier operates on two levels: one is his unconscious will to power that seeks to live on, and second is his conscious creation of a value-system where he reigns superior despite his natural inferiority. When the female “victim,” in turn, appeals to her body and the resulting mixed-blood children as the indisputable “evidence” of her victimization, it admittedly empowers her claims against the perpetrator, but at the same time, unwittingly falls

253 Ibid., 150.
into his intended embrace because it subscribes to his value-system. She is not raped because her body is “inferior,” and her children are in turn, not evidence of her inherent “inferiority.” Rather, the rape seeks to install a value-system that works on the conscious level of the woman in relation to her own reproductive functions. By pointing to her victimization, she is hence infected with ressentiment, which is the only way the weak (soldier) can come to dominate the strong (female)—through a complete reversal of values attached to “strong” and “weak.” However, on the same token she cannot choose not to react. Her reaction is reasonable. She cannot, by sheer virtue of her autonomous “free will,” escape the material violence done unto her body. The woman and her mixed-blood child then, spin endlessly in a “no win” situation.

On the battlefield, the father is anonymous. There is no other way of making himself memorable other than by infecting his victim with ressentiment through the aid of pain: “pain was the most powerful aid to mnemonics.”254 If rape is the desire to live on despite man’s inferior position vis-à-vis the materiality of the female body, then the need for such powerful mnemonic devices wane as the presence of the U.S. military in Okinawa becomes more established. Here, Takazato’s historicization of sexual domination from wartime, occupation, to post-reversion economic liberalism fits perfectly. In place of the uncountable battlefield rapes came a system of prostitution that served the U.S. military. After reversion in 1972, the economic gap between G.I.s and local women collapsed giving rise to a culture of “free-love.” In each successive stage, the need to use sheer violence—the pain of rape—diminishes.

In accordance with Takazato’s analysis, all stages of sexual domination under military regimes (rape, prostitution, and “free love”) are in fact, products of structural violence. However, I want to make a crucial distinction. All three stages can be

categorized similarly not because they are lacking in agency, and are at the complete mercy of the U.S. military. Rather, they are all different moments in the same _will to power_. Rape victims, prostitutes, and women who fall in love with G.I.s uniformly share a _will to survive_ the postwar Okinawan landscape dominated by a value-system where the power to kill takes precedence over the power to birth.

This does not mean, however, that the sheer _will to survive_ can transcend material effects by virtue of the strength of an individual’s free will as argued in the case for “free love.” The discourse of Okinawan women who make the most of their situation, and assert a strong will in order to forge a better and brighter future certainly breaks out of the victim portrait as idealized by Takara Kurayoshi or Hayashi Chika. However, it is not only misleading, but flat-out wrong. Like proponents of Okinawa or the Okinawan woman as victim, proponents of free-will such as Takara or Hayashi assume a straight causal chain between intention and effect. The soldier’s fear of the fading away of his material existence through death and an inferior relation to sexual reproduction incites his unconscious _will to power_ to survive the only way the weak can—through a manipulation of value-systems on the conscious level. Precisely because of (or despite) the inferiority of his material sex, he uses sex to camouflage the unassuming consequence of his act—to instill a value-system in woman where she believes it is the inferiority of her own sex (“by virtue of [her] sex”) is the undisputed evidence of the rape. He is not an agent that can will away the weakness of his body and his immortality, but rather, it is the very materiality of his inferior reproductive faculties that inspires him to appeal to the conscious level of _ressentiment, i.e._, a reversal of values.

Hence, just as the soldier comes no where near transcending the materiality of his body through the strength of his will, Okinawan women likewise cannot simply will away the material effects of the U.S. military. Rather, it is the exact same will to
survive found in the soldier and rape victim that inspires action on a conscious level. In the case of the so-called *Amejo*, this is the desire to survive the postwar Okinawan landscape by taking on the material wealth of the English language, “American culture,” and superior “American babies.” In this sense, it is not an Okinawan woman willing her way out of the material effects of the U.S. military, but exactly the opposite: the will to power found on the unconscious level inspires her to turn to that which is most threatening—the U.S. military—and turn it into a cite of possibility on a conscious level.

In the case of the determined victim, the will is supposedly stripped away from the body, rendering it passive and open to immediate violation. In the case of the agent of free will, the will supposedly transcends the body, rendering it all powerful and above violation. However, both are merely different moments in the same mode of thinking that separates too easily the unconscious from the conscious and the material body from the intellectual faculty of interpretation. Humans do not operate only on the level of their bodies (unconscious) or only on the level of their intellect (conscious), but rather, are an always-in-the-making end product of the constant conversation between the two. The opposition between determined victims and agents of free will then, is a mere separating the two poles, a mere clinging to each extreme, thereby reinforcing the other with greater vigor. The rape victim and *Amejo* are not the same victims stripped of their wills as the Beijing workshop suggests, but rather are two moments in the same will to power.

By insisting on the agency that predicates victimization, I am not “blaming the victim.” This is a misunderstanding of terms. Again, to ask Okinawans to accept invasion of their island and to ask women to let the violence of rape roll of their backs is to ask Okinawans to die. Rather, I am attempting to separate two crucial moments within the process of victimization so as to find an alternative to the determined victim
versus agent of free will paradigm, illustrate how victimization is in a complicit relationship between victim and victimizer that mutually exploits the resulting children thereof, and crack open a different possibility for Amerasian existence. From the perspective of an Amerasian, insistence on woman as the absolute victim of sexual violence damns their identity into the existence of “damaged goods” and forecloses the possibility to exist as something else. It unwittingly prescribes to the purpose of sexual violence in the first place—to ensure that Amerasians will always know they are their father’s child. In this sense, the absence of Tanaka’s father when she was growing up paradoxically brings forth an even stronger and more painful reminder that she is her father’s daughter and incites an insatiable drive to search for him. It disallows the child to articulate their mothers as anything other than “determined victims,” even though their mothers problematically lock them into a damned existence. It locks the child into a sexual war between their parents where both attempt to assert the power of their sex over their child, and forecloses the possibility to “make [their] own family registry…to release [themselves] form the relationship with blood, and weave the threads of [their] own genealogy.”

In the next section, I want to return to Tanaka’s text to illustrate how the sexual politics of her parents, mediated by the understanding of miscegenation under the U.S. military in Okinawa affects her sexuality and ability to sexually reproduce. To borrow Bataille’s words, offspring is not allowed to become “discontinuous,” “self-contained,” and “independent” from its parents, and hence, encounters difficult in reproducing a next generation—it becomes “sterile.”

“A People in Exile”

Tanaka writes of the reasons behind her drive to find her father.
My experience as a young mixed-blood child in an impoverished single-mother home inevitably determined the direction of my life—the humiliating and painful memory of the boys who jeered at me, “Amirikā! Amirikā!” as I walked outside...

They are painful words for a mixed-blood child without a father such as myself...

That is why if I am just hanging around pointlessly, I feel like I am worthless good for nothing. As if I was a wrinkle in the carpet.²⁵⁵

Tanaka is clear that to be a mixed-blood child without a father entails she is the end product of a humiliating violence by the U.S. military unto Okinawa. In this description, she is a “child born to a knocked up woman.” It is not enough to state here that the boys who caused her so much trauma were merely internalizing Okinawa’s condition of defeat, and incorrectly deflecting it onto a helpless child. Rather, the problem is more fundamental. It is the understanding of causality underlying how Tanaka’s identity is understood that forecloses any possibility for her to live. She feels as if she is nothing more than a “wrinkle in the carpet.” Her life is utterly lacking in meaning, and she is at a loss of how she can attribute meaning to her life under such an oppressive understanding of causality. Her father is the aggressor (cause), her mother, the duped woman (medium), and Tanaka, the undesired shameful consequence—a “child of sin.” Whether it is young boys her taunt her, or a group of feminists that come to the aid of “women and children” who suffer the material effects of the military, this fundamental formula of causality that underlies her identity is the same. It is this

²⁵⁵ Tanaka, Harukanaru maboroshi no chichiyo [My distant specter of a father], 43-44; 147.
understanding of causality interwoven with her lineage that causes her to become “hopeless.”

[What if] I was a child born out of the screeches coming out of the red-light district. This hopeless thought tormented me. I clenched my fist so hard that I wounded my own hand, and ran out of the bustling district.\(^{256}\)

When her entire existence is governed by this view of causality, the sexual origins of her life overwhelmingly determines the meaning she can attribute to her own life, and causes her to contemplate suicide. “‘I am so exhausted. Not from my poverty, but from the utter lack of hope…’ I started to think that at this point, living and dying becomes the same thing.”\(^{257}\) Importantly, the moment when she faces the idea of suicide, it is not the destitute material conditions, \textit{i.e.}, poverty, that brings on her exhaustion, but rather, the sheer “lack of hope” in her life. She implicitly recognizes at this point that material conditions do not govern who she is, but rather, more painful than her material conditions is the inability to attribute meaning to her own existence as an Amerasian. Living without this meaning is living as a non-existence where “living and dying becomes the same thing.”

Looking back to her past “origins” forecloses her ability to make a future for herself, and throws her into thoughts of death. Simultaneously, the idea renders her incapable of entertaining the idea of sexual reproduction that points to the future.

One doesn’t need to quote Freud to figure out that my hands

\(^{256}\) Ibid., 70.  
\(^{257}\) Ibid., 98-99.
and feet were entangled in the sticky web of conflicting feelings about my birth, about my blood, about my mother, and about my destitution. My heart was consumed with this constant writhing.  

This causes her “distrust in men.”

“This word still rings in my ear. It was not merely an injury felt at the heat of the moment, but it became the cause of my feelings of disgust about the uncomfortable circumstances surrounding my birth as a young girl.

To think of the monumental effects and suffering that these words caused me makes me boil over with indignation. This is the main reason behind my distrust of men that continues until this day.  

Not only does she have a persistent “distrust of men,” but she experiences a complete inability to identify with her mother’s sexuality. This is most poignantly illustrated at the sight of her mother’s pregnant body.

My younger sister was born during my third-year of junior high school. Because of this, I almost completely despised my mother. When her stomach started to show, I was so

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258 Ibid., 174.
259 Ibid., 52-53.
disgusted that I almost vomited…

I thought to myself:

“She is completely lacking in any reservation about sex. Although she is the mother to my younger brother and I, she continues to do these filthy things. I know how children are born into this world…My mother is back again at the dirty act. Now, another shameful child will be born.”

…“I was born from this mother.”

“Half of this mother’s blood is running through my veins. This half of my blood is repugnant.”

…As my mother’s stomach started to stick out, and her hands and feet started to swell, she looked ugly to me. Each time I looked at her face, I started to burn with rage to the point that it one could see that my body was quivering in anger.260

It is no surprise then, that this affects Tanaka’s own sexuality.

Yes, Tanaka Midori is sick in her deep crevice (fukami dokoro). I am pathologically afraid of “sex.” I am finally able to take distance from my mother and see her in her humanity to the point where I am even envious of her unbridled sex at times. Even so, the unhappy affair of sex is burned into me so persistently that I cannot shake it off.261

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260 Ibid., 85-86.
261 Ibid., 180. Emphasis of “deep crevice” here is Tanaka’s. It is perhaps a metaphor for her sex, i.e., her sexual cavity.
It is clear that Tanaka is disgusted with men, her mother’s sexuality, and her own sexuality because she cannot escape the implications of being called “Amerikā!”—the idea that she is a product of miscegenation where her mother is not only a victim, but an embarrassing loser who is compelled to use her sexuality to survive a humiliating defeat. It is the “monumental effect” of this word that incites the drive to get down to the bottom of her sexual origins and search for her “distant specter of a father.”

She starts by mustering up the courage to ask her mother about her paternity, and is shocked at the ease and glibness in which her mother speaks. She learns that her father was branch manager of American Express Bank on Camp Zukeran. Her mother worked as his maid in a mansion for foreigners, where the two fell into a romantic sexual relationship. When her mother became pregnant, she quit her job, and gave birth to the baby alone. Her father repeatedly asked her mother for her hand in marriage and to join him in America. He even followed her in a “sparkling foreign car” from which she resolutely walked away, and repeatedly refused all advances.²⁶²

Tanaka blames her mother for not marrying her father, and following him to the land of plenty—America.

I thought, why couldn’t she muster up the courage to go to America for me? It was a shame. Yes, it is far away, and going to an unknown and unseen land America would have been difficult. However, since I was born, couldn’t she have gone for my sake? I thought this because we were so poor, and I suffered so dearly as a fatherless child.²⁶³

²⁶² Ibid., 176.
²⁶³ Ibid., 123.
In addition to blaming her mother, Tanaka cannot accept her story. It is quite different from the clichéd romance between G.I.s and Okinawan women where the woman is “deceived,” “knocked up,” and then left to raise her child alone.

My mother always told me that she was not dumped by my father, but rather, she was the one who took me and ran away. However, in the depths of my heart, I could never believe her. It was unfathomable that a woman who lost everything in the defeat of war could run away from the bank branch manager of a victor nation.²⁶⁴

She cannot accept the story because she is still wedded to the violating formula of causality common to the dichotomy between determined victims and agents of free will. On one hand, Tanaka recognizes in her flirtation with suicide that it as not “poverty,” but a “lack of hope” that was the most painful. Hence, in the last instance, she understands that it is the failure to interpret her existence in world as an agent that is more painful than immediate material lack. Nonetheless, she cannot see her mother as anything other than the immediate medium of material violence that lacks any ability to interpret her situation and make choices as an agent. As a “woman who lost everything in the defeat of war” her “defeat” for Tanaka is immediately felt, just as the “pain” of rape is immediately felt for a “victim” of sexual violence. It is “naturally” subordinated literally under the material might of American capital represented by her father, a “bank branch manager of a victor nation” just as a woman’s body is “naturally” subordinated under the physical might of the male body. Tanaka is still subject to the power of

²⁶⁴ Ibid., 203.
ressentiment, and is unable to change its value-system by breaking out of the oppressive formula for causality that weds material conditions to the purported rational course of human action. According to this sort of rationalism, a “woman who lost everything in the defeat of war” will naturally wish to have her “lack” filled by a “bank branch manager of a victor nation.” It is incomprehensible that “she was the one who took [Tanaka] and ran away” on her own accord. Precisely because she is wed to the causal chain of strong violating the weak, resulting in a hybrid existence, the only possibility that she can conceive of her future is to complete the causal equation by finding her father and achieving the “American dream” so she is no longer belittled for being a “fatherless child.” Because she conflates “defeat” with impoverished material conditions and “victory” with material wealth, the only happy ending is to cross over to the land of the plenty.

The point here is not to blame Tanaka. When I interviewed politicized Amerasians raised in the U.S. who knew all-too-well the capabilities of their father and realities of America, many were critical of the strong desire amongst Okinawan Amerasians to find their father and distance themselves from their mother and mother’s culture. They felt Amerasians in Okinawa harbored unrealistic fantasies of their fathers and America, and problematically exonerated responsibility of their American fathers at the expense of belittling their mothers. However, like the man quoted earlier who justified U.S. occupation by saying, “If America didn’t come here [to Okinawa] like England went over there [to Hong Kong], then we would not be rich,” the fact that Tanaka desperately seeks her father and is disgusted with her mother does not entail that she is fulfilling her biological destiny as a “reproduction of death” designed to produce a next generation of soldiers that will dominate the “different nation and different race” of their mothers. Rather, just as a victim of sexual violence unwittingly falls into the calculated embrace of the rapist by asserting her victimization, while at
the same time, cannot afford not to react, Tanaka is incapable of not having a desire to find her father because his memory is so painfully seared into her being by Okinawan society. While it turns her into an aggressor against her own mother, she at the same time cannot deny her will to power or her will to survive her situation in Okinawa an existence denied of all meaning as a “fatherless child.” Her reaction is perfectly reasonable.

While this will to survive turns her into a victimizer vis-à-vis her mother, it is also the very substratum from which she is able to assert herself as an agent who can begin to create her own world of meaning; it is the fertile ground from which she can potentially liberate herself and her mother from the violence of causality that underlies her existence. In this sense, it is important to note that Nietzsche did not condemn ressentiment because it is inherently bad, but rather, he took a radically neutral stance and recognized it as a moment in the very positive, very full-of-potential, and very human will to power that is beyond good and evil.

When Tanaka finally meets her father, her primordial hunger to know her “origins” is satisfied in much the same way a starving individual is fed food and a violated woman is able to regain control of her body. However, just as she realizes that in the last instance, it is not her impoverished material conditions, but the inability to give meaning to her existence which is of most importance, the fulfillment of her primordial hunger to know her paternal “origins” as a material issue, and her ability to endow her existence with meaning is a completely different affair. In other words, just because she found her “origins” does not necessarily preclude that she has fulfilled the destiny of the causal chain, and become her “father’s child.”

For example, after she meets her father, ascertains the veracity of her mother’s story, and is offered U.S. citizenship by her father by potentially becoming his “adopted daughter,” the primordial hunger of her existence that determined her life since
childhood is immediately satiated.

…New blood started to flow through my veins. The black “blood” that I imaged stagnating through my veins turned into fresh blood and started pulsing vivaciously…I decided to live my life very, very preciously. This decision filled my body to the point where I became feverish. In this way,…I searched and found the “evidence of my blood” that had always hovered fearfully in my spirit. In this way, I have now “resolved” everything. There is nothing to be afraid of anymore.265

However, even though her mother encourages her beforehand to take U.S. citizenship and accept adoption by her natural father, Tanaka hesitates when the prospect materializes into a reality.

There was another article that caught my attention and shook me to the depths of my heart. The article was to the effect of an Okinawan woman who married a G.I., lived in America, got a divorce after four-and-a-half years, and returned to Okinawa. Her young daughter was ridiculed for being a “Jap” in preschool.

Mixed-blood children are discriminated as “Amirikā” in Okinawa, and despised as “Jap” when they cross over to America. No matter where mixed-blood children go, they will always have to live as a “people in exile.” This article

265 Ibid., 231; 243.
overlapped with the issue of me becoming an adoptive daughter to my father, and taking on U.S. citizenship.266

At the end of her long journey, Tanaka’s insatiable hunger to know her “origins” is satisfied. However, fulfillment of this material hunger does not preclude how she interprets the situation. Rather, instead of fulfilling the causal chain by becoming the American father’s daughter she often fantasized about in the midst of intense suffering and poverty, she problematizes the causal chain altogether. This becomes particularly poignant to her when thinking of Amerasians in the U.S. If Tanaka had “cross[ed] over to America” as she dreamed of as a child, she would not have become an “American” in the sense of becoming a white woman completely divorced from Okinawa. She would have been “despised as a ‘Jap.’” On one hand, Amerasians who “cross[ed] over to America” and Amerasians who “are discriminated as ‘Amerikā’ in Okinawa” seem to be at polar opposites in terms of the material—the former speaks English, possess U.S. citizenship, knows their father, and lives with the benefits of American power while the former speaks Okinawan/Japanese, posses either no citizenship or Japanese nationality, does not know their father, and lives in the presence of their mother’s culture. However, Tanaka is able to recognize that both share the same structure of oppression: “No matter where mixed-blood children go, they will always have to live as a ‘people in exile.’” Here, Tanaka resists clinging to either polar opposite (America:Okinawa, father:mother, oppressor:victim), and emerges with a distinctly original Amerasian thought in which she is able to attribute meaning to her existence on her own terms.

Having come full circle, Tanaka is finally able to accept her mother, and feels horrible for having doubted that she could really create her own values in the world as

266 Ibid., 238.
a “woman who lost everything in the defeat of war.”

If my mother had gotten into my father’s car after he ran after her, her life would have been completely different. She would have avoided being blamed by an insolent daughter who asked her, “Why did you give birth to me?” She would have not panted in pain through extreme poverty. The woman living in the same white house pictured in my dreams that my father actually took as his residence in a seaside town in sunny Florida would have been my mother.

But, my mother did not do any of those things. My mother, who didn’t get in that sparkling foreign car was selfless. I came to think it was this mother who was so beautiful. My mother who gave herself and never expected anything in return. My mother maintained that attitude from beginning to end with men...My mother who never ingratiated with men. My mother who never calculated the exchange of money for love. My mother, who gave only the weak love. My mother, who could render herself a nothingness. My mother who gave and never wanted. My mother, in the midst of poverty, or I should say, precisely because she was poor, lived as a “woman”...

Tanaka finally recognizes her mother as a woman, immune to the value-system

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267 Ibid., 176.
determined by men, who is able to create her own values. In this sense, her mother is free of ressentiment in the sense that she does not see herself as a “victim” since “she gave herself and never asked for anything in return” nor is she a free willing agent who can transcend her material conditions through the strength of her will as she “panted in pain through extreme poverty.” Rather, she suffers the material conditions as an Okinawan woman with an Amerasian child on her own terms. Her mother recognizes that living by her own value-system entails living in conditions of extreme poverty, but chooses her freedom to interpret and live by her own world of meaning instead of being enslaved by material determinations.

However, the purpose here is not to provide a uni-dimensional valorization of her mother’s life choice. Tanaka finally is able to come to “think that it was this mother who was so beautiful” at the end of the memoir, but only after surviving extreme poverty, intellectual confusion, and emotional agony. Tanaka was compelled to not only live in poverty, but she was also left to fend for herself in a war zone of interpretations on Amerasian identity that almost left her for dead. Perhaps this is why Tanaka writes of her mother in terms of admiration and envy instead of affinity and commonality of female experience: “The mother who lived her life as a “woman.” It was this mother whom I envied.”

The subject position between a pure-blood Okinawan woman and a mixed-blood Amerasian is fundamentally different. Hence, although woman is in a privileged position to transfer part of her being onto the child because of the experience of pregnancy where the material separation from the body of the child and mother is blurred, the intense material conditions of oppression surrounding Amerasian identity prevent any fluid continuity between mother and daughter. Rather, Tanaka asks for discontinuity: “I want to…weave the threads of my own genealogy.”

Whether Amerasian mothers cite their children as the unfortunate “evidence” of

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268 Ibid., 177.
their victimization, or Amerasian mothers cite their children as the attractive “prize” at the end of a liberating free-love relationship with American men, both are different moments of *ressentiment* that foreclose the ability for Amerasians to create original meaning in their lives, and create their own genealogy. Yet, even Tanaka’s mother, who resisted both positions, still could not provide the material conditions for her daughter’s well being as a child. In the former case, Amerasian mothers attempt to come to terms with their material conditions by *reacting* to the situation so as to escape it without fully being able to problematize the way in which the material and intellectual are separated into polar opposites. In the latter case, an Amerasian mother shows no reaction and “render[s] herself a nothingness,” but instead suffers the material conditions fully on her own terms. Hence, we are left in a “no win” situation where material need and the ability to establish a new system of values are seemingly incommensurable.

Herein lies the conundrum of Amerasian identity as a theoretical issue. Amerasians embody the material consequence of colonial violence, but at the same time, to ultimately determine their existence as a predetermined causal effect is to foreclose the presence of a will to power that is also the very fertile ground from which liberation can potentially be sowed. The moment of *ressentiment* is not inherently good nor bad, but lies in a neutral space *beyond good and evil*; to react to material violence is perfectly *reasonable*; to react is the very *will to power* necessary for agents of interpretation to attribute original meaning to their lives. Yet, to cling onto *ressentiment* forecloses the ability to reach an *inner experience* where divisions between the self and other dissolve into an eternal continuum where racial and sexual difference no longer matter. Yet, this *inner experience* is difficult to reach when confronting the real life problem of a threat to one’s own material existence.

It is possible to simply say Amerasians encapsulate the modern human condition
of a multiply split subject. However, where others may be able to take refuge in the identity of a victim, identity as a free willing agent, or identity as a creator of values irrespective of the immediate material consequences it may bring to themselves or their children, all moments are inescapably concentrated into a single Amerasian existence so they are denied the ability to claim any one space as their own and live constantly as a “people in exile.” They are punished for being “children of the enemy” while robbed of their ability to claim “victimhood.” Yet it is these Amerasians—white Amerasians in particular—who by virtue of the color of their skin or association with strong presence of America, are in a different relationship to the material than their pure-blood counterparts. That is, they are either ridiculed for failing to live up to their material destiny as individuals with an “American presence” but lacking in a father, English language skills, or citizenship, or they are blamed for cashing in on their “American privilege” that their victimized motherland is systematically denied.

For example, before Tanaka meets her father, she is fired from her job at a cosmetic company because she felt guilty for pushing expensive cosmetics onto hard-working Okinawans, and instead ends up giving free samples away. Growing up as a poor Amerasian, this luxury was incomprehensible to her. However, after she meets her father, the transformation in her attitude towards capital is extreme.

March came, and cold Tokyo started to become spring-like. My heart too, was liberated from a long period of heaviness, and sparkled like never before.

My eyes fell upon a boutique window. The spring clothes were in. The clothes were decorated so gorgeously. They were so colorful that it seemed as if someone had brought in a bouquet of flowers. I was completely taken in by the sight. I fell into the
illusion that I was standing in a field where flowers were blossoming wildly.

I opened the beautiful door, and entered the boutique…

I never knew that browsing for clothes could be so much fun, and that I could be so happy that my heart pounded within me.

“I think blue would go well with your kind of hair (ogushi).”

“This piece is perfect for you because your skin is white, and your eyes are blue.”

The old me would have quickly become uncomfortable, and run out of the boutique upon hearing those words. But this time, it didn’t bother me at all. Actually, those words resonated comfortably in my ears.

I said to myself for the first time, “I am beautiful.” There was a pretty “haafu” standing in the mirror that I have never seen before…

The old me was plain, and tried to present herself as plain. That is why I couldn’t pick out colors that were beautiful. However, now when I look at myself, I think pretty colors go well on me…

The salesperson exclaimed, “wonderful.”

Of course, it was all probably flattery, but I was elated. It was as if I was the same as the beautiful sparkling foreign daughter that I saw in church long ago.

When I started to think about money, I became a little
depressed, but I was sold on the salesperson’s suggestion to put it on “monthly installments,” and bought so many pieces that I couldn’t carry them out with both hands. This would have been impossible for the old me.269

Just as it is a mistake to assume Tanaka’s drive to find her “paternal origins” precludes that she will “become her father’s daughter” and fulfill the causal chain underlying her existence, it is a mistake to assume that Tanaka’s complexion has finally “cashed in” on the American privilege her schoolmates ridiculed her for “lacking” despite white skin. However, the fact remains, she is left to negotiate her identity, as a member of a “people in exile,” that precariously shifts between material hunger and material excess.

“I Must Nevertheless Endeavor to Live On”

Tanaka concludes her memoirs with the following regret.

In these memoirs, which do not exceed the rank of junior high school writing, I failed most of all to indicate that it was none other than “God” who carried me along to finally meet my father.270

Tanaka not only thanks God for allowing her to meet her father, but she associates Christianity with a purified masculine version of America, and priests as potential father figures.

However, even though she thanks God at the end of her memoir, Tanaka’s

269 Ibid., 235-236.
270 Ibid., 246.
attitude towards complete consummation with God as her father is ambivalent: “No matter where mixed-blood children go, they will always have to live as a ‘people in exile.’” In addition to this common experience of being a “people in exile” is the insatiable drive to attribute meaning to mixed-blood life out of the utter hopelessness of facing an oppressive and predetermined formula of causality that frames their lives.

Tanaka writes, “The antonym of life is death; the antonym of hopelessness is prayer.”²⁷¹ Like Nietzsche’s slave, religion is the only way Tanaka is able to attribute meaning to her otherwise meaningless suffering and have hope to live through it. But unlike Nietzsche’s slave, religion does not become a way to cement the “cause and effect” of a causal chain, or wed the “doer” with the “deed.” Unlike Weber’s Protestant ethic, she does not posit herself as a chosen one whose ascetic attitude has the unintended effect of reaping the fruits of labor that are retrospectively labeled being under the “grace of God.” Rather, precisely because she is mixed, Tanaka’s appeal to religion is to find an alternative meaning to her life that is not already determined by the damning causal chain. She writes,

…then one day, I began to pray.

On that day, I became liberated from all hopelessness, and my heart became peaceful. Sadness and hatred vanished, and I began to firmly believe that my birth was “desired by God who endowed me with life on this earth.”²⁷²

It is God who put her on earth, not the work of her parents. It is precisely because she is

²⁷¹ Ibid., 182.
²⁷² Ibid., 182.
troubled by the sexual politics of her parents that prevents her the ability to break free into a individual “discontinuous” existence all to her own that she can only trust the “love of God.”

I want something eternal and everlasting. I want an everlasting love. That can only be the love of God. To desire something everlasting is arrogance. Humans are humans because they hurt each other. Precisely because love is changing, there is sadness and there is happiness. Even if I understand such things in my head, my heart continues to desire an “unchanging love” through and through.  

Tanaka realizes that neither one of her parents is capable of giving her the type of infallible love that she desires. “Humans are humans because they hurt each other,” but in Tanaka’s case, this is particularly nuanced because she is embroiled in a “no win” situation between the sexual politics of her parents. No solution—becoming a victim, an agent of free will, or a new creator of female values—can ever meet all of her needs. Hence, in the end, she is left with only a faith that it was a transcendent power—God—that endowed her with life. It is with this great ambivalence of constantly living as member of a “people in exile” which leaves her with a half-hearted resolution to say, “I must nevertheless endeavor to live iza ikimeyamo.”

In this sense, Tanaka speaks most poignantly of the postcolonial condition. Similarly, Gayatri Spivak reads “Mary” of Mahasweta Devi’s “The Hunt”: “If we think of postcolonial, figuratively, as the living child of a rape, the making of Mary is, rather

273 Ibid., 177.
literally, its figuration.” Spivak is careful not to “read Mary as the representative of the postcolonial” as a metaphor or a metonym because to do so would be to fall into the oppressive and violating formula of causality that underlies miscegenation. Instead she is interested in the “logic of her figuration.” The logic of this figuration is how the mixed-blood figure is posited as the “result” or as the “post” in “postcolonial.” This signifies a temporality with a clearly demarcated beginning (origin), medium of colonial violence (which usually takes place through the land or female body), and its consequence. Rather, Tanaka illustrates the necessity to free herself from the causal chain while simultaneously being chained to the material effects of its violence. She is rejected from her primary paternal origin, the maternal body, and “returning” to any land, but yet she is at a loss as to how to move forward to the future as a subject who must nonetheless deal with the material conditions of the postcolonial aftermath. Betrayed by her origins, in the last instance, the only thing that grounds her existence is not her race or sex, nor the sting of material violence, but a faith that her life was bestowed upon this earth for a reason.

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275 Ibid., 282.
“Securing Okinawa for Miscegenation: A Biopolitical Reading of Nagadō Eikichi’s ‘Tent Village of Garama’”

Opposite Views of Security behind a Unified Front of Protest

On February 10, 2008 U.S. Marine staff sergeant Tyron Luther Hadnott of Camp Courtney, age thirty-eight, kidnapped and sexually assaulted a fourteen-year-old Japanese national in Okinawa City. Enraged, 6,000 citizens gathered in the town of Chatan on March 23 to protest sexual crimes committed by U.S. military personnel.

This case is just one of many in Okinawa. According to Okinawan Prefectural Police statistics, there were fourteen rapes by U.S. military personnel between 1995 and 2007, not including non-military base employees and family dependents who reside on Okinawa Prefecture under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). However, this case received more media and political attention than others because, like the 1995 incident involving a twelve-year-old, the victim was a fourteen-year-old minor.

Because of the media attention, these two cases provide good points of reference. What is striking about the 2008 incident is the degree to which it has been pounded into the heads of U.S. military personnel in the Japanese state that military crime no longer pays. After the 1995 incident, heinous crimes threatened to derail plans underway to realign the U.S. military in the Japanese state. It became a simple tactical calculation: if more crimes destabilize U.S. military interests, they must tighten disciplinary measures within the military institution. And so be it, the U.S. military made efforts to clean up its act.

First, as it is well known, transfer of U.S. military personnel to Japanese

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276 *Okinawa Taimusu* [Okinawa Times] February 27, 2008
authorities prior to indictment became a point of contention in the 1995 incident. This prompted an addendum to clause xvii (3) (c) of SOFA to allow for “sympathetic consideration” in the transfer of suspects in the case of “heinous crimes.” This time, the U.S. military fully cooperated in transferring Hadnott to the Okinawan Prefectural Police.

Second, because of the overwhelming attention drawn to her case, the victim dropped charges with the harrowing statement, “I just want to be left alone.” While the U.S. military has historically allowed suspects to escape back to the U.S., political pressures and media scrutiny would make no allowance this time. Although the Japanese courts were eager to try the sure-win case, Hadnott was instead brought before a military court. He fully cooperated and negotiated to plea guilty to one count of fondling a minor in exchange for a dismissal of charges of rape, adultery, kidnapping through luring, and making a false official statement. He is currently serving a four year sentence.

Third, the four character motto “kōki shukusei” calling for “enforcement of disciplinary rules in the U.S. military” littered newspapers alongside “ikan” (deplorable) and “ikari” (outrage). In response, the highest ranking military official in Japan, Lt. Gen. Bruce Wright, U.S. Forces Japan commander, called for a “special task force” on February 14 to “review and reinforce current sexual assault prevention programs at American bases in Japan and Okinawa.” As a result, Air Force Lt. Gen. Edward Rice, U.S. Forces Japan commander, reported three months later that U.S. military forces in Japan had spent “1 million man hours addressing this issue, and we...

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278 For a list of crimes committed against women, including crimes where the assailant was allowed to escape back to the U.S., see “Crimes Against Women by the US Military in Post-war Okinawa” in Takazato Suzuyo, Okinawa no onnatachi: Josei no jinken to kichi/guntai [The women of Okinawa: women’s rights, bases, and the military] (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 1996), 237-247.
will spend more in the future.” This includes tightening the screening process with “thorough performance and medical reviews of candidates for overseas assignments,” incorporating sexual-assault awareness sessions into newcomer orientations, and working with off-base establishments to create “responsible” alcohol servicing policies. In addition to the “period of reflection” in which mobility off-base was restricted, there is evidence that the U.S. military also curbed the right of expression of SOFA status individuals. Some spouses feared being sent “back to the United States” because of complaints about the restrictions. All of these disciplinary measures are a stark contrast to 1995, when Admiral Richard C. Macke was compelled to resign after he advertized de facto military practice in a de jure capacity as commander of the U.S. Forces in the Pacific: “For the price they paid to rent the car [used to commit the 1995 rape], they could have had a girl.” Prostitution like rape is punishable by military law. This makes it clear that even though laws exist they are not enforced and hence “kōki shukusei” or “enforcement of disciplinary rules in the U.S. military” is demanded.

Fourth, since Hadnott lived off-base in a civilian Okinawan neighborhood, Okinawan Prefectural officials decried the fact that the U.S. military could produce no statistics on the number of its personnel living off-base. Under the Alien Registration Law of Japan, all foreigners are required to register their domicile within 90 days of entry into of Japan and carry with them at all times an Alien Registration card, but those with SOFA status are exempt. In response, the U.S. military reported 77% of its personnel (45,403) live on-base, 23% (10,319) live off-base, and they would try and encourage more on-base living arrangements in the future.

281 Ibid.
Because of these efforts, the U.S. military pats itself on the back and thinks it has made great “progress.” U.S. military affiliates proudly boasted that crime amongst SOFA status members in Okinawa is approximately half that of the general population in Okinawa Prefecture.\textsuperscript{284} Even so, Air Force Lt. Gen. Edward Rice impressively states, “it’s not good enough for us” indicating his aim for a zero crime statistic within the population.\textsuperscript{285} According to this logic, if crime is eliminated, the U.S. military can also eliminate any claims against its presence.

The understanding that “progress” has been made, however, is based on the assumption that the problem with the U.S. military in the Japanese state is merely one of correcting discrepant legal codes between states, \textit{i.e.}, extraterritoriality. By making adjustments to the law (\textit{i.e.}, SOFA), wrinkles in the mutually cooperative relationship of state \textit{sovereignty} (U.S.-Japan Security Treaty) can be ironed out. Working in conjunction with both, \textit{disciplinary techniques} (kōki shukusei) are tightened to ensure that the gears are well-oiled and operating flawlessly.

But when Okinawan politicians appealed to the law as a means of protesting the U.S. military, is a more finely tuned military machine exactly what they had in mind?

The legal demands on part of Okinawan politicians from staunchly anti-base to base-negotiable were almost entirely non-partisan. It is safe to say that nearly everyone opposed the particular sting of militarized crime. These kind of non-partisan moments amidst chronic internal division within social and political post-war history in Okinawa can be traced back to the all-island struggle (shimagurumi tōsō) of 1954 when USCAR threw farmers off their land at gunpoint in order to construct U.S.


military installations as discussed at length in Chapter 3. Just as opposition to USCAR land acquisition penetrated all strata of society and cut across party lines, opposition to militarized crime in Okinawa is almost uniform. What differs, however, is two different views of “security” motivating each faction’s opposition.

On one hand, out of an “ethics of conviction,” anti-colonial, environmentalist, feminist, and pacifist groups argue that the only way to achieve true “security” in the most fundamental sense possible is through the total elimination of military bases. In this way, “security” is rooted in higher principles that rise above the complicated realities of everyday life in which Okinawa has grown to depend on the U.S. military. For example, in response to the 2008 incident, feminist politicians such as Itokazu Keiko (an independent in the Upper House of the Japanese Diet) and Takazato Suzuyo (former Naha City Councilwoman), together representing Okinawan Women Act Against Military Violence (OWAAMV) issued a statement addressed to President Bush, Consul General Kevin Maher, and Lt. Gen. Richard Zilmer claiming that the “military is a violence-intrinsic institution” that must be completely eliminated “in order to abolish such violence.”

On the other hand, opposition to militarized crime enables conservatives to negotiate better terms for the contentious construction of a new military base in Henoko of northern Okinawa. Although it is currently impossible for any politician who wholeheartedly embraces the base plan to get elected in Okinawa, Prefectural Governor Nakaima Hirota, backed by the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) consents in principle, but has spent an entire administration haggling over the details and effectively stalemating its advance. While it is easy to criticize him as “selling out” the most vulnerable in Okinawan society (i.e., women, children, residents who live around the bases, and even the dugong), this position is one of resignation.

286 Statement issued February 13, 2008 by OWAAMV, Takazato Suzuyo and Itokazu Keiko co-chairs.
towards the fact that Okinawa is thrown to its knees by the brute political force and military machinery of Japan and the U.S. In adherence to an “ethics of responsibility,” they attempt to care for more immediate everyday reality of the population as a whole by maximizing Okinawa’s “security” within an inevitable relationship with giants.

It is because Okinawans are torn between suffering the effects of the U.S. military and having no choice but to comply to some degree with it in order to survive that there can be non-partisan demonstrations of “opposition” amidst conflicting ways of fighting for “security.” Do you want to eat, or do you want to avoid being murdered or raped by the military? Yet the problem is more complicated than a simple game of carrots and sticks (ame to muchi). Rather the question is, how does one survive in the schizophrenic state of a multiply split subject that lives alongside chronic violence?

These two positions fall along two different ways of engaging with power that are not mutually exclusive, but perhaps complementary. The former, is a negative force that kills and rapes; it is carried out through the repressive institution of the military that turns humans into killing machines, and only benefits the all powerful system of states at the expense of belittling individual human dignity. Power for the latter is a positive force that protects and cares; it gains its momentum from the very will to life itself and it takes the population as a whole as its target. Hence, lodging an attack on conservatives on the basis of their lack of a strong will in the face of power, false ideology, or cold-heartedness is like shooting them with a poisonous arrow dipped in the wrong kind of poison. It may irritate, but they are otherwise immune because they are engaging with power on an entirely different level. No longer is it a problem of the individual and institutions as is key to Foucault’s disciplinary model, but it is a question of how best to regulate the population as a whole in order to care for it in its entirety. This is exactly what Foucault meant by “biopower.”

Below, I will (1) trace Foucault’s groundbreaking transition to biopower that
takes place through his genealogy of the modern state, (2) relate it to the feminist critique of the military institution, (3) underscore how biopower incorporates resistance to institutions as the very stuff of its power, and lastly (4) articulate the importance of a biopolitical analysis for the dilemma of Amerasian identity via discussion of Nagadō Eikichi’s short story “The Tent Village of Garama.”

The State as the “Coldest of Cold Monsters”

Although Foucault is heavily indebted to Nietzsche, he immediately makes clear that his genealogy of the state will take critical distance to what he calls “Nietzsche’s hypothesis” of the “clash between forces.” Foucault faults Nietzsche for clinging to a primary aggression that acts as a motor throughout a history of nihilism. A subject is formed through ressentiment, or the spirit of revenge, as it lashes out against superior forces. After St. Paul’s universalization of Christianity, ressentiment is replaced by bad conscience, in which aggression lashed out on others is turned back upon the self to create ascetic, self-berating behavior. In both instances, individuals attempt to purge themselves of their own vulnerability (perceived as weakness) by either manipulating a value-system where they emerge triumphant over dominating forces, or institutionalizing the value-system in the form of the church to have it achieve the same effect. Instead of coming to terms with this vulnerability, it is constantly deferred to the future. Prevented from recognizing their potential, this deflection brings on a slow decay. The state, like the church, is an institution that enables the festering of this disease: It “is a prudent institution for the protection of individuals against one another…if it is completed and perfected too far it will in the end enfeeble the individual and, indeed, dissolve him—that is to say, thwart the original purpose of the

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state in the most thorough way possible.”

Hence, this institution that individuals collectively erect to protect themselves from not only one another, but themselves, turns into an oppressive force. In this way, Foucault traces primary aggression, or the inevitable “clash between forces” all the way to Nietzsche’s description of the state as the “coldest of all cold monsters.”

According to Foucault, theorists such as Nietzsche have overestimated the state by conflating a simplistic theory of sovereignty as a negative oppressive power with a complex relation of positive productive power in which sovereignty is subsumed as a mere moment. In pursuit of this analysis, Foucault takes his point of departure the transitional period in Europe where the vertical relationship between a king and his subjects was increasingly interrupted by battles on the horizontal plane. He traces a shift from the 16th to 17th centuries (after the end of the civil and religious wars) when “private warfare” came to be relegated to the periphery of the state until the “State acquired a monopoly on war.” Battles were waged horizontally throughout what can now be called “society” defined precisely by its disunity and multiplicity. A “society made up of a certain number of individuals, and which has its own manners, customs, and even its own law...is what the vocabulary of the day called a ‘nation.’”

The multiplicity of nations termed “society” forms in tandem with the emergence of a discordant “historico-political discourse” that revolves around the central idea of war.

War obviously presided over the birth of States: right, peace, and laws

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292 Ibid., 134.
were born in the blood and mud of battles... War is the motor behind institutions and order. In the smallest of its cogs, peace is waging a secret war. To put it another way, we have to interpret the war that is going beneath peace: peace itself is a coded war. We are therefore at war with one another; a battlefront runs through the whole of society, continuously and permanently, and it is this battlefront that puts us all on one side or another. There is no such thing as a neutral subject. We are all inevitably someone’s adversary.293

At first glance, Foucault appears to be simply following sociological theories of the emergence of the modern state since Weber’s famous definition as “the monopoly of the legitimate physical force within a given territory.” Weber, before Foucault, similarly located the emergence of the modern state around the time of the religious wars. According to Weber, it was Luther who “relieved the individual of the ethical responsibility for war and transferred it to the authorities.” In other words, the subject of the modern state is founded at the moment when “guilt” is transferred to the state because “[t]o obey the authorities in matters other than those of faith could never constitute guilt.”

It is precisely the Nietzschean moment of “guilt” that founds the subject (of bad conscience) involved in the Weberian conception of the modern state that Foucault takes issue with. Foucault is not interested in the modern state as a receptacle of guilt that “has continually grown and developed as a sort of threatening organism above civil society,” thereby morphing into the “coldest of cold monsters.” Instead he is

293 Ibid., 50-51.
295 Ibid., 124.
interested in studying a set of practices that discursively produce the state as an effect.

This understanding of the state as discursively productive emerges from the shadows of his writing on sexuality. These 1976 lectures are preceded by the first volume of *History of Sexuality* published that same year, in which Foucault for the first time writes about biopower in relation to sexuality. Readers of the volume will recall that Foucault is dedicated to dismissing Freud’s repressive hypothesis. An uncontrollable sexuality, raging beneath the surface of Victorian society is not repressed. Rather, the constant attention to sexuality as a force that must be contained produces the power-effect of intensifying, increasing, and magnifying society’s obsession with sex. This is why “[s]exuality’ is far more of a positive product of power than power was ever repression of sexuality.”

As an extension of this discussion into the historico-political discursive realm, positing the state couched in the language of sovereignty as “an essentially repressive” apparatus produces power-effects that are politically lucrative. When each nation wields history as the weapon to claim greater legitimacy for power within the state, it appears as if sovereignty has been usurped and must be restored by proper hands. Sovereignty comes forth as a lack that must be filled. Sovereignty is what crowns every successful struggle. However, it is precisely through positing the repressive power of the king, the law, or the state—in essence, the sovereign—that nations are able to mobilize and subjugate it into its cause as a power-effect. In this way, “[i]t is not the king who constitutes the nation; a nation acquires a king for the specific purpose of fighting other nations.” Although not lacking in a capacity for violence, sovereignty is reduced to its instrumental value as the prize in a partisan

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298 Ibid., 122.
battle purportedly fought in its name.

Accordingly, history discursively produces a new political rationality in which history not only speaks of the past as an object, but through doing so, becomes an active player in politics—a historical subject in the making of politics befittingly termed “historico-political.” It is precisely in this way Foucault identifies an inversion of Clausewitz’s principle that war is the continuation of politics by asserting politics is a continuation of war.\(^{300}\) Historical “truth” is deployed from a “combat position” which functions “exclusively as a weapon that is used to win an exclusively partisan victory.”\(^{301}\)

Given the attention to truth and power mutually embraced in a “combat position,” it is no surprise that excerpts of the 1976 lectures appeared first in English as “Two Lectures” in a collection of Foucault’s interviews, lectures, and writings entitled *Power/Knowledge* (1980). Moreover, this is where we find the frustrating epistemological dilemmas between truth and power in relation to the problem of resistance. In Foucault’s genealogy of the state, he is clear: “As I see it, we have to bypass or get around the problem of sovereignty—which is central to the theory of right—and the obedience of individuals who submit to it, and to reveal the problem of domination and subjugation instead of sovereignty and obedience.”\(^{302}\) He is critical of positing a repressive power such as the state and then mobilizing historical “truth” as a weapon of resistance to illustrate how it has trampled the “will” of the subaltern. Once truth reaches the position of power, it is studied, re-colonized and then usurped by an opposing discourse. Hence, “resistance” unwittingly reinforces this relationship of power that paradoxically, subjugates individuals ever more deeply in its web.

\(^{300}\) Ibid., 47-48.
\(^{301}\) Ibid., 57.
\(^{302}\) Ibid., 27.
Feminist Critique of the Military Institution

Foucault’s genealogy of the modern state revolves around war and sexuality. How then, is it possible to situate Foucault within the feminist critique of militarized violence? How is it possible to conduct a feminist critique of the modern state while not overestimating the power of both the sovereign and patriarch as a sort of gendered “cold monster” at the same time?

As a product of the radical feminist movement, Susan Brownmiller’s Against Our Will (1975) became a definitive feminist text on sexual violence including wartime rape. Unlike Freud’s account of the origin of society as a primal horde of brothers who slay their father, cannibalize him, and worship him as a god, Brownmiller gives the following account at the origins of society:

Indeed, one of the earliest forms of male bonding must have been the gang rape of one woman by a band of marauding men. This accomplished, rape became not only a male prerogative, but man’s basic weapon of force against woman, the principal agent of his will and her fear. His forcible entry into her body, despite her physical protestations and struggle, became the vehicle of his victorious conquest over her being, the ultimate test of his superior strength, the triumph of his manhood.

Man’s discovery that his genitalia could serve as a weapon to generate fear must rank as one of the most important discoveries of prehistoric times, along with the use of fire and the first crude stone ax.303

Despite Freud’s characterization of the origins of society as “phallo-centric” and Brownmiller’s as “gyno-centric,” both share a similar view of sovereignty. Power originates in the sovereign, whether it be the weapon-bearing father capable of castrating his son or man and his “genitalia” that “serve[s] as a weapon to generate fear.” Power is a weapon inflicted onto subjects. This understanding of sovereignty frames her writing on wartime sexual violence. The male inclination to use rape as a weapon to force her into the subjugation of patriarchy is repressed during peacetime, but runs unchecked during times of war: “War provides men with the perfect psychologic backdrop to give vent to their contempt for women.”

Betty Reardon in large part inherits Brownmiller’s insights, but takes them one step further—to a systemic critique of oppressive institutions that bears the title of her well-known monograph *Sexism and the War System* (1985). Here, violence originates in “inner psychic constructs” and when exteriorized, these constructs result in “structural violence” embodied in the entire war system. As shown in my Chapter 6, the concept of “structural violence” developed by the peace studies scholar Johan Galtung suggests that oppression is carried out on an institutional level completely indifferent to individual human intention, such as institutionalized racism. Reardon similarly argues the military is nothing but the institutionalization of patriarchy: “[t]he military, then, is the distilled embodiment of patriarchy; the militarization of society is the unchecked manifestation of patriarchy as the overt and explicit mode of governance.” These “structures and practices” are “embodied in the state,” form “the basic paradigm for the nation-state system,” and posit “security” as having the greatest military might. Wartime rape functions as the ultimate weapon to force women into submission to the war system that is nonetheless against their interests as

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304 Ibid., 32.
306 Ibid., 15. Emphasis is in the original.
a sex. Like Galtung, she subscribes to a critique of brainwashing that functions as a “coping device that enables the oppressed to survive by accepting…the values and world view of the oppressor.”

Here, we already have the initial groundwork for what will go on to become a global or transnational feminist movement against militarization. If only women, across state borders, could realize that true security in the most fundamental sense possible can only be achieved through the elimination of the military institution then true peace could be attained.

Reardon’s work comes out of a global movement towards women’s rights catalyzed by the United Nations declaration of 1975 as the “Year of the International Woman.” Women in Okinawa were organically forming a feminist movement and philosophy of their own stimulated by these global changes. To celebrate the “Decade of the International Woman,” Okinawan women joined in on the tenth year United Nations Conference in Nairobi, Kenya in 1985. Shortly after returning from this conference, Minamoto Tetsumi (Radio Okinawa producer), Takazato Suzuyo (Former Naha City Councilwoman), Miyagi Harumi (Women’s Historian) coordinated a yearly Unai Festival to celebrate women’s accomplishments, learn about women’s history, provide a space for grassroots groups concerned with gender, and address problems still looming in the future. Many of these same women went on to become part of Okinawan Women Act Against Military Violence (OWAAMV), established yet another decade later, immediately after their participation in the Beijing Women’s Conference in 1995.

As a product of the time, many Okinawan feminists integrated a critique of institutions in their protest of the military. While numerous Okinawans, in addition to Japanese and U.S. military affiliates, have not been reluctant to demonize the assailants as “monsters,” OWAAMV has been extremely careful not to individualize

307 Ibid., 47.
the problem, but instead address the military institution, and finally the state, as the ultimate location of power and responsibility. Since the most publicized rapes of 1995 and 2008 involved not only minors, but African-American men, the convergence of sexism and racism in the military has made any one-dimensional condemnation of the assailants problematic. Takazato recuperates the humanity of the assailants by transferring not the guilt as Weber via Nietzsche would have it, but as a corollary, the blame to the military institution that transforms them into killing machines. Regarding the 1995 case she writes the following.

…now there is much talk of racism against blacks. In their own country, they are probably very good sons and husbands, so I am sure that [the rape incident] was hard for their families to believe. In American society, discrimination against blacks is a very severe reality. However, no matter how much they are able to be everyday normal people in their own country, as soon as they turn into soldiers, their humanity changes. Within the inhuman organization of the military, there is also discrimination against blacks more severe than in normal society. For men like this, it is inevitable that they come to exercise violence in a most deplorable form towards an Other such as women in particular. Neither we, nor the local mass media made any mention of the fact that they were black nor did we know. I think the only way to eliminate discrimination against blacks is to eliminate the military altogether.³⁰⁸

³⁰⁸ Takazato Suzuyo 1996 Impaction No. 95. p. 17.

Takazato’s critique of the racism and classism present in the military institution echoes the anti-war movement that raged through Okinawa as the greatest outpost of the
Vietnam War by American, Japanese, and Okinawan activists alike. This era allowed feminists to tap into broader reaching analyses of institutional violence to enhance their global critique of the war system. Thus, different from Brownmiller’s gravitation toward feminist separatism, Reardon argues the advantage of a structural examination of the war system allows for the integration of multiple sites of institutional violence such as race, class, and nation that all converge at the site of war. Similarly, the “monster” that OWAAMV is after is not a cultural American, a racial Other, or the male sex, but the military institution itself. Although OWAAMV acknowledges the humanity, or rather the stripping of the humanity of the individual assailants, they nonetheless do not hesitate to push for punishment via the juridical scene of the law.

However, when the law is used to punish institutional violence, both victim and assailant are forced to appear as unified subjects before the law even though there is always an inevitable excess to which they fail to be reduced. Justice is achieved through first nationalizing subjects before the law when ironically the African-American male and Okinawan female are minorities that come together in the first place precisely because they are both placed in a compromised position by the mutually reinforcing U.S. and Japanese states. This is what Foucault has called the “boomerang effect” of colonialism. National identity is not merely constructed in the suzerain state, but African-Americans are manufactured as American national subjects in the colonial space of Okinawa and imported back to the U.S. In order to achieve “justice,” Okinawans as well must appear as Japanese national subjects in their interaction with the U.S. military, which is funded and enabled by the Japanese government under the auspices of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

In order to avoid misunderstanding, I must emphasize that it is both necessary to obtain legal consequences for militarized crime, and the evocation of its history is

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309 Reardon, Sexism and the War System, 70.
empirically accurate. However, the problem is not necessarily the failure of the law to work on behalf of Okinawa (i.e., extraterritoriality), nor is it the failure of the U.S. and Japan to “understand” Okinawa’s painful history (i.e., recognition). On the contrary, the very legal apparatus and modes of recognition that Okinawan activists/politicians argue for become the welcomed opportunities for the U.S. and Japan to diffuse Okinawa’s anger. American, Japanese, and conservative Okinawan politicians alike quickly recognized the dire need to contain resistance within legal channels so as to minimize any effect the incident might have on U.S. military’s realignment plans on Okinawa. By limiting and controlling the venues allocated to Okinawans to voice their protest, the grid of intelligibility that discursively produces power is tightened, made more efficient, and more formidable. Resistance is not only contained by limiting it to juridical terms, but by challenging the SOFA, it actually provides the opportunity for a sort of “resistance training” for the military and unwittingly strengthens the very terms upon which it is founded. This is what Foucault meant by the “tactical reversibility” of historico-political discourse that is studied, re-colonized, and re-appropriated by power: “Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power.”\(^\text{310}\) Resisting the monster conceived as a negative power inadvertently entangles Okinawans ever more deeply into a web of power through their own inertia of resistance.

OWAAMV’s critique of institutional violence is indeed powerful. By putting a framework of “structural violence” into place, countless individuals have been able to contextualize a personal struggle with militarized violence and raise it to the level of a collective dilemma that gains strength and courage in numbers. In a sense, OWAAMV has captured the negative moment of a deductive power that kills and rapes and have

added a feminist chapter to Okinawa’s long history of anti-military activism. In Foucault’s genealogy of the state however, sovereignty’s deductive power expressed through oppressive institutions is subsumed to a larger operation of productive power that takes the population as its object. The U.S. military as well, does not operate only on the level of institutional control of individual bodies through repressive techniques, but it also operates through regulatory apparatuses that seek to guarantee security of the population as a whole.

Biopower

The 19th century was marked with the emergence of a new element in historico-political discourse. This is the idea of the population that pushes Foucault far beyond working simply with the techniques of discipline central to institutions. Discipline never fully escaped the sovereign-subject relationship as Foucault illustrates with the idea of the panopticon in Discipline and Punish. Every individual is subjected to the all encompassing gaze of the sovereign to the extent that “we can say that the panopticon is the oldest dream of the oldest sovereign.”311 Discipline does not emerge from uniformity, but makes use of a multiplicity of individuals in a society toward a certain norm. Discipline does not prohibit but prevents and tends to everything to the last minute detail. Lastly, discipline codifies things into what is obligatory and forbidden. Discipline is always there to remind us that there is indeed such thing as “good,” “bad,” “normal” and “abnormal” behavior.312

Biopower, on the other hand, does not deal with discipline of individuals in institutions but rather the regulation of the population. Governments are no longer concerned with the individual subject, but with a population that has emerged as a new

312 Ibid., 44-47.
political actor with a set of its characteristics all to its own. In this way, biopower functions as a grand calculus of variables and dynamic physics concerned with the fluctuations and movements of life. No longer will the problem be simply how to put a stop to masturbation in school children, contain insanity in the mental hospital, or correct deviant bodies in the prison for the problem is not how to save individuals from their own evil raging within. Rather, the population is an element beyond good and evil; it is like an indifferent force of nature itself. Instead of eliminating phenomena targeted as evil in disciplinary techniques, biopower manipulates them in such a way that they do not pose problems for the population as a whole. In this way, the regulation of the population is an intricate balancing act between multiple variables in motion that Foucault terms a “progressive self-cancellation of phenomena by the phenomena themselves.”313 He states that “finding support in the reality of the phenomenon, and instead of trying to prevent it, making other elements of reality function in relation to it, in such a way that the phenomenon is canceled out.”314 Granted, certain sectors of the population may suffer as a result of some of the evils discipline seeks to curb. But so long as the population as a whole is kept in good health the main target of security of the population will obtain.

This crucial shift allows him to think his way out of older problems and extend his analyses. First, he revises his earlier writing on freedom and resistance. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault showed how children, soldiers, and prisoners are subjected to disciplinary techniques that at once restrict their behavior and incite them to clamor for freedom. The exercise of freedom as resistance to oppression in the liberalist tradition however is actually produced by the restrictive disciplinary techniques themselves.

313 Ibid., 66.
314 Ibid., 59.
Foucault revises this thesis by pointing out that freedom must now accommodate not only disciplinary power but now the pre-eminence of regulatory apparatuses. Freedom is no longer restricted to a disciplinary field of “exemptions and privileges attached to a person” but it is integrated into the regulatory apparatus to open up “the possibility of movement, change of place, and processes of circulation of both people and things.”\textsuperscript{315} All of these things guarantee mobility, \textit{i.e.}, the ability to move, transform, and adjust to the fluctuations in the population so as to give the individual a sense of security. Hence, Foucault states “freedom is nothing else but the correlative of the deployment of apparatuses of security.”\textsuperscript{316}

Freedom as resistance to institutions is but a moment in the freedom for the population as a whole to achieve greater security. Because the organizing logic for both versions of freedom is different, it is not necessarily contradictory that an individual can resist against institutions in one instance, and throw themselves behind a demand for greater security in the next. This is why there can be non-partisan opposition to the U.S. military institution motivated by completely opposite views of security.

Securing Okinawa for Miscegenation

With a sketch of disciplinary techniques and regulatory apparatuses in place, we are finally able to situate the two versions of security outlined in the beginning of this paper.

Anti-military activists argue out of an “ethics of conviction” for the complete elimination of military bases as the only way to achieve true security in the most fundamental sense possible. However, they are thrown into a situation where they at

\textsuperscript{315} Ibid., 48-49.
\textsuperscript{316} Ibid., 48.
once oppose the state and are forced through its legal channels to voice their grievances, thereby reinforcing the logic of the state itself. Their resistance is not only absorbed into biopower, but biopower actually feeds off of this resistance as the very inertia through which it magnifies itself. Herein lies the internal logic of biopower.

As Roberto Esposito writes, “these two effects of sense—positive and negative, preservative and destructive—finally find an internal articulation.” He continues, “This means that the negation doesn’t take the form of the violent subordination that power imposes on life from the outside, but rather is the intrinsically antinomic mode by which life preserves itself through power.” Power does not encroach upon life from the outside, dulling its vitality. On the contrary, power taps into life from within, and harnesses its energies of resistance against the negative in order to make itself stronger. Even though life resists against the negative in order to protect itself, the very life force itself paradoxically necessitates the negative in order to become strong. From this antinomy is born biopolitics in which politics seizes upon life’s magnification in the wake of the negative.

It is in this theoretical gap, between resistance against the external power over life and oppression generated though the internal power of life, that political forces launch their subtle attack positively cast as the guarantee of life of the population against anti-military activists who negatively focus on the destructive powers of the institution.

The most poignant example that comes to mind is Shimajiri Aiko (Democratic Party of Japan Minshutō) who is the first Japan-born representative to the National Diet (House of Councilors) elected from Okinawa prefecture in the special elections of 2007. Shimajiri replaced Itokazu Keiko (independent, and co-founder of OWAAVM)

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after she relinquished her seat to run for the prefectural gubernatorial election of 2006. Itokazu is a former peace education bus guide that attracts charismatic support in Okinawan politics as a fresh female face that women can relate to in their everyday lives. As it is well known, she lost to conservative Nakaima Hirota (LDP) in the 2006 gubernatorial election. Pursuant of Itokazu’s vacated seat, Shimajiri played down her Japanese origins, touted her husband’s Okinawan name, sported Okinawan kariyushi fashion, and even danced the celebratory Okinawan kachashi when she won the election. Passing herself off as a woman of Okinawa, she capitalized on the female vote built up by a long line of anti-military feminist politicians with her campaign slogan “change politics from the kitchen (daidokoro kara seiji wo kaeru).” By portraying herself as advocating “life instead of bases (kichiyori seikatsu),” she implicitly posed the following dichotomy: “if you oppose bases, you will die, if you elect me, I will give you life.” Hence, while she emphasized a platform for an improved environment for childcare and healthcare on one hand, then incumbent LDP ultra-nationalist Prime Minister Abe Shinzō extended his support with the knowledge that she would not be yet another Okinawan headache in the Japanese government’s move to build a new base in Henoko, Northern Okinawa. As soon as she was elected, the Japanese government commented, “Judging from Shimajiri’s policies, it seems that the people of [Okinawa] prefecture have finally come around to a realistic choice regarding the base problem.”318 In this way, Okinawa’s plea for a better life is translated into the will to accept new bases by the Japanese government.

I do not mean to suggest that Shimajiri openly campaigned for bases, because she did not. As stated earlier, Okinawa has consistently voiced opposition through the democratic process, and no politician can be elected in Okinawa on an openly pro-base platform. The point is that she never even had to resort to such draconian

measures because she realizes power can operate in a much more productive manner. Shimajiri has recognized the defunct nature of sovereign power and instead capitalizes on a new regulatory apparatus termed “governmentality.”

As Foucault illustrates, governing no longer takes place from above by a sovereign who enforces his will over his principality, thereby freeing him to concentrate on the more important external threats. Instead, governmentality tends to the internal management of what has emerged as a “society” characterized by a multiplicity of horizontal fighting that takes place within the state. Although the pre-eminence of governmentality was initially curbed by mercantilism and reason of the state (raison d’État), Foucault argues that it was the introduction of the population with a set of characteristics all to its own that unleashed the regulatory apparatus of governmentality. Similarly, Shimajiri is unconcerned with the individual struggle against the military institution, but rather, she is enabled through the introduction of the life of population as a whole that she vows to serve: “life instead of bases.” And if a long line of Okinawan female politicians have appealed to the everyday sensibility of women in their struggle against military bases, then Shimajiri will not oppose this discourse, but instead seek a “progressive self-cancellation of phenomena by the phenomena themselves” by neutralizing the anti-military edge to Okinawan feminist discourse in her own female led politics.

Shimajiri’s politics attaches itself to the very drive for the preservation of life ripped open by the peculiar trauma of suffering from negative militarized violence on one hand, and sheer fright of leaving the positive embrace of security the military offers on the other. In this way, governmentality is internal to the things it directs: “it is to be sought in the perfection, maximization, or intensification of the processes it directs, and the instruments of government will become diverse tactics rather than
laws.” Hence, although the Japanese government has appealed to the law to force bases on Okinawa as seen in the historic Ota case of 1996, Shimajiri exercises a form of power that does not need to exercise external force, but rather feeds on the life force of the population itself. It is in this way Wendy Brown contrasts Weber’s definition of the state as a “monopoly of violence” with Foucault’s governmentality as the rationality that “releases governments from the need to use physical violence.”

In the same way that Foucault rids governmentality of the ax of sovereignty, he radically denudes the police of its conventional definition as an explicit instrument of state violence. As with governmentality, apparatuses of security come forth at the breakup of feudal powers and the emergence of a newly competitive European state system marked by the treaty of Westphalia. No longer does the state have as its “ultimate vocation” expansion towards a “final unity” of Empire, but the Treaty of Westphalia ensured a “balance of Europe” that “meant the impossibility of the strongest state laying down the law to any other state.”

As with governmentality, when external threats are checked by the Treaty of Westphalia, states are given the opportunity to concentrate on internal affairs: “This maintenance of the relation of forces and development of the internal forces of each element, linking them together, is precisely what will later be called a mechanism of security.” Security is reinforced by new “military-diplomatic” techniques that tend to the equilibrium between states, and the police that tends to the internal order of states so all states can realize their full potential to the degree that no one state is ever

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320 Then incumbent governor Ota Masahide sided with approximately 3,000 landowners in refusing to sign land leases to the US military. However, Japan’s Supreme Court upheld the forced leasing policy in 1996.
323 Ibid., 290.
324 Ibid., 299.
325 Ibid., 296.
overtaken by another.

Precisely because anti-military activists have drawn international attention to militarized crime in Okinawa, conservative Japanese and Okinawan politicians along with U.S. military officials work to correct the imbalance between the local Okinawan prefectural police and a military policing of its own soldiers through a tightening of disciplinary measures with the signatory techniques of the police force: statistics of U.S. military personnel living off base and surveillance reinforcements including the proposal to set up cameras in Okinawan neighborhoods to monitor criminal activity. These techniques ensure a U.S.-Japan transpacific equilibrium that “function[s] as a sort of inter-state police or as right.”

Instead of focusing on police brutality, Foucault is interested in the productive functions of the police: to promote the “well-being” of the population, the “coexistence of men and circulation of goods,” and “communication.” While the U.S. military erected “sanitation stations” to curb sexually transmitted diseases, took advantage of the strong dollar to ensure a constant Okinawan labor supply (including sexual services), and established A-sign bars to facilitate “communication” between Okinawan women and U.S. military personnel, these one-sided techniques can no longer sustain the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Instead, the “well-being” of the entire Okinawan population, military and civilian, must be ensured. This is why Air Force Lt. Gen. Edward Rice dedicates himself to eliminating militarized crime in Okinawa. He certainly meant it when he “sent his heart out to the victim” of the 2008 rape, because if Okinawans are exposed to danger, the U.S. and Japan cannot sustain a happy and healthy labor force to sustain U.S. military bases in Okinawa. Sexual violence no longer pays as much as creating an environment for young women to

326 Ibid., 315.
327 Ibid., 335.
328 Ibid., 336.
safely sleep with their “good neighbors” under international protection. Protecting Okinawan civilians now becomes a problem of protecting the population that will labor and serve the needs of the U.S. military. Okinawa must be secured for miscegenation.

“The Tent Village of Garama”

Biopower does more than just work on preexisting bodies. Biopower creates bodies. Foucault’s discussion of the mentally ill posed as internal threats to the social body in his 1974-1975 lectures at the Collège de France, Abnormal, leads into his discussion of racism determined by the sexual reproduction of certain types of bodies that takes center stage in his post 1975 lectures on biopolitics. Below, I would like to turn to Nagadō Eikichi’s short story “The Tent Village of Garama” to show how biopower not only incorporates a flight from the negative in its productive expanse, but fuses itself into the living flesh bodies of the population through miscegenation.

“The Tent Village of Garama” was published in Shin Okinawa Bungaku one year after reversion in April 1973. The story takes place in an internment camp in the fictional Village of Garama nearly one year after the end of the Okinawan War in 1946. It is split into two sub-narratives that occur at the exact same time in different places within Garama: the murder of Haterma Kōkichi by Lieutenant McFarlen and Karimata Sayo’s birthing of a “carrot-top baby.”

Although the lieutenant has his corporal take Kōkichi’s body around the neighboring village, it is left unclaimed. The corporal buries the body without the knowledge that it belongs to the father of an elementary school aged boy named Takeru who lived with his father in a tent in a far corner of Garama. Kōkichi had left his son in the tent to search for food amongst U.S. military supplies. His fears of executing this dangerous mission are overcome by a confusion of “pro-American”
sentiments of awe for America’s virile embrace and the raw pangs of starvation. However, Kōkichi’s belief in America’s generosity is betrayed as the lieutenant looks upon the “horribly starving civilian” as a “potato worm” and shoots him to death.\(^{329}\)

Because Kōkichi promised his son Takeru to never leave the tent out of concern for his safety, Takeru has no way of knowing he should leave for help after his father goes missing, and dies of starvation after seven days of waiting in tragic desolation.

On the other corner of the corner of the village, Sayo gives birth to a “carrot-top baby” after three-nights and two-days of painful labor. Although her mother Gosei tried to hide all three of her daughters, she could not fight off the seven or eight blond G.I.s that sexually assaulted her daughter. Immediately after the child is born, Sayo is listless and wordless. Gosei drowns her grandchild and swears her other two daughters to secrecy. She throws the body in a dungaree sack, and takes her eight-year old son Ryōhei along to dispose of it on the outskirts of the village near the Pacific Ocean.

Gosei tells Ryōhei that they are going to dispose the body of the only dog to survive the war, Buchi. But just as Gosei digs a ditch wide and deep enough for the body, Ryōhei notices a cry from the sack, and misrecognizes the baby as his “younger brother.” He importunes his mother to keep his “younger brother.”

The two narratives travel paths through the village, and are woven into one at the end as the ditch dug for the “carrot-top baby” that is allowed to live is used as the same ditch in which Takeru is buried after he is allowed to die.

It is tempting to read the story as a national allegory: Okinawan territory is invaded (Sayo is raped) and the Okinawan man is castrated (Eikichi is squished like a limp “potato worm” by the virile Americans he admires). All in all, the deflowering of occupied woman can be read as an allegory for the usurpation of sovereignty. Indeed

\(^{329}\) Nagadô Eikichi, “Garama no tento mura” [In the tent village of Garama], Shin Okinawa Bungaku [New Okinawan Literature], vol. 24 (1973): 106.
Michael Molasky has accused Okinawan male authors of playing up sexual violence in order to protest a depravation of sovereignty represented in the literary text as castration. However, with the exception of Ōshiro Tatsuhiro’s well-known *Cocktail Party* (1967) which Molasky largely bases his analysis on, rape did not often appear in Okinawan literary texts until after the 1972 reversion which is out of his analytic scope, and more specifically, after the 1995 incident. Molasky’s problem is that he is still wed to a conception of sovereignty as a negative power that comes crashing down from without. By linking sovereignty with patriarchy as a gendered “cold monster,” he is able to argue for the liberation of Japanese/Okinawan women from both nationalism and patriarchy (conceived as their freedom to access American men) who fight against castrated men desperate to regain their sovereignty.

In order to avoid such impoverished readings of Okinawan literature, an examination of the politics of metaphor in relation to both sovereignty and biopolitics through Nietzsche is useful here. In “Truth and Lies in a Non-moral Sense,” Nietzsche describes the repetitive use of “conventional metaphor” as an instrument that allows us to forget the precarious link between cause and effect. Causality is a mere fiction, and metaphor is the rhetorical device that allows for the emergence of a causal agent who can will their effects onto the world. In order to escape the negative force of the unknown, humans rely on metaphor, and hence, metaphor becomes an instrument that facilitates *ressentiment* and bad conscience. We insist that the fictional is real, and thereby repress the function of the metaphor and with it, a confrontation of our own vulnerability as beings that live helplessly in a world of uncertainty.

When metaphor or allegory is used to read literature, a bodily violation for example comes to be read as an infringement of political sovereignty. In this way,

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metaphor works to mobilize literature into the service of politics conceived in its institutional sense, where representations of sexual violence serve as ammunition for political protest against extraterritoriality. But when metaphor is used to facilitate politics in its institutional sense to recuperate sovereignty, we end up with the same problems of the institution that serves as protection from individual vulnerability discussed earlier. Because this vulnerability is not confronted, and the individual is not challenged to grow stronger, the institution becomes an oppressive force that enables slow decay of the very subjects it is designed to protect—that “cold monster” that Foucault criticized so harshly.

While recognizing Nietzsche’s limitation, Roberto Esposito nonetheless emphasizes his influence on Foucault’s biopolitics, and in fact attempts to reread biopolitics through a paradigm of immunization by returning to Nietzsche’s texts. There he notes another level to Nietzsche’s text, namely the point where his constant use of physiological, biological, and naturalistic analogies or metaphors cease to hold their rhetorical function and become effectual.

…the absolute originality of the Nietzschean text resides in the transferral of the relation between state and body from the classical level of analogy or metaphor, in which the ancient and modern tradition positions it, to that of an effectual reality: no politics exists other than that of bodies, conducted on bodies, through bodies. In this sense, one can rightly say that physiology, which Nietzsche never detaches from psychology, is the very same material of politics. It is its pulsating body.331

331 Esposito, Bios: Biopolitics and Philosophy, 84.
When power is conceived as merely an external force, congealed in the institution that is wielded onto individuals, metaphor holds. But metaphor breaks down when power is generated from within life itself. And of course, by life, we mean hear actual living bodies: politics is “its pulsating body.”

With Nietzsche’s help, we can frame Nagadō’s story in a biopolitical context. First, as the title suggests, the story takes place in an internment camp. Wounded or captured Okinawans from the south and Okinawans who surrendered from the north flood a village of 500 to 20,000 in a matter of three months. The Okinawa as they once knew it is destroyed, and they engage in a new relationship with the terrain geographically defined by the U.S. military establishment. As potential threats, they are put under constant surveillance, and Japanese imperial soldiers are separated from their Okinawan families. But simultaneously as potential laborers for the U.S. military, they are incorporated into the folds of the military’s power through the care extended to them. Their health is managed, as they given immunization shots, powdered with pest killing DDT, and distributed food, clothing, and household items. The co-presence of power, in both negative and positive extremes, captures the essence of the internment camp as a biopolitical space par excellence.

The focus on the internment camp as a space lacking in sovereignty does not merely work on the level of illustrating how Okinawans were violated by an external power. The object of the internment camp is not merely to extract resources from the land and bodies. Rather, it is to introduce to the bodies under its care a completely new physical sensibility. This is the physical sense that their bodies are now part of a living continuum of the species life of the population that will be cared for by the U.S. military as a pastor cares for his sheep. They are introduced to a “technology of the

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332 Nagadō Eikichi, “Garama no tento mura” [In the tent village of Garama], Shin Okinawa Bungaku [New Okinawan Literature], 109.
333 Ibid., 113.
self” in which they must develop a new relationship to their own bodies in a way that they both understand themselves as objects of care but also subjects that attempt to thrive within it.

This transformation in which the individual recognizes themselves as an object of the population and acts as a subject within it is precisely what Foucault meant by pastoral power, the first regulatory apparatus completed by the governmentality and police trinity that works in the service biopower. This transformation cannot come forth anymore forcefully than it does under the sign of sex which is the “means of access both to life of the body and the life of the species.” 334 In the “body-organism-discipline-institutions” series, disciplinary techniques work on making bodies fit for institutional manipulation; in the “population-biological processes-regulatory mechanisms-State” series, biopower works on regulating the biological processes of bodies as connected to the species life of populations. 335 It is sex which lies at the cross roads of both:

On the one hand, sexuality, being an eminently corporeal mode of behavior, is a matter for individualizing disciplinary controls that take the form of permanent surveillance…but because it also has procreative effects, sexuality is also inscribed, takes effect, in broad biological processes that concern not the bodies of individuals but the element, the multiple unity of the population. Sexuality exists at the point where body and population meet. And so it is a matter for discipline, but also a matter for regularization. 336

336 Ibid., 251-252.
“Because of its procreative effects” sexuality becomes the prime site through which bodies encounter the crisis of how to cope with its new relationship to itself as part of the species population. This is why in the tent Village of Garama, Sayo’s birthing occupies the central crisis of the story.

Sayo’s rape is not merely the problem of the external violation of her body or will like a territory’s sovereignty is violated by invading forces. Rather her forced pregnancy presents the dilemma of how her birthing capacities are transformed into a vehicle for the biopolitical production of the life-species of the population. Racial genocide is not achieved through enemy to enemy combat as is conceived in the old version of sovereignty, but it is programmed into the very reproductive faculties of the female body itself. Sayo is impregnated with racial genocide. Power literally works through biology: “it is no longer the enemy that makes an attempt on life from the outside, but the enemy is now life’s own propulsive force.”

This means the baby is a seed of destruction that will grow up only to remind Okinawans of their racial inferiority, aid in the racial domination and eventual annihilation of Okinawans, and some day come to be the objects of admiration of their inferior counterparts when domination is complete. This is exactly what is meant by “genocidal rape” which is a eugenics tactic used in Yugoslavia and Rwanda to threaten an inferior race with genocidal extinction through the procreative act of birth.

Once the baby is perceived as a biological threat, a sort of virus programmed to wipe out the Okinawan population, it initially registers in Gosei’s mind that it must be exterminated. Posed as a biological threat, the baby exposes her to a new form of vulnerability which is the possibility that not only her daughter’s reproductive capacities, but also the community’s (i.e., life species) ability to reproduce itself will compromised—something she could never have even imaged until then. Her initial

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way of coping with the biological threat is to sanitize it, thereby perfectly illustrating what Foucault meant by racism defined as “the break between what must live and what must die.” The “elimination of the biological threat” is the only way to secure the life of her daughter. Life thrives off of death.

After drowning the baby, Gosei tries to convince both herself and her eight-year-old son that it is a dead dog that they must dispose of. In this way, she argues with Ryōhei, too young to understand the implications of the birth, when he discovers the mass in the sack is in fact a human.

“Ma, isn’t that a human baby? Ma, you gave birth to him?”

“Foolish child, didn’t I tell you it was a dog? Here, take a look...”

She quickly stuffed the contents back into the bag in a way that seemed to contradict the words coming out of her mouth. Ryōhei looked at her horrific face juxtaposed against the hand that stuffed the contents back. In that instance, Ryōhei instinctively understood what was going on.

“Ma, you’re going to kill my younger brother.”

As soon as he came to this realization, Ryōhei jumped for his mother’s hand and clung to her like a real dog.

“Why are you going to kill him? Why kill him? Isn’t he our younger brother?....”

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339 Ibid., 256.
“I told you it was a dog. Don’t you get it? Didn’t I say it was a red dog?”

“No! He’s human! No! I want a younger brother for us!”

“It’s a dog. A thieving dog. The child of a thieving dog. A thieving dog that stole its way into the womb of someone’s daughter.”

“Liar! Ma’s a liar!”

Gosei’s language slips between “dog,” “red dog,” “thieving dog,” and “child of a thieving dog.” On the first level, Gosei flat out lies about the contents of the sack. However, she secondly attempts to tell the truth to her son by speaking in metaphors: when she says the baby in the sack is a dog, she means it in the sense of a “thieving dog” that has “stole its way into the womb of someone’s daughter.” She is attempting to explain to Ryōhei that it is a child of rape in the sack that must die. On a third level however, the function of metaphor as an instrument of substitution starts to break down as she is unclear if the “thieving dog” can stand in for the “child of a thieving dog” as two qualitatively different entities, or if father and son are one and the same biological continuum. Here the epistemological dimension of truth and lie folds at confrontation with the ontological question “What is it/he?” Is it one and the same as its father, and hence a nonhuman threat which must be exterminated, or is he a qualitatively different entity that cannot be reduced to his father (i.e., a human)? Ryōhei’s charge that his mother is a liar seems to resonate on both epistemological and ontological levels. The contents of the sack is not a dog nor is it a mere extension of its father’s violence which must be exterminated—“He’s human!”
As soon as Gosei allows herself to reach into the sack and embrace the naked baby, the warmth of both of their bodies bonding together reinvigorates Gosei’s maternal experience of raising Sayo and Ryōhei. The child is allowed to “let live.”

However, this is not the happy ending of the story. While the “carrot-top baby” is allowed to “let live,” Takeru at the other corner of the village is quietly and slowly allowed to “let die” without notice. How is it possible to understand the relationship between what is allowed to “let live” and what is allowed to “let die”?

Gosei has not only left herself exposed, but her entire family and species being to a potential threat. But whereas vulnerability in Nietzsche’s moral philosophy immediately signifies a violent recoiling at the threat of death into the throws of ressentiment or bad conscience, she ultimately comes to embrace it as the indeterminate promise of birth. Gosei moves from morality, predicated on a flight from vulnerability, to ethical reflection in which she attempts to tend to a new sense of self by embracing vulnerability as part of the human condition. This is a gamble that puts her at “extreme risk” as Esposito explains in his recuperation of Nietzsche’s project.

The greatest danger that the community faces is therefore its own preventive withdrawal from danger. Once immunized, the community doesn’t run any risk of wounding, but it is precisely for this reason that it seals itself off blocking from within any possibility of relation with the outside and therefore any possibility of growth…the result is that the community loses its own self-generating potential…It is precisely here in the clench of this extreme risk, that the point of productive conjunction between generation and innovation is produced.340

It is understandable how Gosei could not initially afford to take this “extreme risk.” Indeed, her act of attempted infanticide stands amongst the countless abortions that actually did/do take place in Okinawa by women like Sayo. The actions of these women must be understood as a struggle for survival. On the other hand, by sanitizing the threat, Gosei also risks reinforcing the genocidal force of biopower in the name of resisting against it for it still circulates through the logic of immunization. Through this particular form of resistance, she unwittingly reinforces the very mechanism of “domination and subjugation” in which she not only becomes an object of the species population under U.S. military control, but a self-generating subject of its power force, albeit in negative form.

Gosei’s difficult choice attests to the negative, thanatopolitical moment of biopolitics that finds its most extreme expression in racial genocide. Yet, what is even more troubling is the fact that it exists in a continuum of the life giving protection, security, and care of biopower. Hence, Gosei’s initial attempt to exterminate an Amerasian should not be confused with the solely destructive power of sovereignty, of which, if we purge ourselves completely, can finally emerge as good human beings. The attempted extermination is part of a productive power in which the greater killing of internal threats to the social body of the population supposedly guarantees a better life for all.

Takeru’s father Kōkichi in fact finds himself gambling at the opposite end of the continuum where he attempts to tap into the positive life giving powers of security. Split between the raw pangs of hunger and out of concern for his son, Kōkichi throws himself into the generous embrace of the U.S. military. He is not unlike conservative Okinawans that attempt to tend to the messy immediate realities of the population by maximizing Okinawa’s “security” within an inevitable relationship with giants.
However, this also poses an “extreme risk” which is “the risk of not being able to face new risks.”\textsuperscript{341} Always dependent on either the U.S. military or Japanese government for their security, Okinawans remain in a relationship with the self in which the only way of dealing with vulnerability is to attempt to purge it from its being. The risk of not taking the “extreme risk” not only leads to Kōkichi’s own death, but also the slow death of his only surviving child. Takeru is so frightened of exposing himself to the dangers of the outside world because of his father’s concern for his security that he ends up literally decaying in the tent enveloped in his protection.

Conclusion

In Chapter 6, I problematized situating all Okinawan women, from victims of sexual violence to partners in romantic relationships with U.S. military personnel within the logic structural violence because it forecloses their will to power—the very ground from which resistance can be sowed. As a predetermined causal effect, the living empirical “evidence” of this victimization, structural violence critiques also foreclose the presence of a will to power needed for Amerasians to attribute original meaning to their lives.

By introducing the dimension of biopower in this chapter, I illustrated how this will to power, articulated here as the force of life, is actually appropriated by regulatory apparatuses. Hence, when the drive towards greater security for the population is reduced to false consciousness, a theoretical blind spot is created. The transition from the negative face of militarized brutality to the positive embrace of biopower cannot be accounted for by merely mobilizing a gallery of horrors from Okinawa’s history or focusing on sporadic acts of violence. Rather, I tried to articulate a logic of co-presence between negative and positive power, in which the positive not

\textsuperscript{341} Ibid., 191.
only absorbs but actually draws its inertia from the negative. I don’t think the question is, how is it possible to resist the oppression of violent institutions, but perhaps, how is it possible to resist the oppression of being cared for by the state?

By returning to the most negative moment possible in Okinawan history--genocidal rape by the U.S. military and Okinawan’s attempt to exterminate this racial threat from the social body, my intention was illustrate the negative moment of biopower that animates the increasing drive towards security in Okinawa. Today, much talk has been made of accepting Amerasians through multiculturalism and legal advances have been made to guarantee Amerasians citizenship, child support, and equal education. These measures are all necessary. On the same token however, Okinawa has only been secured for miscegenation. The same genocidal tendencies lurk beneath the inviting surface of tolerance and security. The only way Amerasians have been allowed to thrive is by embracing their racial superiority (of which not all Amerasians posses because not all are white)—the very threat Gosei attempted to sanitize in drowning her grandson. It is in this sense that the glamorous promise of Amerasian life continues to be seeped in death.
CONCLUSION

My ambition was to make this an exhaustive collection of documents pertaining to Amerasians. While I think my dissertation succeeded in pulling together one of the most comprehensive collections of data on the subject in both English and Japanese, it could benefit more from more archival research in the National Archives in Washington, D.C. and in the local city halls (shiyakusho) in Okinawa.

The genealogical approach of discourse analysis provided me with a theoretical frame that ultimately developed into a full-fledged study of biopolitics. I countered the “repressive hypothesis” of power, sexuality, and the state with a productive notion of biopower. Like Foucault, my explorations with biopower encountered some difficult theoretical knots. In particular, I found it difficult to articulate the relationship between power in its negative mode and power in its productive mode without reproducing a rigid structural ontology such as that found in Agamben or Bataille. I attempted to avoid this problem through a discursive reading of history in the spirit of Foucault, and a performative reading of literature in the spirit of Judith Butler and Tomiyama Ichirô. Although biopower has been developed widely from theorists such as Agamben, Butler, Esposito and Negri/Hardt, each differ in their attempt to articulate the relationship between the thanatopolitical mode and biopolitical mode of power. I will need to mature more as a theorist to work out these complications in my own original way.

I attempted to answer the bottom-line conundrum in Amerasian identity: How is it possible to exist in the world when born purportedly as a seed of destruction of your mother’s race? Furthermore, how is it possible to come out into the public sphere when your identity has been exploited for this purported position? On one hand, it is difficult for Amerasians to simply ignore the effects of structural violence of the U.S.
military’s sexual dominance over the Okinawan people because often times, they are the first to feel it. On the other hand, to subscribe to the idea that Amerasians, and their mothers, are merely victims robbed of any agency whatsoever may be instrumental in waging a political claim against power, but unwittingly forecloses their ability to intervene in the discursive formation that assaults them. Instead of positing the will as something that is robbed (as in sexual violence or extraterritoriality) or restored as the prize of a valiant resistance, I attempted to articulate a will to power that dares to understand “determined victims” as predicated by agency, and “free willing agents” as rebounding from the fear of victimhood.

In my treatment of Tanaka Midori’s *My Distant Specter of a Father*, I showed how she was driven to utter hopelessness, defeat, and near suicide from her failure to fully identify with either pole. Instead of repressing the shuffling, wavering, and contradictions in her text, I embraced them as moments where she struggled to develop a different kind of technology of the self as a member of a “people in exile.” This is a methodology in which even moments of so-called “complicity” of the starving whom seek to satisfy their appetite with food of the oppressor are read as multivalent. This is not necessarily an endorsement for seeking refuge in the embrace of the oppressor, but rather, the first step in dealing with the enormous complexities of displaced peoples in a displaced island such as Okinawan Amerasians who seek security precisely because they are violently denied it.

Admittedly, opening up the possibility for this kind of a reading is risky. In Nagadō Eikichi’s “Tent Village of Garama,” I showed how the characters attempted to deal with risk. On one hand, when faced with the assault of genocidal rape, the Okinawan community may have no choice but to violently react to eliminate the “threat” which is the Amerasian in acts of preventive birth (abortion) or post-birth (infanticide). Without advocating or even condoning this act of Amerasian genocide, it
is possible to understand this reaction as a reasonable one that is a moment in the will to survive. At the same time, Gosei realizes that to accept her “carrot top” grandson as a “threat” unwittingly reinforces the subjective technology in which Okinawans can only emerge as humans by seeking the refuge of sovereignty as dictated by the nation-state form. Instead, she takes a “risk” in allowing her grandson to survive, and opens herself up to a radical vulnerability. This “risk” is neither correct nor incorrect, but rather is the condition of possibility for her very humanity.

This dissertation attempted to conduct a historical and literary discourse analysis of Amerasians in Okinawa from 1945 to 2000. As such, it is not intended to act as a tool of real politics to end discrimination of Amerasians, nor am I confident in my abilities to effect immediate political change. Instead, it is an attempt to think about hope of children born to a totally defeated people.

As Ifa Fuyū stated, “Even if they are able to hope that their descendents will come to have this capacity in the future, they themselves are in no position to command their descendents to be in possession of it…The only choice Okinawans have is to throw themselves before the will of their descendents after them.” Sixty years later after Ifa’s final words, I think Okinawa’s situation has changed little. While biopower harnesses the very will to survive as the channels through which it circulates, it may also be through the very will to survive that the children of a totally defeated people are able to intervene with power through a new articulation to the meaning of their lives. As Tanaka Midori wrote, “I must nevertheless endeavor to live iza ikimeyamo.”
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